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Abstract 
Jurisdictions around the world are increasingly considering the utility of rights-based 
approaches to environmental protection, a trend which has been termed the ‘environmental 
rights revolution’. Although Australia has not embraced this global trend, it is fortunately 
placed to learn from the experience of other jurisdictions which have already begun to 
integrate versions of these concepts into their legal systems. The aim of this thesis is to 
consider the potential utility of one particular rights-based approach within the Australian 
environmental protection context. The thesis seeks to explore whether legal recognition of 
the human right to a healthy environment at the international level and at the Australian 
domestic level might offer some potential benefits for environmental protection (hereafter 
‘the right’). In order to explore the possible realisation of these general benefits in a specific 
environmental protection context, the thesis conducts a case study on Australian water 
resources management.  
Firstly, it outlines the nature of existing approaches to environmental protection in Australia, 
in order to identify the challenges currently facing environmental protection, and to ascertain 
whether there is room for the adoption of new approaches. It then seeks to explain why 
Australia has failed to embrace rights-based approaches as a possible means of addressing 
environmental protection. Having identified various potential rights-based approaches 
which Australia could adopt, the analysis concentrates on one particular rights-based 
approach, namely, legal recognition of the human right to a healthy environment. The legal 
status of the right at international law is considered, concluding that the right may be 
interpreted as an implied right under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (‘ICESCR’). 1  It is noted that as the right has yet to receive explicit 
recognition under the Covenant, it is not yet possible to determine the precise content of the 
right and the obligations it imposes on state parties. Despite this, it is argued that it is possible 
to identify a number of potential benefits for environmental protection in Australia 
associated with international legal recognition of the right. Specifically, increased scrutiny 
of Australia’s environmental protection performance, the opportunity to learn from 
international experiences with implementation of the right, and the facilitation of comparison 
1 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 
993 UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 January 1976). 
iv 
against an international standard. The potential realisation of these benefits in the case study 
context of Australian water resources management is discussed. A number of limitations 
associated with international legal recognition of the right for environmental protection are 
outlined, including the fact that the obligations imposed by the right may be largely 
duplicative of existing international environmental law obligations, and the Australian 
Government’s human rights record in relation to rights recognised at the international level 
which are not recognised under domestic legislation.  
Options for domestic legal recognition of the right are then outlined, explaining that there 
are constitutional and legislative options for recognition in Australia. A set of potential 
benefits for environmental protection associated with domestic recognition of the right in 
other jurisdictions is explored, in order to ascertain whether realisation of these benefits in 
the Australian context would constitute benefits for environmental protection according to 
the definition adopted by the thesis. These benefits include increased prioritisation of 
environmental protection considerations in government decision-making, and increased 
avenues to bring legal actions in the interests of environmental protection. As it is concluded 
that the identified benefits would be considered benefits if they could be realised in the 
Australian context, Chapters Six and Seven discuss the potential realisation of these benefits 
under specific forms of constitutional and legislative recognition.  
The case study of Australian water resources management is utilised to demonstrate the 
potential operation of these benefits in a specific environmental protection context. It is 
argued that although both forms of recognition are unlikely to occur in the near future, 
legislative recognition of the right is more likely to be accepted than constitutional 
recognition. Having evaluated a range of possible legislative recognition options, it is argued 
that the most preferable form of recognition is recognition of an independent human right to 
a healthy environment in the context of a broader statutory bill of rights based on the 
dialogue model at both the Commonwealth and state/territory levels. It is argued that 
recognition of the right through this form of recognition may be a potentially useful, albeit 
limited, tool for environmental protection in Australia.  
v 
The limitations of the right as a tool for environmental protection are outlined, in particular 
the limitations associated with the form of recognition, the nature and content of the right, 
and the social and political context in which it must operate. It is concluded that whilst the 
right may have a potentially useful operation as a tool for environmental protection in 
Australia, its general utility should not be overstated. This is due partly to the inherently 
limited nature of the right as a tool for environmental protection, and partly to the limited 
scope of the thesis research. It is explained that future research is necessary to ascertain 
further potential benefits associated with recognition of the right in Australia, including 
consideration of the right’s potential operation in specific environmental protection contexts. 
However, it is explained that this cannot occur until the normative content of the right is 
authoritatively outlined, as only then will it be possible to consider the potential impact of 
the right at a more specific level. It is hoped that the research will contribute to a national 
discussion regarding the adequacy of traditional legal and regulatory approaches to 
environmental protection, and to a broader international discussion concerning the utility of 
rights-based approaches to environmental protection.   
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Since the creation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights after the Second World 
War, ‘rights talk’ has pervaded moral, political and legal discourse as the universal language 
in which the basic freedoms and duties of humanity should be expressed. The Declaration 
sought to recognise and protect the ‘inherent dignity’ and ‘equal and inalienable rights of all 
members of the human family’, as a reaction to the devastation experienced over the course 
of the World Wars.1 In its willingness to recognise the importance of adherence to the rule 
of law, the achievement of equality and the ‘dignity and worth of the human person’ it was 
a landmark agreement.2  
However, the drafters never intended to comprehensively elucidate the entire body of rights 
possessed by members of the human species. Of the thirty articles and preamble that make 
up the Declaration, nowhere is a right to a healthy environment directly mentioned. Although 
the Declaration recognises the right to life and the right to a standard of living adequate for 
health, it fails to explicitly recognise a fundamental pre-condition for the achievement of 
these rights, namely, a healthy natural environment. In light of this, it is unsurprising that 
the relationship between human rights and the environment has increasingly attracted 
attention in both the human rights and environmental law communities.1  
Initially, this interest was of a largely academic nature, inviting consideration of the nature 
of the relationship between human rights law and environmental protection, as well as the 
possible existence of environmental rights, such as the human right to a healthy environment. 
However, as noted by Boyd, in recent years the discussion has begun to transcend the realms 
of theory into a consideration of whether, and to what extent, human rights can be practically 
utilised as a means of achieving environmental protection.2 At the international, national and 
1 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA res. 217A (III), UN GAOR, 3rd sess, 183rd plen mtg, UN Doc 
A/810 (10 December 1948) 71.  
2 Ibid. 
1 See generally Donald K Anton and Dinah L Shelton, Environmental Protection and Human Rights 
(Cambridge University Press, 2011).  
2 David R Boyd, The Environmental Rights Revolution: A Global Study of Constitutions, Human Rights and 
the Environment (UBC Press, 2012), 3.  
2 
 
local levels, human rights approaches to environmental protection are increasingly being 
implemented, raising important questions about their impact on legal systems and their 
ability to assist in addressing the global decline in environmental health. As one of the 
nations which has thus far eschewed formal recognition of environmental rights, Australia 
provides an ideal case study to explore the potential impact of environmental rights 
recognition upon an already advanced system of environmental protection and natural 
resources management. Australia holds the (perhaps dubious) distinction of being the only 
democratic nation without a national bill of rights.3 It is therefore unsurprising to note that 
Australia is one of only fifteen nations that does ‘not yet recognize that their citizens possess 
a legal right to a healthy environment’.4 Similarly, Australia is yet to recognise the human 
right to water, or the rights of non-human animals and environmental entities.5 Accordingly, 
an important question to consider is why Australia has failed to embrace rights-based 
approaches to environmental protection and management, and whether and to what extent 
these approaches may be of some utility in the Australian context. Countries around the 
world have begun to integrate versions of the human right to a healthy environment into their 
constitutions, laws, policies and political rhetoric, and Australia is well placed to learn from 
this experience in order to make an informed decision about whether it should join the 
‘environmental rights revolution’. It is integral that this decision is informed by considered 
analysis and discussion of the rationale, necessity and desirability of legal recognition.  
 
The aim of this thesis is to consider the potential utility of one particular rights-based 
approach within the Australian environmental protection context. The thesis seeks to explore 
whether legal recognition of the human right to a healthy environment at the international 
level and at the Australian domestic level may be capable of offering benefits for 
environmental protection (hereafter ‘the right’ or ‘HRTHE’). As it is not possible to consider 
the right’s potential impact on all aspects of environmental protection in Australia, in order 
to explore the research question in a specific environmental protection context, the thesis 
conducts a case study on the right’s potential impact on the protection and management of 
water resources, particularly in the Murray-Darling Basin (‘MDB’).   
                                                          
3 Australian Human Rights Commission, How are Human Rights Protected in Australian Law? 
<https://www.humanrights.gov.au/how-are-human-rights-protected-australian-law>. 
4 Boyd, above n 2, 48.  
5 See generally Meg Good, 'Implementing the Human Right to Water in Australia' (2011) 30 (2) University of 
Tasmania Law Review 107.  
3 
 
If the human right to a healthy environment receives legal recognition in Australia, water 
management is one of the main areas it may affect. Accordingly, water management has 
been selected as the case study for assessing the potential impacts of legal recognition on 
environmental protection. As the world’s driest inhabited continent, one of the key 
environmental challenges facing Australia is the management of the nation’s precious water 
resources. Questions about who and what should be able to use, control and impact on water 
will only increase in importance over the next fifty years as Australia faces the dual 
challenges of global warming and global population growth. At present, the laws and 
policies which govern Australian water management do not incorporate an explicitly rights-
based approach. Rather, they are grounded in the theory and practice of property law, often 
characterising rights to water in proprietary terms.6 Indeed, one of the major reforms in water 
law over the past few decades was the facilitation of trade in water rights, enabled by the 
separation of land and water title.7  
 
For the above reasons, exploring the potential implications of legal recognition of the right 
on Australia’s legal and policy framework for protecting water resources may help to 
provide a useful indication of how recognition of the right may impact on environmental 
protection more generally. The MDB has been selected as a specific case study area within 
this context, as it is Australia’s largest river system which has attracted significant scholarly 
and political debate. As the focus of Australia’s principal water law and policy reforms, the 
Basin has been subject to a range of environmental protection approaches. Accordingly, it 
is useful to consider how alternative environmental protection approaches may operate 
within this existing framework.  
 
The thesis ultimately concludes that legal recognition of the HRTHE in Australia may offer 
potential benefits for environmental protection. Characterising environmental protection as 
a fundamental human interest deserving of protection by a right may help strengthen calls 
for improved environmental protection, and the intergenerational aspects of the right may 
encourage focus on consideration of the impacts of current practices on the enjoyment of the 
right by future generations. The thesis concludes that although the right is an inherently 
limited tool for environmental protection, legal recognition may increase consideration and 
                                                          
6 See generally, Michael McKenzie, ‘Water Rights in NSW: Properly Property?’ (2009) 31 Sydney Law 
Review 443.  
7 Ibid 444.  
4 
 
prioritisation of environmental protection considerations in government decision-making 




1.2 Research question 
This thesis aims to address the following overarching research question:  
Could international and/or domestic legal recognition of the human right to a healthy 
environment offer any potential benefits for environmental protection in Australia? 
In order to provide a response to the key aspects of the question, the thesis has been designed 
to answer the following sub-questions: 
1. Legal recognition 
How could the human right to a healthy environment be recognised at the 
international level and in Australia’s domestic laws, and what are the most preferable 
forms of recognition?  
2. Benefits for environmental protection 
What are some general potential benefits for Australian environmental protection 
associated with international and domestic legal recognition of the right? How could 
these benefits for environmental protection be realised through the identified 
preferable forms of legal recognition? To demonstrate the potential realisation of 
these benefits in a specific environmental protection context, how could these 
benefits be realised in the Australian water management context? 
 
As the research question seeks to explore the extent to which legal recognition of the right 
may offer ‘benefits’ for environmental protection in Australia, it is necessary to define what 
may be conceived of as a ‘benefit’. For the purposes of this thesis, a benefit for 
environmental protection is defined as a consequence of legal recognition which assists in 
the achievement of ecologically sustainable development (‘ESD’), and addresses challenges 





1.3 Contribution to the literature 
Three main bodies of literature were reviewed in order to scope the thesis question; the 
literature addressing human rights and the environment, Australian environmental law, and 
Australian water law, policy and management. Firstly, the ‘human rights and the 
environment’ literature was considered. Due to the thesis’ focus, particular consideration 
was devoted to the scholarship pertaining to the human right to a healthy environment. It 
was identified that whilst significant theoretical discussion has been devoted to the concept, 
there is a ‘gap’ in the literature in relation to analysis of the practical implementation of 
environmental rights-based approaches. 8  A corresponding gap was identified in the 
Australian environmental law literature, which contains minimal discussion of the potential 
application of rights-based approaches to environmental protection in the Australian context. 
Similarly, relatively little scholarly attention has focussed on the application of rights-based 
approaches to environmental protection in the specific context of Australian water resources 
law and management.  
 
Accordingly, the thesis is situated within various bodies of legal scholarship, contributing to 
three main areas for further development. The first area for further research concerns 
practical implementation of rights-based approaches to environmental protection. Boyd has 
outlined a number of ‘priorities for future research’ in this regard.9 In particular, he has 
called for research exploring the reasons why common law legal systems have been more 
reluctant to recognise the HRTHE as compared to civil law legal systems.10 He also argues 
that an ‘investigation into the extent and effectiveness of the right to a healthy environment 
when recognized in subnational constitutions or regular legislation would be a useful 
addition to the field.’11 This thesis attempts to contribute to both of these priority research 
areas, as it explores the possible factors contributing to Australia’s reluctance to join the 
environmental rights revolution (a common law legal system), and evaluates the potential 
impact of legislative recognition of the right.  
 
The second area for further research concerns the application of rights-based approaches to 
environmental protection in Australia. The research aims to contribute to this gap in the 
                                                          
8 Amanda Cahill-Ripley, The Human Right to Water and its Application in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories (Routledge, 2011) 3. 
9 Boyd, above n 2, 286. 
10 Ibid 288. 
11 Ibid 290.  
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literature by providing an evaluation of the potential utility of one particular rights-based 
approach for environmental protection in the Australian context. The thesis aims to identify 
whether legal recognition of the human right to a healthy environment in Australia may 
potentially be capable of providing some general benefits for environmental protection. Only 
a limited number of commentators have sought to directly consider the question of whether 
Australia should consider recognition of environmental rights as a tool for environmental 
protection.12 Accordingly, this thesis seeks to make a useful contribution to the existing 
literature by engaging in an evaluation of how the right to a healthy environment may be 
practically implemented in Australia. Finally, the thesis contributes to the identified gap in 
the literature relating to the application of rights-based approaches to environmental 
protection in the Australian water management context. At present, the water law and policy 
literature has devoted minimal attention to the possible benefits that rights-based approaches 
may have to offer water management.  
 
It is hoped that overall the thesis will contribute to a national discussion regarding the 
adequacy of traditional legal and regulatory approaches for achieving adequate 
environmental protection, and to a broader international discussion concerning the utility of 
rights-based approaches to environmental protection. This broader discussion contributes to 
a growing movement and body of literature discussing the need to reform environmental law 
in order to enable it to respond to inherent and fundamental systemic challenges facing 
environmental protection.13 The capacity of the right to assist in improving environmental 
protection in light of these challenges is addressed in Chapter Seven.  
 
  
                                                          
12 For example, see Rowena Cantley-Smith, 'A Human Right to a Healthy Environment' in Paula Gerber and 
Melissa Castan (eds), Contemporary Perspectives on Human Rights Law in Australia (Thomson Reuters, 
2013) 447.  
13 For a summary of some key debates in the area, see Paul Anderson, Reforming Law and Economy for a 
Sustainable Earth: Critical Thought for Turbulent Times (Routledge, 2015).  
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1.4 Research methodology and process 
1.4.1 Research objectives and choice of methodology 
The thesis adopts a theoretical research approach, involving the consultation of relevant 
academic literature and other relevant published sources. Whilst the possibility of engaging 
in qualitative research involving the consultation of experts in the field was considered, it 
was decided that such an approach may be more appropriate for future research. The first 
part of the research question is well suited to a theoretical research approach, as it requires 
discussion of possible forms of legal recognition of the HRTHE at the international level 
and under Australian domestic law. This is an enquiry which can be comprehensively 
considered without recourse to qualitative research. The second aspect of the research 
question addresses the potential benefits for Australian environmental protection associated 
with international and domestic legal recognition of the right. Various possible approaches 
to this aspect of the question were considered. It was decided that given the lack of 
authoritative articulation of the scope and content of the right at the international level, it 
would not be possible to ascertain how a specific formulation of the right could impact on 
environmental protection in Australia. Rather, the research sought to identify some general 
potential benefits associated with legal recognition, in order to ascertain whether they could 
possibly be realised through the identified preferable forms of legal recognition.  
The thesis explores the potential benefits of environmental protection associated with both 
international legal recognition and domestic legal recognition of the right. For international 
legal recognition of the right, a number of possible consequences of recognition were 
evaluated to ascertain whether they could constitute ‘benefits’ for environmental protection 
according to the definition adopted. For domestic legal recognition of the right, as it is not 
possible for the thesis to consider all of the potential benefits for environmental protection, 
the thesis was restricted to consideration of whether domestic legal recognition is capable of 
realising a set of identified potential benefits. The following set of potential environmental 
protection benefits were selected:  
1. Emphasis on the fundamental importance of the interrelationship between human 
health and wellbeing and the state of the natural environment;  
2. Stronger basis for environmental laws and policies;  
3. Increased prioritisation of environmental protection considerations in government 
decision-making;  
4. Safeguards against environmental protection rollbacks;  
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5. Safety net by filling gaps in environmental legislation;  
6. Avenues to bring legal actions in the interests of environmental protection;  
7. Inform environmental quality standards. 
 
The rationale for the selection of these benefits was twofold. Firstly, a number of these 
benefits have been associated with domestic legal recognition of the right in other 
jurisdictions. The selected benefits have been drawn from Boyd’s research, which identified 
numerous benefits associated with domestic legal recognition of the right across the world.14 
Accordingly, it is relevant to consider whether Australia may be able to enjoy a similar 
experience. Secondly, it is argued that these benefits address key aspects of the goals of 
ESD, and assist in addressing some of the key challenges facing Australian environmental 
protection. 15 Chapters Six and Seven consider how these potential benefits may be realised 
in the Australian context, under different forms of legal recognition. As it would be 
impossible to comprehensively discuss the potential realisation of these benefits in all areas 
of environmental protection in Australia, the research focussed specifically on their 
realisation in one environmental protection context. The Australian water management 
context was selected in recognition of the fact that protection of water resources is one of 
the key environmental management areas that may be impacted by adoption of a rights-
based approach to environmental protection.  
 
To further scope the enquiry, water management within the Murray-Darling Basin was 
selected as the focus for the case study in recognition of the significant literature addressing 
water management and environmental protection in the Basin and the significance of the 
Basin as Australia’s largest and most utilised river system. It is acknowledged that the choice 
of research methodology can have a significant influence on the ultimate conclusions of the 
research. It would have been possible to select a different set of potential benefits, a different 
set of legal recognition options, and to assess the potential realisation of these benefits 
through the identified forms of legal recognition in different environmental protection 
                                                          
14 Boyd’s research has confirmed the realisation of the following benefits for environmental protection 
associated with domestic constitutional recognition of the right: stronger environmental laws, creation of a 
safety net to close gaps in environmental law, the prevention of rollbacks on environmental protection, 
improved implementation and enforcement of environmental laws and policies, promotion of environmental 
justice, increased public involvement in environmental governance, increased governmental accountability, 
the creation of a level playing field with social and economic rights, and improved environmental education: 
Boyd, above n 2, 27-32. 
15 The rationale is explained in further depth in Chapter Five. 
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contexts. For this reason, it is recognised that the scope of the research is necessarily limited 
(discussed further at 1.5). 
 
1.4.2 Research process  
In order to respond to the overarching research question, a number of sub-questions were 
developed to guide the analysis. The thesis structure is guided by six sets of sub-questions, 
with each substantive chapter (excluding the introduction and conclusion) designed to 
address one question set. The following section details the research process, by outlining the 
rationale for each of these sets of sub-questions, and explaining the research method adopted.  
Chapter Two – Approaches to Environmental Protection in Australia 
Research sub-questions:  
1. What are the current approaches to environmental protection in Australia?  
2. Have these approaches been successful in achieving ecologically sustainable 
development?  
3. What are some of the key environmental protection challenges facing Australia?  
4. What approaches to environmental protection have been adopted in the Murray-Darling 
Basin water management context, and how effective have they been?   
Rationale and method:  
The first set of sub-questions aim to identify the current approaches to environmental 
protection in Australia, in order to provide context for the subsequent discussion of the 
adoption of possible rights-based approaches. By defining the concept of ecologically 
sustainable development, and identifying various environmental challenges facing 
environmental protection in Australia it also assists in elucidating a key aspect of the 
research question. As explained above, the research question seeks to determine whether 
legal recognition of the right may offer some potential benefits for Australian environmental 
protection. Benefits have been defined to mean consequences which assist in the 
achievement of ecologically sustainable development, and address challenges currently 
facing the pursuit of environmental protection. As the thesis utilises water resources 
management as a case study to explore the broader research question, the questions seek to 
determine the current approach to environmental protection in the water resources context, 
and to ascertain the general effectiveness of this approach. As the right’s potential impact on 
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environmental protection in this context is considered throughout the thesis, it is necessary 
to provide this context at the outset.  
In conducting this research, two main bodies of literature were consulted. Firstly, the 
literature pertaining to environmental regulation in Australia was considered, in order to 
ascertain the nature of current regulatory models, and their effectiveness for achieving 
environmental protection. Primarily, reliance was placed on scholarly sources and the 
opinions of environmental law experts. Secondly, the literature pertaining to Australian 
water resources law and policy was consulted. As this is a broad and complex area of the 
law, the research was limited to consideration of the literature addressing sustainability in 
water management, and water pollution and water quality regulation in the MDB region. A 
range of sources were relied upon, including scholarly sources, government sources, 
Australian case law, and water management and environmental protection legislation.   
Chapter Three – The Environmental Rights Revolution and Australia 
Research sub-questions:   
1. What is the environmental rights revolution, and why has it emerged?  
2. What are the types of environmental rights which have been recognised?  
3. Has Australia embraced the concept of environmental rights?  
4. If not, what are the possible factors explaining Australia’s reluctance? 
Rationale and method:  
The second set of sub-questions have been designed to provide context to the discussion of 
the adoption of possible rights-based approaches. They seek to understand the factors 
explaining Australia’s reluctance to embrace rights-based approaches to date. The questions 
also seek to understand why other countries have adopted rights-based approaches, and 
whether any of these motivating factors might also be applicable in the Australian context. 
The overall aim of the chapter is to determine whether there are legitimate and significant 
reasons explaining Australia’s refusal to join the environmental rights revolution, which 
might mitigate against adoption of a rights-based approach. To answer these questions, the 
global scholarship addressing environmental rights was consulted. This included 
consideration not only of the literature addressing human rights approaches to environmental 




Chapter Four – International Legal Recognition of the Human Right to a Healthy 
Environment 
Research sub-questions: 
1. Can the human right to a healthy environment be established as a moral right?  
2. What is the legal status of the right under international law?  
3. What is the scope and content of the right, and what obligations does it impose on states? 
4. How can compliance with the obligations imposed by the right be assessed at the 
international level? 
Rationale and method:  
The third set of sub-questions have been designed to ascertain the legal source and status of 
the right at international law, in order to identify the possible scope and content of the right. 
Understanding the potential content of the right is crucial, as it informs subsequent 
discussion of the potential benefits associated with legal recognition of the right at both the 
international and domestic levels. The international legal status of the right also has 
implications for the legislative options available to Australia, explored in later chapters.  
To answer the questions posed in this chapter, the literature addressing three main subject 
areas was addressed, namely, human rights theory, human rights and the environment 
scholarship, and international human rights law. Within each of these bodies of scholarship, 
particular focus was placed on literature addressing the human right to a healthy 
environment. In addition to scholarly sources, particular reliance was placed on guidance 
provided by the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
regarding the content of ESC rights recognised under the Covenant. The literature addressing 
the development and use of human rights indicators was also consulted in order to determine 
how state compliance with the obligations imposed by the right may be evaluated.  
Chapter Five – Potential Benefits of Legal Recognition of the Human Right to a 
Healthy Environment for Australian Environmental Protection 
Research sub-questions:  
1. What are some potential benefits for environmental protection in Australia associated 
with international legal recognition of the human right to a healthy environment?  
2. How could the human right to a healthy environment be recognised under Australia’s 
domestic laws?  
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3. What potential benefits for environmental protection may be associated with domestic 
legal recognition of the right?  
4. What are the possible limitations of both forms of recognition?  
 
Rationale and method:  
The fourth set of sub-questions are designed to ascertain how international and domestic 
legal recognition of the right may impact on domestic environmental protection in Australia. 
If the right is recognised as an implied right under the ICESCR, certain obligations would 
be imposed on Australia. The aim of these questions is to determine whether the imposition 
of obligations on the government and the conferral of the right on Australian citizens could 
possibly benefit environmental protection. This question is explored both generally, and 
specifically in relation to the potential impact on water resources management. As there may 
possibly be a wide range of potential benefits offered by the right, this chapter seeks to limit 
the scope of the thesis analysis by outlining a set of potential benefits for environmental 
protection which have been associated with domestic legal recognition of the right in other 
jurisdictions. Subsequent chapters then evaluate the extent to which these potential benefits 
may be realised under different forms of domestic legal recognition.  
Aspects of four bodies of literature were consulted for this chapter; international human 
rights law, international environmental law, and Australian human rights law. The set of 
benefits for environmental protection associated with domestic legal recognition of the right 
were drawn from the research of David R Boyd, who has conducted the most recent and 
comprehensive study of the impacts of domestic recognition of the human right to a healthy 
environment in jurisdictions around the world.  
Chapter Six – Constitutional Recognition of the Human Right to a Healthy 
Environment in Australia  
Research sub-questions:  
1. Is it possible to recognise the human right to a healthy environment under the Australian 
Constitution? 
2. If so, what is the most preferable form of recognition?  
3. Can the potential benefits for environmental protection identified for domestic legal 
recognition be realised through the preferable form of constitutional recognition?  
4. How could these benefits be realised in the Australian water management context? 
5. What are the potential limitations? 
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Rationale and method:  
The fifth set of sub-questions are designed to evaluate whether constitutional recognition of 
the right is a possible and desirable form of legal recognition of the right in Australia. As 
one of the research sub-questions seeks to identify the most preferable form of legal 
recognition of the right, it is necessary to consider the main legal recognition options, and 
their associated advantages and limitations. The questions aim to ascertain whether the 
potential benefits for environmental protection identified in the previous chapter could be 
realised through the form of constitutional recognition identified as the most preferable. This 
was explored both generally, and specifically in relation to the potential impact on the case 
study context of water resources management.  
For this chapter, five areas of scholarship were considered. Namely, the literature addressing 
Australian constitutional law, US constitutional law (insofar as it was relevant as a means of 
comparison), constitutional environmental rights, Australian environmental law, and 
Australian water law. As Australia has a unique constitutional context, the literature 
pertaining to the realisation of the right in other constitutional contexts was not relied upon. 
Rather, the chapter focussed on ascertaining the possible consequences of constitutional 
recognition in Australia, and their potential impacts on environmental protection.  
Chapter Seven – Legislative Recognition of the Human Right to a Healthy 
Environment in Australia  
Research sub-questions:  
1. Is it possible to provide legislative recognition of the human right to a healthy 
environment in Australia?  
2. If so, what is the most preferable form of legislative recognition?  
3. Can the potential benefits for environmental protection identified for domestic legal 
recognition be realised through the preferable form of legislative recognition?  
4. How could these benefits be realised in the Australian water management context? 
5. What are the potential limitations? 
 
Rationale and method:  
The sixth set of sub-questions are designed to explore whether legislative recognition of the 
right is a possible and desirable form of legal recognition of the right in Australia. Exploring 
the potential legislative recognition options is important, if it is concluded that constitutional 
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recognition is not the most preferable form of recognition. The questions seek to identify the 
most preferable form of legislative recognition, and to discuss whether the potential benefits 
for environmental protection associated with domestic recognition identified in Chapter Five 
can be realised through this form of recognition. This is explored both generally, and 
specifically in relation to water resources management.  
For this chapter, five areas of literature were consulted. Namely, Australian constitutional 
law (for the consideration of legislative power), Australian human rights law, Australian 
environmental law, Australian water law, and Australian administrative law. As with the 
constitutional law chapter, rather than placing reliance on the experience of other 
jurisdictions with legislative recognition of the right, the chapter focusses on ascertaining 
the possible consequences of legislative recognition in Australia, and how these 
consequences could help realise the potential benefits for environmental protection 
identified. Illustrations of how these benefits may be realised in the case study context of 
water management are utilised to demonstrate how the general benefits for environmental 
protection may be realised in a specific context. A comprehensive analysis of the potential 
impact of the right in the case study context is not conducted, as it is neither necessary nor 
possible to do so. It is unnecessary in terms of responding to the overarching research 




1.5 Limitations of the research 
The thesis is necessarily limited in its scope. It does not seek to demonstrate that the human 
right to a healthy environment offers a panacea for the problems facing environmental 
protection. Rather, it aims to test the limited hypothesis that specific forms of legal 
recognition of the human right to a healthy environment may be capable of offering some 
potential benefits for environmental protection in Australia. In order to scope the enquiry, 
the full suite of possible environmental protection benefits associated with various different 
forms of recognition have not been explored. The potential benefits with respect to 
international legal recognition have been restricted to consideration of three main possible 
benefits. Similarly, for domestic legal recognition, the analysis has been limited to 
consideration of the potential realisation of a specific set of possible benefits. The conclusion 
that these possible consequences of legal recognition may constitute benefits has been 
informed by a particular understanding of the goals of environmental protection and the 
challenges facing environmental regulation, which are both subjects of debate. Furthermore, 
as the thesis has utilised a case study of the possible realisation of these benefits in the water 
management context, further research will be required to more fully explore the potential 
implications of legal recognition of the right for the management of other critical 
environmental issues. For instance, it may be useful for future research to consider how the 
proposed form of legislative recognition may operate as a beneficial tool for environmental 
protection in other contexts, such as biodiversity conservation and climate change.  
 
As the content of the right has not been authoritatively outlined at the international level, it 
is not yet possible to ascertain more specific potential benefits associated with legal 
recognition. Accordingly, the benefits for environmental protection have been stated at a 
degree of generality which allows for differing interpretations of the content of the right. 
Exploration of these potential benefits in the case study context is accordingly limited to 
illustrations of how these potential general benefits may be realised in a specific 
environmental protection context. It is not a comprehensive exploration of the potential 
impacts of legal recognition of the right on water resources management in Australia. 
Accordingly, the thesis’ conclusions have been correspondingly restricted in scope. The 
research is only capable of providing a response to the overarching research question. It 
cannot be used as authority for the proposition that legal recognition of the HRTHE is an 
unequivocally useful tool for environmental protection in all contexts. It can only be utilised 
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as a starting point for discussion regarding the potential utility of one particular form of legal 





1.6 Thesis structure  
 
Chapter One introduces the aims of the thesis, explains the research process, and outlines 
how the thesis is intended to contribute to gaps in the existing literature.  
 
Chapter Two outlines the current approaches to environmental protection in Australia, and 
highlights some of the key challenges facing environmental protection. In order to provide 
context for the thesis’ case study, the chapter outlines the approach to environmental 
protection in the Australian water resources management context. It is concluded that as 
Australia continues to face numerous environmental protection challenges, it is important to 
consider additional approaches, such as rights-based approaches.   
 
Chapter Three attempts to explain why Australia has thus far refused to join the 
environmental rights revolution, and offers a number of potential explanations for 
Australia’s reluctance. It argues that Australia’s failure to adopt a rights-based approach can 
be attributed to a number of factors, including, a perception that existing approaches are 
adequate, general hesitation to provide legal recognition for broad rights declarations and a 
lack of environmental rights advocacy. It argues that the perception that environmental rights 
may be at odds with the nature of Australia’s common law legal system is flawed for various 
reasons. In particular, it contends that concerns relating to the politicisation of the judiciary, 
opening the ‘floodgates’ to litigation, and the creation of unintended and undesirable 
outcomes can be challenged on a number of grounds, and should not be viewed as 
determinative arguments against recognition. The chapter concludes that although the 
adoption of a rights-based approach would constitute a significant departure from the status 
quo, consideration of domestic legal recognition of the right is warranted in light of the 
positive experience in other jurisdictions and the need to identify new tools for improving 
environmental protection.  
 
Chapter Four outlines the possible sources of the right at international law. It argues that 
although the right is yet to receive express recognition under a binding international treaty, 
the right may be viewed as an implied right under the ICESCR. Although this interpretation 
has not been accepted by the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (UNCESCR), it is conceivable that the right will receive international legal 
recognition in the future. In order to outline the potential scope and content of the right to a 
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healthy environment under the ICESCR, it explores the approach to interpretation of a 
related right (the human right to water) by the UNCESCR and applies this approach to the 
interpretation of the HRTHE. It argues that although it is not yet possible to authoritatively 
determine the right’s content, through consideration of the possible content of the right it is 
possible to identify a number of potential obligations imposed by recognition of the right. 
The chapter then considers how compliance with these obligations could be assessed at the 
international level. However, it concludes that due to the absence of authoritative guidance 
on the content of the right, it is not yet possible to develop human rights indicators to measure 
progress towards realisation of the right.  
 
Chapter Five considers the potential benefits for environmental protection in Australia 
associated with international and domestic legal recognition of the right. The options for 
international legal recognition of the right are canvassed, concluding that the most likely 
form of recognition is as an implied right under the ICESCR. It then discusses whether 
recognition of the right at the international level may assist in improving environmental 
protection at the domestic level in Australia. It concludes that there are various potential 
benefits associated with international legal recognition, including increasing international 
scrutiny, and facilitating comparisons against international standards. The possible 
realisation of these benefits in the case study context of water management is then 
considered, and a number of limitations of international legal recognition of the right for 
environmental protection are identified. The analysis then turns to consideration of the 
potential benefits for environmental protection associated with domestic legal recognition 
of the right.  
 
As the thesis defines a ‘benefit’ for environmental protection in Australia as a legal 
consequence of recognition which assists in the achievement of ESD and addresses 
Australia’s environmental protection problems, the chapter considers whether realisation of 
a number of the ‘benefits’ for environmental protection enjoyed in other jurisdictions would 
constitute benefits in Australia according to the definition adopted. Having concluded that 
these legal consequences of recognition could constitute benefits in the Australian context, 
the chapter explains that the set of identified benefits will be utilised to guide the analysis of 
the potential benefits of constitutional and legislative recognition in subsequent chapters 
(Chapter Six and Chapter Seven).  
20 
 
Chapter Six considers options for constitutional recognition of the right at the 
Commonwealth and state/territory levels. Through consideration of the recognition options, 
it concludes that the most preferable form of recognition is recognition of the right under a 
constitutionally entrenched bill of rights at both levels of government. It concludes that 
although there are various potential benefits for environmental protection associated with 
this form of constitutional recognition, recognition of a constitutionally entrenched bill of 
rights is unlikely in the current political climate. For this reason, options for legislative 
recognition are considered in Chapter Seven.  
 
Chapter Seven considers the options for legislative recognition of the right, and argues that 
recognising the right within federal/state/territory bills of rights legislation based on the 
dialogue model is the most preferable form of domestic legal recognition. The analysis then 
turns to consideration of whether the proposed form of legislative recognition is capable of 
realising the set of potential benefits for environmental protection outlined in Chapter Five. 
It concludes that it is possible that these benefits could be realised to varying extents, 
including increased prioritisation of environmental protection considerations in government 
decision-making and the facilitation of further avenues to challenge government decision-
making. However, the chapter cautions that whilst a legislatively recognised right would 
likely prove to be neither dangerous nor redundant in its operation, it is a limited tool for 
assisting environmental protection.  
 
Chapter Eight concludes that whilst there are various criticisms and limitations associated 
with legal recognition of the right, these issues do not outweigh the potential benefits 
recognition of the right may have to offer environmental protection in Australia. However, 
it cautions against overstating the general utility of the right, given the limited scope of the 
thesis, the significant and broad ranging nature of the challenges facing environmental 
protection, and the limited operation of the right. The chapter explains how the research 
contributes to the identified gaps in the literature, and concludes by highlighting potential 





Chapter Two  
Approaches to Environmental Protection in Australia 
 
What are the current approaches to environmental protection in Australia? Have these 
approaches been successful in achieving ecologically sustainable development? What are 
some of the key environmental protection challenges facing Australia? What approaches to 
environmental protection have been adopted in the Murray-Darling Basin water 
management context, and how effective have they been?   
 
2.1 Introduction 
The aim of this thesis is to ascertain the potential utility of a rights-based approach to 
environmental protection for achieving improved environmental protection in Australia. It 
was explained in Chapter One that for the purposes of the analysis ‘benefits’ for 
environmental protection are defined to mean consequences of recognition which assist in 
the achievement of ecologically sustainable development (ESD), and address challenges 
currently facing the pursuit of environmental protection. Accordingly, this chapter first 
defines the concept of ESD, and evaluates the extent to which ESD is currently implemented 
in Australian law and policy. It then outlines the nature of current approaches to 
environmental protection in Australia, and identifies a number of challenges facing 
environmental protection. It explains that over the past few decades, traditional regulatory 
approaches have been supplemented by newer regulatory models, including market-based 
approaches which seek to provide economic incentives for improved environmental 
protection. The chapter then explores in greater detail the approach to environmental 
protection in a specific environmental protection context, namely, the approach to water 
management in Australia’s largest river system (the Murray-Darling Basin).   
 
As water management has been selected as the case study to explore the thesis’ broader 
overarching research question, providing this context is necessary to ground subsequent 
discussions of the possible impact of a rights-based approach on the existing system. The 
chapter concludes that given the failure to fully operationalise the principles of ESD, and the 
various challenges continuing to face environmental protection in Australia, an exploration 
of the potential utility of alternative approaches may be useful. Accordingly, Chapter Three 




2.2 Ecologically sustainable development 
As explained in Chapter One, for the purposes of this thesis ‘benefits’ for environmental 
protection are defined to mean consequences which assist in the achievement of ecologically 
sustainable development (‘ESD’), and/or address challenges currently facing the pursuit of 
environmental protection. This section addresses the meaning of ecologically sustainable 
development, and evaluates the extent to which ESD is currently implemented in Australian 
law and policy.  
 
2.2.1 Definition of ESD 
As noted by Fisher, although the concept of ESD is not necessarily ‘universally accepted, 
clear in concept or enforceable in practice’ it is ‘in one form or another…the fulcrum around 
which environmental law is evolving’. 1  Australia’s National Strategy for Ecologically 
Sustainable Development, defines ESD as ‘using, conserving and enhancing the 
community’s resources so that ecological processes, on which life depends, are maintained, 
and the total quality of life, now and in the future, can be increased.’2 Utilising this definition, 
McGrath notes that ESD therefore ‘involves two aspects: a threshold test and a balancing 
exercise’.3 The threshold test requires that the ‘‘ecological processes on which life depends’ 
must be protected’.4 He cites the ‘water cycle’ as one of these crucial ecological processes.5 
The balancing exercise refers to the need to increase the ‘total quality of life’ at present and 
into the future. McGrath argues that this ‘means more than simply development which can 
be continued indefinitely and it is more than balancing economic, social and environmental 
concerns…’6 He suggests that the principles of ESD can be used to determine how to achieve 
this balance.7  
 
The guiding principles outlined in the Strategy were designed to help governments to 
determine how to achieve ESD. The principles are as follows:  
- decision making processes should effectively integrate both long and short-term economic, 
environmental, social and equity considerations 
- where there are threats of serious or irreversible environmental damage, lack of full scientific certainty 
should not be used as a reason for postponing measures to prevent environmental degradation 
                                                          
1 D Fisher quoted in Chris McGrath, Does Environmental Law Work? How to Evaluate the Effectiveness of 
an Environmental Legal System (Lambert Academic Publishing, 2010) 55.  
2 Department of the Environment (Cth), National Strategy for Ecologically Sustainable Development 1992 
<http://www.environment.gov.au/about-us/esd/publications/national-esd-strategy>. 
3 McGrath, above n 1, 57. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid, 58. 
6 Ibid, 59. 
7 Ibid.  
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- the global dimension of environmental impacts of actions and policies should be recognised and 
considered 
- the need to develop a strong, growing and diversified economy which can enhance the capacity for 
environmental protection should be recognised 
- the need to maintain and enhance international competitiveness in an environmentally sound manner 
should be recognised 
- cost effective and flexible policy instruments should be adopted, such as improved valuation, pricing 
and incentive mechanisms 
- decisions and actions should provide for broad community involvement on issues which affect them.8 
 
In the Intergovernmental Agreement on the Environment, the parties agreed that ESD 
‘should be used by all levels of Government in the assessment of natural resources, land use 
decisions and approval processes’.9 As explained by Godden and Peel, the aim of the ESD 
principles outlined in the Strategy was not to stipulate ‘precise environmental standards’.10 
Rather, it was to ‘guide the development of specific environmental rules and to provide a 
framework for making individual decisions that balance environmental and development 
considerations’.11  
 
2.2.2 Integration of ESD into law and policy 
The extent to which the principles of ESD have been adequately integrated into 
environmental policy, planning and approval processes is a question of debate.12 Macintosh 
argues that ESD as a ‘meta-objective’ of Australian environmental protection law and policy 
has not had a significant impact on Australian environmental institutions. 13 Whilst it is 
difficult to ascertain the substantive impact of the concept, it has certainly become a crucial 
principle in Australian environmental policy which is implemented to varying degrees in 
law and policy at all levels of government. 
 
The Commonwealth’s premier piece of environmental legislation, the Environment 
Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) outlines five principles of ESD. 14 
                                                          
8 Department of the Environment (Cth), above n 2. 
9 Department of the Environment (Cth), Intergovernmental Agreement on the Environment 1992 [Schedule 
2] <https://www.environment.gov.au/about-us/esd/publications/intergovernmental-agreement>. 
10 Lee Godden and Jacqueline Peel, Environmental Law: Scientific, Policy and Regulatory Dimensions 
(Oxford University Press, 2009), 136. 
11 Ibid. 
12 See generally the recent special edition (Vol 22 (1)) of the Australasian Journal of Environmental 
Management on the topic. In particular, Giorel Curran & Robyn Hollander, ‘25 Years of Ecologically 
Sustainable Development in Australia: Paradigm Shift or Business as Usual?’ (2015) 22 (1) Australasian 
Journal of Environmental Management 2. 
13 Andrew Macintosh, ‘The Impact of ESD on Australia’s Environmental Institutions’ (2015) 22 (1) 
Australasian Journal of Environmental Management 33, 34. 
14 Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) s 3A:  
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These principles include the precautionary principle,15 and the principle of inter-generational 
equity. 16  ESD principles are also incorporated into state/territory environmental 
management and protection legislation.17 However, as Godden and Peel note, overall there 
has been ‘limited implementation of ESD in environmental legislation’ in Australia.18 Whilst 
the concept has received significant recognition at the policy level, there is still significant 
room for improvement in terms of legislative recognition and operationalisation of the 
principles of ESD in government decision-making.  
  
                                                          
(a)  decision-making processes should effectively integrate both long-term and short-term economic, 
environmental, social and equitable considerations; 
(b)  if there are threats of serious or irreversible environmental damage, lack of full scientific 
certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing measures to prevent environmental 
degradation; 
(c)  the principle of inter-generational equity—that the present generation should ensure that the 
health, diversity and productivity of the environment is maintained or enhanced for the benefit of 
future generations; 
(d)  the conservation of biological diversity and ecological integrity should be a fundamental 
consideration in decision-making; 
(e)  improved valuation, pricing and incentive mechanisms should be promoted. 
15 Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) s 3A (b). 
16 Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) s 3A (c). 
17 See for example, Protection of the Environment Administration Act 1991 (NSW) s 6 (1). 
18 Godden and Peel, above n 10, 139. 
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2.3 Approaches to environmental protection in Australia 
2.3.1 Regulatory models 
Australia has adopted a variety of approaches to environmental protection. Godden and Peel 
have identified five regulatory models in operation at present in Australia: the common law 
model, the command and control model, the community participation model, the market-
based model, and the incentive-and-information-based model. 19  Although primarily 
Australia has adopted a command and control approach to the regulation of environmental 
harm, it has increasingly moved towards new regulatory models.20 Each model represents a 
different conceptualisation of the human/environment relationship, and the appropriate role 
of the state in its regulation. The common law model conceptualises the environment through 
the paradigm of property law, with environmental protection occurring as a by-product of 
the protection of property rights (for example, through using nuisance or trespass actions).21  
 
Whereas, the command and control model conceptualises the environment as an object 
which must be protected using the regulatory and enforcement power of the state. 22 In 
contrast, rather than focusing on the state, new regulatory models place responsibility on 
other actors and institutions. For instance, the market-based model views the role of the state 
as a regulator of market rules, and places faith in the ability of the market to ‘achieve an 
efficient allocation of environmental resources at reduced cost’.23 These different models 
utilise different tools and mechanisms to address environmental problems. 24  As the 
command and control model is the key regulatory model, it is useful to consider the 
regulatory tools associated with this approach.  
 
2.3.1.1 Command and control approach 
Primarily, the command and control approach is operationalised through the passage of 
environmental protection legislation at the Commonwealth and state/territory levels. 
Responsibility for environmental protection is divided between the Commonwealth and 
                                                          
19 Godden and Peel, above n 10, 144. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid 145. 
22 Ibid 147. 
23 Ibid 149. 
24 Ibid 153. 
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state/territory governments, with the majority of environmental planning, approvals and 
assessments occurring at the state/territory and local government level. However, 
increasingly the Commonwealth is playing a greater role in environmental management and 
protection, through the passage of national legislation and the creation of national 
environmental policies. The Commonwealth’s premier piece of environmental legislation is 
the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) (‘EPBC Act’). 
The EPBC Act is a complex statute, which is guided by a number of objects listed under s 3 
(1). The objects include the objective of promoting ESD through the conservation and 
ecologically sustainable use of natural resources, and providing for the protection of the 
environment (in particular, matters of national environmental significance).25 The Act aims 
to achieve these objectives through various mechanisms. It outlines a number of ‘matters of 
national environmental significance’ (‘MNES’) which are protected under the legislation, 
including world heritage properties, national heritage places, wetlands of international 
importance, listed threatened species and ecological communities, migratory species 
protected under international agreements, Commonwealth marine areas, the Great Barrier 
Reef Marine Park, nuclear actions and water resources in relation to coal seam gas 
development and large coal mining development.26 Actions that have or are likely to have a 
significant impact on the MNES are subject to the legislation’s assessment and approval 
processes.  
 
Failure to adhere to the Act’s requirements can result in the application of civil and criminal 
penalties (the ‘control’ aspect of the command and control model). The Department of the 
Environment’s Compliance and Enforcement Policy for the Act explains that the 
Department uses a range of monitoring and compliance auditing procedures to ensure 
compliance with the legislation.27 However, despite the institutional structures in place to 
ensure that the Act achieves its objectives in practice, there are various criticisms of the 
operation of the legislation. Godden and Peel argue that although the Act has had various 
positive influences on improving environmental protection in Australia, there are a number 
                                                          
25 Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth), s 3 (1) (a)-(b). 
26 Department of the Environment (Cth), What is Protected Under the EPBC Act? 
<https://www.environment.gov.au/epbc/what-is-protected>. 
27 Department of the Environment (Cth), Compliance and Enforcement Policy: Environment Protection and 




of ‘dark sides’ to its operation.28 They argue that these dark sides ‘may detract from, or even 
overshadow entirely, its possible virtues’. 29  Specifically, they identify ‘three potential 
weaknesses’ of the Act, ‘which may constrain its future development as a mechanism for 
advancing best practice environmental impact assessment’:30  
1. the vagaries of government administration of the Act (particularly at the ‘political’ level of ministerial 
decision-making);  
2. the heavy reliance placed on environmental groups to scrutinise federal decision-making and to take 
action in response to government or developer lapses; and 
3. the likely need to depend on the courts, rather than the federal government, for future progressive 
development of the environmental impact assessment requirements of the legislation.  
 
A number of these criticisms have been echoed by other commentators, who have criticised 
both the design and operation of the Act. For instance, Macintosh argues that the legislation 
suffers from significant ‘structural issues’ which are hindering its ability to achieve its 
objectives.31 Examination of the practical outcomes of the Act’s processes appear to support 
the conclusion that the Act’s effectiveness is limited. A study of the environmental outcomes 
of 50 referrals between 2008 and 2012 revealed ‘limited evidence for positive environmental 
outcomes’.32 Despite these critiques, various commentators have reported on a number of 
positive outcomes flowing from the enactment of the legislation. For instance, Chris 
McGrath argues that there are a number of important examples of the Act’s provisions being 
successfully utilised to achieve its objectives.33 Whilst it is not possible to resolve these 
debates over the effectiveness of the legislation, it suffices to demonstrate that there is 
significant scholarly division regarding the Act’s utility.  
 
The Commonwealth Parliament has also passed legislation over a range of other 
environmental protection and management areas, including heritage protection, Antarctic 
                                                          
28 Positive impacts include, ‘ensuring government accountability’ and acting as an ‘influence on state-based 
environmental impact assessment’: Lee Godden and Jacqueline Peel, ‘The Environment Protection and 
Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth): Dark Sides of Virtue’ (2007) 31 Melbourne University Law 
Review 106, 106. 
29 Ibid 135. 
30 Ibid. 
31 For example, see Andrew Macintosh, ‘Why the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation 
Act’s Referral, Assessment and Approval Process is Failing to Achieve its Environmental Objectives’ (2004) 
21 (4) Environmental and Planning Law Journal 288, 302. 
32 Susan Tridgell, ‘Evaluating the Effectiveness of the Environment Protection and Biodiversity 
Conservation Act 1999 (Cth): 2008-2012’ (2013) 30 (3) Environmental and Planning Law Journal 245, 245. 
33 Chris McGrath, ‘Swirls in the Stream of Australian Environmental Law: Debate on the EPBC Act’ (2006) 
23 (3) Environmental and Planning Law Journal 165, 170-176. 
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protection, water resources protection, hazardous waste management and ozone protection.34 
However, its legislative reach is limited by the scope of its legislative power granted under 
the Commonwealth Constitution. Accordingly, in various areas of environmental 
management and protection the Commonwealth has been required to engage in a form of 
co-operative federalism with the states. In 1992, this resulted in the creation of the 
Intergovernmental Agreement on the Environment, which is an agreement between the 
Commonwealth and state/territory governments setting out their respective responsibilities, 
and agreeing upon key environmental protection and management principles.35 Since that 
agreement, the Commonwealth and state/territory governments have worked together on 
various environmental protection issues, including most notably, protection of Australia’s 
water resources.  
 
Environmental protection legislation based on the command and control model also exists 
at the state/territory level.36 The general approach adopted across state/territory jurisdictions 
is to regulate environmental issue areas separately utilising specific legislation, in 
conjunction with general environmental protection legislation guided by broader 
environmental policies and planning objectives. This approach has enjoyed significant 
success at regulating certain ‘traditional’ environmental problems (such as point source 
water pollution). 37  However, it is generally less effective in addressing new types of 
environmental issues caused by multiple lawful individual actions (such as climate change 
caused by greenhouse gas emissions, and diffuse source water pollution).38 Acknowledging 
the limitations of traditional command and control approaches for regulating these new 
challenges, increasing recourse has been made to alternative models, such as the market-
based approach to environmental protection.39  
 
2.3.1.2 Market-based approach 
An increasingly important alternative and supplementary approach to traditional command 
and control regulation is the market-based model. Although this approach has not yet been 
                                                          
34 Department of the Environment (Cth), Legislation <https://www.environment.gov.au/about-
us/legislation>. 
35 Department of the Environment (Cth), above n 9. 
36 For a summary of relevant statutes, see Godden and Peel above n 10, 159-160. 
37 Ibid, 148. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid 149. 
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widely utilised, and continues to be the subject of debate, it has been applied in a number of 
environmental protection contexts. Most significantly, a market-based approach has been 
adopted in the water management context, through the creation of a national water market 
(comprised of various component markets).40 The market facilitates the trade of tradeable 
water rights (also referred to as ‘water products’) with the aim of enabling ‘available water 
resources to be put to their most efficient use’.41 Through the creation of environmental water 
entitlements, it is also possible for the environment itself to act as a participant in the 
market.42 Whilst the full effects of these reforms won’t be felt for a number of years, there 
are already discernible benefits associated with this approach.43 For the most part, possible 
adverse environmental impacts associated with trading have not eventuated.44 In light of the 
growing complexity and scope of modern environmental problems, it is likely that 
Australian environmental protection will continue to explore these types of new approaches.  
 
  
                                                          
40 Bureau of Meteorology (Australia), About the Water Market 
<http://www.nationalwatermarket.gov.au/about/index.html>. 
41 Department of Environment, Land, Water and Planning (Vic), Water Entitlements and Trade 
<http://www.depi.vic.gov.au/water/governing-water-resources/water-entitlements-and-trade>. 
42 For example, see Victorian Environmental Water Holder <http://www.vewh.vic.gov.au/home>. 
43 National Water Commission, Water Markets in Australia: A Short History (2011) 115 
<http://www.nwc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0004/18958/Water-markets-in-Australia-a-short-
history.pdf>. 
44 As noted by the National Water Commission (ibid), ‘[i]n principle, water trading can cause adverse 
environmental impacts if it leads to more water being used in absolute terms (particularly where water is over 
allocated), more water being used in inappropriate areas, or reduced river flows (for example, where trade 
increases the amount of water extracted for irrigation upstream in a river catchment and reduces the amount 




2.4 Challenges facing environmental protection in Australia 
Although Australia’s approach to environmental protection compares favourably to 
numerous jurisdictions around the world, there is still significant room for improvement. 
Determining to what extent current approaches adopted under Australian environmental law 
have been effective in protecting the Australian environment is a task deserving of its own 
thesis. It is notoriously difficult to accurately and comprehensively ascertain the impact of 
law generally, and it is particularly challenging in the case of the environment. However, 
there are a few possible indicators which may provide an insight into the effectiveness of 
Australia’s environmental protection systems. In particular, the current state of Australia’s 
environmental health, and the nature and extent of continuing environmental challenges.  
 
2.4.1 State of Australia’s environmental health 
In order to measure the success of current approaches to environmental protection, it is not 
sufficient to simply determine the state of Australia’s environmental health. There are two 
main reasons for this. Firstly, it is difficult to settle on a definition of ‘environmental health’, 
as there is a wide range of possible definitions available. For instance, it could mean how 
functional the natural environment is for humans and non-human animals, such as ‘fishable 
and swimmable’ water, arable land and breathable air. Alternatively, it could denote a higher 
standard, which includes biodiversity and sustainability considerations. The standard could 
be ascertained by reference to human rights standards, exploring the level of environmental 
health necessary to meet human rights obligations. Relevant rights include the right to health 
and the right to an adequate standard of living. Assessing the state of Australia’s 
environmental health against such standards would require the application of human rights 
indicators to assess progress towards realisation of the rights and the fulfilment of the 
obligations they impose.  
 
Secondly, the achievement of some degree of environmental health does not necessarily 
imply that environmental protection approaches have been successful at adequately 
regulating the relationship between humans and the natural environment, and in achieving 
their objectives. Environmental health could be attributed to various other factors, including 
cultural change, or the absence of environmental pressures. Moreover, it fails to account for 
the manner in which environmental protection is achieved. For instance, it could be possible 
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for a government to secure a healthy environment through draconian measures, with little or 
no public input into the decision-making process.  
 
Whilst acknowledging the limitations of environmental health as a measure of the 
effectiveness of environmental protection strategies, the state of the Australian environment 
is undeniably a relevant factor for consideration. State of the Environment reporting ‘is the 
internationally and nationally accepted method for assessing environmental performance’.45 
It occurs nationally and in each of the states and territories. The most recent national research 
conducted by a committee of independent experts reveals that whilst ‘much of Australia’s 
environment and heritage is in good shape, or improving’, other aspects ‘are in poor 
condition or deteriorating’.46 The Report warns of numerous serious developing risks to the 
state of Australia’s environmental health, in particular the impacts of climate change and a 
growing population. 47  Accordingly, whilst the report card contains numerous positive 
indications of successful environmental management, there are significant areas for 
improvement in terms of how Australia manages existing and developing environmental 
problems. These general trends are confirmed at the state and territory level, although there 
are differences in the nature and extent of successes and challenges between the 




                                                          
45 Department of Environment and Heritage Protection (QLD), State of the Environment Queensland 2011 
(2011) ii <http://www.ehp.qld.gov.au/state-of-the-environment/report-2011/pdf/executive-summary.pdf>. 
46 State of the Environment 2011 Committee, In Brief The Australian Environment in 2011 
<http://www.environment.gov.au/science/soe/2011-inbrief/australian-environment#ib1>. 
47 Ibid. 
48 See generally; NSW Environment Protection Authority, NSW State of the Environment 2012 (2012) 
<https://www.epa.nsw.gov.au/soe/soe2012/summary.htm>; Commissioner for Environmental Sustainability 
Victoria, Victoria State of the Environment 2013 (2013) 
<https://www.ces.vic.gov.au/sites/default/files/publication-documents/Introduction.pdf>; Environmental 
Protection Authority (WA), State of the Environment Report 2007 (2007) 
<http://www.epa.wa.gov.au/abouttheepa/soe/2007/Pages/default.aspx>; Environment Protection Authority 
(SA), State of the Environment Report 2013 South Australia (2013) 
<http://www.epa.sa.gov.au/soe_2013/index.html>; Office of the Commissioner for Sustainability and the 
Environment, ACT State of the Environment Report 2011 (2011) 
<http://reports.envcomm.act.gov.au/actsoe2011/executive_summary.html>; Department of Environment and 




2.4.2 Environmental protection challenges 
Serious threats to the health and sustainability of the Australian environment continue to 
pose significant challenges for environmental protection. These include, but are not limited 
to, climate change, biodiversity loss, habitat loss, and salinity. Identifying the key challenges 
facing environmental protection in Australia is ultimately a question of opinion, involving 
various political and value judgements. There is a diversity of opinion regarding every stage 
of the environmental protection process, including the assessment of the need, extent and 
application of environmental protection, the selection of appropriate methods and the 
implementation of those methods. Whilst acknowledging this, it is possibly to identify 
various general social, economic, political and legal challenges facing environmental 
protection in Australia.  
 
2.4.2.1 Economic challenges 
In order to protect the environment adequately, it may be necessary to place limits on 
economic growth in certain instances.49 The nature and rationale of such limits is largely 
dependent on the approach to environmental protection adopted. As discussed below in 
Chapter Three, adherents to an earth jurisprudence or ‘wild law’ approach may perceive that 
there are certain ‘ecological limits’ which can not be exceeded. Respecting these limits may 
involve placing limits on economic growth to some extent. Human rights-based approaches 
to environmental protection may require limits to economic growth in order to maintain a 
standard of environmental health necessary to fulfil human rights obligations. An ESD 
approach may require limits to be placed on economic development where development is 
not ecologically ‘sustainable’. Accordingly, it can be seen that it is possible that 
contradictions may be perceived between the pursuit of environmental protection and the 
pursuit of economic growth. Determining how to achieve a balance between the sometimes 
competing objectives of economic growth and environmental protection represents one of 
the most significant challenges for environmental protection both globally, and in Australia. 
Whilst attempts have been made to create economic incentives to assist in the achievement 
of environmental protection in Australia, the fact remains that there are numerous economic 
incentives for individuals, corporations and governments to take actions which cause or do 
not adequately take into consideration environmental harm and environmental sustainability.  
                                                          




2.4.2.2 Political challenges  
There is a broad diversity of opinion regarding the goals of environmental protection, and 
the nature of the human/environment relationship. Significant political divergence exists 
over crucial questions, such as the value and role of the natural environment and the best 
approaches to environmental protection. For instance, in Australia, there are numerous 
political disagreements between the Greens party and other major political parties on key 
environmental issues, including whether Australia should put a price on carbon, whether 
new coal mines should be approved in an age of climate change, and how to best 
operationalise the principles of ESD. Although to some extent these political disagreements 
contribute to an informed public dialogue on these contested issues, they continue to pose 
challenges for the achievement of environmental protection.  
 
2.4.2.3 Social challenges  
Raising public awareness over environmental issues is an important means of achieving 
adequate environmental protection. In order to encourage public participation in 
environmental decision-making processes, it is vital that the public have access to 
information about environmental issues, and are equipped with the tools necessary to take 
action. However, despite various environmental campaigns by governments and non-
government organisations, numerous relatively easily addressed environmental problems 
continue to persist. For instance, it is possible for the vast majority of human waste to be 
recycled and for the vast majority of energy to be sourced from renewable sources. Despite 
this, both waste and non-renewable energy continue to pose problems for the health of the 
natural environment. Countering natural human tendencies to prioritise other competing 
considerations over and above sustainability considerations is an ongoing challenge which 
will need to be counteracted with a range of approaches.  
 
2.4.2.4 Legal challenges 
Related to the political challenges discussed above, there are various challenges associated 
with the legal system and the laws impacting on the natural environment. As demonstrated, 
despite the existence of a broad range of laws and policies designed to achieve environmental 
protection, various significant environmental problems continue to exist. A number of these 
regulatory failures can be attributed to deficiencies within the content of the law, whilst 
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others can be attributed to inadequate compliance and enforcement.50 Achieving law reform 
and improving compliance and enforcement is an ongoing challenge which is inextricably 
linked to the political challenges discussed above. The nature and degree of reform in this 
regard is dependent on how the environment is valued and how competing political values 
and priorities are balanced.  
 
Although this is by no means a comprehensive list of the challenges currently facing the 
pursuit of environmental protection in Australia, it is indicative of some of the key issues.  
 
  
                                                          
50 The Environmental Defenders Offices of Australia have been researching and highlighting deficiencies in 
Australian environmental laws and their enforcement over the past few decades.  For further information on 
areas for reform, see: Environmental Defenders Offices of Australia, Policy Submissions 
<http://www.edo.org.au/submissions>. The scholarship of Chris McGrath has also shed light on the various 
inadequacies in environmental law content and implementation in Australia. For a list of relevant 




2.5 Approach to environmental protection in the Australian water 
resources management context 
Australian water resources management has been selected as the case study for the thesis, as 
protection of water resources is one of the key environmental management areas that may 
be impacted by adoption of a rights-based approach to environmental protection. 
Accordingly, it is necessary to provide context for the case study analysis by outlining the 
current approach to environmental protection in the Australian water resources management 
context. As water resources management covers a broad range of issues, in order to scope 
the analysis, the thesis focusses specifically on the challenges of achieving sustainable water 
resources management and water quality and pollution regulation in the Murray-Darling 
Basin.  
 
2.5.1 Water and the Murray-Darling Basin (MDB) 
Water is the most precious natural resource on Earth. Humans, animals and the environment 
are united and divided by their common dependence on this finite yet renewable substance. 
It is distinguishable from other natural resources (such as oil) by its necessity for life, and 
the absence of any substitute. It is at once a public good and a valuable commodity, capable 
of invoking both cooperation and conflict. Although the value of water is widely recognised, 
this recognition does not always translate into adequate protection of water resources from 
excessive human interference. 
 
It is an oft quoted fact that Australia has the distinction of being the world’s driest inhabited 
continent. It is perhaps lesser known that the Australian hydrological cycle can also lay claim 
to having the ‘world’s highest rainfall variability’.51 The unique nature of the Australian 
hydrological cycle is important to appreciate, especially when human population distribution 
is taken into consideration. The majority of Australia’s 24 million (approx.) people live near 
the coast, with a vast proportion of the nation’s interior occupied by desert, and little else.  
As a result, there is a significant water demand placed on the nation’s limited and highly 
variable water resources. In line with a global trend, most of Australia’s water is consumed 
by agricultural industries, and recent statistics demonstrate that this water use is increasing.52 
                                                          
51 National Water Commission, Water Challenges in Australia 
<http://nwc.gov.au/publications/topic/corporate/corporate-brochure/corporate-brochure>. 
52 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Information Paper: Towards the Australian Environmental-Economic 
Accounts (2013) ch 2 
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The bulk of Australia’s agricultural water consumption occurs in the Murray-Darling Basin 
region (‘MDB’), which is widely referred to as Australia’s ‘food bowl’.53 The Basin is home 
to approximately four million people and twenty three rivers across four states (QLD, NSW, 
Vic, SA) and one territory (ACT).54 Accordingly, the way in which the MDB’s water is 
managed directly impacts on the continued viability of Australia’s economy, and food 
security. For this reason, the following section considers how the Australian approach to 
water resources management has evolved generally, and specifically in regards to the 
management of the Basin’s water resources. 
 
2.5.2 Evolution of Australian water resources management 
As noted by Fisher, ‘[i]t is now recognised that the quality and quantity of water resources 
are just as much a function of cultural, social, economic, political and legal considerations 
as they are a function of a range of natural phenomena.’ 55  Whilst some countries are 
naturally ‘water rich’ or ‘water poor’, the availability and health of water resources is 
ultimately determined by the way in which governments manage the resources within their 
jurisdiction. Naturally water scarce landscapes can be managed in order to provide a balance 
between competing users, and ensure water for the future. Conversely, poor water 
management in a ‘water rich’ country can result in diminished water availability and quality. 
In other words, the health of a nation’s water resources is not entirely a question of 
hydrogeological ‘luck’, but rather the product of a complex range of legal, political and 
policy factors.  
 
Over the course of Australia’s relatively short history as a nation, a number of different 
approaches to managing water have been utilised. The evolution of these approaches paints 
a picture of a nation gradually realising the true value of its limited water resources. Initially, 
Australia’s approach to water management was informed by English attitudes towards water 
use, reflecting our early nation’s close ties to the United Kingdom.56 As noted by a number 
of commentators, the reception of English water laws and policies was not ideal, given the 
                                                          
<http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Latestproducts/4655.0.55.002Main%20Features42013?opendocu
ment&tabname=Summary&prodno=4655.0.55.002&issue=2013&num=&view=>. 
53 Murray-Darling Basin Authority, Irrigated Agriculture in the Basin - Facts and Figures 
<http://www.mdba.gov.au/about-basin/irrigated-agriculture-in-the-basin>. 
54 Murray-Darling Basin Authority, Water <http://www.mdba.gov.au/discover-basin/water>. 
55 D E Fisher, Water Law (LBC Information Services, 2000), 1. 
56 National Water Commission, above n 43, 19. 
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significant differences between the countries in terms of both water availability and water 
demand.57  The application of English common law doctrines was inappropriate for the 
nature of Australian water resources, and resulted in the development of inadequate water 
governance regimes.58  
 
With the growth of the nation came recognition of the need to plan for the use and 
development of water resources in order to facilitate economic development. As Australia 
was heavily reliant on agriculture for its economic growth, water was viewed as a key 
component in government policies designed to increase agricultural output. Surface water 
resources were over-allocated in most key agricultural regions, which combined with natural 
climate variations created increasingly severe and more frequent water availability issues. 
Groundwater resources were over exploited and lacked adequate oversight and monitoring 
to ensure future availability. By the turn of the twenty first century, Australia was 
experiencing its most severe drought in recorded history. Pressure was placed on Australian 
governments, especially the federal government, to develop an adequate response to the 
desperate state of Australia’s water resources. The great diversity of relevant stakeholders 
(agricultural industries, indigenous communities, environmentalists, etc…) and the 
complexity of the social, economic and scientific issues involved made for a novel policy 
challenge. These challenges were further exacerbated by the distribution of powers between 
the Commonwealth and state/territory governments, as under the stewardship of 
state/territory governments Australia’s water resources had deteriorated significantly.  
 
By the 2000’s, a number of Australian capital cities were under severe water restrictions, 
whilst significant rivers no longer reached the sea. A national perception of state/territory 
government policy failure led to calls for increased Commonwealth involvement in water 
management.59 Given its significant value as a natural resource, understandably a number of 
state governments were wary of accepting this Commonwealth incursion into an area which 
had traditionally fallen under the ambit of state control. The foundations of this federal 
division of powers can be found in the Australian Constitution, which fails to adequately 
address environmental management generally, or water management specifically. Under the 
                                                          
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Kate Stoeckel, Romany Webb, Luke Woodward and Amy Hankinson, Australian Water Law (Thomson 
Reuters 2012) 6. 
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Constitution, the Commonwealth possesses no direct legislative power to legislate with 
respect to water resources.60 However, despite this absence of direct regulatory authority, 
the Commonwealth has a range of mechanisms available to exert control over water 
management within, and between states/territories.61  This ranges from the provision of 
conditional financial assistance to the states (s 96) to the use of indirect legislative power 
(for example, the external affairs power).62 There is only one specific express limitation on 
the Commonwealth’s power over state water resources.63  
 
Section 100 stipulates that the Commonwealth ‘shall not, by any law or regulation of trade 
or commerce, abridge the right of a State or of the residents therein to the reasonable use of 
the waters of rivers for conservation or irrigation.’ Unfortunately, the content, scope and 
nature of this limitation on Commonwealth power and the meaning and application of the 
‘right’ or ‘rights’ referred to are still unclear. However, it is clear why the section was 
originally included within the Constitution. At the time of its birth, certain states were 
concerned about the need to prevent a Commonwealth takeover in this area.64 In particular, 
they were concerned that the Commonwealth might legislate to ‘ensure river navigability’ 
to the detriment of state irrigation interests.65 Although the High Court has had a number of 
opportunities to clarify the interpretation of the section, unfortunately it has failed to provide 
clear direction, resulting in the current uncertain state of the law.66  
 
Despite this uncertainty, it is evident that the Commonwealth has significant legislative and 
political scope to mount a national response to Australia’s water issues. The gradual increase 
in Commonwealth involvement has been evidenced through the creation and expansion of 
Commonwealth laws, policies and institutions governing water management. The first 
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significant move towards Commonwealth direction in the area occurred in 1994 with the 
introduction of the COAG Water Reform Framework.67 The ‘most controversial elements’ 
of the Framework reform agenda were ‘the formal allocation of water to the environment’ 
and the ‘separation of water property rights from land title’.68 Both of these reforms were 
aimed at improving the sustainability of water resource management. In order to implement 
the reforms agreed to in the Framework Agreement, six state/territory jurisdictions reformed 
their relevant water legislation (two had already done so), facilitating inter alia the allocation 
of environmental water and the separation of water access entitlements from land titles.69   
 
Developing on this foundation, in 2004 the National Water Initiative (NWI) was introduced 
to ‘complement and extend’ the 1994 reform agenda.70 The NWI functions as Australia’s 
key water policy document, guiding the implementation of further reforms. 71  The NWI 
required the COAG parties to agree to a number of objectives, which would cumulatively 
lead to the ‘economically efficient’ use of water and improve ‘environmental water 
outcomes’.72  The third biennial assessment of the implementation of the NWI in 2011 
revealed that although the reforms have ‘delivered substantial improvements in the way 
Australia manages its water resources… there are areas where implementation can improve, 
and new challenges have arisen’.73 Accordingly, the (recently decommissioned) National 
Water Commission has called for ‘renewed political commitment’ to national reform, in 
order to ensure that the NWI fulfils its objectives.74  
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As a result of the 1994 and 2004 reforms, Australia is now home to the world’s most 
advanced water trading market, worth approximately $1.4 billion dollars.75 The development 
of the Australian water market was facilitated by the separation of water access rights from 
land, in order to enable trading. 76  The rationale for water trading is that scarce water 
resources will be allocated according to the highest valued use. 77  Although the 
implementation of trading in water access entitlements has not been free from criticism, it is 
undeniable that water trading has had a significant impact on water distribution and 
allocation. As noted by the National Water Commission, water trading has delivered 
significant economic benefits and ‘has been a major success story in water policy reform’.78 
The Commission argues that traditional approaches to water resources management could 
not have achieved these results, stating that ‘it is inconceivable that centrally determined 
systems of water provision to competing users would have enabled the flexible movement 
and reallocation of water that has occurred over the past decade.’79 
 
2.5.3 The Water Act 2007 (Cth) and the MDB 
The exertion of Commonwealth power reached a significant peak in 2007, with the 
introduction of Australia’s first national piece of water management legislation, the Water 
Act 2007 (Cth) (‘Water Act’). The Water Act established a co-ordinated national approach 
to the management of Australia’s largest river system, the Murray-Darling Basin (MDB). It 
was also in itself a landmark piece of Australian legislation, representing an unprecedented 
expression of Commonwealth power over an area formerly solely governed (largely 
separately) by five state/territory governments. As noted by Kildea and Williams, the 
legislation represented a departure from a general trend whereby ‘the Commonwealth has 
largely been unwilling to use its coercive powers to wrest control of rivers management from 
the states’.80  
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The Act provides for the creation of a ‘Basin Plan’ to guide the sustainable management of 
the Basin’s water resources.81 A new Commonwealth authority created under the Act (the 
Murray-Darling Basin Authority) was tasked with the duty of creating the Plan, which has 
been described as ‘one of the most controversial pieces of public policy in recent history’.82 
Under the Act, the Authority is required to develop a Plan which limits the amount of water 
capable of being diverted from the river system to sustainable levels, known as Sustainable 
Diversion Limits (‘SDLs’).83  
 
Draft versions of the Plan were met with significant opposition and criticism from various 
stakeholders, including irrigators, environmentalists and scientists. Famously, one version 
of the Plan was publicly burnt by a discontent irrigator, protesting the Authority’s 
methodology for arriving at the SDLs.84 The final version of the Plan, which has now passed 
into law, is also not free from criticism.85 Some critics have argued that the SDLs set under 
the Plan are inadequate for achieving sustainability, whilst others have argued that they go 
too far and prioritise environmental outcomes over social/economic outcomes.86  
 
The issue of how to balance sometimes competing social, economic and environmental 
considerations has been at the heart of many water law and policy debates in Australia, 
especially in regards to the Water Act. The objects of the Act are outlined in Section 3, which 
states that one of the objects is to ‘give effect to relevant international agreements’.87 In 
giving effect to these agreements, the Act aims to promote the management of the Murray 
Darling’s water resources in ‘a way that optimises economic, social and environmental 
outcomes’.88 Since the Act’s introduction, significant legal and political debate has focused 
on the interpretation of the requirement that ‘economic, social and environmental’ resources 
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should be optimised.89 Although the Act explains that these outcomes should be optimised, 
it provides minimal guidance on how these different factors should be prioritised.90 
 
In 2010, Water Minister Tony Burke sought legal advice regarding the prioritisation of these 
factors,91 in response to significant opposition to the Murray-Darling Basin Authority’s 
Guide to the Proposed Basin Plan.92 The Australian Government Solicitor advised that ‘the 
overarching objective of the Act and the Plan is to give effect to relevant international 
agreements’, and that ‘both the Convention on Biological Diversity and the Ramsar 
Convention on Wetlands appear to frame their environmental obligations in ways that permit 
consideration of social and economic factors’.93  However, some commentators argued that 
the balance used by the Authority in designing the Guide inappropriately prioritised 
environmental outcomes.94 Legal advice from Professor George Williams advised that the 
MDBA was required to ‘give primacy to the environment’ in order to ‘faithfully implement’ 
the international agreements referred to in the legislation.95  
 
However, others argued that what was required was a ‘balance’ between environmental and 
socio-economic factors. For example, the NSW Irrigators’ Council argued that ‘the Objects 
of the Water Act (Cth) 2007 are not reflected in the balance of the Act and, in particular, in 
the priorities of the Basin Plan.’96 According to their interpretation, the Act provides for 
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‘equal treatment between economic, social and environmental outcomes’ and that objective 
should be reflected in the Plan.97 However, Bonyhady argues that it is arguable whether the 
Act intended to achieve a ‘balance’ between these factors, given the context of its enactment 
in 2007.98 He notes that that during parliamentary debate, there had been ‘no talk of triple-
bottom line’, and there ‘was no suggestion that all three factors should be treated equally’, 
and ‘no discussion of balance’.99  
 
Determining the correct prioritisation of these factors has significant practical implications. 
Under the 2010 approach which prioritised environmental considerations, the MDBA 
proposed to set the reduction in average surface water diversions at 3-4,000 GL.100 After a 
process of political compromise resulted in an interpretation which encouraged a ‘balancing’ 
of these factors, this figure was reduced to 2,750 GL. 101 It is anticipated that reducing 
consumption by this amount will help ‘bridge the gap’ between current levels of use, and 
the Sustainable Diversion Limits (SDLs) established under the Basin Plan.102 As of 30th 
September 2014, the Commonwealth had recovered ‘1,908 GL (long-term equivalent) of the 
2,750 GL reduction in surface water’.103 However, those who subscribe to an interpretation 
of the Act which prioritises environmental factors, maintain that a reduction of 2,750 GL is 
inadequate for returning the basin to environmental health.104  
 
Whilst the legal argument in favour of this approach is arguably stronger than the argument 
in favour of a ‘balancing’ approach, from a pragmatic perspective it must be accepted that 
political considerations will influence whether ‘legislation intended to prioritise the 
environment actually results in the environment being put first’. 105   As has been 
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demonstrated over the course of the water reform debate in Australia, attempts at prioritising 
the environment which involve reducing water use rights can be highly politically divisive. 
Despite this and other challenges however, the fact remains that Australia’s water reform 
experiment in the MDB has been in many respects a policy success. As noted by Skinner 
and Langford, the legislation ‘is an ambitious reform agenda that aims to recover water for 
the environment to an extent that is as yet unprecedented globally’.106 In terms of outcomes, 
they observe that the Act ‘has led to increases in irrigation productivity, significant 
environmental benefits, and higher water security for all water users, which will improve 
resilience and adaptive capacity for future droughts and climate change’.107 
 
The environmental benefits associated with the Water Act reforms are undeniable, yet 
difficult to quantify. As reported by the Commonwealth Environmental Water Office, ‘[a]s 
at 31 December 2015, over 5,183 gigalitres of Commonwealth environmental water has now 
been delivered to rivers, wetlands and floodplains of the Murray-Darling Basin.’ 108 
However, Crase et al argue that ‘too much emphasis’ has been placed on ‘the volume of held 
water as an indicator of environmental benefit’ and a presumed causal relationship between 
increasing held water and increasing ‘environmental benefit’.109 They argue that this is 
regrettable as ‘continued focus on volumetric measures as a policy ambition disguises 
important nuances, especially when it comes to environmental water management’.110 In 
particular, they note the non-linear nature of ‘trade-offs’ between lowering SDLs and 
impacts on irrigators.111 They observe that ‘halving SDLs will not halve the environmental 
benefit and may well inflict monetary disadvantage on some irrigators for no recognisable 
gain on the environmental front.’112 
 
Conflict over appropriate volumetric water allocations in the MDB, and the prioritisation of 
the environment over other interests has led to various legal challenges to water reform 
legislation. Some particularly relevant cases hail from NSW, as a result of its experience 
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with the introduction of new water management legislation designed to address the fact that 
‘NSW was at the limits of its available water resources’ and ecological degradation of water 
resources was resulting in ‘water quality problems, loss of species, wetland decline and 
habitat loss’.113  
 
In 2009, the case of ICM Agriculture Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (2009) 240 CLR 140 (‘ICM’) 
was considered by the High Court, involving a challenge to the validity of a licence 
conversion effected under new NSW legislation which resulted in a reduction of the 
plaintiffs’ water access entitlements.114 The entitlements were reduced as part of a broader 
scheme to return the system to a state of environmental health and put the aquifer ‘on a more 
sustainable footing’.115  Although the challenge was ultimately unsuccessful on various 
grounds, it served to demonstrate the difficulty of balancing the State’s duty and right to 
regulate water in the public interest, with the interests of private beneficial users of water.  
The case confirmed that regulation of water resources is the responsibility and the right of 
government, as water is fundamentally a public resource. Accordingly, if altering the nature 
of private rights to the resource is necessary to achieve sustainable management, then that 
falls within the scope of the government’s power. Although it was acknowledged that this 
may inevitably disadvantage certain users in an economic sense, it is in the interests of all 
users that the long term interest in the viability of the resource is protected through taking 
preventative action to ensure sustainability.  
 
Following in the wake of ICM, a similar unsuccessful challenge was brought by different 
parties before the NSW Land and Environment Court in 2013 in the case of Arnold v 
Minister Administering the Water Management Act 2000 (No 6) [2013] NSWLEC 73 
(‘Arnold’).116 The judgment in Arnold provides an interesting insight into the complexities 
involved in balancing the sometimes competing water management principles contained 
within post-reform era water legislation. The judge noted that ‘[r]ights to use water are of 
critical importance not just to those who are interested in particular water entitlements but 
to society as a whole’, and emphasised the importance of noting the objectives of the 
legislation, which were to ‘[p]rovide for the sustainable and integrated management of the 
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water sources of the State for the benefit of both present and future generations’. 117 
Accordingly, the judge held that in making water sharing plans, the Minister was obliged to 
‘give priority to protection of the water source’, and to apply the principles of ecologically 
sustainable development (ESD).118 In particular, he clarified that in stating that ‘the social 
and economic benefits to the community should be maximised’, the legislation should not 
be interpreted as requiring the Minister to ‘maximise the social and economic benefit to the 
community’.119  Rather, the Minister was only required to ‘take all reasonable steps to 
generally promote [the water management] principles as a whole’.120 Taken as a whole, it is 
clear that the principles have a protective focus. Of the eight general water management 
principles included in the statute, six have an environmental protection aim. Accordingly, it 
would seem unreasonable to interpret the statute as requiring the Minister to effectively 
prioritise social and economic benefits in light of the clear and consistent focus on 
sustainable management.  
 
The outcomes of both of these challenges (ICM and Arnold) to legislation prioritising 
environmental protection of water resources are indicative of a broader shift in Australian 
water law, policy and management. Where legislation governing the management of water 
resources has a clear protective aim, absent any legal wrong or contrary indication, judges 
will interpret that legislation in accordance with Parliament’s intention – to prioritise the 
protection of the environment. This judicial interpretation approach applies even where 
doing so may result in negative social and economic consequences for individuals, or 
communities. As noted by Chief Justice of the Land and Environment Court of NSW, the 
judiciary has ‘an important role to play in explicating, upholding and enforcing the law in 
relation to the sustainable use of Australia’s water resources’.121 For instance, he argues that 
where existing water use rights are modified by a statutory regime intended to achieve 
sustainability, judges may need to engage in ‘strict interpretation and application of any 
exception for existing users’ in order to ‘ensure that the purpose of the policy and any legal 
reform is not frustrated’.122 
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2.5.4 Monitoring and assessment of key water management reforms 
In order to achieve effective water management and to support the key water reforms in the 
Basin, it is necessary to provide for ‘robust, independent and transparent monitoring and 
assessment’.123 Over the past ten years, the National Water Commission (NWC) provided 
independent oversight of national water reform efforts, through a variety of mechanisms.  
As explained by the NWC, it performed numerous functions, including the promotion of 
‘informed debate about water issues ranging from urban water management to 
improvements in the operation of water markets and responding to the emerging impact of 
coal seam gas developments on water resources’.124 In 2014, the Australian Government 
announced its intention to dismantle the NWC, following the completion of the National 
Commission of Audit. The rationale provided was that in light of ‘the substantial progress 
already made in water reform and the current fiscal environment, there is no longer adequate 
justification for a stand-alone agency to monitor Australia's progress on water reform’.125 
The Senate Committee tasked with reviewing the proposed legislation which sought to 
dismantle the Commission recommended in favour of the Government’s proposal.126  
 
Dissenting voices were provided by Labor, the Greens and an Independent, who all 
questioned whether the alleged economic gains justified the loss of Australia’s only source 
of truly independent oversight at the federal level in this area.127 The Commission was the 
‘only independent federal body that [tracked] water policy’ in Australia, and performed a 
number of vital functions, including providing advice to COAG and the Australian 
Government on water policy. 128  The Commission was also tasked with auditing ‘the 
effectiveness of the implementation of the Murray-Darling Basin Plan’ and promoting water 
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reform.129 Dismantling the NWC has resulted in the discontinuation of a number of these 
functions, 130  with remaining functions divided amongst a variety of existing agencies, 
including the Department of the Environment and the Productivity Commission. 131 
However, various interest groups have raised opposition to this institutional substitution. For 
example, The Australian Conservation Foundation argued in its submission that abolishing 
the Commission represents a ‘backward step’ for Australian water management.132 They 
argued that delegating responsibilities to the Productivity Commission could ‘result in 
another wave of conflicts over water due to the absence of what all sides regard as a well-
respected expert independent body.’ 133  Other groups challenged the necessity of an 
independent expert body in this context. For instance, the National Irrigators’ Council 
supported the reforms, and argued that removal of the NWC provided ‘an opportunity to 
reduce red tape’ and to ‘refine and improve upon the often cumbersome monitoring, auditing 
and reporting burdens placed on industry and state agencies.’134  
 
Regardless of the perspective adopted, it is clear that removal of the NWC will have 
implications for the way in which the NWC’s functions are performed. One of the most 
important functions of the Commission was monitoring progress towards the 
implementation of the NWI. Accordingly, disbanding the Commission may have 
implications for the continuing progress of the NWI. In this regard, the Water Services 
Association of Australia argued that by removing the Commission, Australia has lost 
‘national water leadership and the fearless advice and independent custodianship of the 
National Water Initiative’. 135  Arguably, dedicating an independent body to the task of 
overseeing the implementation of the NWI helps to ensure that water reform remains a key 
policy issue for government. This function of the NWC in relation to the NWI was noted by 
the outgoing Chair of the NWC, who raised concerns over the tendency of Australian 
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governments to prioritise water reform as a policy issue during periods of water stress, and 
to ‘remove resources from water management in times of good supply’. 136 She argued that 
‘this waxing and waning does not reflect the productivity gains from more efficient water 
management, both rural and urban, nor does it encourage innovation’.137 Further, she noted 
that it ‘also risks Australia not being well positioned to respond effectively in the future to 
the opportunities and challenges posed by economic restructuring, global markets, climate 




In the Commission’s fourth and final assessment of the NWI, it concluded that Australian 
water reform is at a ‘crossroads’.139 It explained that ‘many reform gains are now taken for 
granted’ and that the ‘multi-party support’ that had been crucial to the success of the NWI 
was ‘at risk of breaking down’.140 The Chair noted that the combined impact of improved 
water availability and institutional change may operate to jeopardise the future of water 
reform in Australia, as water as a policy issue now ‘has less presence on the national political 
agenda’.141 She argued that in light of the removal of various key water institutions, both 
water management generally and the NWI specifically would ‘no longer have a clear 
position within the COAG forum’. 142  However, despite the removal of the NWC, 
independent monitoring of the implementation of the Basin Plan and the operation of the 
Water Act will continue. For instance, in 2014 an Independent Review of the Water Act was 
conducted by an expert panel, which held consultations and received public submissions on 
the operation of the Act. The panel concluded that whilst significant achievements have been 
made in relation to the implementation of the Basin Plan, ‘there is still much to do to ensure 
that it is implemented in full and on time by 1 July 2019’.143 
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143 Commonwealth of Australia, Report of the Independent Review of the Water Act 2007, Commonwealth of 
Australia 2014 (2014), 9 <http://www.environment.gov.au/system/files/independent-review-water-act-
2007.pdf>. 1st July 2019 is the date at which the SDLs come into effect. For the Government’s response to 
the Review, see: Australian Government Department of Agriculture and Water Resources, Report of the 
Independent Review of the Water Act 2007 Australian Government Response (2015) 
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2.5.5 Water quality and pollution management in the MDB 
 
2.5.5.1 Water quality and pollution issues in the MDB 
There are two main types of water pollution in Australia; point source and non-point source 
(‘diffuse’) water pollution.144 As the name suggests, point source water pollution refers to 
pollution which can be traced to an identifiable location/point (such as industrial waste from 
a pipe), and diffuse source water pollution refers to pollution which enters waterways from 
various ‘points’ (such as agricultural run-off).145  Legal regulation of water pollution in 
Australia adopts this distinction by establishing distinct regimes for the regulation of each 
source type. Up until recent decades, focus was predominantly placed on the regulation of 
‘point source’ water pollution.146 Not only is the source of this pollution easier to identify 
and therefore regulate, but it was also traditionally the more significant water pollution 
problem. However, increasingly ‘diffuse’ source water pollution has gained significance, 
both in terms of impact on the environment and as a policy priority for water management. 
Throughout the MDB, diffuse source water pollution is a significant issue, particularly in 
relation to excessive salts, nutrients and sediments.147  
 
The sources of diffuse water pollution are linked to land-use and consumptive water use. 
According to the latest edition of the Australian Bureau of Statistic’s Water Account 
Australia, agriculture continues to consume the largest volume of Australia’s water (52% in 
2009-2010).148 Due to the quantity of water used by the agricultural industry in Australia, 
and the impacts of agriculture on land and the hydrological cycle, agriculture has a very 
significant impact on both the quantity and quality of Australia’s water resources. Key 
impacts include agricultural run-off, nutrient enrichment and chemical contamination,149 
                                                          
<http://www.environment.gov.au/system/files/resources/6b4a93b6-e3ac-4efa-8b10-
f16dbe1a4d45/files/government-response-water-act-review.pdf>. 
144 Some parts of this section contain material published in Meg Good, 'Water Pollution: Treated Seriously, 
or Seriously in Need of Treatment?' (2014) 113 Precedent 23. 
145 Department of Environment and Resource Management (QLD), Caring for our water (2012) 
<http://www.derm.qld.gov.au/environmental_management/water/caring_for_our_water/index.html#managin
g_water_quality>. 
146 Rebecca Nelson, 'Regulating Nonpoint Source Pollution in the US: A Regulatory Theory Approach to 
Lessons and Research Paths for Australia' (2011) 35 University of Western Australia Law Review 340, 341.  
147 Murray-Darling Basin Authority, Water Quality <http://www.mdba.gov.au/basin-plan-roll-out/water-
quality-and-salinity>. 
148 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Water Account Australia 2009-2010 (2011) 
<http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Lookup/CAE301277A675941CA257956000E646E?opendocume
nt>. 
149 Agriculture and Resource Management Council of Australia and New Zealand and Australian and New 
Zealand Environment and Conservation Council, Rural Land Uses and Water Quality: A Community 
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which can affect the quality of both surface water and groundwater resources.150 These 
problems are difficult to manage as they are created by the cumulative actions of numerous 
often non-identifiable individuals and entities. As the MDB is Australia’s most crucial 
agricultural region, many of the Basin’s diffuse source water pollution issues can be 
attributed to agricultural land use.151 The following section considers the respective roles of 
the Commonwealth Government and the Basin state/territory governments in regulating 
water quality and pollution in the Basin.  
 
2.5.5.2 Role of the Commonwealth 
Management of water quality and water pollution in the MDB primarily occurs at the 
state/territory level. However, the Commonwealth does have a role to play in regulating 
water quality in the Basin. Under the Water Act, one of the stated ‘purposes’ for the Basin 
Plan (which are designed to further the ‘objects’ of the Act) is the requirement that the Plan 
must provide for ‘Basin-wide environmental objectives for water-dependent ecosystems of 
the Murray-Darling Basin and water quality and salinity objectives’.152 In order to ensure 
that the specified purposes are adequately implemented, the Act stipulates the mandatory 
content of the Plan. A number of the specified ‘matters’ for inclusion in the Plan impact on 
the regulation of water quality in the Basin.153 However, the Act specifically states that ‘the 
control of pollution’ is one of the express matters which may not be dealt with directly by 
the Basin Plan.154 Presumably this express exclusion was incorporated into the Act in order 
to ensure that the federal legislation did not intrude on pre-existing state-based arrangements 
for pollution control.  
 
Despite this, the Commonwealth is not impotent in terms of addressing water pollution in 
the Basin. There is scope for the Commonwealth to address pollution impacts on water 
resources through Australia’s principal environmental legislation, the Environment 
Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) (‘EPBC Act’). The EPBC Act 
                                                          
Resource Document (2000) <http://www.environment.gov.au/water/publications/quality/pubs/rural-land-
uses-paper9.pdf>. 
150 Ibid 19.  
151 See Schedule 10 of the Basin Plan which outlines the key causes of water quality degradation in the 
Basin.  
152 Water Act 2007 (Cth), s 20 (c).  
153 Ibid s 22 (1).  
154 Section 22 (10) explains that ‘a provision of the Basin Plan has no effect to the extent to which the 
provision directly regulates: (a) land use or planning in relation to land use; or (b) the management of natural 
resources (other than water resources); or (c) the control of pollution.’   
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provides for the protection of ‘matters of national environmental significance’ (MNES) 
through the establishment of a federal assessment and approval process. The Act defines a 
number of specific MNES, also known as ‘triggers’. Water impacts can be considered where 
for instance, a proposed action may have a significant impact on Ramsar wetlands. 155 
Recently, water resources were included as an additional MNES, creating a ‘water trigger’ 
limited to the ‘impacts of proposed coal seam gas and large coal mining developments on 
water resources’.156 The absence of a more generally applicable water trigger is partly due 
to the fact that the Act is limited to the regulation of those subject matters which can be 
supported under the external affairs power by reference to Australia’s international 
environmental obligations,157 and partly due to the fact that the states/territories are primarily 
responsible for environmental impact assessment, the management of water resources and 
pollution control. 
 
Although the Commonwealth is increasingly becoming more involved with water 
management generally, addressing water pollution issues still remains predominantly within 
the domain of state/territory jurisdiction. The division of responsibilities between the two 
levels of government was outlined in the 1992 Intergovernmental Agreement on the 
Environment. Although the Agreement does ‘not constitute a binding legal document’,158 it 
does set out the ‘responsibilities and interests of the Commonwealth’ in relation to ‘national 
environmental matters’. 159  These responsibilities include ‘facilitating the co-operative 
development of national environmental standards and guidelines’. 160  In 1997, these 
respective roles were further qualified by the Heads of Agreement on Commonwealth and 
                                                          
155 As declared by the Minister to be a declared Ramsar wetland, or under Art 2 of the Convention on 
Wetlands of International Importance especially as Waterfowl Habitat (Ramsar Convention), opened for 
signature 2 February 1971, 996 UNTS 245 (entered into force 12 December 1975): Australian Government, 
Wetlands of international importance (Ramsar wetlands) (2011) 
<http://www.environment.gov.au/epbc/protect/wetlands.html>. 
156 Department of the Environment (Cth), Water Resources – 2013 EPBC Act Amendment – Water Trigger 
<http://www.environment.gov.au/epbc/what-is-protected/water-resources>. 
157 As explained by Gerry Bates (above n 4, 80), the EPBC Act must ‘reflect appropriate means of, and be 
adapted to’ the numerous international treaties it relies upon: Convention Concerning the Protection of the 
World Cultural and Natural Heritage, opened for signature 23 November 1972, 1037 UNTS 151 (entered 
into force 15 December 1975); Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially as Waterfowl 
Habitat (Ramsar Convention), opened for signature 2 February 1971, 996 UNTS 245 (entered into force 12 
December 1975); Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals, opened for 
signature 23 June 1979, 1651 UNTS 333 (entered into force 1 November 1983); Convention on International 
Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, opened for signature 3 March 1973, 993 UNTS 243 
(entered into force 1 July 1975).   
158 Bates, ibid. 
159 Australian Government, Intergovernmental Agreement on the Environment (1992) [2.2.1].   
160 Ibid [2.2.1 (iii)].  
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State roles and responsibilities for the Environment (‘Heads of Agreement’), which inter alia 
clarified that the Commonwealth has an interest in the ‘development of agreed strategies and 
programmes to prevent and ameliorate land and water degradation…’161  
 
In keeping with these statements, in the context of water pollution policy the 
Commonwealth’s role has primarily involved the development of national guidelines, 
standards and strategies and the provision of funding. Numerous policy initiatives are 
underway at the Federal level to address water pollution generally, and specifically in the 
MDB. As noted earlier, the principle national initiative with respect to water management is 
the ‘National Water Initiative’ (NWI).162 The NWI has numerous objectives, including 
the overall objective of returning Australia’s water resources to environmental health. 163 
Accordingly, the NWI requires Australian governments to work cooperatively to 
achieve water reform goals, including those relevant to improving Australia’s overall 
water quality standards, monitoring and outcomes. 164 The Initiative supports, and is 
supported by, a range of other relevant national water/environment initiatives, such as 
the National Water Quality Management Strategy (‘NWQMS’) and Caring for our 
Country.165   
 
The NWQMS is a national strategy consisting of national water policy objectives, the 
establishment of a process for developing management plans for water resource areas, 
and the development of water quality guidelines. 166  Under the ‘auspices’ of the 
NWQMS, a set of national water quality guidelines were developed - the Australian and 
New Zealand Guidelines for Fresh and Marine Water Quality (‘Water Quality 
Guidelines’). 167  As explained by the Australian and New Zealand Environment and 
                                                          
161 Council of Australian Governments, Heads of Agreement on Commonwealth and State Roles and 
Responsibilities for the Environment (1997) [28]. 
162 Commonwealth of Australia, Intergovernmental Agreement on a National Water Initiative (2004) 
<http://www.nwc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0019/18208/Intergovernmental-Agreement-on-a-national-
water-initiative2.pdf>. 
163 Ibid.  
164 Under the NWI, the Federal and state/territory governments are required to submit implementation plans 
which detail how they intend to implement the Initiative.  
165 Australian Government, Caring for our Country (2012) <http://www.nrm.gov.au/>. 
166 Department of the Environment (Cth), National Water Quality Management Strategy (2012) 
<http://www.environment.gov.au/water/policy-programs/nwqms/index.html>.   
167 Australian and New Zealand Environment and Conservation Council and Agriculture and Resource 
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Conservation Council and Agriculture and Resource Management Council of Australia and 
New Zealand, the ‘guidelines are not mandatory, nor should they be regarded as such’.168 
Rather, the Water Quality Guidelines ‘provide recommendations that water managers can 
use to guide practice and formulate policy’, whilst still enabling states/territories to adopt 
protective measures adapted to the needs and requirements of their own jurisdictions.169  
 
The Caring for Our Country initiative (mentioned above) replaced a previous national water 
initiative – the National Action Plan for Salinity and Water Quality (‘NAPSWQ’).170 An 
assessment of the factors that led to the relative failure of the NAPSWQ concluded that 
numerous issues that contributed to its failure have not ‘been adequately addressed’ by its 
replacement Caring for Our Country.171 As the program is still in its early stages, it is 
difficult to assess its effectiveness in overcoming these challenges. Overall, at the national 
policy level the Commonwealth has tended to focus on water quantity and availability issues, 
rather than water quality/pollution issues (as is evident in the focus of the COAG water 
reform agenda).172 However, the Water Act represents a significant reform in this regard, as 
the Act requires the development of a Water Quality and Salinity Management Plan 
(‘WQSMP’) under the Basin Plan. The WQSMP is guided by the principles of ESD, and is 
intended to build on the NWQMS and the Basin Salinity Management Strategy.173 It outlines 
the key causes of water quality degradation in the Basin, sets water quality objectives for 
Basin water resources and establishes water quality targets.174  
 
The national policies and plans discussed in this section encourage and facilitate consistency 
between jurisdictions and provide state/territory governments with crucial policy guidance. 
However, national policies and guidelines have to be interpreted and applied within the 
contexts of the broader land use, environment and resource planning regimes established 
                                                          
168 Ibid 4.  
169 Ibid.  
170 Australian Government, National Action Plan for Salinity and Water Quality Archive (2008) 
<http://www.napswq.gov.au/napswq/index.html>. 
171 David J Pannell and Anna M Roberts, 'Australia's National Action Plan for Salinity and Water Quality: a 
Retrospective Assessment' (2010) 54 Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 437, 454.  
172 Council of Australian Governments Standing Council on Environment and Water, COAG Standing 
Council on Environment and Water Terms of Reference (2012) 
<http://www.scew.gov.au/publications/pubs/coag-standing-council-on-environment-and-water-terms-of-
reference.pdf>. 
173 Murray-Darling Basin Authority, Water Quality and Salinity Management Plan (2011) 
<http://www.mdba.gov.au/sites/default/files/archived/proposed/FS_WQSMP.pdf>. 
174 Basin Plan 2012 (Cth), Ch 9. 
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under state/territory jurisdictions. Accordingly, the effectiveness of these policies is not only 
contingent upon the adequacy of their content, but also on the nature and extent of their 
implementation at the state/territory level.  
 
2.5.5.3 State/territory water quality and pollution management in the MDB 
As noted above, water quality and water pollution are primarily managed at the state/territory 
level. Each Australian State/Territory has established a statutory pollution control regime, 
which consist of a broad range of environmental, planning, land use, development and 
natural resource management laws and policies. Although the relevant government 
departments and agencies involved in pollution control regulation differ between the States, 
some form of environment protection authority operates in each jurisdiction. As explained 
by Romany Webb, environmental protection authorities in the states/territories ‘have four 
key tools available to them to protect water quality and prevent pollution’. Namely, ‘state 
environment protection policies’, ‘licensing controls over activities that may cause 
environmental harm’, ‘notices requiring persons to stop polluting or harming the 
environment, and/or remedy the environmental damage they have caused’ and ‘pollution 
offences’.175 In recognition of the inevitability of some degree of water pollution, all of the 
regimes focus on pollution prevention and control, rather than attempting to eliminate water 
pollution completely.176  
 
Although approaches to water pollution regulation and management differ between the 
Basin states/ACT, to gain an understanding of the general regulatory approach it is useful to 
examine one jurisdiction in particular detail. As the most populous Basin state, the 
jurisdiction of New South Wales (NSW) provides a suitable case study. 
 
Regulation of water pollution in NSW 
A range of authorities are responsible for responding to water pollution in NSW, including 
water corporations, local councils, Catchment Management Authorities and the 
                                                          
175 Romany Webb, ‘Water Quality’ in Kate Stoeckel, Romany Webb, Luke Woodward and Amy Hankinson, 
Australian Water Law (Thomson Reuters, 2012) 531, 557.  
176 As noted by Lyster et al in the context of NSW’s pollution regime: Rosemary Lyster, Zada Lipman, 
Nicola Franklin, Graeme Wiffen and Linda Pearson, Environmental and Planning Law in New South Wales 
(Federation Press, 2009), 478.  
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Environment Protection Authority (EPA).177 The principal piece of legislation addressing 
pollution of the environment in NSW is the Protection of the Environment Operations Act 
1997 (NSW). In relation to the specific issue of water pollution, the Act imposes a general 
prohibition on the pollution of waters.178 Unless one of the stipulated defences applies (for 
instance, if a polluter acted within the scope of a relevant licence), any person found in 
violation of the prohibition will be guilty of an offence and liable for significant financial 
penalties.179 The Act establishes a licencing regime which essentially creates ‘licences to 
pollute’ under specified conditions. These licences may be revoked by the Minister if the 
licence holder is found guilty of a ‘major pollution offence’, as defined under the Act.180  
 
In order to ensure that violations are identified and investigated, relevant authorities are 
granted various investigative powers under the Act, including powers to acquire 
information/records and search and entry powers.181 The effectiveness of these powers for 
identifying and preventing water pollution is largely contingent on the extent of their 
utilisation by relevant authorities and the perception of their use by those the Act intends to 
regulate. However, identifying water pollution incidents is not the sole responsibility of the 
relevant authorities. Under the Act, there is a duty to notify relevant authorities of any 
'pollution incident' which causes 'material harm to the environment'.182 The Act stipulates 
the class of people who owe the duty to notify, such as the occupier of premises on which 
the pollution incident occurs.183 It is an offence to breach the duty, punishable by significant 
financial penalties. 184  The imposition of this duty to notify supports the pollution 
management regime established by the Act as it provides relevant corporations and 
individuals with an incentive to notify authorities about pollution incidents which may be in 
contravention of the provisions of the Act. Indeed, the Act specifically states that the duty 
applies even where ‘to do so might incriminate the person or make the person liable to a 
penalty’. 185  A range of penalties are provided for under the Act. As explained by the 
                                                          
177 Office of Environment & Heritage (NSW), Contacts for Water Pollution  
<http://www.environment.nsw.gov.au/pollution/water.htm>. 
178 Protection of the Environment Operations Act 1997 (NSW) s 120.  
179 Ibid s 123. Cases where such penalties have been applied, include: EPA v Waste Recycling and 
Processing Corporation (2006) 148 LGERA 299; EPA v CSR Building Products Ltd [2008] NSWLEC 224. 
Further cases are cited in Lyster et al, above n 176, 510 n 71.  
180 Protection of the Environment Operations Act 1997 (NSW), s 82 (1).  
181 Ibid ss 190-210.  
182 Ibid s 147.  
183 Ibid s 148.   
184 Ibid s 152.  
185 Ibid s 153 (1).  
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Environmental Defender’s Office (NSW), the Act 'contains three different enforcement 
mechanisms: pollution notices, criminal prosecutions and civil action.’186  
 
The Department of Environment and Climate Change (NSW) notes that there ‘is a long 
history of successful enforcement’ of the Act.187 Whilst not all jurisdictions in Australia have 
always enjoyed a similar enforcement record with their pollution control regimes, it is 
evident that the mere existence of such penalties can have a regulatory impact, even in the 
absence of completely adequate enforcement. This argument is supported by John 
Braithwaite’s concept of a ‘regulatory pyramid’ which gradually escalates in seriousness, 
ranging from the use of persuasion at the bottom of the pyramid, to the prosecution of 
criminal offences at the top of the pyramid (to be used as a last resort or for extremely serious 
offences).188  However, as argued by Rob White, ‘[t]he contingencies of the regulatory 
pyramid are such that there is a lack of a pyramid as such if the peak is never attained (that 
is, the ‘big stick’ is never or rarely used).’189 According to Government reports, the EPA in 
NSW ‘has averaged about 100 prosecutions per year for pollution offences’ since its 
inception.190 However, as noted by Lyster et al, there has been a ‘decline in prosecutions for 
more serious offences’ over recent years, with a corresponding ‘large increase in penalty 
notices’. 191  Arguably this trend does not necessarily render the regulatory pyramid 
ineffective, as the regime has been in operation for over a decade now and therefore a culture 
of compliance has presumably developed.  
 
There is also a role for civil society in the enforcement of water pollution laws. For example, 
under the Protection of the Environment Operations Act 1997 (NSW), ‘any person’ may 
bring civil proceedings to ‘remedy or restrain’ breaches of the Act.192  The broadening of 
standing in NSW is representative of a more general trend, which aims to empower the 
                                                          
186 Environmental Defender’s Office (NSW), Water, Air and Noise Pollution 
<http://www.edo.org.au/edonsw/site/factsh/fs04_1.php>. 
187 Department of Environment & Climate Change (NSW), NSW Diffuse Source Water Pollution Strategy 
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191 Ibid 530.  
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community to take on a more significant role in environmental law enforcement.193 There 
are a variety of rationales for this development, including the argument put forward by Hon 
Justice Brian J Preston of the Land and Environment Court of NSW. He argues that ‘[i]n 
order for environmental laws to be effectively enforced, it is not sufficient to rely on public 
authorities to do the enforcing.’ 194  This sentiment is shared by a broad range of 
commentators, and receives particular support from public interest environmental law 
organisations, such as the Australian Network of Environmental Defender’s Offices 
(ANEDO).195 Whilst it may be possible for environmental laws to be effectively enforced 
by public authorities alone, it is certainly beneficial to also enable community members and 
public interest organisations to aid the enforcement of water pollution laws. However, as 
noted by Roberts and Craig, the absence of a ‘litigious culture in Australia’ can limit the 
effectiveness of these sorts of provisions.196 
 
Regulation of diffuse source pollution in NSW 
Complementing NSW’s regulation of point source water pollution, the State also has in place 
a regulatory regime for the control and management of diffuse source water pollution. The 
key policy document governing this area is the NSW Diffuse Source Water Pollution Strategy 
which was made in recognition of the fact that ‘diffuse source water pollution remains one 
of the biggest challenges in improving water quality for government, industry and the 
community.’197 The Strategy notes the complex array of initiatives, policies, bodies and 
strategies already in operation by numerous different authorities to address various aspects 
of diffuse water pollution. It identifies and discusses a number of 'impediments' currently 
impacting on the management of diffuse source water pollution, including the need to 
provide adequate resources/skills/expertise, and the need for 'greater coordination between 
different industry groups and government'.198 In contrast to the regulation of point source 
                                                          
193 However, as noted by Hon Justice Brian J Preston, in the absence of a ‘statutory standing provision, the 
person needs to establish standing under the common law test’: Justice Brian J Preston, 'Enforcement of 
Environmental and Planning Laws in New South Wales' (Paper presented at the Law and Sustainability 




194 Ibid 2.  
195 Australian Network of Environmental Defender's Offices, About Us <http://www.edo.org.au/>. 
196 A M Roberts and R K Craig, ‘Regulatory Reform Requirements to Address Diffuse Source Water Quality 
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water pollution, the Strategy emphasises the fact that the management of diffuse source 
water pollution is an area ‘where standards and norms are not yet well established’.199 In 
recognition of the ‘complex temporal and spatial interaction of multiple pollutants from 
multiple sources’, the Strategy establishes a Priority Action Plan (PAP) which focuses on 
‘minimising pollutant loads at the source by focusing on land uses and related management 
practices’ (emphasis added).200 
 
The serious issue of groundwater pollution is also being addressed. The State Groundwater 
Policy is the key groundwater policy in NSW which operates within the general legislative 
framework which regulates impacts on groundwater.201 The Policy incorporates a variety of 
more specific groundwater policies, such as the Groundwater Quality Protection Policy.202 
The Groundwater Quality Protection Policy furthers the aims of broader state natural 
resource management goals, such as the state target of improving groundwater quality by 
2015. 203  Importantly, the Policy adopts an ‘integrated approach to groundwater 
management’, which requires that ‘groundwater issues must be considered in relation to 
surface water management and land use planning decisions.’ 204  This is important as it 
recognises the reality of the hydrological cycle by encouraging policy to avoid artificially 
compartmentalising different elements of the water cycle (i.e. surface water, groundwater, 
etc…) and regulating different pollution types (i.e. land/water/air pollution) under separate 
regimes. This approach is representative of a broader trend towards acknowledgment of the 
inter-dependency of natural systems in the design of pollution regulation.205 A trend which 
has manifested in increasing integration of the concept of ‘integrated natural resource 
management’ and the associated concept of ‘integrated catchment management’.206 In NSW, 
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Catchment Management Authorities (CMAs) created under the Catchment Management 
Authorities Act 2003 (NSW) have been established to pursue the goals of integrated natural 
resource management. 207  This move towards integrated catchment management has 
occurred across Australia, and constitutes a positive development for water pollution 
regulation.  
 
2.5.5.4 Monitoring and reporting on water quality in the MDB 
Critical to the successful implementation of the water quality and pollution laws and policies 
at both the Commonwealth and state/territory levels, is the establishment of adequate and 
effective water quality monitoring and pollutant monitoring systems. At the Commonwealth 
level in relation to the Basin Plan, the MDBA, Commonwealth Environmental Water Office 
and the Department of the Environment are all responsible for monitoring and evaluation of 
Basin water resources.208 Monitoring and reporting guidelines have also been developed 
under the NWQMS. The Australian Guidelines for Water Quality Monitoring and Reporting 
(‘Monitoring Guidelines’) acknowledge that ‘[w]ater quality guidelines and standards can 
only be developed with data from monitoring’.209 As with the Water Quality Guidelines 
discussed above, the Monitoring Guidelines are not ‘prescriptive’.210 They are intended to 
provide an outline of ‘approaches and attitudes that have been shown to be effective in water 
quality monitoring’.211  
 
However, as noted in the Australian Natural Resources Atlas, comprehensive water 
quality monitoring is complicated and resource intensive. Despite an annual investment 
of approximately $150 million, ‘water quality monitoring in Australia, has a limited ability 
to assess and report on the status of Australia's surface waters’.212 Due to the limitations of 
water quality monitoring, it is important that adequate information is recorded about the 
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sources and levels of pollutants entering Australia’s waterways. In order to address this 
issue, the Australian Government has implemented a national internet database called the 
'National Pollutant Inventory' (NPI) which provides information about the emissions of 93 
types of pollutant into the Australian environment.213 The NPI divides data into information 
about point source emissions (derived from data provided from relevant industries), and 
information about non-point source emissions (derived from government data). The database 
is a useful source of information on water pollution in Australia, providing the public, 
industry and government with an important overview of the concentrations, distribution and 
sources of a range of significant pollutants.  
 
However, whilst the NPI is a useful regulatory tool, it does suffer from a few shortcomings. 
One shortcoming relates to the legal status of the NPI.  The Inventory was established as a 
‘National Environment Protection Measure’ (NEPM) by a legislative instrument made under 
the National Environment Protection Council Act 1994 (Cth) (and corresponding 
State/Territory legislation).214 As the NPI is an NEPM, it has ‘no direct regulatory control 
over industry or individuals’, and there are ‘no sanctions for non-compliance’.215 Whilst this 
shortcoming does not render the NPI ineffective, it does mean that the NPI’s utility and 
relevance is dependent upon the continued cooperation of relevant stakeholders.  
 
The scope of the NPI is also potentially problematic. The NPI is not comprehensive as it 
does not cover all pollutants entering Australia’s waterways. Given the ever increasing list 
of pollutants threatening the health of water resources, it would be desirable to ensure that 
the only national inventory of pollutants entering the Australian environment is 
comprehensive. A further shortcoming of the NPI relates to the legal status of information 
provided for the purposes of reporting to the Inventory.  If information supplied under the 
NPI reveals that the business/organisation in question is in breach of legal obligations 
imposed under state/territory law, the information submitted to the NPI may not be used as 
‘evidence’ for the purposes of any ‘court proceedings’.216 Presumably this provision was 
incorporated to encourage honest reporting, a rationale which furthers the underlying 
                                                          
213 Department of the Environment (Cth), About the NPI <http://www.npi.gov.au/npi/index.html>. 
214 National Environment Protection (National Pollutant Inventory) Measure 1998 (Cth) made under s 14 (1) 
of the National Environment Protection Council Act 1994  (Cth).  
215 Lyster et al, above n 176, 478. 
216 National Environment Protection (National Pollutant Inventory) Measure 1998 (Cth) s 26 (1).  
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purpose of the NPI. However, it is arguably unfortunate that this may come at the expense 
of ensuring an adequate response to infringements of the law.    
 
Civil society also has a role to play in monitoring and reporting on water quality and 
pollution in the MDB. Civil society performs a number of functions including water quality 
monitoring, water pollution reporting, environmental law enforcement, raising awareness of 
water pollution and implementing measures to reduce water pollution. As noted in the 
Australian Guidelines for Water Quality Monitoring and Reporting, ‘community monitoring 
of water quality occurs throughout Australia’.217 Community participation in water quality 
monitoring both complements and acts as a ‘check’ upon government monitoring, through 
programs such as ‘Waterwatch’.218 However, the ability of community programs to perform 
these functions is contingent upon the degree of community involvement, and the response 
of government to community input.  
 
At present, Waterwatch has over 50 000 volunteers involved in the program, and has 
received significant support from the government.219 A 2005 review of community based 
monitoring in a region of South Australia highlighted the benefits and challenges associated 
with community based water monitoring.220 The main challenges reported, included 'the 
difficulty of renewing the membership and enthusiasm of community groups and the risk of 
losing experienced and capable participants and project officers'. 221  Despite these 
challenges, it is clear that community participation in water monitoring has discernible 




                                                          
217 Australian and New Zealand Environment and Conservation Council and Agriculture and Resource 
Management Council of Australia and New Zealand, above n 209, 3.  
218 Australian Government, About Waterwatch Australia <http://www.waterwatch.org.au/about.html>. 
219 Ibid.  
220 Patrick O'Connor, Paul Dalby and Annie Bond, A Review of Community Based Monitoring in the South 
Australian Murray-Darling Basin (2005) SA Murray-Darling Basin Integrated Natural Resource 
Management Group Inc 
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2.6 Challenges facing environmental protection in the Australian water 
management context 
As demonstrated by the foregoing discussion, there are various challenges facing 
environmental protection in the water management context in the MDB. All of the identified 
economic, political, social and legal challenges facing environmental protection generally 
are evident to some extent in this context. This section outlines some key challenges facing 
sustainable water management and the regulation of water quality and water pollution in the 
Basin. 
 
2.6.1 Challenges for achieving sustainable water management in the MDB 
As can be seen from the preceding discussion, there is a complex legal and policy framework 
in place to provide for sustainable water resources management in the MDB. At the 
Commonwealth level, the Water Act recognises the importance of sustainability 
considerations for planning and decision-making in relation to the Murray-Darling Basin’s 
water resources.222 However, despite significant reform over the past few decades, the Basin 
continues to face a wide range of water management challenges impeding the achievement 
of sustainability. Conflicting political interests and a history of over-allocation continue to 
delay the progress of crucial water reforms. As articulated by the current Chair of the 
MDBA, ongoing challenges include; ‘multiple layers of overlapping jurisdictions’, 
‘competing regulatory frameworks’, ‘opposing political imperatives’ and ‘ever-increasing 
community expectations’.223  
 
In 2015, a Select Committee on the Murray-Darling Basin Plan was formed to ‘inquire on 
the social, economic and environmental impacts’ of the Plan on regional Basin 
communities.224 Although the Committee is yet to report, hundreds of submissions have 
                                                          
222 As explained by Gardner, Bartlett and Gray, whilst the Act ‘does not expressly refer to ‘ecologically 
sustainable development’’, it does incorporate ESD considerations through other mechanisms. State/territory 
water resources management legislation in each of the Basin jurisdictions also recognises the importance of 
ensuring the sustainability of the resource for the future. However, as noted by Gardner, Bartlett and Gray, 
‘only the objectives of the South Australian Act contain an unqualified substantive objective of ecologically 
sustainable development’: Alex Gardner, Richard Bartlett and Janice Gray, Water Resources Law 
(LexisNexis Butterworths, 2009), 51. 
223 Craig Knowles, ‘Sustainable Development and Climate Change: Practical Solutions in the Energy-Water 
Nexus’ (Speech delivered at the UN General Assembly – Thematic Debate, New York, 16 May 2013) 2 
<http://www.un.org/en/ga/president/67/issues/climatechange/Panellists/Craig%20Knowles%20Speech%20to
%20PGA%20Debate%2016%20May%202013.pdf>. 
224 Select Committee on the Murray-Darling Basin Plan, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into the Murray-
Darling Basin Plan (2015).  
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been received from individuals and organisations involved in the management of the MDB. 
According to the MDBA’s submission, ‘implementation by Commonwealth and state 
agencies is on track’, 225  and reforms are already delivering environmental benefits. 226  
However, various submissions questioned the design and implementation of the Plan. For 
instance, the NSW Farmers’ Association submitted ten recommendations for reform, 
including urging immediate ‘discussion of scenarios where there may be alternatives to 
achieving environmental outcomes without removing productive water from the basin’.227 
The Association argued that it ‘is undeniable that removing productive water from 
businesses and from communities’ will have a ‘large’ impact on regional communities.228  
 
The Australian Conservation Foundation and Environment Victoria in comparison 
contended that ‘overall, the evidence to date suggests that the actual impacts of the Plan on 
irrigation-dependent communities are relatively small’.229 These divergent perspectives are 
representative of a broader divide between relevant stakeholders in the Basin concerning the 
appropriate balance to be achieved between social, economic and environmental factors. 
Further debate exists as to the appropriate means of achieving this balance. Finding a way 
to address the interests and concerns of all relevant stakeholders, whilst pursuing the 
overarching aim of returning the Basin to ecological health constitutes arguably the most 
significant legal and policy challenge in the MDB.  
 
2.6.2 Challenges for the regulation of water quality and water pollution in the MDB 
Improving the quality of Basin water resources has been a key priority of water reforms in 
the MDB. It is clear that whilst there are various systems at the Commonwealth and 
state/territory levels for ensuring adequate standards of water quality and water ecosystem 
health in the Basin, there are continuing challenges to address. Traditional command and 
control approaches have proven to be effective for addressing certain water pollution and 
quality issues. However, they have proven to be limited in regards to other issues, such as 
                                                          
225 Murray-Darling Basin Authority, Submission 243 to Select Committee on the Murray-Darling Basin Plan, 
Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into the Murray-Darling Basin Plan, 25 September 2015, 2. 
226 Ibid 31. 
227 NSW Farmers’ Federation, Submission 289 to Select Committee on the Murray-Darling Basin Plan, 
Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into the Murray-Darling Basin Plan, September 2015, 2. 
228 Ibid 9. 
229 Australian Conservation Foundation and Environment Victoria, Submission 147 to Select Committee on 
the Murray-Darling Basin Plan, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into the Murray-Darling Basin Plan, 
September 2015, 10. 
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addressing diffuse source water pollution. As noted by Neil Gunningham and Darren 
Sinclair, ‘…while ‘first generation’ water pollution problems caused by major point sources 
are now largely under control, far more complex challenges are posed by ‘second generation’ 
problems including, in particular, diffuse pollution (also called non-point source 
pollution)’.230 The comparative regulatory success of point source pollution, vis a vis diffuse 
source pollution has led one commentator to characterise non-point source pollution as ‘the 
unfinished business of water quality regulation in Australia.’231 Jurisdictions around the 
world have grappled with the problem of regulating diffuse source water pollution, which 
presents unique challenges which can not be adequately managed using regulatory 
mechanisms designed for point source pollution.232   
 
In line with Gunningham and Sinclair’s earlier work relating to ‘smart regulation’, they 
explored a range of potential policy options for addressing diffuse source water pollution 
from agriculture. One potential option they explored related to the use of ‘nutrient 
management plans’ (NMPs), which are currently in use in a number of overseas 
jurisdictions.233 NMPs can be defined as plans which ‘assist in quantifying the mass balance 
of nutrients produced and utilised on-farm, and in identifying potential risks of nutrient 
losses to surface water, waterways or groundwater.’234 Gunningham and Sinclair evaluated 
a range of potential implementation options, including the possibility of statutorily mandated 
NMPs.’ 235  Requiring agricultural industries to develop and abide by NMPs, or similar 
compulsory land use management plans, can be politically difficult to realise, and practically 
difficult to enforce. Although policy recognition of the crucial link between land use and 
water quality has been achieved in Australia, arguably it has failed to fully translate into 
meaningful policy action to effectively address diffuse source water pollution. This failure 
can be attributed to a number of issues, including the current reliance on ‘voluntarism’ in 
diffuse source water pollution regulation. 236  As noted earlier, traditionally the 
                                                          
230 Neil Gunningham and Darren Sinclair, ‘Policy Instrument Choice and Diffuse Source Pollution’ (2005) 
17 (1) Journal of Environmental Law 51, 51.  
231 Nelson, above n 146, 384.  
232 Michelle Perez, Regulating Farm Non-Point Source Pollution: The Inevitability of Regulatory Capture 
and Conflict of Interest? (2011) 9 Stockholm International Water Institute 
<http://www.siwi.org/documents/Resources/Best/2010/2011_OTWF_Michelle_Perez.pdf>. 
233 Gunningham and Sinclair, above n 230, 60.  
234 Australian Pork Limited, Sustainable Piggery Effluent Utilisation in Australian Farming Systems: Case 
studies on the development and implementation of Nutrient Management Plans at ten Australian piggeries 
(2011) 3 <http://www.australianpork.com.au/pages/images/Nutrient%20Case%20Studies%20-
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235 Gunningham and Sinclair, above n 230, 60.  
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Commonwealth has not taken an active role in regulating diffuse source water pollution, 
preferring to leave the issue to state/territory regulation. Rebecca Nelson argues that this 
‘federal reluctance to regulate non-point sources aggressively’ can be attributed to ‘the link 
between nonpoint pollution and land use.’237 Land use regulation, like water regulation and 
pollution regulation, has traditionally fallen within the ambit of state/territory regulation. 
Despite this, as noted above, under the Basin Plan addressing water quality and salinity 
issues has been made a priority issue. Although is not yet possible to predict whether this 
Commonwealth guidance is likely to be effective, it is certain that the management of diffuse 
source water pollution in the Basin will continue to pose a significant legal and policy 
challenge for years to come.   
 
2.6.3 Room for new approaches 
In recognition of the limited ability of traditional resource management and environmental 
protection approaches to ensure sustainable management of the MDB, new approaches have 
been trialled, including the adoption of market-based mechanisms. Whilst these mechanisms 
have enjoyed some success, there is certainly scope for the adoption of additional and 
alternative approaches to environmental protection in this context. Recent research exploring 
the achievements and limitations of cap and trade market-based instruments in the Australian 
water management context concluded that there have been various achievements, especially 
in the MDB.238 However, the research also identified various ‘flaws’ which the authors argue 
‘require water law and policy to look beyond markets’.239  
 
In particular, they argue that ‘accounting for wider social impacts of markets remains a 
significant challenge’, one which may be an inherently unavoidable limitation of market 
based mechanisms. 240  It is clear that market based mechanisms are not capable of 
comprehensively addressing the broad range of issues facing the MDB. In light of the 
limitations of market based mechanisms, it is worth considering the potential utility of rights-
based approaches for addressing the identified challenges.  
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What are the current approaches to environmental protection in Australia? Have these 
approaches been successful in achieving ecologically sustainable development? What are 
some of the key environmental protection challenges facing Australia? What approaches to 
environmental protection have been adopted in the Murray-Darling Basin water 
management context, and how effective have they been?   
 
 
The aim of this chapter was to outline the current systems for environmental management 
and protection in Australia, in order to identify whether there is scope for the consideration 
of new approaches. It also sought to define the concept of ecologically sustainable 
development, and to identify challenges currently facing environmental protection in 
Australia. It was explained that there are numerous challenges facing environmental 
protection, including economic, social, political and legal challenges. Whilst existing 
approaches to environmental protection have proven capable of addressing certain 
environmental problems, there has been an increasing move towards the adoption of new 
regulatory models in recognition of the changing nature of environmental issues.  
 
As water resources management has been selected as the case study for the thesis, the chapter 
focussed specifically on the approach to environmental protection in a specific water 
management context, namely sustainable water management and water quality and pollution 
regulation in the Murray-Darling Basin. It was demonstrated that despite significant reforms 
over the past few decades, there are various challenges facing environmental protection in 
this context. In particular, the challenge of balancing competing interests in the Basin’s water 
resources, and the challenges posed by complicated water quality problems (such as diffuse 
source water pollution). Having concluded that there is scope for adopting new approaches 
to environmental protection, the following chapter considers the possible utility of adopting 
rights-based approaches in Australia. Rather than viewing protection from environmental 
harm as a form of assistance granted by the state, rights-based approaches view 
environmental protection as a right owed by the state to its citizens. This conceptualisation 
of the human/environment relationship and the role of the state in the regulation of the 
relationship differs from existing approaches.  
 
As explained, the dominant approach at present is the command and control approach, which 
has had success in regulating some more traditional environmental problems but is limited 
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in its ability to adequately regulate newer more complicated environmental issues. Although 
alternative approaches are already being adopted, there is still significant room for the 







The Environmental Rights Revolution and Australia 
 
What is the environmental rights revolution, and why has it emerged? What are the types of 
environmental rights which have been recognised? Has Australia embraced the concept of 




Increasingly, jurisdictions around the world are looking beyond traditional legal approaches 
to environmental protection, and embracing the notion that human beings may possess 
certain fundamental ‘environmental rights’. Although these rights differ in terms of their 
scope, content, nature, form and objectives, they mainly seek to recognise some form of 
human right to live in a healthy and clean natural environment. David R Boyd has labelled 
this legal and political trend the ‘environmental rights revolution’, which he explains has 
emerged partly as a result of a broader rights revolution around the world. He defines the 
rights revolution as the ‘sustained, developmental process that has produced new rights or 
expanded existing rights, resulting in unprecedented recognition and protection of these 
rights and extension of rights to previously “right-less” groups’.1 The environmental rights 
revolution can be viewed as both part of this more general international trend towards human 
rights recognition and practice, and as a response to increasing concern over the adequacy 
of existing approaches to environmental protection.  
 
The aim of this chapter is to explore the nature of the environmental rights revolution, and 
to ascertain potential explanations for Australia’s reluctance to embrace a rights-based 
approach to environmental protection. It outlines various types of environmental rights, 
including more ecocentric rights concepts. A number of possible factors explaining 
Australia’s decision to eschew a rights-based approach to environmental protection are 
considered. These include the nature of the Australian legal and political system, the nature 
of Australian approaches to the protection of human rights and the environment, and the 
perception that current approaches to environmental protection are adequate. It is concluded 
that these factors do not constitute sufficient reasons to deny consideration of the potential 
benefits associated with the adoption of a rights-based approach in Australia. Accordingly, 
                                                          
1 David R Boyd, The Environmental Rights Revolution: A Global Study of Constitutions, Human Rights and 
the Environment (UBC Press, 2012) 7. 
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subsequent chapters consider the possibilities for implementation of a specific rights-based 





3.2 Rights-based approaches to environmental protection 
Boyd has methodically traced the march of the environmental rights revolution from its 
academic beginnings to formal legal recognition in numerous nation states. Through his 
extensive analysis of the nature and extent of its influence on legal systems, public opinion 
and environmental quality, he concluded that ‘...nations with constitutional provisions 
related to environmental protection have superior environmental records.’2 Whilst this is a 
promising finding, it does not necessarily indicate that rights-based approaches to 
environmental protection are necessarily an effective tool for improving environmental 
health and achieving ecologically sustainable development. As noted by Boyd, '[f]urther 
research is required to substantiate these initial results and determine whether there is a 
cause-and-effect relationship.'3  Jodoin supports the exercise of caution, and argues that 
‘further quantitative analysis is indeed required to control for the effect of many other 
confounding and intervening variables, such as the well-known influence of rising income 
levels on environmental performance.’4 
 
Even if it is not possible to substantiate a cause and effect relationship between legal 
recognition of environmental rights and improved environmental protection, as Boyd 
advocates, legal recognition could at the very least be ‘viewed as a useful additional tool for 
the societal actors engaged in the process of attempting to transform today’s unsustainable 
societies.’5 In support of this claim, his research reveals that legal recognition results in 
‘many of the anticipated benefits and few of the potential drawbacks forecast by legal 
experts’.6 These benefits include, but are not limited to, ‘providing an impetus for stronger 
legislation’, ‘bolstering the implementation and enforcement of existing environmental laws 
and policies’, ‘offering a safety net by filling gaps in environmental legislation’ and 
‘protecting environmental laws and regulations from rollbacks under future governments.’7 
Despite evidence of these benefits manifesting in practice, Boyd is careful to qualify his 
claim that ‘constitutional protection of the environment can be a powerful and potentially 
transformative step toward’ the goal of ecologically sustainable development, 8  by 
                                                          
2 Ibid 276.  
3 Ibid. 
4 Sebastien Jodoin, 'Should We Be So Positive About Environmental Rights: A Review of David R Boyd's 
The Environmental Rights Revolution' (2012-2013) 8 McGill International Journal of Sustainable 
Development Law and Policy 131, 138.  
5 Boyd, above n 1, 287.  
6 Ibid 251.  
7 Ibid 28.  
8 Ibid 3. 
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acknowledging that it should not be viewed as a ‘silver-bullet for today's environmental 
problems’.9 The utility of any legal approach to environmental protection must be viewed 
within the broader context of the myriad legal, political, social, economic and environmental 
challenges facing the achievement of sustainability. It would be unreasonable to expect any 
one approach to provide a solution to the large range of interrelated and complex 
environmental problems created by modern society.  Indeed, some commentators argue that 
‘[t]he challenges in overcoming unsustainability arguably go well beyond the empire of 
environmental law.’10 Whilst some have called for broader social structural change, others 
have advocated for reforms ‘within the system’. The environmental rights revolution 
represents an interesting compromise between these positions as it involves an important 
revision of the nature of the human/environment relationship, whilst utilising the existing 
legal/political architecture established by the human rights enterprise. As noted by Nickel, 
the ‘human rights movement has strong international recognition, support and 
institutions…to offer environmentalism’.11  
 
However, it is a matter of debate as to whether it offers a genuine alternative to existing 
approaches to environmental protection. For example, Boyd notes that ‘there are experts 
who believe that a rights-based approach to environmental protection is the only effective 
alternative to today’s market-based approach’, which they claim ‘is failing to adequately 
protect the environment’.12 However, it is arguable whether rights-based and market-based 
mechanisms are necessarily alternatives. Market-based mechanisms may be utilised to fulfil 
the rights and responsibilities established by environmental rights. For example, an 
environmental tax could be utilised as a mechanism to reduce the emission of a pollutant, 
thus contributing to an improvement in environmental health and therefore potentially 
assisting in the fulfilment of the right to a healthy environment. There may however be 
tensions between the underlying values relied upon by these different approaches. Rights-
based approaches conceptualise the human/environment relationship in terms of rights and 
                                                          
9 Ibid 42. 
10 Richardson notes that evolutionary psychologists ‘are helping to pinpoint some explanations in factors 
such as humankind’s modest capacity for cooperation and altruism beyond our immediate familial and tribal 
affinities, as well as our cognitive biases against acting for the long-term.’ Benjamin J Richardson, 'Book 
Review: The Right to a Healthy Environment: Revitalizing Canada's Constitution; The Environmental Rights 
Revolution: A Global Study of Constitutions, Human Rights, and the Environment' (2013) 179 British 
Columbia Quarterly 241, 241. 
11 Nickel cited in Tim Hayward, Constitutional Environmental Rights (Oxford University Press, 2005), 11.   
12 David R Boyd, The Right to a Healthy Environment: Revitalizing Canada's Constitution (UBC Press, 
2012) 35.  
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responsibilities, with human beings possessing a ‘right’ to some level of environmental 
health. It is possible that inconsistencies could be perceived between this conceptualisation 
of the relationship, and the market-based approach which views natural resources and the 
natural environment as being capable of constituting tradeable private human property.  
 
Similarly, it is debatable whether rights-based approaches offer genuine alternative guiding 
principles and objectives for environmental protection. The most influential and prevalent 
concept guiding environmental protection over the past 30 years has been the concept of 
‘sustainable development’. As noted by Fisher, whilst it is not necessarily ‘universally 
accepted, clear in concept or enforceable in practice’ it is ‘in one form or another…the 
fulcrum around which environmental law is evolving.’13 Although the concept is notoriously 
difficult to define simply, accurately, and with universal agreement, the most well-known 
formulation hails from the 1987 Brundtland Report, which defined sustainable development 
as ‘development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of 
future generations to meet their own needs.’14 It is important to consider whether the aims 
of sustainable development differ sufficiently from the aims of rights-based approaches to 
constitute true alternatives to the status quo.  
 
One potential point of distinction may lie in the way that rights-based approaches prioritise 
environmental protection considerations. Some critics argue that the concept of sustainable 
development is problematic on the grounds that it gives ‘priority to development’ over the 
environment.15 As Dresner notes, the ‘identification of sustainable development with the 
growth agenda has made radical environmentalists deeply suspicious of it.’16 Accordingly, 
there are concerns that the concept does not adequately achieve the necessary balance 
between the various often competing interests it attempts to reconcile. It is possible that 
rights-based approaches could offer alternative guiding principles for environmental 
protection, which may better assist in achieving an adequate balance between environmental 
protection considerations and competing interests.  
                                                          
13 Chris McGrath, Does Environmental Law Work? How to Evaluate the Effectiveness of an Environmental 
Legal System (Lambert Academic Publishing, 2010) 55.  
14 Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development: Our Common Future, UN Doc 
A/42/427 (1987) annex I.  
15 Simon Dresner summarising the views of Tim O’Riordan and Nitin Desai in Simon Dresner, The 




3.3 Emergence of the Environmental Rights Revolution  
As discussed above, the environmental rights revolution refers to a global trend towards 
legal recognition of rights relating to the human/environment relationship. Predominantly, 
these rights have been recognised in the form of constitutional rights. In order to understand 
why Australia has not joined this revolution, it is important to consider the factors motivating 
this global shift towards environmental rights recognition and advocacy.  
 
Although there are undoubtedly myriad potential explanations for the global emergence of 
the environmental rights revolution, arguably the following four factors have played a 
significant role:  
1. A perception that current methods for addressing the global decline in ecological 
health are inadequate;  
2. An increasing disenchantment with traditional environmental law;  
3. A desire to find a rationale for giving the interests of environmental protection 
increased prioritisation over potentially competing interests; 
4. The popularity of the ‘rights’ discourse as a means of protecting fundamental 
interests.  
 
Arguably, one of the main factors leading to the emergence of the environmental rights 
revolution is an increasing perception that current methods for addressing the global decline 
in ecological health are inadequate. Despite the existence of a plethora of international, 
regional and national regimes for environmental protection, environmental harm and 
ecological decline continue to persist. Understandably, this perception of ineffectiveness has 
contributed to a view that new and alternative approaches to environmental protection and 
regulation may be necessary. As explained above, it is possible that rights-based approaches 
may provide an avenue for giving the interests of environmental protection increased 
prioritisation over potentially competing interests. One possible way that rights-based 
approaches may facilitate increased prioritisation, is by operating as ‘trumps’ over other 
interests. 17  Rather than forcing environmental protection considerations to be balanced 
against competing interests, recognising that human beings have environmental rights may 
                                                          
17 The concept of rights as ‘trumps’ has been advocated by Dworkin (explored below in Chapter Four): 
Dworkin cited in Denise Meyerson, Jurisprudence (Oxford University Press, 2010), 244.  
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help to ensure that these fundamental interests are capable of ‘trumping’ less fundamental 
interests. As noted by Shelton, rights-based approaches ‘are preferred by many… because 
human rights are maximum claims on society, elevating concern for the environment above 
a mere policy choice that may be modified or discarded at will.’ 18 She further argues that 
‘the moral weight afforded by the concept of rights as inherent attributes that must be 
respected in any well-ordered society exercises an important compliance pull.’19 Weston and 
Bollier support this characterisation, explaining that the conceptualisation of rights as trumps 
acting as maximum claims on society, means that they are ‘not matters of charity, a question 
of favour or kindness to be bestowed or taken away at pleasure’.20 Rather, they argue that 
conceptualising rights in this way means that rights constitute ‘values or goods deemed 
fundamental and universal’.21 They qualify that although not ‘absolute’, these rights are 
‘superior to other claimed values or goods’.22 In other words, rather than the standard of 
environmental protection being determined as a matter of choice as a product of a 
cost/benefit analysis taking into consideration competing interests, the standard would have 
to be determined taking into consideration, as a matter of fundamental importance, the state’s 
duty to respect environmental rights.  
 
However, the ability of rights to act as ‘trumps’ over other interests is contingent upon the 
political and legal context in which they are intended to operate. For instance, various 
developing nations have broad rights guarantees in their domestic law, yet significant rights 
breaches in practice. Even in countries with strong legal and political institutions, legal 
recognition of a right does not necessarily guarantee its protection and fulfilment.  Boyd 
notes the continuance of racism and sexism in Canada, despite constitutional rights to 
equality as a prime example.23 However, he argues that ‘it is incontrovertible that rights have 
contributed to some amelioration of the wrongs they are intended to address.’24 Experience 
with human rights recognition and implementation in the decades since the recognition of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights demonstrates that acknowledging and 
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implementing rights can have significant impacts on human attitudes, behaviour and legal 
systems. Accordingly, the popularity of the rights discourse as a means of protecting 
fundamental interests is understandable, and may help to explain why an increased 
perception of environmental protection failure has led to increased environmental rights 
recognition.  
 
From the above discussion, it can be seen that there are numerous potential factors 
contributing to the emergence of the environmental rights revolution. In order to better 
understand the nature of this revolution, it is important to appreciate the different types of 






3.4 Types of environmental rights  
Environmental rights refer broadly to moral, political and legal rights which govern the 
relationship between humans and the natural environment. They can be divided into two 
main categories; rights possessed by human beings (environmental human rights), and rights 
possessed by natural entities (rights of nature).  
 
3.4.1 Environmental human rights 
Environmental human rights refer to human rights which govern the human/environment 
relationship. 25  Accordingly, they fall under the umbrella of human rights law. Under 
international human rights law, a distinction is drawn between civil and political rights (‘CP 
rights’) and economic, social and cultural rights (‘ESC rights’).  There are also categories 
referred to as ‘generations’ of rights, with three generations consisting of ‘first generation’ 
rights (CP rights), ‘second generation’ rights (ESC rights) and ‘third generation’ rights (a 
broad group of often contested rights).26 Environmental human rights exist across all three 
generations, and as noted by Alan Boyle, ‘do not fit neatly into any single category.’27 He 
argues that they ‘can be viewed from at least three perspectives, straddling all the various 
categories or generations of human rights.’28 The following section will consider each of 
these types in turn, assessing their relative potential benefits and challenges for 
environmental protection. 
 
3.4.1.1 First generation human rights  
There are various civil and political rights of relevance to the human/environment 
relationship. Although these rights do not have protection of the environment as their central 
aim, in keeping with the interrelated and interdependent nature of human rights, their 
recognition can impact on the human/environment relationship. For example, as noted by 
Boyle, ‘…existing civil and political rights can be used to give individuals, groups and 
                                                          
25 Environmental human rights can be distinguished from ‘ecological rights’. As explained by Taylor, 
ecological rights are ‘human rights which are subject to certain limitations’. Taylor explains that ‘[t]hese 
limitations recognize that individual freedoms are exercised in an ecological context, in addition to a social 
context’: Prudence E Taylor, ‘From Environmental to Ecological Human Rights: A New Dynamic in 
International Law?’ (1997-1998) 10 (2) Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 309, 309.  
26 Li-Ann Thio, ‘The Universal Declaration of Human Rights at 60: Universality, Indivisibility and the Three 
Generations of Human Rights’ (2009) 21 (1) Singapore Academy of Law Journal 293, 305. 






NGOs access to environmental information, judicial remedies and political processes.’29 
Ensuring adequate facilitation of these procedural guarantees, is in many ways a prerequisite 
to being able to fulfil substantive guarantees to a clean and healthy environment. An 
informed and politically empowered populace should, atleast theoretically, be more capable 
and motivated to encourage governments to uphold duties imposed by environmental rights. 
Boyle explains that CP rights can perform this ‘empowerment’ role by ‘facilitating 
participation in environmental decision-making and compelling governments to meet 
minimum standards of protection for life, private life and property from environmental 
harm.’30 
 
There are various benefits associated with utilising CP rights to pursue environmental 
protection goals. Firstly, it is undoubtedly less controversial to propose the ‘greening’ of 
existing human rights, than to propose the recognition of ‘emerging’ human rights. 
Accordingly, it is more likely that nation states will engage in legal recognition and practical 
implementation of CP rights. As CP rights are the most well accepted and widely recognised 
category of human rights, it is possible to utilise existing laws, regulations, policies and 
institutions to pursue the goals of environmental protection. As noted by Boyle, this 
approach ‘avoids the need to define such notions as a satisfactory or decent environment’, 
and in avoiding this definitional complexity also ensures that it ‘falls well within the 
competence of human rights courts’.31  However, both of these apparent benefits of an 
indirect approach to environmental protection through the fulfilment of CP rights, have 
associated disadvantages. Whilst avoiding defining the desired environmental standard 
sought to be achieved through rights recognition overcomes various political and 
institutional barriers, it does also pose a significant problem in terms of achieving 
environmental protection goals.  
 
As noted by Boyle, it means that ‘even those individuals who are victims of violations cannot 
ask a human rights court or the UN Human Rights Committee to decide in favour of 
environmental protection merely because they believe that is where the public interest is best 
served.’ 32 Rather, they ‘can only ask it to weigh their own rights against the public interest 
in some other value such as trade or development.’33 He explains that whilst this process 
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may achieve some benefits for environmental protection, ‘these will be incidental 
consequences, not the result of any broader commitment to a particular kind of 
environment.’34 Accordingly, whilst CP rights certainly have a role to play in environmental 
protection, they are not a sufficient mechanism by themselves. For this reason, it is important 
to consider the potential roles for second generation and third generation human rights.  
 
3.4.1.2 Second generation human rights  
Economic, social and cultural rights (‘ESC rights’) are related to, yet distinct from CP rights. 
Examples of ESC rights include the rights to education, health and an adequate standard of 
living.35 They are intended to ‘ensure the protection of people as full persons, based on a 
perspective in which people can enjoy rights, freedoms and social justice simultaneously.’36 
Although they do have a ‘collective dimension’, as with CP rights they are individual rights 
possessed by every human being. 37  However, unlike with most CP rights, ‘the rights 
involved require positive action by States rather than, as in the case of the majority of civil 
and political rights, mere recognition of individual's rights and corresponding non-
interference by the State.’38 However, as noted by Danilo Türk, in order for states to fulfil 
the duties established by ESC rights, ‘the people should be able to control and govern the 
State, which is only possible if civil and political rights are respected.’39 This highlights the 
importance of recognising the fundamental interdependence and indivisibility of human 
rights.  
 
In terms of utilising ESC rights as a means of improving environmental protection, it is 
increasingly being acknowledged that there may exist a human right to a healthy 
environment. This individual right can be conceptualised as both a derivative right of already 
internationally recognised ESC human rights (such as the right to an adequate standard of 
living and the right to health), and as an independent right. Boyle notes that the ‘main 
argument for this approach is that it would privilege environmental quality as a value, giving 
                                                          
34 Ibid. 
35 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 
993 UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 January 1976).   
36 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Fact Sheet No.16 (Rev.1), The Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1991) 3 < 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet16rev.1en.pdf >.  
37 United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, Can Each of Us Claim Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights? 
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38  Danilo Türk, Special Rapporteur, The Realization of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UN Doc 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/16 (3 July 1992) [12]. 
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it comparable status to other economic and social rights such as development, and priority 
over non rights-based objectives.’40 However, he warns that in raising the right to the status 
of other ESC rights, it leaves the right ‘vulnerable to tradeoffs against other similarly 
privileged but competing objectives, including the right to economic development.’41 Whilst 
this is an issue, arguably it is preferable to have the right considered in the balancing of 
competing rights as an equal ESC right, rather than not weighing into the balance at all.   
 
3.4.1.3 Third generation human rights  
Third generation rights differ from first and second generation rights, in both their nature 
and degree of acceptance. They are collective rights, addressing broad issue areas such as 
‘development, environment and peace’.42 Downs explains that ‘the goal of third generation 
human rights is to enhance and facilitate the fulfillment of first and second generation 
rights’.43 Rather than recognising the human right to a healthy environment as an individual 
ESC right, it is possible to recognise the right to a healthy environment as a collective third 
generation right.  Although this is the most controversial and least accepted version of the 
right, Boyle argues that it has numerous benefits over recognition of the right as an individual 
ESC right as it ‘would benefit society as a whole, not just individual victims’.44  
 
He also argues that it ‘would enable litigants and NGOs to challenge environmentally 
destructive or unsustainable development on public interest grounds’ and ‘would give the 
environmental concerns greater weight in competition with other rights’.45 Despite these 
potential benefits, due to the contested status of the third generation version of the right, and 
the practical complexities of its implementation, the individual ESC version of the right has 
been more widely adopted in domestic legal systems. Arguably, a number of the benefits 
outlined by Boyle could be realised through domestic legal recognition of an individual ESC 




                                                          
40 Boyle, above n 12.  
41 Ibid 2.  
42 Lucy Richardson, ‘Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (and Beyond) in the UN Human Rights Council’ 
(2015) 15 Human Rights Law Review 409, 411. 
43 Jennifer A Downs, ‘A Healthy and Ecologically Balanced Environment: An Argument for a Third 
Generation Right’ (1993) 3 Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law 351, 358. 
44 Boyle, above n 27, 35. 
45 Ibid.  
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3.4.2 Rights of nature 
The environmental rights revolution also encompasses more ecocentric conceptions of the 
human/environment relationship. 46  The rights of nature discourse advocates for a 
conceptualisation of this relationship as a relationship between rights-bearers. This body of 
thought is distinct from the human rights discourse, and challenges what one commentator 
has described as the ‘hegemonic status’ of human rights: 
Human rights discourse has assumed hegemonic status and is widely billed as “the only game in town” 
for environmental protection. Yet, many commentators have voiced serious concerns that a human 
rights model cannot address the root causes of environmental exploitation. To begin, the approach is 
overtly anthropocentric. Even the phrase “human rights and the environment” is species specific, 
focuses on “rights” which is an inherently individualistic concept and sets up an immediate dichotomy 
between the “human” and the “environment”.47 
 
Unlike the greening of existing human rights, or the recognition of a human right to a healthy 
environment, ‘nature rights’ perspectives involve a much more fundamental challenge to the 
status quo and the basic constitutive elements of modern societies. They represent a 
challenge to legal, political and economic systems based on the concepts of private property, 
capitalist accumulation of wealth and the power of corporations. Some of these approaches 
set the foundations for social change through legal reforms which recognise the ‘rights’ of 
nature as a whole, and of specific natural entities.48 The discourse is based on the central 
claim that natural entities possess rights simply by virtue of their existence. One of the most 
well-known advocates of this position is Christopher Stone, who authored the seminal book, 
Should Trees Have Standing? Stone’s thesis involves granting ‘legal rights to forests, 
oceans, rivers, and so-called “natural objects” in the environment.’49 He advocates for a 
‘guardianship approach’, whereby natural entities would possess legal standing, exercisable 
through a human guardian. 50  Although suggesting the concept provoked significant 
academic debate, as noted by Stone himself, it ‘had an impact on 'environmental law and 
ethics, quite out of proportion to its actual impact on the courts.'51 
                                                          
46 Parts of this section have been published in Meg Good, 'The River as a Legal Person: Evaluating Nature 
Rights Approaches to Environmental Protection in Australia' (2013) 1 National Environmental Law Review 
34.  
47 Peter Burdon, 'Environmental Protection and the Limits of Rights Talk' (2012)   
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48 See generally, James A Nash, 'The Case for Biotic Rights' (1993) 18 Yale Journal of International Law 
235; James L Huffman, 'Do Species and Nature Have Rights?' (1992) 13 Public Land Law Review 51.  
49 Christopher D Stone, Should Trees Have Standing? Law, Morality, and the Environment (Oxford 
University Press, 5th ed, 2010) 3. 
50 Ibid 18. 
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However, despite the failure to attract widespread support, the concepts articulated by Stone 
are beginning to find favour in a handful of legal jurisdictions around the world. For 
example, in 2008, Ecuador recognised the rights of nature in its Constitution by 
acknowledging that nature has the ‘right to exist, persist, maintain and regenerate its vital 
cycles, structure, functions and its processes in evolution’, and that humans have the 
corresponding right to ‘demand the recognitions of rights for nature’. 52  Since its 
introduction, a few legal challenges have been raised utilising the new provisions, with one 
resulting in a success for nature rights advocates.53 In 2011, an action was brought on behalf 
of an Ecuadorian river. The river had been polluted with the remnants of road construction. 
The court recognised the river’s right to flow, and issued an injunction preventing further 
contamination, as well as remediation and other orders.54  
 
Recognition of nature rights has also occurred in more developed nations, such as the United 
States of America (US) and New Zealand. In the US, the Community Environmental Legal 
Defence Fund (CELDF) has been assisting local communities to establish ‘Community Bills 
of Rights’ which assert the ‘right to local self-governance’ in jurisdictions across America.55 
These rights declarations additionally recognise ‘the right to clean air and water, sustainable 
energy, sustainable food systems, and the rights of nature’, and specifically prohibit 
‘activities that would violate those rights’.56 Although these declarations are of questionable 
legal validity, they have made an impact on environmental protection and citizen 
empowerment in a number of communities.57 Most recently, the CELDF was retained to act 
on behalf of a watershed, which is intervening in a legal suit challenging the validity of a 
local bill of rights declaration.58 The Fund reports that this is the first time that ‘an ecosystem 
in the United States [has] filed a motion to intervene in a lawsuit to defend its own rights to 
exist and flourish.’59  
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The concept of a non-human natural entity possessing legal personality has also been trialled 
in New Zealand, where a major river has recently been granted legal personhood.60 The river 
is recognised as possessing ‘the rights, powers, duties and liabilities of a legal person’, which 
are to be exercised through a ‘human face and voice’ appointed through partnership between 
the New Zealand Crown and the local māori ‘iwi’.61 The precise legal impacts of this novel 
reform will not be known until implementing legislation is passed. However, it is certain 
that this landmark agreement represents a significant development in the practical 
implementation of nature rights theory.  
 
Despite these examples of support for the concept of ‘nature rights’, there are numerous 
criticisms aimed at the concept, both in theory and in practice. From a theoretical perspective 
at the most basic level, there is no universal agreement as to the precise basis for these rights 
claims. It is possible to argue that natural entities possess rights as the product of some form 
of broader ‘right to life’ possessed by the Earth as a natural entity. However, this is open to 
question, as it is arguable whether individual rights for individual natural entities would 
necessarily result from a broader right to life possessed by the Earth. Moreover, it is 
debatable whether these entities are even capable of acting as rights holders.62 Elder argues 
that non-living natural entities are not ‘morally relevant’ as they lack sentience and are 
incapable of experiencing pain, and are therefore not capable of possessing ‘rights’.63 Whilst 
these are legitimate arguments against the recognition of such rights, it is important to note 
that there is an inherent ‘speciesism’ involved in any argument which seeks to reconcile the 
conferral of rights on human beings purely by virtue of their membership of the human 
species, whilst denying rights to other living and non-living entities on grounds that wouldn’t 
preclude humans from rights claims.64  
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Anthropocentric Interpretation of Environmental Rights' (2008) 86 (3) Texas Law Review 615, 635-636. 
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A further theoretical criticism takes issue with the presumption that natural entities have 
‘interests’, and that human beings are capable of identifying and representing those interests. 
For example, Huffman argues that Stone’s guardianship approach ‘fails because we humans 
cannot know what serves the interests of natural objects, even assuming that they have 
interests in any meaningful sense.’65 Such presumptions have been criticised as a form of 
hypocrisy by commentators who note that in attempting to give a voice to natural entities, 
and thereby avoiding anthropocentricism, nature rights advocates may be guilty of engaging 
in anthropocentric thinking, by presuming that ‘they know what is best for the natural 
environment’.66  
 
On a more pragmatic level, there are various issues facing practical implementation of the 
rights of nature. It is possible that the rights may be too broad to be capable of enforcement 
and recognition, or even if they are, their capacity to protect the interests of natural entities 
could be called into question in light of the continuing challenges facing the recognition and 
protection of more established human rights. Practical experience with existing nature rights 
recognition demonstrates the relevance of some of these issues. A prime case in point is the 
example of Ecuador’s constitutional recognition of the rights of nature. Mary Whittemore 
argues that ‘successful execution of the amendments is unlikely’ for various reasons.67 She 
argues that it is unlikely that the amendments will be effective in achieving their objectives 
of improved environmental protection, due to a range of factors, including: 'Ecuador's legal 
and political environment', 'lack of government accountability', 'legal barriers to 
implementation', 'past corruption in Ecuador's constitutional court' and 'procedural confusion 
over standing'. 68  In the eight years since the amendments were passed, the Ecuadorian 
government has achieved little in the way of ensuring the development of a conducive 
environment for their effective operation. 69  The reality remains that environmental 
degradation is still increasing in Ecuador despite the amendments, due largely to a 
fundamental inconsistency between the Constitution’s protection of the rights of nature and 
the government’s pursuit of profit.70  
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The experience of Ecuador demonstrates that stating that natural entities have rights which 
must be given serious consideration in decision-making affecting the environment will only 
have a chance of successfully contributing to environmental protection, if they are reinforced 
by a supportive institutional and political environment. Natalia Greene from the Fundación 
Pachamama (Ecuador) acknowledges that implementation of the provisions has been less 
than ideal, citing the challenges posed by Ecuador’s political and economic climate. 71 
However, she emphasises that the amendments have been a success in a broader sense. 
Recognition of the rights of nature represents a challenge to the dominant mindset which 
sees the law as a means of simply minimising or in some cases legitimising environmental 
harm.72  She notes that the amendments have transformed public debate in Ecuador from 
focussing on how mining should be regulated, to a debate about whether mining should be 
taking place at all.73 Similarly, Akchurin observes that ‘social movement actors’ have started 
to ‘refer to the constitution as the new normative vision of where they want Ecuadorian 
society to be headed’.74  
 
Despite these potential benefits, the practical workability of the ‘rights of nature’ are still 
largely unknown. There is no definitive exposition at the international level of the content 
of nature rights (although, there has been some debate over a proposal to introduce a charter 
of mother earth rights),75 and there are serious questions regarding who has authority to 
speak on behalf of natural entities. Accordingly, although the concept of granting nature 
‘rights’ is an interesting and important area for further research, it will not form the focus of 
this thesis in recognition of the unlikelihood of legal recognition in Australia. Given 
Australia’s reluctance to recognise various human rights (such as ESC rights), it is highly 
unlikely that an Australian parliament would recognise rights of a more controversial nature. 
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3.5 Environmental Rights and Australia 
Australia has thus far failed to embrace the environmental rights revolution. It is currently 
one of only fifteen nations (including Canada and the US) which does not recognise the 
human right to a healthy environment at the federal level.76 Australia’s premier piece of 
environmental protection legislation (Environment Protection and Biodiversity 
Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) (the ‘EPBC Act’)) does not contain any explicit environmental 
rights. Owing to the absence of a federal bill of rights, there is also no scope to recognise the 
right, or other environmental rights through the ‘greening’ of existing human rights. 
Similarly, at the state/territory level, there are no environmental rights included within bills 
of rights legislation in the ACT and Victoria. There have been no legislative attempts to 
introduce environmental rights at either level of government, and politically the issue has 
been relatively untouched. Despite this lack of legislative implementation, there have been 
some calls for recognition of environmental rights in Australia.  
 
In particular, support has been expressed by various non-profit entities for the legal 
recognition of the human right to water and some form of the human right to a clean and 
healthy environment. 77  For instance, the Environment Defenders Office (NSW) and 
Environment Defenders Office (Victoria) Ltd have recommended ‘specific protection of 
environmental rights either in the form of an encompassing right to a clean and healthy 
environment or a set of related environmental rights.’78 It is important to consider why 
Australia has failed to follow these recommendations to recognise environmental rights, in 
order to identify potential challenges for attempts to recognise the rights in the future. The 
following section discusses a number of possible factors contributing to the decision to 
eschew a rights-based approach to environmental protection in Australia. Namely, the nature 
of the Australian legal and political system, the nature of Australian approaches to protection 
of human rights and the environment, and the perception that current approaches to 
environmental protection are adequate.  
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3.5.1 Factors explaining Australia’s reluctance to join the environmental rights 
revolution  
 
3.5.1.1 Australia’s legal and political systems and approach to rights protection 
 
Due to its foundations as a former English colony, Australia has a common law legal system 
characterised by observance of the rule of law and the concept of representative and 
responsible government.  Interestingly, other similarly wealthy Commonwealth nations with 
common law legal systems, such as Canada and New Zealand, are also notable exceptions 
to the environmental rights trend.79 Countries with civil law legal systems appear more 
willing to recognise environmental rights, which is perhaps unsurprising given their general 
preference for codification of law over gradual incremental development through case law 
and precedent.80 In Australia, there is a longstanding preference for rights to be developed 
gradually over time through judicial precedent, rather than through broad rights declarations 
in legislation. Although Australia has not passed comprehensive legislation recognising the 
human rights contained within the major international human rights treaties (to which it is a 
party), it has various mechanisms in place for achieving human rights protection. This 
protection is achieved through a combination of constitutional interpretation, the common 
law, specific human rights legislation, the system of parliamentary democracy, and 
government policies intended to create a human rights culture. Due to this system of 
protection, it may be the case that there is a perception that the recognition of express 
environmental rights is unnecessary. Gellers’ research exploring the factors leading to the 
adoption of environmental rights within nation states found that ‘the worse a country’s 
human rights record in terms of its protection of civil liberties, the more likely it is to 
promulgate an environmental right in its constitution’.81  
 
There has been a traditional reluctance in Australia to engage in comprehensive recognition 
of human rights at the federal level. Despite significant public support for the introduction 
of a federal statutory bill of rights, and a 2009 recommendation from the National Human 
Rights Consultation Committee supporting the reform,82 the federal government has failed 
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to introduce a federal bill of rights. Although one state and one territory jurisdiction have 
enacted human rights charters,83Australia is yet to join the majority of the world’s liberal 
democracies by declaring a list of the fundamental rights of its citizens in one uniform 
legislative instrument or constitution.  
 
 
This reluctance to embrace broad rights declarations can be attributed to various factors, 
including (but not limited to):  
- A belief that the most effective way to secure rights protection is through gradual 
development of common law precedent and where relevant, legislative recognition of 
specific rights negotiated through the political process;  
- A concern that broad rights protection could lead to unintended and undesirable 
consequences;  
- A perception that broad rights declarations are inconsistent with the nature of Australia’s 
legal and political systems (for example, the notion of parliamentary sovereignty);84  
- A concern that providing legislative or constitutional recognition of broad human rights 
would place the judiciary in an inappropriate position, both in terms of interpretation and 
enforcement;  
- A concern that defining a list of comprehensive rights could actually serve to limit rights 
protection.85  
 
Those jurisdictions which have embraced rights declarations, have restricted their 
recognition to CP rights. As explained by Taylor, the ‘core concept’ of CP rights is ‘liberty 
of the individual, which is to be protected against the abuse and misuse of state authority’.86 
Arguably, these rights sit better with the underlying foundations of the Australian legal and 
political system, as both are built upon ‘the political philosophy of liberal individualism and 
economic laissez-faire’.87 As CP rights are liberty rights which grant citizens ‘freedom from’ 
certain treatment, but do not entail great demands upon the state,88 they are better suited to 
this underlying political philosophy. In contrast, ESC rights operate as ‘claims to social 
equality’ (i.e. positive rights), and accordingly where necessary aim to compel ‘state 
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intervention’ to achieve their fulfilment.89 The nature of ESC rights does not sit as well with 
the Australian legal/political system, and for this reason they have been consistently denied 
legal recognition at both the federal and state/territory levels (despite support for their 
introduction from various individuals, organisations, institutions and the general public).90  
As environmental rights generally fall within the classification of ‘second generation’ or 
‘third generation’ rights, and are by their very nature broad rights, it is perhaps unsurprising 
given the context outlined, that there has been a reluctance to afford them legal recognition. 
This conclusion is supported by Boyd’s research, which found that '[o]f the twenty-three 
nations employing exclusively common-law systems, only three have environmental 
provisions in their constitutions’.91 He argues that this ‘reflects the Anglo-American caution 
regarding constitutional recognition of social and economic rights’.92 
 
 
One of the main reasons for caution regarding the implementation of ESC rights in Australia 
relates to the role of the judiciary in their interpretation and enforcement. According to the 
concept of the separation of powers, the judiciary is only authorised to exercise judicial 
power, and must remain independent from the two political arms of government. Concerns 
over politicisation of the judiciary have been cited as reasons against the recognition of ESC 
rights at both the federal and state/territory levels.93 ESC rights often concern controversial 
topics involving issues of distributive justice. As noted by Meyerson, if ESC rights are made 
justiciable, ‘then courts are given the power to affect the distribution of resources’.94 For 
instance, in regards to the management of the natural environment, some critics argue that 
the courts are an inappropriate institution for the resolution of complex environmental 
regulation issues. As noted by Boyd,  ‘…critics argue [that] courts lack institutional capacity, 
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technical expertise, and resources required to address complex environmental issues and are 
the wrong place for resolving polycentric issues involving conflicting values and diverse 
interests.’95 In the US, the judiciary has been reluctant to adjudicate disputes of this nature 
due in part to its ‘apprehension about playing the role of arbiter of … value-laden and 
technical questions’, such as the meaning of ‘clean and healthy environment’.96 It is likely 
that the Australian judiciary would demonstrate similar caution over engaging in the 
determination of such questions, which are arguably more appropriately dealt with by the 
democratically elected legislature.  
 
 
3.5.1.2 Australian approach to environmental protection 
Australia’s approach to environmental protection is not characterised by a willingness to 
make broad sweeping guarantees of environmental protection through policy or law. The 
Australian Constitution does not contain recognition of the importance of environmental 
protection, and in fact contains no specific federal head of legislative power to enable the 
federal parliament to legislate directly with respect to environmental matters. Accordingly, 
the federal legislature must utilise heads of legislative power which do not specifically 
pertain to the environment (such as the external affairs power and the corporations power) 
in order to pass federal environmental laws. As a result of this constitutional lacuna, 
considerable uncertainty, conflict and debate has focussed on the respective roles of the 
federal and state/territory governments over environmental protection and natural resources 
management. Particularly, with respect to the management of critical natural resources, such 
as water.  
 
Similarly, in the US the ‘federal government has no general plenary authority to enact laws’, 
and has traditionally relied upon the commerce clause to achieve passage of environmental 
legislation. 97  Hill, Wolfson & Targ argue that the US legislature’s failure to embrace 
environmental rights can in part be attributed to this lack of direct constitutional power, 
rather than ‘any specific objection to creation of an environmental right.’98 It may be the case 
that Australia’s federal division of legislative power and environmental management 
responsibilities have similarly influenced attitudes regarding the necessity and desirability 
                                                          
95 Boyd, above n 1, 28. 
96 Ibid 391. 
97 Barry E Hill, Steve Wolfson and Nicholas Targ, 'Human Rights and the Environment: A Synopsis and 




of environmental rights recognition. There are also other aspects of Australia’s approach to 
environmental protection which may have influenced the decision not to embrace 
environmental rights. As noted in Chapter Two, Australia has mostly adopted traditional 
command and control approaches to environmental protection, situated within a broader 
framework designed to achieve the goal of ecologically sustainable development. A rights-
based approach would represent a potentially significant alteration to the status quo, as it 
represents a different conceptualisation of the human/environment relationship. As noted 
earlier, rather than conceptualising environmental protection as a service that the state 
chooses to provide, rights-based approaches conceive of environmental protection as a right 
owed to the citizenry by the state.  
 
3.5.1.3 Perception of effectiveness of current approaches to environmental protection 
It is possible that Australia has chosen not to adopt a rights-based approach to environmental 
protection due to a perceived lack of necessity. Unlike many other nations in the world, 
Australia can lay claim to a complex system of environmental laws, regulations and policies 
which are largely publicly accessible and enforceable (subject to certain qualifications and 
limitations). Examining the context within which other countries have embraced 
environmental rights perhaps sheds light on Australia’s decision not to follow suit. In many 
of these jurisdictions, environmental rights have been viewed as a means of pursuing 
environmental justice and empowering citizens who feel that the current law provides them 
with inadequate recourse for public participation in environmental decision-making.99 Some 
of the most ambitious environmental rights declarations have occurred in developing nations 
with far from impressive environmental protection track records. 100  In the context of 
governance systems struggling to achieve adequate protection of the environment due to 
broader governance issues, recognition of environmental rights may be perceived as more 
necessary. 
 
As can be seen from the discussion in Chapter Two, there are reasonable grounds for 
presuming that there may not be a significant need for the development of new approaches 
to environmental protection in Australia, given the operation of various functional systems, 
laws and processes. However, it remains that Australia is yet to achieve the goal of 
ecologically sustainable development, an aim at the heart of Australian environmental 
                                                          
99 For instance, Boyd’s research found that this particular benefit of recognition of the human right to a 
healthy environment was particularly pronounced in various developing nations: Boyd, above n 1, 239. 
100 For example, Ecuador (as discussed above).  
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regulation. Accordingly, there does appear to be space to explore new approaches to 







What is the environmental rights revolution, and why has it emerged? What are the types of 
environmental rights which have been recognised? Has Australia embraced the concept of 
environmental rights? If not, what are the possible factors explaining Australia’s 
reluctance? 
 
Australia is now part of a minority of countries which have failed to join the environmental 
rights revolution. The aim of this chapter was to explore the possible factors explaining the 
emergence of the environmental rights revolution around the world, in a bid to understand 
why Australia has exempted itself from this global trend. It was argued that the revolution 
has emerged as a result of various factors, including a perception that current methods for 
addressing the global decline in ecological health are inadequate, an increasing 
disenchantment with traditional environmental law, a desire to find a rationale for giving the 
interests of environmental protection increased prioritisation over potentially competing 
interests, and the popularity of the ‘rights’ discourse as a means of protecting fundamental 
interests. Understanding the factors leading to the emergence of the revolution at the 
international level sheds light on the possible reasons why Australia has failed to follow suit. 
In particular, the possible absence of a perceived need for alternative approaches to 
environmental protection, and the absence of a strong rights culture.  
 
It was explained that the Australian political and legal system has not traditionally embraced 
broad rights declarations as a means of protecting the interests of humans or the 
environment. This is partially due to a longstanding belief that the most effective way to 
secure such protection is through gradual development of common law precedent, and where 
relevant, legislative recognition of specific rights negotiated through the political process. It 
is also partly due to concerns that broad rights declarations are inconsistent with the nature 
of Australia’s legal and political system, and may lead to undesirable and unpredictable 
consequences. A further possible explanation for Australia’s choice to eschew a rights-based 
approach is the perception that recognition of environmental rights could be duplicative, 
unnecessary or even potentially counter-productive in light of Australia’s existing systems 
for environmental protection. Australian environmental law and policy is complex and 
operates at three governance levels (local/state/federal). Difficulties in predicting the 
potential impact of environmental rights recognition on these existing legal regimes may be 
one reason why this approach has not been actively championed. Moreover, there may be a 
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perception that environmental rights are unnecessary, as the current system may be viewed 
as operating relatively effectively.  
 
Despite this traditional reluctance to recognise broad rights declarations as a means of 
protecting fundamental interests, and the potential perception that environmental rights 
recognition is unnecessary and undesirable for achieving environmental protection goals, 
there is scope to consider the potential benefits of the application of a rights-based approach 
in Australia. As demonstrated in Chapter Two, Australia is still facing numerous 
environmental challenges, and therefore must remain open to consideration of new tools for 
environmental protection. Accordingly, the next chapter considers the international legal 
status, scope and content of the human right to a healthy environment, in order to ascertain 











Chapter Four  
International Legal Recognition of the Human Right to a 
Healthy Environment 
 
Can the human right to a healthy environment be established as a moral right? What is the 
legal status of the right under international law? What is the scope and content of the right, 
and what obligations does it impose on states? How can compliance with the obligations 




Over the past few decades, the possible existence of a human right to a healthy environment 
(‘HRTHE’) has attracted significant academic debate. This chapter aims to explore this 
debate, in order to determine whether the right is a fundamental human right necessary for 
the fulfilment of other human rights recognised under the principal human rights treaties. 
Commentators have argued for and against the existence of the right as a human right, with 
the weight of academic opinion arguably now weighing in its favour. However, the legal 
status, scope and content of the right under international law remains uncertain, largely due 
to the fact that the right has not been directly recognised under any binding global legal 
agreement.   
 
The chapter first considers whether the right can be established as a moral human right. 
Concluding that it is possible to mount a persuasive argument for the right’s existence as a 
moral human right, it then considers the legal status of the right at international law. It is 
argued that the right can most cogently be established as an implied right under the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature 16 
December 1966, 993 UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 January 1976) (‘ICESCR’), derived 
primarily from the rights to health and an adequate standard of living. As a derivative right, 
the precise content and expression of the right is uncertain as it has not been authoritatively 
articulated by a United Nations (‘UN’) body. Accordingly, as the UN has not yet recognised 
the right as an implied ICESCR right it is concluded that it is not yet possible to ascertain 
the precise content of the right.  However, it is acknowledged that some guidance on the 
right’s possible content can be ascertained from an examination of the content of the rights 
from which the HRTHE may be derived. Utilising this content, a number of potential 
obligations imposed by the right are outlined. Whilst these obligations have not been 
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articulated by an authoritative body, they suffice to demonstrate the possible obligations 
which may be associated with international legal recognition of the right as an ICESCR right. 
The chapter then turns to consideration of how compliance with the obligations imposed by 
the right may be assessed at the international level. It is concluded that due to the lack of 
guidance on the content of the right, it is not yet possible to define human rights indicators 
to measure progress towards domestic realisation of the right. However, it is argued that it 
is still possible to evaluate the possible benefits for domestic environmental protection 
associated with international legal recognition of the right. Accordingly, the subsequent 
chapter seeks to identify a number of benefits associated with the imposition of state 







4.2 Moral Right to a Healthy Environment 
 
In order to establish whether the human right to a healthy environment is capable of 
constituting a moral human right, it is first necessary to consider the nature of rights more 
generally. There is a vast body of literature dedicated to the deceptively simple question, 
‘what are rights?’ No one definition can be declared as objectively correct or authoritative. 
However, in their most basic sense, rights can be conceived as a means of asserting an 
entity’s entitlement (or ‘claim’) to something. This may be an individual person’s 
entitlement to be free from particular treatment by the state (such as the ‘right to freedom 
from torture’), or it may conversely refer to the state’s entitlement to exert a certain degree 
of power over individuals, in pursuance of the public interest (for example, a ‘right to 
detain’). Authority for these claims may be based on morality, or the law. Rights claims 
based on the law can be conceived as legal rights. Legal rights are ‘…rights which exist 
under the rules of legal systems or by virtue of decisions of suitably authoritative bodies 
within them’.1 As these rights are established under systems of law, they do not exist unless 
recognised either explicitly or implicitly within an established legal system.  
 
Conversely, moral rights are a species of right which can be claimed by human beings simply 
by ‘virtue of their humanity’.2 These rights have been referred to by various terms (including 
‘natural rights’), and are the subject of a range of theories addressing their existence, 
rationale, value and operation. Human rights can be classified as both moral rights and legal 
rights. As they are universal and inalienable by nature, they are a classic example of natural 
or moral rights. They are possessed inherently by every human being, irrespective of legal 
recognition. However, recognition of these rights under international law, and within the 
domestic legal systems of states, can also render them legal rights.3 For this reason, Hiskes 
explains that human rights occupy a ‘rather ambiguous position between the fully moral 
status of the seventeenth century ‘natural rights’ formulations and the positivistic ‘legal 
rights’ whose origin is in positive law.’ 4  He cites Habermas’ attempt to resolve this 
                                                          
1 Kenneth Campbell, Legal Rights (2013) Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-rights/>. 
2 Andrew Byrnes, Hilary Charlesworth and Gabrielle McKinnon, Bill of Rights in Australia: History, Politics 
and Law (UNSW Press Ltd, 2009) 2. 
3 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA res. 217A (III), UN Doc A/810 at 71 (1948) states that the 
‘foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world’ is the ‘recognition of the inherent dignity’ and ‘equal 
and inalienable rights of all members of the human family’. 
4 Richard P Hiskes, 'The Right to a Green Future: Human Rights, Environmentalism, and Intergenerational 
Justice' (2005) 27 Human Rights Quarterly 1346, 1349. 
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contradiction by suggesting that human rights can be viewed as ‘extra-positive’ rights.5 By 
this he means that they are ‘more than merely legal, although not quite fully universal moral 
rights.’6  
 
Determining the nature of human rights has important implications for ascertaining criteria 
for assessing whether or not a particular claim is worthy of the status of a moral human right.  
As noted by Weston, there are numerous fundamental questions about human rights which 
are ‘yet to receive conclusive answers’, including:  
‘Whether human rights are to be viewed as divine, moral, or legal entitlements; whether they are to be 
validated by intuition, custom, social contract theory, principles of distributive justice, or as prerequisites 
for happiness; whether they are to be understood as irrevocable or partially irrevocable; whether they are 
to be broad or limited in number and content – these and kindred issues are matters of ongoing debate and 
likely to remain so as long as there exist contending approaches to public order and scarcities among 
resources.’7 
 
These issues hint at the difficulty of agreeing upon criteria for ascertaining whether or not a 
particular claim is worthy of the status of a moral human ‘right’. One key theory posits that 
moral human rights exist to protect fundamental human interests.8 In order to qualify for the 
status of human rights, these interests must be ‘of sufficient importance to justify having 
institutionalised duties on the part of others to respect and protect those interests’. 9 
Therefore, according to this theory, in order to establish that humans have a moral right to 
healthy environment, it must first be determined whether they have an interest of sufficient 
importance to justify the imposition of duties upon others to protect, respect and fulfil that 
interest. Defining ‘importance’ for this purpose is problematic in itself. As noted by Jerome 
Shestack ‘…one may be speaking of one or more of the following qualities: (1) intrinsic 
value; (2) instrumental value; (3) value to a scheme of rights; (4) importance in not being 
outweighed by other considerations; or (5) importance as structural support for the system 
of the good life.’10 Fortunately, human rights law provides some guidance in this regard. 
International human rights treaties have consistently sought to protect fundamental human 
interests, which impact on the quality and continuance of human life. Existing human rights 
                                                          
5 Habermas quoted in ibid, 1350.  
6 Ibid. 
7 Weston quoted in Prudence E Taylor, 'From Environmental to Ecological Human Rights: A New Dynamic 
in International Law?' (1998) 10(2) Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 309, 316. 
8 For an explanation of interest based theories of rights, see Kenneth Campbell, Rights, Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rights/#2.2>. 
9 Tom Campbell, Rights: A Critical Introduction (Routledge, 2006), xiii.  
10 Jerome J Shestack, 'The Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights' in Janusz Symonides (ed), Human 
Rights: Concepts and Standards (Ashgate, Gower & Lund Humphries Publishing, 2000) 33, 33. 
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recognise that humans have individual entitlements to claim to be treated in a certain way, 
or to be guaranteed access to certain resources, in order to ensure that they are able to lead a 
free and dignified life. As explained by Merrills, ‘the concept of human rights is grounded 
in the idea of autonomy and self-realization’,11 and therefore as the claimed right to a healthy 
environment impacts on ‘life, property and the ability to run one’s affairs’, he argues it is 
not ‘incompatible’ with the notion of a human right.12 As all human rights are premised upon 
the presumption that humans have access to an environment capable of sustaining human 
life, the human right to a healthy environment can be viewed as a pre-requisite right to all 
other human rights. Indeed, various United Nations bodies have recognised that a healthy 
environment is a pre-requisite to the enjoyment of human rights.13  
 
All human beings have an interest in maintaining a healthy natural environment, as 
humankind is reliant upon clean air, clean water and arable soil and land to sustain human 
life. Although some human beings may perceive that in the short term at least they have a 
more immediate interest in harming the natural environment (for example, in order to secure 
food, land, money, etc…), the pursuit of this interest would not even be possible if they did 
not have access to an environment capable of sustaining their physical existence. 
Accordingly it can be argued that all humans who have an interest in survival have an 
overriding and fundamental interest in maintaining the health of the natural environment.14  
 
Maintaining a healthy natural environment therefore appears to satisfy the ‘importance’ 
threshold. It is however possible to argue that despite meeting this threshold, the interest 
could be ‘adequately protected by norms weaker than rights’.15 Utilising rights as the method 
of protection has implications for how the interest is balanced against other interests. As 
noted by Denise Meyerson, rights advocates argue that interests protected by rights ‘are too 
                                                          
11 J G Merrills, 'Environmental Protection and Human Rights: Conceptual Aspects' in Alan E Boyle and 
Michael R Anderson (eds), Human Rights Approaches to Environmental Protection (Clarendon Press, 1998) 
25, 27. 
12 Ibid, 28. 
13 A summary of relevant statements is provided in Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights and United Nations Environment Programme, Human Rights and the Environment, Rio+20: 
Joint Report OHCHR and UNEP (2012) 12-15 
<http://www.unep.org/delc/Portals/119/JointReportOHCHRandUNEPonHumanRightsandtheEnvironment.pd
f>. 
14 For the purposes of this discussion, it is presumed that the relevant environment is that of planet Earth. It is 
however recognised that it is theoretically possible that at some point in the future, humanity may be 
sustained in an environment other than Earth.   
15 James W Nickel, 'The Human Right to a Safe Environment: Philosophical Perspectives on Its Scope and 
Justification' (1993) 18 Yale Journal of International Law 281, 291. 
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important to be left to the mercy of a cost-benefit utilitarian exercise’.16 In other words, to 
some extent they should be given the ability to operate as ‘trumps’. As characterised by 
Dworkin, rights can be viewed as ‘trumps’ which are ‘a card of a stronger suit than the 
general interest’.17 Arguably, this level of protection is required in order to adequately 
protect the human interest in maintaining a healthy environment. Left unabated, human 
impacts on natural resources and the Earth’s natural functioning would collectively result in 
further ecological decline, and most probably collapse. Despite the existence of an ever 
growing body of international and domestic environmental law and policy, the global 
environment is in a state of ecological crisis.18 For this reason, human legal rights to impact 
on the health of the environment must in some instances be limited, modified or removed in 
order to protect, respect and fulfil the fundamental human interest in maintaining a healthy 
environment. Accordingly, protecting this interest with a ‘right’ may be a necessary means 
of ensuring that where required this fundamental interest is able to trump other less 
fundamental interests.  
 
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that it is possible to mount a persuasive argument 
that the human right to a healthy environment exists as a moral right. However, it must be 
acknowledged that there are myriad theories regarding the nature of rights, the existence of 
moral rights, and the ways in which moral rights can be established. This is a highly 
contested area of political and legal philosophy, and accordingly it is not possible to state 
that the right can be definitively established as a moral right. In fact, Alston argues that 
‘…the establishment of criteria of enduring relevance is almost impossible in a field that is 
constantly undergoing evolutionary flux’.19 Specifically in relation to the articulation of 
environmental rights, he maintains that it is a ‘quintessentially political issue’.20 Despite this, 
for the purposes of this thesis it will be accepted that it is possible to establish a moral right 
to a healthy environment according to an interest based theory of rights. The following 
sections examine the extent to which the right is currently recognised internationally and in 
the law of nation states as a legal right.  
                                                          
16 Denise Meyerson, Jurisprudence (Oxford University Press, 2010), 244. 
17 Meyerson summarising Dworkin, ibid. 
18 For an overview of some of the key environmental problems facing the global environment, see United 
Nations Environment Programme, Global Environment Outlook 5 Assessment Full Report: Environment for 
the Future We Want (2012) <http://www.unep.org/geo/geo5.asp>. 
19 Philip Alston, ‘Conjuring Up New Human Rights: A Proposal for Quality Control’ (1984) 78 (3) The 
American Journal of International Law 607, 616.  
20 Ibid.  
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4.3 Sources of the right at international law  
 
The sources of international law are summarised in the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice, opened for signature 26 June 1945, 33 U.N.T.S. 993 (entered into force 24 October 
1945) in Art 38 (1):  
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by 
the contesting states;  
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;  
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;  
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly 
qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.  
 
Boyd has considered the application of each of these categories to the human right to a 
healthy environment, and concluded that the legal status of the right is dependent on the 
interpretation adopted. He notes that there is a divergence in opinion between those who 
adopt a ‘progressive’ interpretation and those who adopt a more ‘traditional’ approach. He 
explains that ‘[t]hose who favour a liberal, progressive interpretation of international law are 
more likely to affirm the establishment of the right to a healthy environment, while those 
who adhere to a more traditional, positivist approach will deny the existence of this right.’21 
Despite these differing interpretations he claims that according to his research, ‘the majority 
of organizations and experts specializing in international law, human rights law, and 
environmental law agree that there is an emerging human right to a healthy environment’.22 
As the legal sources of the right are not the main focus of this thesis, this section will briefly 
consider each category, with a view to reaching a working conclusion as to whether the right 
exists at international law.  
 
4.3.1 International custom  
Dahlman explains that state practice must ‘meet two conditions’ in order to constitute 
customary international law – the ‘objective element and the subjective element’:23   
The objective element requires that the practice is general. The subjective element, also known as 
opinio juris sive necessitatis, or simply opinio juris, requires that states follow the practice because 
they recognise it as a norm of international law. 
                                                          
21 David R Boyd, The Environmental Rights Revolution: A Global Study of Constitutions, Human 
Rights and the Environment (UBC Press, 2012) 111. 
22 Ibid 106.  
23 Christian Dahlman, ‘The Function of Opinio Juris in Customary International Law’ (2012) Nordic Journal 
of International Law 327, 329. For judicial explanation of the requirement, see North Sea Continental Shelf 
cases (Germany v Denmark, Germany v The Netherlands) ICJ Rep (1969) 3 para 74.  
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Applying the first objective element to this context, it can be easily established that the state 
practice is ‘general’ and not specific to any particular region or country. A broad diversity 
of states from around the world have recognised some form of the HRTHE in their legal 
systems. As to the subjective element, there is significant evidence that this state practice is 
the result of recognition of the HRTHE as a norm of international law. Through an analysis 
of the customary law status of the right to a healthy environment, Lee concluded that ‘there 
is evidence that the right is developing as a rule of customary international law’.24 This 
conclusion was reached as a result of extensive consideration of state practices followed ‘out 
of a sense of international legal obligation’ to recognise the HRTHE.25 Lee was careful to 
exclude from this analysis practices ‘not undertaken with a sense of international legal 
obligation based on [a state’s] recognition of a right to a healthy environment’. 26  This 
conclusion has also been reached by other academic commentators in the field, 27  and 
accordingly for the purposes of this thesis it will suffice to accept that the right may possibly 
exist under customary international law. However, as it is a contested source for the right, it 
will not be relied upon as potential grounds for recognition in the Australian domestic 
context.28  
 
4.3.2 General principles of law 
Another potential source of international law consists of the general principles of law 
recognised by civil nations. As explained by Mitchell and Beard, the ‘principles referred to 
may be incorporated in the domestic law of either all, or most, nations’.29 Boyd argues that 
‘an argument can be made that the right to live in a healthy environment constitutes a general 
principle of international law, based on a comparative assessment of domestic laws from 
                                                          
24 Ibid 339. 
25 John Lee, ‘The Underlying Legal Theory to Support a Well-Defined Human Right to a Healthy 
Environment as a Principle of Customary International Law’ (2000) 25 Columbia Journal of Environmental 
Law 283, 302. 
26 Ibid 315. 
27 For example, Collins argues that there is ‘strong evidence of the emergence of the right to environment as 
a principle of customary international law’: Lynda Collins, ‘Are We There Yet? The Right to Environment in 
International and European Law’ (2007) 3 (2) McGill International Journal of Sustainable Development Law 
and Policy 119, 136. 
28 Various commentators question the customary international law status of the right. For instance, Lewis 
argues that ‘without evidence of widespread implementation and enforcement within domestic legal systems, 
it seems unlikely that a customary right could be established at the international level’: Bridget Lewis, 
‘Environmental Rights or a Right to the Environment? Exploring the Nexus Between Human Rights and 
Environmental Protection’ 8 (1) Macquarie Journal of International and Comparative Environmental Law 
36, 43. 
29 Andrew Mitchell and Jennifer Beard, International Law in Principle (Thomson Reuters, 2009) 33. 
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around the world’.30 Given the quantity of nations that have recognised the right in some 
form, it would appear that this argument is sustainable. However, recognition of a right of 
this nature via this source of international law would be unusual in the context of the types 
of principles which have been recognised by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) under 
this category. The ICJ has tended to recognise procedural principles rather than substantive 
rights of this nature.31 Accordingly, whilst this may be a potential source for the right, it is a 
matter of debate as to whether the HRTHE could constitute a general principle of law.  
 
4.3.3 Judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists  
Upon reviewing decisions from global and regional courts and commissions on the linkage 
between human rights and the environment, Boyd concluded that ‘taken as a whole, these 
decisions indicate that the right to a healthy environment is gradually gaining broader 
recognition’.32  He reviewed decisions by the International Court of Justice, the United 
Nations Human Rights Committee, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the European Court of Human Rights, the European 
Committee of Social Rights, and the African Commission on Human Rights.33 Given the 
rigour of the analysis, it is unnecessary to duplicate the examination here. It is clear that 
there is a general trend towards greater acceptance of the HRTHE within these institutions. 
Similarly, Boyd notes a related trend whereby ‘international law organizations, the majority 
of scholarly books and articles, and the majority of experts agree that there is an emerging 
human right to a healthy environment’.34 Whilst there is still significant academic debate as 
to its precise nature, source, scope, content and expression, it is undeniable that the concept 
of a HRTHE is now an accepted part of the human rights discourse. However, as this 
category of international law constitutes a ‘subsidiary source’, it is ‘not technically a means 
by which international law is created’.35 Accordingly, this category could not be relied upon 
as the source of the right at international law, although evidence of judicial decisions and 
the teachings of publicists could be used ‘for the determination of rules of law’ in this 
context.36  
                                                          
30 Boyd, above n 21, 92. 
31 Mitchell and Beard, above n 29.  
32 Boyd, above n 21, 94. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid 104.  
35 Mitchell and Beard, above n 29, 35. 
36 Malcolm N Shaw, International Law (Cambridge University Press, 7th ed, 2014) 78.  
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4.3.4 International conventions 
The most widely accepted source of international law can be found in the law established by 
international treaties and conventions. As discussed earlier, there is no binding international 
legal agreement expressly recognising and defining the human right to a healthy 
environment. However, as noted by John Knox, the United Nations Independent Expert on 
Human Rights and the Environment, ‘the failure to include a right to a healthy environment 
in the seminal human rights instruments is due to timing, not substance.’37 He explains that 
‘[t]he modern environmental movement began in the late 1960s, just too late to be reflected 
in the foundational human rights treaties.’38 Increasingly, the importance of the relationship 
between the protection of human rights and the protection of the natural environment has 
been recognised by international human rights bodies. The HRTHE is now expressly 
recognised in a number of regional human rights treaties and agreements, 39  and the 
significance of environmental health for the realisation of human rights has been recognised 
in various international human rights conventions.40  
 
4.3.4.1 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
Although the human right to a healthy environment is not expressly recognised under the 
ICESCR, there are a number of rights recognised under the Covenant which depend upon a 
healthy environment for their realisation. In particular, the rights to health and an adequate 
standard of living. Whilst the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (UNCESCR) has recognised the importance of a healthy environment to the 
realisation of both of these rights, it has not recognised an implied right to a healthy 
                                                          
37 John Knox, Greening Human Rights (2015) Open Democracy 
<https://www.opendemocracy.net/openglobalrights/john-knox/greening-human-rights>. 
38 Ibid. He goes on to note that subsequently in the 1970s,‘[t]he international community 
recognized this connection in its very first major environmental conference, in Stockholm in 1972, 
which proclaimed that the natural environment is “essential” to the enjoyment of basic human 
rights, including the right to life itself.’ 
39 Regional human rights treaties and agreements recognising a form of the human right to a 
healthy environment, include: African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights opened for 
signature 27 June 1981, 1520 UNTS 217 (entered into force 21 October 1986), Additional Protocol 
to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights (Protocol of San Salvador) opened for signature 17 November 1988, OAS Treaty Series No. 
69 (entered into force 29 November 1999), and the Arab Charter on Human Rights opened for 
signature 22 May 2004, reprinted in 12 IHRR 893 (2005) (entered into force 15 March 2008). 
40 Boyd (above n 21, 81) notes that three international human rights treaties ‘indirectly suggest that a 
minimum level of environmental quality is a basic human right’: the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
opened for signature 20 November 1989, 1577 UNTS 3 (entered into force 2 September 1990), the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women opened for signature 1 March 
1980, 1249 UNTS 13 (entered into force 3 September 1981), and the Geneva Conventions.  
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environment. However, it is possible that at some point in the future the Committee will 
recognise that the right to a healthy environment can be interpreted as an implied right under 
the Covenant, derived from the right to health,41 and the right to an adequate standard of 
living (and possibly other rights).  
 
The UNCESCR has already made statements which acknowledge the vital importance of a 
healthy environment to the realisation of both of these rights. In General Comment No. 14 
discussing the right to health, the Committee clarified that the right to health is not a ‘right 
to be healthy’.42 Rather it is a right to have the state respect certain freedoms and entitlements 
which facilitate the achievement of health.43 It contains various comments of relevance to 
the right to a healthy environment. For example, the Committee noted that the right to health 
‘extends to the underlying determinants of health, such as… a healthy environment.’44 In 
order to address these underlying determinants, Art 12.2 (b) of the Covenant obliges states 
to engage in the ‘improvement of all aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene’. 45 
The Committee explained that this comprises (amongst other things) ‘…preventive 
measures in respect of occupational accidents and diseases; the requirement to ensure an 
adequate supply of safe and potable water and basic sanitation; the prevention and reduction 
of the population’s exposure to harmful substances such as radiation and harmful chemicals 
or other detrimental environmental conditions that directly or indirectly impact upon human 
health.’46 
 
In examining these obligations, the Committee took note of Principle 1 of the Stockholm 
Declaration47 and various relevant international law developments of relevance to the right 
to a healthy environment. 48  In order to comply with these obligations, the Committee 
                                                          
41 Melissa Fung notes that ‘interpretations of the [Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights] and 
UN Special Rapporteur have established it as being essential to the right to health’: Melissa Fung, 'The Right 
to a Healthy Environment: Core Obligations Under the International Covenant of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights' (2006) 14 Willamette Journal of International Law and Dispute Resolution 97, 105. 
42 General Comment No. 14: Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UNCESCR, 22nd sess, E/C.12/2000/4 (2000), para 8. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid para 4. 
45 Ibid para 15. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, UN Doc A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1 (1972).  
48 ‘The Committee takes note, in this regard, of Principle 1 of the Stockholm Declaration of 1972 which 
states: “Man has the fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate conditions of life, in an 
environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and well-being”, as well as of recent developments in 
international law, including General Assembly resolution 45/94 on the need to ensure a healthy environment 
for the well-being of individuals; Principle 1 of the Rio Declaration; and regional human rights instruments 
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explained that states are required to take both preventative and proactive measures. Measures 
include creating and implementing ‘national policies aimed at reducing and eliminating 
pollution of air, water and soil’.49 The Committee has also made reference to the importance 
of a healthy environment for securing all of the component rights of the right to an adequate 
standard of living. The right to an adequate standard of living encompasses various rights, 
including the right to food, the right to water and the right to housing. For instance, it is not 
possible to respect, protect and fulfil the right to food, without an adequate environment for 
food production (including soil, water and climactic conditions). Similarly, realisation of the 
right to water requires states to ensure the environmental health of water resources, in order 
to maintain the health and sustainability of the resource for both present and future 
generations.50  
 
Accordingly, it can be seen that although the HRTHE is not expressly recognised under the 
ICESCR, it can be argued that there exists an implied HRTHE as a result of the express 
recognition of rights which require a healthy environment for their realisation. For the 
purposes of this thesis, the right is interpreted as an implied right under the ICESCR. 
However, it is recognised that this interpretation may not be adopted by the UNCESCR. 
Despite this, it is possible that the right may receive express recognition in the future. 
Accordingly, the following section considers the possible nature, scope and content of the 
human right to a healthy environment as an ICESCR right. 
  
                                                          
such as article 10 of the San Salvador Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights.’General 
Comment No. 14: Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UNCESCR, 22nd sess, E/C.12/2000/4 (2000), 19 n 13. 
49 Ibid, para 36. 
50 General Comment No. 15: Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UNCESCR, 29th sess [5], E/C.12/2002/11 (2002). 
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4.4 Content and obligations imposed by the right 
 
As the HRTHE has received neither express recognition under the ICESCR nor recognition 
by the UNCESCR as an implied right, it is not possible at present to identify the precise 
content of the HRTHE as a Covenant right. Although some aspects of the right’s content can 
be identified through examination of the rights from which it may be implied, such analysis 
does not provide a comprehensive view of the right’s content. Similarly, consideration of 
how the right’s content has been interpreted within regional and national jurisdictions does 
not provide an accurate insight into the content of an implied or express HRTHE under the 
ICESCR. Until a UN body provides guidance, the content of the right under the ICESCR 
remains a matter of academic speculation. The human right to a healthy environment is 
capable of various possible interpretations. As Fung observes, the right can be given a 
narrow or broad interpretation:51  
A "right to a healthy environment" can mean, narrowly, the right to live in a healthy environment free 
from toxins or hazards that threaten human health, or, more broadly, a right to have that environment 
protected by legislative and other proactive measures. Corresponding duties of the State can be limited 
to merely refraining from unlawfully polluting air, water, and soil, or expanded to require the State 
"to take reasonable and other measures to prevent pollution and ecological degradation, to promote 
conservation, and to secure an ecologically sustainable development and use of natural resources…”52 
 
It is possible that the UNCESCR may choose to conceptualise the HRTHE as a composite 
right, consisting of various component substantive and procedural rights necessary to secure 
the right to a healthy environment. Substantive rights may include rights to a biodiverse 
environment, clean air, a stable climate, clean water, healthy soil, and the right to live in a 
natural environment. There is also a range of procedural rights which may be incorporated 
within the right’s content. These rights may include the rights to participate in decision-
making affecting the environment, access to justice about environmental matters, and access 
to information about the environment.53 Where the right has been recognised in the domestic 
                                                          
51 Fung, above n 41, 126. 
52 Fung ibid citing SERAC v. Nigeria, Case No. ACHPR/COMM/A044/1, ¶ 51 (Afr. Comm’n Hum. & 
Peoples’ Rts. May 27, 2002). 
53 Various procedural rights of relevance to environmental protection are already recognised at the 
international level. For a discussion of the extent and nature of protection in this regards, see: Donald K 
Anton and Dinah L Shelton, Environmental Protection and Human Rights (Cambridge University Press, 
2011) 356-435. The most significant treaty addressing procedural rights relevant to environmental protection 
is the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision Making, and Access to Justice 
in Environmental Matters, opened for signature 25 June 1998, 2161 UNTS 447 (entered into force 30 
October 2001). Article 1 of the Convention explains that its objective is to ‘contribute to the protection of the 
right of every person of present and future generations to live in an environment adequate to his or her health 
and well-being…’ To do so, it requires that the parties ‘shall guarantee the rights of access to information, 
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laws of states, it has been subject to varying interpretations regarding its content. If the 
UNCESCR decides to recognise the right under the Covenant and to elucidate its content, it 
may draw upon these national experiences with the operation and content of the right. 
However, the utility of this jurisprudence for clarifying the right’s content under the ICESCR 
is limited by the different ways in which the right has been expressed and operationalised 
within each jurisdiction. Accordingly, the next section develops a methodology for 
determining the possible content of the right as an ICESCR right, without relying on 
guidance from national and regional interpretations of the right’s content.  
 
4.4.1 Potential content of the human right to a healthy environment under the ICESCR 
In the context of the human right to a healthy environment, there has been no authoritative 
guidance provided by the UN as to the content of the right and the obligations it may impose 
on state parties. However, the UNCESCR has provided guidance regarding the content of 
the human right to water (‘HRTW’), which is an implied right derived from the same rights 
from which the HRTHE may be implied (the rights to health and an adequate standard of 
living) under the Covenant. 54  Accordingly, consideration of the content of the HRTW 
provides some indication of the way in which the UNCESCR may approach interpretation 
of the HRTHE in the future. It also provides an insight into aspects of the content of the 
HRTHE which may overlap with the content of the HRTW.  
 
The UNCESCR has outlined the content of the right to water in General Comment No. 15.55 
The Comment begins by explaining that the parties to the Covenant must ‘adopt effective 
measures to realize, without discrimination, the right to water…’56 It defines the right as 
entitling ‘everyone to sufficient, safe, acceptable, physically accessible and affordable water 
for personal and domestic uses’. 57  Accordingly, primarily the focus of the right is on 
ensuring that individuals have adequate physical and economic access to safe drinking water. 
                                                          
public participation in decision-making, and access to justice in environmental matters’. As of January2016, 
there are 39 signatories to the Convention.  
54 It has recently been clarified by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the human right to water and 
sanitation and the Chair of the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights that the human right 
to water is distinct from (although related to) the human right to sanitation: United Nations Human Rights 
Office of the High Commissioner, ‘Right to sanitation, a distinct human right – Over 2.5 billion people lack 
access to sanitation’ (2015) 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=16903&LangID=E>. 
55 General Comment No. 15: Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UNCESCR, 29th sess [5], E/C.12/2002/11 (2002). 
56 Ibid, para 1. 
57 Ibid, para 2. 
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The Comment then considers the legal bases of the right, outlining the Covenant rights from 
which the right to water may be derived.58 It explains that under Art. 11 (1), various rights 
are articulated as flowing from the realisation of the right to an adequate standard of living.59 
The Comment notes that the section uses the word ‘including’, which the Committee argues 
‘indicates that this catalogue of rights was not intended to be exhaustive’.60 They argue that 
in addition to the rights to adequate food, clothing and housing, the right to an adequate 
standard of living also incorporates a right to water.61 It is foreseeable that the Committee 
may adopt a similar interpretation in regards to the HRTHE, as it can be persuasively argued 
that a healthy environment is necessary for the realisation of an adequate standard of living.  
 
The Committee further notes the relationship between the right to health and the right to 
water. It explains that under Art. 12 (2) (b) of the Covenant, parties are required to ‘take 
steps on a non-discriminatory basis to prevent threats to health from unsafe and toxic water 
conditions’.62 The Comment explains that this means that the parties ‘should ensure that 
natural water resources are protected from contamination by harmful substances and 
pathogenic microbes’. 63  These statements from the Committee articulate an area of 
intersection between the human right to water and the HRTHE. In order to provide access to 
safe drinking water, states must ensure adequate environmental hygiene of the resource. 
Whilst in the context of the human right to water this may be interpreted narrowly to mean 
that the water utilised by citizens directly is free from toxins and pathogens, in the context 
of the human right to a healthy environment it may have a broader operation. Thus it could 
extend to the protection of water resources not intended for human use, and therefore impose 
a more general obligation to engage in environmental protection of water resources.  
 
The Comment explains that the right to water ‘contains both freedoms and entitlements’:64 
The freedoms include the right to maintain access to existing water supplies necessary for the right to 
water, and the right to be free from interference, such as the right to be free from arbitrary 
disconnections or contamination of water supplies. By contrast, the entitlements include the right to 
a system of water supply and management that provides equality of opportunity for people to enjoy 
the right to water. 
                                                          




62 Ibid, para 8. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid, para 10. 
113 
 
In order to realise these freedoms and entitlements, the Comment explains that the ‘elements 
of the right to water must be adequate for human dignity, life and health’ in line with the 
Covenant rights. 65  Accordingly, it outlines the obligations associated with ensuring the 
availability, quality, and accessibility of water. As the elements of the HRTHE would also 
have to be adequate for human dignity, life and health, it is likely that states would similarly 
need to ensure a healthy environment of adequate availability, quality and accessibility. 
Availability in the HRTHE context could impose an obligation that adequate environmental 
resources are maintained by the state. Quality in the HRTHE context could impose an 
obligation that a minimum standard of environmental quality is maintained. Accessibility in 
the HRTHE context could impose an obligation that a healthy environment is ‘accessible to 
everyone without discrimination’. 66  Accessibility in the HRTW context incorporates 
physical and economic accessibility, as well as non-discrimination and information 
accessibility. 67 These aspects of accessibility could arguably also apply to the HRTHE. 
Accordingly, states may be obliged to ensure that access to a healthy natural environment is 
possible for all people within their jurisdiction, and that everyone is able to ‘seek, receive 
and impart information’ concerning environmental health and protection.68  
 
Having outlined the normative content of the right, the Committee then outlined the content 
of the obligations to respect, protect and fulfil the HRTW. As explained by the Office of the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights, the obligation to respect ‘means that States must 
refrain from interfering with or curtailing the enjoyment of human rights’.69 The obligation 
to protect ‘requires States to protect individuals and groups against human rights abuses’, 
and the obligation to fulfil ‘means that States must take positive action to facilitate the 
enjoyment of basic human rights’.70 In regards to the obligation to respect the right, the 
Committee explained that the obligation ‘requires that States parties refrain from interfering 
directly or indirectly with the enjoyment of the right to water’.71 They specified that this 
includes (but is not limited to), refraining from ‘unlawfully diminishing or polluting water’.72 
                                                          
65 Ibid, para 11. 
66 Ibid, para 12 (c). 
67 Ibid, para 12. 
68 Ibid, para 12 (c) (iv). 
69 United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Frequently Asked Questions, United 
Nations <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/AboutUs/Pages/FrequentlyAskedQuestions.aspx>. 
70 Ibid. 
71 General Comment No. 15: Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the International Covenant 




This represents a point of overlap with the HRTHE, as undoubtedly one of the aspects of the 
obligation to respect the HRTHE would be to require states to refrain from unlawfully 
diminishing or polluting the natural environment (which would include water resources).  
 
In regards to the obligation to protect, the Committee explained that the obligation ‘requires 
State parties to prevent third parties from interfering in any way with the enjoyment of the 
right to water’.73 They explained that this includes ‘adopting the necessary and effective 
legislative and other measures to restrain, for example, third parties from denying equal 
access to adequate water; and polluting and inequitably extracting from water resources, 
including natural sources, wells and other water distribution systems’. 74  Similarly, the 
obligation to protect with respect to the HRTHE would most probably oblige states to 
prevent third parties from denying access to a healthy environment, and polluting or 
diminishing the natural environment.  
 
In regards to the obligations to fulfil, the Committee explained that the obligation ‘can be 
disaggregated into the obligations to facilitate, promote and provide’:75 
The obligation to facilitate requires the State to take positive measures to assist individuals and 
communities to enjoy the right. The obligation to promote obliges the State party to take steps to 
ensure that there is appropriate education concerning the hygienic use of water, protection of water 
sources and methods to minimize water wastage. States parties are also obliged to fulfil (provide) the 
right when individuals or a group are unable, for reasons beyond their control, to realize that right 
themselves by the means at their disposal. 
 
They further explained that the obligation to fulfil ‘requires States parties to adopt the 
necessary measures directed towards the full realization of the right to water’, which includes 
‘according sufficient recognition of this right within the national political and legal systems’, 
and ‘adopting a national water strategy and plan of action to realize [the] right’.76 It is likely 
that the obligation to fulfil in the HRTHE context would therefore require states to adopt the 
necessary measures to progress towards full realisation of the right, including recognising 
the right in their domestic legal systems, and adopting a national plan of action to realise the 
right. The Committee also explained that the obligation to fulfil requires states to ‘adopt 
                                                          
73 Ibid, para 23. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid, para 25. 
76 Ibid, para 26. 
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comprehensive and integrated strategies and programmes to ensure that there is sufficient 
and safe water for present and future generations’.77  
 
Recognition of the intergenerational aspects of the right to water indicates that it is likely 
that if the HRTHE was recognised as an implied Covenant right, it would enjoy a similar 
intergenerational operation. Collins advocates for the inclusion of an intergenerational 
component in any independently recognised HRTHE, in light of ‘the profound vulnerability 
of future generations to harm resulting from our current environmental decision-making’.78 
She argues that this component is necessary as different types of environmental harm impact 
on the interests of current and future generations differently.79 She reasons that ‘…a strictly 
present-focused right to environment would fail to achieve environmental protection 
sufficient to safeguard the interest of future humans, since some activities that cause little or 
no immediate environmental harm may be devastating to the future (e.g. groundwater 
mining).’80 
 
Accordingly, if the HRTHE applies not only to present generations, but also future 
generations, the obligation to fulfil would impose on states a requirement to manage the 
natural environment in a way that ensures that future generations will be able to live in a 
healthy environment. This could be interpreted as creating an obligation on states to 
sustainably manage the natural environment, with a view to maintaining sufficient 
environmental quality and environmental resources to sustain future generations.  
 
 
                                                          
77 Ibid, para 28. It stated that this may include:  
(a) reducing depletion of water resources through unsustainable extraction, diversion and 
damming; (b) reducing and eliminating contamination of watersheds and water-related 
eco-systems by substances such as radiation, harmful chemicals and human excreta; (c) 
monitoring water reserves; (d) ensuring that proposed developments do not interfere with 
access to adequate  water; (e) assessing the impacts of actions that may impinge upon 
water availability and natural-ecosystems watersheds, such as climate changes, 
desertification and increased soil salinity, deforestation and loss of biodiversity;  (f) 
increasing the efficient use of water by end-users; (g) reducing water wastage in its 
distribution; (h) response mechanisms for emergency situations; (i) and establishing 
competent institutions and appropriate institutional arrangements to carry out the 
strategies and programmes. 
78 Collins, above n 27, 149. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Ibid.  
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4.4.2 Core obligations imposed by the right 
Having identified a number of aspects of the obligations to respect, protect and fulfil the 
right, the Committee then identified nine ‘core obligations’ requiring immediate 
realisation.81 As an ICESCR right, states are obliged to progressively realise full realisation 
of the right, subject to resource limitations. The Covenant obliges parties to ‘take steps’ 
towards full realisation of the recognised rights.82 However, it also obliges states to achieve 
the minimum core obligations of the right, immediately. As explained in General Comment 
No. 3, ‘…the Committee is of the view that a minimum core obligation to ensure the 
satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum essential levels of each of the rights is incumbent 
upon every State party.’83  The minimum essential levels of each right oblige states to 
immediately realise the core content of the right. Given the varying resource capacities of 
different states, it is important to ensure that requiring immediate compliance with the core 
obligations of the right does not impose unattainable obligations on states. The obligation to 
take steps towards progressive realisation of the remainder of the obligations recognises that 
achieving immediate full realisation of the right may not be possible in certain states due to 
resource constraints. The core obligations of the HRTW identified by the Committee are:   
(a)  To ensure access to the minimum essential amount of water, that is sufficient and safe for personal 
and domestic uses to prevent disease; 
(b)  To ensure the right of access to water and water facilities and services on a non-discriminatory 
basis, especially for disadvantaged or marginalized groups; 
(c) To ensure physical access to water facilities or services that provide sufficient, safe and regular 
water; that have a sufficient number of water outlets to avoid prohibitive waiting times; and that are 
at a reasonable distance from the household; 
(d)  To ensure personal security is not threatened when having to physically access to water; 
(e)  To ensure equitable distribution of all available water facilities and services; 
(f)  To adopt and implement a national water strategy and plan of action addressing the whole 
population; the strategy and plan of action should be devised, and periodically reviewed, on the basis 
of a participatory and transparent process; it should include methods, such as right to water indicators 
and benchmarks, by which progress can be closely monitored; the process by which the strategy and 
plan of action are devised, as well as their content, shall give particular attention to all disadvantaged 
or marginalized groups; 
(g)  To monitor the extent of the realization, or the non-realization, of the right to water; 
                                                          
81 General Comment No. 15: Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, above n 55, para 37. 
82 The Covenant obliges states to take steps ‘…individually and through international assistance and co-
operation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to 
achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate 
means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures: International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 993 UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 
January 1976) [2 (1)].  
83 General Comment No. 3: The Nature of States Parties' Obligations (Art. 2, Para. 1, of the Covenant), 
UNCESCR, 5th sess, E/1991/23 (1991). 
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(h)  To adopt relatively low-cost targeted water programmes to protect vulnerable and marginalized 
groups; 
(i)  To take measures to prevent, treat and control diseases linked to water, in particular ensuring 
access to adequate sanitation.84 
 
There has been limited academic discussion regarding the possible core obligations imposed 
by the HRTHE. However, one commentator (Fung) has outlined a number of possible core 
obligations of the right by examining the ‘application of the main treaties concerned with 
the right to a healthy environment at the global, regional, and state level’.85 Through this 
analysis, Fung concludes that the obligations ‘should concentrate specifically on those 
environmental issues affecting human health’. 86  She advocates for an approach to the 
identification of the core obligations of the right which is in accordance with the Covenant’s 
focus on achieving progressive rather than immediate realisation of the right, within the 
state’s available resources.87  Acknowledging this, she argues that the core obligations 
should not require additional financial expenditure on behalf of states, given the imbalance 
in available resources between states.   
 
She reasons that as core obligations ‘place an immediate burden on a state, that burden 
should not be so great as to render it insurmountable’.88 In her opinion, the obligations 
associated with the ‘obligation to fulfil’ would impose immediate costs on state parties upon 
ratification.89 Accordingly, she argues that only the obligations to protect and respect should 
constitute core obligations.90 In defining the scope of the right, Fung articulates possible 
examples of the core obligations to respect and protect the HRTHE ‘that mirror the core 
obligations required under the rights to food, water, and housing’ from which she argues that 
the right is derived under the ICESCR.91 The following section considers all three types of 
obligation (to respect, protect and fulfil), and extends Fung’s analysis in order to put forward 
a suggested set of core obligations imposed by the HRTHE. 
 
                                                          
84 General Comment No. 15: Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, above n 55, para 37. 
85 Fung, above n 41, 102. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Ibid 118. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Ibid 120. 
91 Ibid 126. 
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4.4.2.1 Obligation to Respect  
The obligation to respect requires states to ‘refrain from interfering with or curtailing the 
enjoyment of human rights’.92 In the context of the HRTHE, Fung suggests that the core 
obligations may include: 
- States abstaining from ‘…interfering with the ability of individuals to live in a 
healthy environment’;93  
- States refraining from ‘…unlawfully polluting air, water, and soil, for example, 
through industrial waste from state-owned facilities, from using or testing nuclear, 
biological, or chemical weapons, if such testing results in the release of substances 
harmful to human health’;94 
- States refraining from ‘reducing the levels of clean air, water, and land to levels 
below those necessary for a healthful existence…’;95 
- States refraining from ‘devastating existing areas meeting the quality requirements 
of a healthy environment’;96 
- State refraining from ‘interfering with efforts by individuals or communities to 
relocate to "healthy environments”’.97 
 
Reflecting on Fung’s suggested obligations, it can be seen that the HRTHE may create a 
minimum standard of environmental health, which the state must refrain from reducing. By 
doing so, it characterises environmental pollution as a human rights breach, and the 
maintenance of a minimum standard of environmental quality as a human rights obligation. 
Such an obligation could have significant implications for how states engage in 
environmental management. It suggests that there is an ascertainable minimum level of 
environmental health necessary for human survival at present and into the future. Requiring 
states to refrain from reducing environmental health below this minimum standard could 
operate to prevent states from engaging in ‘rollbacks’ on environmental protection.98 As the 
obligation has an intergenerational application, it is arguably not just limited to the 
                                                          
92 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, above n 69.  
93 Fung, above n 41, 126. 
94 Ibid. 
95 Ibid 129. 
96 Ibid 130. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Boyd, above n 21, 27-32. 
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maintenance of a minimum level of environmental health for human populations at present. 
Future generations equally have a right to a healthy environment, and accordingly the 
minimum standard of environmental health must be sufficient for humans both at present 
and into the future.  
 
4.4.2.2 Obligation to Protect 
The obligation to protect requires ‘states to protect individuals and groups against human 
rights abuses’.99 In the context of the HRTHE, Fung suggests that this may include: 
- States ensuring ‘that corporations or other third party actors are not violating peoples' 
environmental rights’;100 
- States taking ‘active steps to improve environmental health’;101  
- States monitoring and addressing violations by third parties;102  
- States enacting ‘legislation to guarantee that private actors do not engage in practices 
that would reduce the quality of air, water, and land resources’;103 
- States monitoring ‘the observance of adopted legislation to guarantee that individuals 
are actually free to exercise their rights’;104 
- States prohibiting ‘discriminatory State practices protecting certain more affluent 
areas while tolerating or even facilitating the despoliation of other areas’;105 
- States enacting ‘legislation to guarantee that private actors do not engage in practices 
that would reduce the accessibility of areas of adequate environmental quality’.106 
 
Fung’s analysis suggests that a fundamental aspect of the core obligation to protect the 
HRTHE is the duty to ensure that third parties (such as corporations) are not engaging in 
violations of the right. As the obligation to respect may require that a certain minimum level 
of environmental health must be maintained, the obligation to protect may therefore operate 
to require states to ensure that third parties are not engaging in actions which reduce 
                                                          
99 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, above n 69. 
100 Fung, above n 41, 127. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Ibid 129. 
104 Ibid. 
105 Ibid. 
106 Ibid 130. 
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environmental health below that standard. She also argues that the right obliges states to take 
‘active steps’ to improve environmental health.107  
 
However, she limits this obligation on costs grounds, arguing that the ‘core obligations of 
the right to a healthy environment should not necessitate development of a national plan to 
ensure the availability of a healthy environment since those duties would not be cost-free’.108 
Arguably however, development of a national plan could constitute part of the core 
obligations imposed by the right, as the plan could allow for resource constraints. Moreover, 
there is precedent for the requirement of a national plan as a core obligation of an ESC right, 
as the creation of a national water strategy was one of the core obligations of the HRTW 
identified by the UNCESCR in General Comment No. 15.109  
 
4.4.2.3 Obligation to Fulfil 
The obligation to fulfil requires that ‘states must take positive action to facilitate the 
enjoyment of basic human rights’.110 In the context of the HRTHE, Fung suggests that core 
obligations may include: 
- States engaging in their ‘own research and assessment of health and environmental 
conditions’;111 
- States taking ‘reasonable and other measures to prevent pollution and ecological 
degradation, to promote conservation, and to secure an ecologically sustainable 
development and use of natural resources…’;112 
- States adopting ‘measures against environmental and occupational health 
hazards’.113  
As discussed above, Fung argues that these obligations ‘would attribute the heaviest burden 
to the State’ and therefore should not constitute core obligations.114 However, it is difficult 
to see how the right could be realised in any effective manner without some aspects of these 
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109 General Comment No. 15: Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, above n 55, para 37 (f). 
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obligations constituting minimum core content. For instance, in order to refrain from 
reducing the minimum standard of environmental health, states would need to engage in 
research and assessment of health and environmental conditions. Accordingly, it is 
submitted that aspects of the obligation to fulfil should constitute part of the core obligations 
of the right.  
 
4.4.2.4 Possible core obligations imposed by the right 
In light of the foregoing discussion, it is possible to identify a number of potential core 
obligations of the HRTHE. Firstly, there may be a core obligation to create a national 
strategy and plan of action to implement the right. As noted above, there is precedent for 
requiring the creation of a national strategy and plan of action as a core obligation of an ESC 
right. Secondly, it is possible that there may be a core obligation to ensure adequate standards 
of environmental quality to enable an adequate standard of living and human health. This 
represents a minimum level of environmental health required to sustain human life. 
Arguably, due to the intergenerational nature of the right, non-core obligations would require 
states to take steps towards the achievement of a higher level of environmental quality and 
sustainability. However, in recognition of varying resource capacities of states, the core 
obligation would most likely only require immediate realisation of a minimum level of 
environmental health. Thirdly, there may be a core obligation to refrain from unlawfully 
polluting the environment. Refraining from unlawfully polluting the environment is not an 
overly arduous obligation to impose on states, and would significantly assist in helping to 
realise the right. Fourthly, there may be a core obligation to require states to refrain from 
interfering with an individual’s enjoyment of a healthy environment.  
 
As the HRTHE is an individual right, it is important that it is not only society as a whole that 
has the opportunity to enjoy a healthy environment, but that all people have the ability to 
live in and access a healthy environment. Further to this, there may also be a core obligation 
to ensure that access to a healthy environment is available to every person without 
discrimination. As all humans are entitled to human rights equally, it is important that the 
right to a healthy environment is not inequitably realised. This was similarly a focus of the 
HRTW core obligations. Another potential yet more contentious contender for a core 
obligation is the obligation to ensure adequate access to information about environmental 
health and management. It is possible that this might not constitute a core obligation as it 
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would arguably be possible to realise the key aspects of the right’s content without imposing 
this obligation. However, it would most likely constitute a more general obligation imposed 
by the right.  
 
Whilst these potential obligations have not been articulated by an authoritative body, they 
can be utilised to guide the thesis’ analysis of the right’s possible operation. It is not possible 
to accurately predict how the UNCESCR may choose to interpret the content of the right, 
and the core obligations it imposes on state parties. However, through examination of the 
Committee’s approach to the interpretation of the HRTW it has been possible to identify 





4.5 Assessing compliance with the obligations imposed by the right 
By recognising the HRTHE at the international level, Australia would be committing to 
protect, respect and fulfil the obligations imposed by the right. However, as demonstrated 
by Australia’s human rights record to date, international recognition of human rights does 
not necessarily translate into adequate domestic implementation and fulfilment. 115  For 
instance, despite significant international pressure over Australia’s treatment of asylum 
seekers, Australia continues to pursue an immigration and detention policy which has been 
deemed to violate various international human rights.116 Accordingly, it cannot be presumed 
that international legal recognition of the HRTHE will ensure that the right will be 
adequately realised at the domestic level in Australia. For this reason, it is necessary to 
determine methods for ascertaining state progress towards fulfilment of state obligations 
under international human rights law. 
 
Although theoretically human rights are universal in nature, inevitably each jurisdiction 
develops different methods of fulfilling their human rights obligations, according to their 
means and within the confines of their political and legal systems. However, it is possible to 
define general standards by which a country’s conduct can be assessed. Increasingly, the 
United Nations is utilising human rights indicators as a means of assessing state progress 
towards human rights realisation. Numerous attempts have been made to develop indicators 
for assessing human rights compliance, including for economic, social and cultural rights 
recognised under the ICESCR.117 The Center for Economic and Social Rights has identified 
a number of 'organizations and individuals’ who are ‘working on developing new 
methodologies for monitoring human rights'.118 In order to understand the importance of 
developing human rights indicators for economic, social and cultural (‘ESC’) rights such as 
the HRTHE, it is essential to define the meaning and purpose of indicators. It is equally 
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important to place the development of indicators into the broader context of the conceptual 
and practical challenges involved in monitoring human rights compliance. 
 
4.5.1 Defining human rights indicators 
The definition, utility and nature of international human rights indicators are all subjects of 
academic debate in the human rights literature. Whilst numerous definitions exist, a useful 
definition has been put forward by Gauthier de Beco, who defines human rights indicators 
as ‘indicators that are linked to human rights treaty standards, and that measure the extent to 
which duty-bearers are fulfilling their obligations and rights-holders are enjoying their 
rights’.119 Accordingly, human rights indicators are designed to assess state compliance 
‘under a legal standard’,120 as opposed to human development indicators which ‘often focus 
only on human outcomes and inputs’.121 The key difference lies in the fact that human rights 
indicators are equally concerned with monitoring procedural protection of human rights on 
the domestic level, such as ‘the presence of relevant judicial institutions and legal 
frameworks'.122 The utility of human rights indicators for monitoring State compliance is 
particularly significant in relation to ESC rights. Whilst some commentators argue that 
monitoring ESC rights using indicators is ‘the future of human rights advocacy’,123 others 
argue that ESC rights ‘should not be monitored at all’.124 Although it is true that there are 
numerous challenges involved in monitoring ESC rights through the use of indicators, 
indicators do perform a number of useful functions which aid both human rights monitoring 
and compliance.  
 
Judith Welling has outlined several of these benefits, including the fact that indicators can 
make state reporting ‘more easily comparable to one another',125 they can create 'interstate 
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peer pressure to provide better information',126 they can 'simplify the work of the CESCR 
treaty body', 127  and they can 'improve the quality and comprehensiveness of collected 
data'.128 Perhaps most significantly, Welling identifies that by 'providing feedback on the 
outcomes of state policy, international indicators can inform decision making and suggest 
areas for future policy change at the government level.' 129  The educative effect of 
international indicators is particularly pronounced in the field of ESC rights, due to the 
complexities states face in attempting to comply with the duties recognised under the 
ICESCR. As noted by Rosga and Satterthwaite, the phrase 'States Parties recognize' in the 
ICESCR has been interpreted 'as creating an obligation on States Parties to construct 
programs, to design policies, or to set up regulatory systems that would allow individuals to 
enjoy the full realization of their rights'.130 Any assistance which can be provided to States 
to help them determine how best to progressively realise ESC rights should be encouraged. 
The information and knowledge generated through the use of indicators is also useful for 
enabling non-government entities/public to monitor State compliance with human rights 
obligations.131  
 
Determining the reasonableness of state efforts towards the progressive realisation of ESC 
rights is notoriously difficult. For this reason, it has been argued that indicators are an 
important mechanism for not only assisting States in recognising effective methods of 
realising ESC rights,132 but also for determining the appropriate legal standard set by the 
requirement that States should use ‘all appropriate means’ to progressively achieve full 
realisation of ESC rights.133 Welling argues that ‘new information concerning the feasibility 
of particular state measures' is required to help inform this standard.134 Analysing state 
compliance through the use of international indicators is one potential mechanism for 
producing and collating this information. For instance, indicators designed to measure 
realisation of the right to water might enquire into the adequacy of the legal framework 
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established to address water pollution. Assessing the comparative efforts of each party to 
address water pollution would create new information about the effectiveness and suitability 
of different legal and policy approaches to the problem.   
 
Where the utility of indicators is accepted, debate focuses on the most effective form of 
indicators. Accordingly, numerous indicator typologies and approaches have been 
developed. A commonly utilised typology divides indicators into structural, process and 
outcome indicators. Structural indicators ‘show a state's intention to abide by international 
human rights law’, 135  process indicators ‘measure the efforts undertaken by states to 
implement international human rights’,136 and outcome indicators ‘measure a state's human 
rights performance’.137 This typology has been characterised as constituting an ‘analytical 
categories approach’ to the development of international indicators.138 By incorporating all 
three categories, the approach measures a ‘duty-bearer’s commitment, efforts and results, 
respectively’. 139  The approach can be contrasted with the ‘obligations approach’, the 
‘tripartite typology approach’ and the ‘merged approach’.140  
 
The merged approach involves the merging of the human rights obligations approach with 
the analytical categories approach described above. 141  The human rights obligations 
approach involves examining 'the key elements of the right' and then determining the 'various 
indicators that could be best used to measure the applicable aspect of the right'.142 Welling 
argues that the resulting approach forms 'a categorical framework that measures ESCR 
fulfillment more comprehensively than a single approach'.143  
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4.5.2 Benefits and limitations of rights indicators 
Although there are numerous benefits associated with the use of international indicators to 
monitor human rights compliance, certain challenges and limitations have been identified.  
 
4.5.2.1 Clarity of content 
Foremost amongst these challenges is the ‘lack of clarity concerning the substantive content 
of the various rights’ incorporated within the ICESCR.144 As noted earlier in relation to the 
human right to a healthy environment, the precise scope and content of the right has not yet 
been clarified. Given the fact that indicators are designed to ‘measure the extent to which 
duty-bearers are fulfilling their obligations’ (explained above) under human rights treaties, 
it logically follows that if there is a lack of clarity concerning the nature of the obligations 
themselves, it will most likely be difficult to develop and use indicators to measure 
compliance with those obligations. In fact, it could be argued that in many ways, the ICESCR 
defers the most difficult (and political) questions to later interpretation by State parties. 
Commentators note that ‘the language of ESC rights is couched in terms which have often 
been interpreted as 'aspirational'’.145  
 
For instance, the concept of progressive realisation has attracted criticism on the grounds 
that it could be ‘used to excuse States’ inaction’.146 It is notoriously difficult to ascertain 
exactly what constitutes sufficient state action towards progressive realisation of ESC rights. 
A challenging balance has to be maintained between taking into consideration comparative 
capabilities between states and ensuring that the obligations recognised under the ICESCR 
provide sufficient safeguards for the ‘universality’ of human rights.  
 
4.5.2.2 Universality, cultural diversity and state autonomy 
A further issue regarding the legitimacy of international indicators concerns the assumption 
of universality they promote, which can sometimes come into conflict with ‘recognition of 
cultural diversity’ 147  – a theme which flows throughout the human rights literature. 
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Demonstrating this potential conflict, de Beco observes that international indicators run the 
risk of measuring a ‘state’s level of development more than its compliance with international 
human rights’.148 Whilst it is important to recognise the different capacities/resources of 
state parties, it is equally important to maintain the concept of universality of human rights. 
Arguably, international indicators achieve this balance by creating a standardised means of 
monitoring state compliance whilst retaining sufficient flexibility to make allowances for 
differing state capabilities.  
 
Despite the obvious benefits of standardisation (such as enabling comparative analysis),149 
some commentators have warned against constructing indicators which remove the ‘gap’ 
between ‘international law and domestic policy’.150  Rosga and Satterthwaite argue that 
removing this gap would ‘short-cut democratic processes by imposing specific policy 
choices on States’. 151  Further, they argue that '...if indicators are created at a level of 
specificity that would allow the treaty bodies to determine compliance as a technical matter, 
those indicators would be overly specific, collapsing the very space for democratic 
participation and accountability that is required by human rights law.'152 In a similar vein, 
Welling cites some common criticisms of international indicators, including the ‘threat’ they 
‘pose to states’ decision-making autonomy’.153  
 
Although these warnings should not be dismissed easily, it is possible to develop 
international indicators which make adequate allowances for these considerations. Indicators 
can be developed which respect the democratic authority of states to develop their own 
policy approaches for rights fulfillment. For example, although the right to water obliges 
states to ensure access to a minimum amount of clean affordable water, it does not dictate 
any particular mode of service delivery. Similarly, the right obliges states to include the 
public in decision-making relating to the management and use of water resources. It does 
not however require states to make any specific policy choices about how to include citizens 
in these processes.  
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Numerous organisations (both government and non-government) have attempted to develop 
human rights indicators. However, the question over who has authority to develop indicators 
has attracted significant debate. Whilst some commentators argue that responsibility and 
authority for developing indicators lies with state parties, others argue that international 
indicators should be developed by United Nations treaty bodies, and relevant human rights 
experts. It is well established that ‘primary responsibility for implementing human rights 
rests with national actors'. 154  However, monitoring of state implementation involves 
numerous actors, including domestic human rights bodies, UN treaty bodies, experts and 
national and international non-government organisations (NGOs).155 As noted by Rosga and 
Satterthwaite, although UN bodies have developed and used international indicators to 
monitor state compliance, these attempts have been conducted ‘in a context where their 
authority is constantly challenged by national governments.'156 To enhance their authority 
(or as Rosga and Satterthwaite argue, to ‘transform a judgment-laden process into one that 
appeared technical, scientific, and therefore…more legitimate'),157 UN treaty bodies have 
increasingly sought guidance from expert individuals/groups/organisations. 
   
Illustrating this trend, in 2008 the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights released a report titled ‘Report on Indicators for Promoting and Monitoring 
the Implementation of Human Rights’ which aimed to outline ‘a conceptual and 
methodological framework for identifying indicators for monitoring compliance with 
international human rights instruments’.158 Kalantry, Getgen and Koh argue that the Report 
'falls short of providing a concrete tool to monitor and evaluate states parties' adherence to a 
particular treaty'.159 Irrespective of the validity of their argument, arguably the Report’s aims 
were less ambitious – seeking to outline a framework, rather than a ‘concrete tool’ for 
monitoring. Whilst the Report ‘presents a list of illustrative indicators for 12 human 
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rights’,160 the human right to a healthy environment is not amongst them.161 The Report’s 
methodology involves the use of structural, process and outcome indicators coupled with 
identified ‘attributes’ which were intended to ‘capture…the essence of the normative 
content’ of the rights examined.162 The approach therefore proceeds upon the assumption 
that the normative content of the rights has been adequately (and authoritatively) outlined in 
‘relevant articles of the treaties and general comments of the committees’. 163  This 
presumption is questionable, given the continually contested content of most of the rights 
incorporated within the ICESCR, and problematic when faced with the prospect of emerging 
rights. 
 
4.5.3 Human rights indicators for the human right to a healthy environment 
At present, there are no internationally accepted human rights indicators for the human right 
to a healthy environment. Additionally, there have been no attempts to develop an indicator 
set by any qualified individuals or institutions. In order to do so, it would be necessary to 
adopt one of the approaches to the development of indicator sets, outlined above. It is 
submitted that the approach adopted by Kalantry, Getgen and Koh is preferable. This 
approach involves:  
1) ‘analyzing the specific language of the treaty that pertains to the right in question’;  
2) ‘defining the concept and scope of the right’;  
3) ‘identifying appropriate indicators that correlate with state obligations’;  
4) ‘setting benchmarks to measure progressive realization’; and  
5) ‘clearly identifying violations of the right in question'.164 
 
Accordingly, the following section follows the first two steps in the process, in a bid to 
ascertain whether it is possible to develop human rights progress indicators for the human 
right to a healthy environment. In accordance with Kalantry, Getgen and Koh’s approach, in 
order to develop indicators for the right it is first necessary to analyse the specific language 
of the relevant treaties creating the obligations. This mirrors the approach adopted by the 
OHCHR. In its 2008 Report (discussed above), the OHCHR explained the methodology it 
used to identify the key ‘attributes’ of the rights considered. They stated that firstly it is 
necessary to convert ‘the narrative on the legal standard of the right’ into ‘a limited number 
of characteristic attributes that facilitate a structured identification of appropriate indicators 
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for monitoring the implementation of that right.’165 They noted that due to the sometimes 
‘general’ and ‘overlapping’ standards outlined in the Covenant and the General Comments, 
the process of identifying the attributes of the right can assist in the ‘process of identifying 
indicators’.166  
 
The OHCHR found that for the majority of human rights considered, ‘on average about four 
attributes were able to capture reasonably the essence of the normative content of those 
rights’. 167  To identify these attributes, they examined relevant international treaties 
addressing the normative content of the rights.168  In 2012, the OHCHR released further 
guidance on the measurement and implementation of human rights indicators. They 
explained that there are ‘three considerations that guide the identification of the attributes of 
a human right’:  
To the extent feasible, the attributes should be based on an exhaustive reading of the standard, starting 
with the provisions in the core international human rights treaties, so that no part of the standard is 
overlooked either in the choice of the attributes of a particular human right or in identifying the 
indicators for that right; 
 
To the extent feasible, the attributes of the human right should collectively reflect the essence of its 
normative content, be few in number and their articulation should help the subsequent identification 
of the relevant indicators; and 
 
To the extent feasible, the attributes’ scope should not overlap. In other words, the selected 




Given this focus on reflecting the normative content of the right, human rights experts have 
warned that ‘only those rights that have been normatively justiﬁed (by norm entrepreneurs 
within the UN human rights system) and conceptualized (through the structure-process-
outcome typology) would be amenable to indicator development’.170 Accordingly, due to 
the absence of authoritative guidance on the normative content of the HRTHE, it is not yet 
possible to develop an indicator set for the right. If the right is accepted as an implied right 
under the ICESCR, guidance would need to be provided by the UNCESCR before an 
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indicator set could be developed. To date, there has only been one attempt to develop an 
indicator set for an implied right under the ICESCR – the human right to water. In 2005, 
Virginia Roaf, Ashfaq Khalfan and Malcolm Langford outlined a framework for developing 
indicators for the right to water, which addressed the aspects of the HRTW outlined under 
General Comment No.15.171 The potential indicators developed through this project were 
the product of an expert workshop involving ‘representatives of the main UN agencies 
monitoring access to water, governments, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, NGOs and other experts on the right to water’.172  
 
The authors adopted the ‘merged approach’ (discussed earlier) by organising the indicators 
‘according to the [analytical categories] approach, with the indicators categorised according 
to the human rights obligations approach’.173 Accordingly, the indicators were divided into 
the analytical types discussed above – structural, process and outcome indicators. 174 
According to Roaf, ‘the gaps in the existing indicators in terms of relevance to a rights-based 
approach were the structural indicators’.175 Structural indicators refer to ‘questions about the 
policy environment for delivery of the human right, with reference to law, constitutions and 
policy institutions’.176  
 
The resulting ‘menu of choices’ of potential indicators are summarised in a matrix attached 
to the report. 177  The matrix indicates whether the indicators are structural, process or 
outcome indicators and which duties they are designed to capture (i.e. the duties to respect, 
protect and fulfil). It is important to note that the indicators included in the report do not 
constitute an exhaustive list of the possible indicators relevant to monitoring the fulfilment 
of the right to water. However, they do provide a starting point for analysis, which can be 
expanded through further research and as evolving understandings of the scope and nature 
of the substantive content of the right develop. 
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It is not possible to apply this approach to the HRTHE, as unlike the human right to water, 
the HRTHE has not been the subject of a UNCESCR General Comment. As noted by 
Kalantry, Getgen and Koh, it is crucial to ‘understand the concepts and scope of the 
obligations’ imposed by a right before developing indicators to measure state compliance.178 
Attempting to develop an indicator set for the HRTHE at this stage would raise issues 
relating to ‘clarity of content’ and ‘authority’ discussed earlier. Indicator sets to evaluate 
state compliance with the right should ideally be developed by individuals and/or 
organisations with greater authority, utilising guidance from international authorities on the 
content of the right. Whilst it may not be possible to assess Australia’s current level of 
compliance with the right at this stage, it is possible to ascertain how international legal 
recognition of the right may potentially impact on Australia’s systems for environmental 
protection and management. Accordingly, the following chapter seeks to identify a number 
of potential benefits for Australian environmental protection associated with international 
legal recognition of the right.  
  
                                                          




Can the human right to a healthy environment be established as a moral right? What is the 
legal status of the right under international law? What is the scope and content of the right, 
and what obligations does it impose on states? How can compliance with the obligations 
imposed by the right be assessed at the international level? 
 
The purpose of this chapter was to consider the legal status of the human right to a healthy 
environment under international law, with a view to ascertaining the potential obligations it 
may impose upon Australia. It was concluded that a persuasive argument can be mounted 
for the existence of a moral right to a healthy environment, and that although the legal status 
of the right at international law is still a matter of debate, the right can be viewed as an 
implied right under the ICESCR. Whilst it was concluded that the content of the right cannot 
be definitively known until the UNCESCR provides authoritative guidance, the foregoing 
discussion does elucidate some possible aspects of the right’s content. The UNCESCR’s 
statements in regards to the content of a related ICESCR implied right (the human right to 
water) were examined, in order to provide insight into the possible contours of the HRTHE 
under the Covenant. Utilising this content, a number of potential obligations imposed by the 
right were outlined. Additionally, a set of potential core obligations requiring immediate 
realisation were identified. These include an obligation to create a national strategy and plan 
of action to implement the right, an obligation to ensure adequate standards of environmental 
quality to enable an adequate standard of living and human health, an obligation to refrain 
from unlawfully polluting the environment, and an obligation to refrain from interfering with 
an individual’s enjoyment of a healthy environment. It was further suggested that there may 
also be a core obligation to ensure that access to a healthy environment is available to every 
person without discrimination, and that every person has adequate access to information 
about environmental health and management.  
 
It was argued that the right does not oblige states to immediately facilitate access to a 
completely healthy environment, nor does it dictate a particular means of achieving the 
outcome sought. Rather, it imposes on state parties an obligation to take steps towards the 
full realisation of the right, whilst allowing for state autonomy in how to fulfil the obligations 




It was concluded that as a result of the lack of guidance on the normative content of the right 
under the ICESCR, it is not yet possible to develop human rights indicators to assess state 
progress towards realisation of these obligations. However, it was argued that even though 
Australia’s current level of compliance with the right can not be assessed, it is possible to 
evaluate the possible impacts of international legal recognition of the right for Australian 
environmental management and protection. Accordingly, the next chapter aims to identify 
some potential benefits associated with the imposition of the obligations to protect, respect 










Potential Benefits of Legal Recognition of the Human Right 
to a Healthy Environment for Australian Environmental 
Protection 
What are some potential benefits for environmental protection in Australia associated with 
international legal recognition of the human right to a healthy environment? How could the 
human right to a healthy environment be recognised under Australia’s domestic laws? What 
potential benefits for environmental protection may be associated with domestic legal 
recognition of the right? What are the possible limitations of both forms of recognition?  
 
5.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to determine the potential benefits for environmental protection in 
Australia associated with international and domestic legal recognition of the human right to 
a healthy environment. The chapter first considers the possible options for international legal 
recognition of the right, concluding that whilst explicit recognition of the right within a 
global binding treaty would be ideal, at present it is more likely that the right would receive 
recognition under an existing human rights treaty as an implied right. Accordingly, the 
possible benefits for domestic environmental protection associated with international legal 
recognition of the right as an ESC right under the ICESCR are considered. It is argued that 
it is possible to identify three key potential benefits associated with this form of international 
legal recognition. Namely, increased scrutiny of Australia’s environmental protection 
performance, the ability to benefit from international experience with the implementation of 
the right, and comparison against an international standard. Whilst none of these potential 
consequences are guaranteed to result in benefits for environmental protection, they certainly 
have the potential to do so. This potential is demonstrated through a case study of the 
realisation of these potential benefits in the case study context of water resources 
management.  
 
The chapter then turns to consideration of the possible options for domestic legal recognition 
of the right in Australia. Whilst it is acknowledged that there are numerous possible options, 
it is explained that the thesis will be limited to exploration of eleven recognition options. It 
is argued that whilst various strong theoretical criticisms have been made against the 
adoption of rights-based approaches to environmental protection, the practical experience of 
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numerous jurisdictions with legal recognition of the HRTHE demonstrates that benefits can 
flow from domestic recognition. Seven of the benefits associated with domestic legal 
recognition in other jurisdictions are outlined, and their potential benefits for environmental 
protection in the Australian context according to the definition of benefits adopted in Chapter 
One are considered. Having identified that these potential benefits could constitute benefits 
in the Australian context, and may possibly be realised through domestic legal recognition 
of the right, it is concluded that the identified options for domestic legal recognition of the 
right warrant exploration. Accordingly, Chapters Six and Seven are devoted to consideration 
of the potential realisation of the identified benefits under different constitutional and 









5.2 Options for international legal recognition of the human right to a 
healthy environment 
As explained in the previous chapter, it is possible to interpret the HRTHE as an implied 
right under the ICESCR. However, it is also possible that future international legal 
recognition of the HRTHE could take other forms. For instance, the right could be 
recognised in an international treaty as an express individual right on its own, or within the 
context of other environmental rights. An attempt was made over two decades ago to draft 
an international document outlining the human rights obligations of relevance to securing 
the right to a healthy environment. The Draft Principles on Human Rights and the 
Environment (‘Draft Principles’) were prepared by an international group of human rights 
experts in 1994, at the invitation of the Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and the 
Environment (Madame Fatma Zohra Ksentini).1 Principle 2 states that ‘[a]ll persons have 
the right to a secure, healthy and ecologically sound environment.’  
 
The Draft Principles outline various substantive and procedural aspects of the right, 
including recognition of the intergenerational nature of human rights obligations in this 
context. However, as noted by Handl, the prospects for formal international legal adoption 
of the Draft Principles ‘remains cloudy’.2 Shelton suggests that this may partly be attributed 
to the drafting process which did not include representatives from various relevant expert 
bodies (such as the United Nations Environment Programme), consequently leading to a 
‘perception that the text was unbalanced, overly-ambitious, and not reflective of the state of 
the law’.3  Accordingly, although it appears unlikely at present, it is possible that the HRTHE 
could be recognised under a specific international treaty outlining the human rights 
obligations relevant to securing fulfilment of the right. However, as this thesis advocates for 
an interpretation of the ICESCR that recognises an implied HRTHE under the Covenant, the 
following section is limited to consideration of the benefits associated with recognition of 
the HRTHE as an ICESCR right.  
                                                          
1 Draft Declaration of Principles on Human Rights and the Environment, Fatma Zohra Ksentini, 
Special Rapporteur, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/9 (1994) annex 1. 
2 Günther Handl quoted in Donald K Anton and Dinah L Shelton (eds), Environmental Protection and 
Human Rights (Cambridge University Press, 2011) 139. 
3 Dinah Shelton, Human Rights and Environment: Past, Present and Future Linkages and the Value of a 
Declaration (2009) Background Paper (Draft), High Level Expert Meeting on the New Future of Human 




5.3 Potential benefits for Australian environmental protection associated 
with international legal recognition  
It is possible to identify three key potential benefits associated with international legal 
recognition of the HRTHE as an ICESCR right. Namely, increased scrutiny of Australia’s 
environmental protection performance, the ability to benefit from international experience 
with the implementation of the right, and comparison against an international standard. 
Whilst none of these potential consequences are guaranteed to result in benefits for 
environmental protection, they certainly have the potential to do so. 
 
5.3.1 Potential benefits for environmental protection 
5.3.1.1 Increased scrutiny 
International legal recognition of the HRTHE as an ICESCR right would subject Australia’s 
approach to environmental protection and management to international scrutiny. It would 
open up Australia’s approaches to environmental issues to an international discussion, 
informed by universal human rights standards. Australia’s environmental performance 
would be subject to the monitoring, reporting and complaints mechanisms under 
international human rights law. Australia is already subject to scrutiny by the Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, requiring compliance with state reporting 
requirements.4 To some extent, aspects of Australia’s environmental protection regime are 
already subject to scrutiny through reporting on progress towards the realisation of other 
ESC rights under the Covenant. For instance, in consideration of Australia’s fourth periodic 
report under the Covenant in 2009, the Committee noted with concern the ‘impact of climate 
change on the right to an adequate standard of living’.5 However, by recognising the HRTHE 
as an ICESCR right, Australia would be required to report on its progress towards realisation 
of the right, and the Committee would be empowered to more comprehensively comment 
on the adequacy of Australia’s approach to implementation. It is further possible that 
international legal recognition of the right could empower individual citizens to raise 
complaints about violations of the right with the UN.  
                                                          
4 Australian Human Rights Commission, Scrutiny under the International Covenant on Economic Social and 
Cultural Rights <https://www.humanrights.gov.au/scrutiny-under-international-covenant-economic-social-
and-cultural-rights>. 




As of 2013, there is in force an Optional Protocol to the ICESCR which enables individuals 
and groups of individuals to submit communications to the Committee ‘claiming to be 
victims of a violation of any of the economic, social and cultural rights set forth in the 
Covenant by that State Party’.6 Although Australia is yet to sign and ratify the Optional 
Protocol, it may do so in the future. If the HRTHE was recognised as a Covenant right, and 
the Optional Protocol was ratified by Australia, Australian citizens (having exhausted all 
domestic remedies) would be empowered to submit communications to the committee 
alleging violations of the HRTHE. To date, the Committee has only published its views on 
one communication received since the Protocol entered into force. The Committee found 
that the state party in question (Spain) had violated the right to housing of the individual 
who brought the communication.7 The Committee issued a number of recommendations to 
the state party indicating how compliance with the right could be achieved, and requested 
that the state party formally respond to the Committee’s views within a specified time 
period.8  
 
The case was published online, receiving significant attention, and drawing international 
scrutiny on Spain’s approach to the realisation of the right to housing under the Covenant. 
Experience with the more established first Optional Protocol to the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights provides some indication as to the potential future impact of 
the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR on human rights protection.9 As noted by Poynder, 
although the Committee’s views ‘are not enforceable’, they are ‘widely published and carry 
significant moral and persuasive authority’. 10  He cites the case of Toonen v Australia 
(‘Toonen’) as support for this argument.11 In the case of Toonen, the UN Human Rights 
Committee found that certain Tasmanian criminal laws criminalising homosexual acts were 
in breach of Article 17 (right to privacy) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
                                                          
6 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for 
signature 24 September 2009, UN GA Res A/RES/63/117 (entered into force 5 May 2013) art 2. 
7 United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, Spain Violated the Rights of a Woman 
Whose House Risks Being Auctioned – UN Committee (2015) 
<http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=16457&LangID=E>. 
8 United Nations Economic and Social Council, Views: Communication No. 2/2014, 55th sess, UN Doc 
E/C.12/55/D/2/2014 (13 October 2015) (‘I.D.G v Spain’).  
9 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 
December 1966, 999 UNTS 302 (entered into force 23 March 1976).  
10 Nick Poynder, ‘When All Else Fails: The Practicalities of Seeking Protection of Human Rights under 
International Treaties’ (2003) Public Lecture presented by the Castan Centre and Australian Lawyers for 
Human Rights at Baker & McKenzie, Melbourne on 28 April 2003 
<https://www.monash.edu/law/centres/castancentre/public-events/events/2003/poynderpaper>. 
11 Human Rights Commitee, Views: Communication No. 488/1992, 50th sess, UN Doc 
CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 (31 March 1994) (‘Toonen v Australia’). 
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Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 
March 1976) (‘ICCPR’).12 Poynder argues that ‘there is no doubt’ that the Committee’s 
findings were the motivation behind the Commonwealth Parliament’s subsequent enactment 
of legislation which prohibited Commonwealth/State/Territory laws from arbitrarily 
interfering with the privacy of consenting adults to engage in sexual conduct (within the 
meaning of Art 17 of the ICCPR).13 This response by the Commonwealth demonstrates the 
significant impact that the Committee’s views can have upon state practices, despite the fact 
that the Committees views are not binding. However, as a general trend, Eastman argues that 
‘the Australian Government’s response to [the Committee’s] recommendations ‘has been 
poor’.14 Moreover, she notes that the expense and delays involved in the process can prove 
problematic.15  Inadequate responses by the Australian Government, and time and cost 
issues, may also limit the effectiveness of the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR. However, 
it is undeniable that some benefits could be derived from increasing international scrutiny 
on Australia’s realisation towards the HRTHE in this manner, and by providing recourse for 
citizens who feel their right to a healthy environment has been violated.  
 
The Optional Protocol would also enable other state parties under the Covenant to raise 
concerns about violations of the HRTHE with Australia directly, and with the Committee.16 
The creation of inter-state dialogue could further encourage international scrutiny and 
accountability, although it is yet to be seen whether this particular mechanism will be 
embraced by state parties. At the domestic level, in the absence of a federal bill of rights, 
there would be minimal independent official scrutiny of Australia’s compliance with the 
obligations imposed by the right, due to the lack of implementation of the ICESCR generally. 
The Australian Human Rights Commission is tasked with a range of statutory 
responsibilities designed to assist the promotion and protection of human rights in 
Australia.17 However, the Commission’s human rights mandate is limited by the legislation 
establishing its powers and functions.18 As the ICESCR is not incorporated in a schedule to 
                                                          
12 Ibid.  
13 Poynder, above n 10. The Commonwealth legislation enacting this reform is the Human Rights (Sexual 
Conduct) Act 1994 (Cth). 
14 Kate Eastman, ‘Australia’s Engagement with the United Nations’ in Paula Gerber and Melissa Castan 
(eds), Contemporary Perspectives on Human Rights Law in Australia (Thomson Reuters, 2013) 96, 111. 
15 Ibid.  
16 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for 
signature 24 September 2009, UN GA Res A/RES/63/117 (entered into force 5 May 2013) art 10. 
17 See generally, Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth).  
18 Australian Human Rights Commission, Australian Human Rights Commission Submission to the United 
Nations Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights Review of Australia’s Fourth Periodic Report 
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the Act, or listed as a relevant international instrument, ‘the rights under the ICESCR may 
not be the subject of a complaint or a self-initiated inquiry or examination of enactment 
conducted by the Commission, except to the extent that those rights are also incorporated in 
other treaties within the Commission’s statutory mandate’.19 International legal recognition 
of the right could help to place pressure on Australia to domestically recognise the right, 
potentially leading to more effective realisation of the right.  
 
It must be noted however that some critics argue that rather than constituting a benefit for 
environmental protection, ‘…“internationalizing” national decision-making in sensitive core 
areas of traditional state sovereignty’ is problematic.20 This is ultimately a matter of opinion, 
however it is certain that a persuasive argument can be mounted in favour of increasing 
international scrutiny of national decision-making which impacts on human rights 
protection.  
 
5.3.1.2 Learning from international experience 
International legal recognition of the right could enable Australia to learn from the 
experiences of other countries seeking to fulfil the obligations imposed by the right. 
Considering that ESC rights do not dictate the means by which their ends are to be achieved, 
it is crucial that states share their experiences to try to devise best practice solutions to the 
complex and varied challenges involved. In 2014, the United Nations Independent Expert 
on human rights and the environment, in conjunction with the United Nations Environment 
Programme, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, and the Legal 
Resources Centre of South Africa convened a regional consultation in South Africa 
examining the relationship between human rights obligations and environmental protection, 
focussing particularly on constitutional environmental rights.21 The consultation noted that 
                                                          




20 Günther Handl quoted in Donald K Anton and Dinah L Shelton (eds), Environmental Protection and 
Human Rights (Cambridge University Press, 2011) 140.  
21 United Nations Independent Expert on Human Rights and the Environment with the United Nations 
Environment Programme, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, and the Legal Resources 
Centre of South Africa, Human Rights and the Environment: Regional Consultation on the Relationship 
Between Human Rights Obligations and Environmental Protection, with a Focus on Constitutional 




there has been a ‘proliferation’ of constitutional rights around the world, and listed a number 
of benefits for environmental protection associated with constitutional recognition of 
environmental rights.22 However, the consultation also discussed a number of challenges 
involved in realising these benefits.23 Prime amongst these challenges was the issue of 
implementation, due to various causes including inadequate access to information, the 
degree of technical expertise and institutional capability required, limitations associated with 
a judicial approach to implementation, issues with judicial independence, court delays and 
the technical nature of litigation, mobilisation and education of communities, and 
definitional issues.24  
 
The consultation further identified a number of ‘good practices’ by states in the 
implementation of constitutional human rights to a healthy environment.25 Various different 
forms of good practices were discussed, including ‘active constitutional courts that have 
created a jurisprudence that interprets and applies constitutional environmental rights’,  
‘practices related to improving access to courts, including through broad standing 
provisions’, and ‘practices related to providing access to environmental information’.26 
Similarly, in the Independent Expert’s mission reports from Costa Rica (2014) and France 
(2015), he identified a number of good practices associated with each country’s 
implementation of environmental human rights. These included in Costa Rica the legal 
recognition of the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, the right to 
access to remedy, and the right to information, 27  and in France, the adoption of the 
Environmental Charter, recognition of rights to information and public participation, and 
international cooperation.28 These ‘good practices’ provide some indication as to how the 
                                                          
22 Ibid 6-8. 
23 Ibid 8-10. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid 11-27. 
26 Ibid. 
27 John Knox, Independent Expert on the Issue of Human Rights Obligations Relating to the Enjoyment of a 
Safe, Clean, Healthy and Sustainable Environment, Report of the Independent Expert on the Issue of Human 
Rights Obligations Relating to the Enjoyment of a Safe, Clean, Healthy and Sustainable Environment, UN 
Doc A/HRC/25/53/Add.1 (8 April 2014) annex (‘Report of the Independent Expert on the Issue of Human 
Rights Obligations Relating to the Enjoyment of a Safe, Clean, Healthy and Sustainable Environment on his 
Mission to Costa Rica (28 July – 1 August 2013)’) 6-13. 
28 ; John Knox, Independent Expert on the Issue of Human Rights Obligations Relating to the Enjoyment of a 
Safe, Clean, Healthy and Sustainable Environment, Report of the Independent Expert on the Issue of Human 
Rights Obligations Relating to the Enjoyment of a Safe, Clean, Healthy and Sustainable Environment, UN 
Doc A/HRC/28/61/Add.1 (6 March 2015) annex (‘Report of the Independent Expert on the Issue of Human 
Rights Obligations Relating to the Enjoyment of a Safe, Clean, Healthy and Sustainable Environment on his 
Mission to France (20-24 October 2014)’) 7-17. 
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right to a healthy environment may be effectively realised within a jurisdiction. As explained 
by the Independent Expert, although they do not constitute ‘best’ practices, they demonstrate 
the variety of laws, policies, and institutional mechanisms that can be utilised to effectively 
progressively realise the right. 29 By recognising the HRTHE, Australia would have the 
opportunity to learn from the experience of other countries who have already trialled 
different mechanisms for achieving progressive realisation of the right in their domestic 
systems. For instance, in Belgium a ‘standstill doctrine’ has been developed in response to 
constitutional recognition of the HRTHE. 30 The doctrine prevents the government from 
‘weakening levels of environmental protection except in limited circumstances where there 
is a compelling public interest’.31 Similar new legal approaches could be adopted in Australia 
as a means of fulfilling the obligations imposed by the right. As the standstill doctrine and 
the identified good practices above demonstrate, the effective realisation of environmental 
rights such as the HRTHE is dependent upon supportive institutional structures. By looking 
to the experience of other countries, Australia may be able to ascertain the most appropriate 
institutional and procedural frameworks to support effective implementation of the right.  
 
5.3.1.3 Comparison against an international standard 
By creating an international standard for environmental protection, international legal 
recognition of the right may help to provide an indication of how Australia is performing 
compared to other jurisdictions. To an extent, domestic environmental protection and 
management is already measured against international standards through various 
mechanisms. For instance, attempts have been made at the international and domestic levels 
to develop indicators to measure the achievement of sustainable development. At the 
international level, the Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) produced a set of 
sustainable development indicators, which have been adopted at the national level in various 
jurisdictions.32 The International Institute for Sustainable Development notes that a range of 
‘organizations such as the OECD, UNSD, UNEP, the World  Bank and others’ have been 
involved in the development of sustainable development indicators over the past two 
                                                          
29 Ibid 7 [24]. 
30 Boyd, above n 21, 224. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations Secretariat, Indicators of Sustainable 




decades.33  In 2012, at the Rio+20 Conference on Sustainable Development, participants 
discussed the need to formulate new sustainable development goals, and associated 
indicators to measure progress towards their achievement.34 In 2015, at the United Nations 
Sustainable Development Summit, a set of Sustainable Development Goals were agreed 
upon by over 150 state leaders. 35  The United Nations is currently in the progress of 
developing indicators to measure the realisation of these goals, which will build and expand 
upon previous efforts to develop international sustainable development indicators.36  
 
Progress has also been made at the national level in various jurisdictions, including 
Australia. The Australian Government has developed a set of sustainability indicators, which 
aim to provide information about Australia’s social/human, natural and economic capital.37 
Although there would obviously be numerous similarities between sustainable development 
indicators and indicators designed to measure progress towards realisation of the HRTHE 
(as they both seek to measure to some extent, the achievement of a certain standard of 
environmental quality), there are some important differences. Principally, these different 
indicator types seek to measure progress towards the achievement of distinct goals. 
Sustainable development indicators measure achievement towards the goals of sustainable 
development, whilst HRTHE indicators would measure state progress towards fulfilling the 
obligations to protect, respect and fulfil the right.  
 
Australia’s environmental performance is also already subject to comparisons against 
international standards due to Australia’s involvement with a wide range of international 
                                                          
33 Laszlo Pinter, Measuring Progress Towards Sustainable Development Goals: Working Paper (2013) 
International Institute for Sustainable Development, 8 
<http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2013/measuring_progress_sus_dev_goals.pdf>. 
34 Ibid 2.  
35 United Nations Development Programme, World Leaders Adopt Sustainable Development Goals (25 
September 2015) <http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/presscenter/pressreleases/2015/09/24/undp-
welcomes-adoption-of-sustainable-development-goals-by-world-leaders.html>. 
36 Division for Sustainable Development, United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 
Indicators in the Transforming Our World – The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development 
<https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/topics/indicators>. 
37 It explains that ‘social and human capital’ means ‘skills and education; health; employment; security; 
institutions, governance and community engagement’; natural capital includes ‘climate and atmosphere; land, 
ecosystems and biodiversity; natural resources; water; waste’; and economic capital refers to ‘wealth and 
income; housing; transport and infrastructure; productivity and innovation’: Department of the Environment 




environmental law treaties and agreements. 38  For instance, Australia is a party to the 
Convention on Biological Diversity, opened for signature 5 June 1992, 1760 UNTS 79 
(entered into force 29 December 1993), which requires state parties to abide by the 
provisions of the Convention, engage in regular reporting, and develop national plans for 
implementation. A project has been developed to help states assess their progress towards 
achieving biodiversity goals, through the use of biodiversity indicators.39 Similarly, other 
international environmental law conventions have processes for ensuring that states comply 
with international standards.  
 
Accordingly, it may be possible to argue that the creation of HRTHE indicators would be 
duplicative of various progress indicators utilised under international environmental law 
agreements. Whilst there would certainly be a significant degree of overlap, it is likely that 
there would also be important points of distinction. Moreover, where there are overlapping 
obligations, the addition of HRTHE indicators to the landscape could help to strengthen and 
co-ordinate Australia’s efforts towards compliance with its various international 
environmental law obligations.  
 
5.3.2 Potential realisation of the identified benefits in the Australian water 
management context 
As identified, there are various potential benefits for environmental protection associated 
with international legal recognition of the right. These include, increased scrutiny of 
Australia’s environmental protection performance, the ability to benefit from international 
experience with the implementation of the right, and comparison against an international 
standard. This section aims to determine the extent to which these potential benefits may be 
realised in the case study context of water resources management in the Murray-Darling 
Basin in Australia.  
 
As argued above, it is possible that international legal recognition of the right may result in 
increased scrutiny of Australia’s environmental protection systems. Accordingly, it may 
                                                          
38 For a list of relevant treaties, see: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Cth), Environment and Sea 
Law <http://dfat.gov.au/international-relations/themes/environment-sea-law/pages/environment-and-sea-
law.aspx>. 
39 Biodiversity Indicators Partnership, The Indicators <http://www.bipindicators.net/>. 
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increase scrutiny of the systems in place to manage Australia’s water resources, and the 
degree to which Australia is taking steps to realise the right in this context. Whilst there is 
no international authoritative statement outlining the state obligations imposed by the 
HRTHE, as explained earlier, it is possible to ascertain certain potential aspects of the right’s 
content. Utilising this content, a number of potential obligations were identified. The 
obligations outlined require that states facilitate sustainable environmental management in 
order to ensure that a minimum standard of environmental health is maintained both at 
present and into the future. Applied to the water context, this may accordingly impose an 
obligation on states to provide a law and policy framework for sustainable water resources 
management. In order to ensure its effectiveness, states would also need to ensure that the 
laws and policies were adequately monitored and enforced.  
 
It was also explained that the right may impose an obligation requiring states to ensure a 
minimum standard of environmental quality. Applied to the water context, this may place 
an obligation on states to ensure adequate standards of water quality and water ecosystem 
health. If there is a minimum standard of environmental health, there must therefore be a 
minimum standard of water quality which extends beyond simply a level of water quality 
adequate for direct human survival needs. The obligation may extend to ensuring a standard 
of water quality that enables the maintenance of ecological health at present and into the 
future. In order to enforce these standards, it may be necessary for the public to be able to 
gain adequate information about water quality, and to participate in and challenge decisions 
affecting water quality. However, ensuring adequate water quality may only partially fulfil 
the potential obligations imposed by the HRTHE. In order to achieve sustainability of the 
resource and the maintenance of ecological health, it may be necessary for states to ensure 
that there are adequate supplies of freshwater to satisfy the needs of not only humans, but 
also non-human animals and the environment itself.  Whilst the human right to water 
focusses on ensuring that human beings have access to ‘sufficient, safe, acceptable, 
physically accessible and affordable water for personal and domestic uses’,40 the HRTHE 
has a broader focus. It seeks to ensure that all of humanity has access to a natural 
environment which is capable of sustaining human life. Accordingly, the right may impose 
                                                          
40 General Comment No. 15: Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UNCESCR, 29th sess [5], E/C.12/2002/11 (2002), para 2. 
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upon states an obligation to ensure adequate supplies of freshwater to satisfy the water needs 
of humans, non-human animals and the environment at present and into the future.  
 
Accordingly, in addition to the general obligations identified earlier to provide legal 
recognition of the right and to create a national strategy for implementation, the right may 
also impose certain specific obligations on states in the water resources context. Namely, an 
obligation to provide a legal and policy framework for sustainable water resources 
management, an obligation to ensure adequate standards of water quality and water 
ecosystem health, and an obligation to ensure adequate supplies of freshwater to satisfy the 
water needs of humans, non-human animals, and the environment at present and into the 
future. Although it is not yet possible to ascertain Australia’s progress towards realisation of 
the right, if these obligations are held to be imposed by the right, it can be seen that Australia 
is already taking steps towards the fulfilment of these obligations in the water resources 
management context. However, if the HRTHE was recognised, the adequacy of these steps 
would become a matter for international scrutiny and debate.  
 
Recognition under the ICESCR, would mean that the UNCESCR would be tasked with 
monitoring Australia’s realisation of these obligations. Accordingly, Australia’s progress 
towards achieving the obligations in relation to water resources management would be 
subject to the reporting and review processes operated by the Committee. Whilst the 
Committee’s views cannot force states to change their behaviour, they can encourage an 
international dialogue on the adequacy of state practices. By recognising the right at the 
international level, Australia could join an international conversation on how best to fulfil 
the right’s obligations in this context. Addressing the myriad challenges raised by water 
resources management is a complicated governance task. Facilitating international sharing 
of information about how to best address these challenges could be beneficial for improving 
environmental protection in this context. However, it is questionable to what extent this 
would prove beneficial, given that Australia is already able to engage with expertise on 
comparative water resources management. The United Nations has developed an ‘inter-
agency coordination mechanism for all freshwater related issues’, known as UN Water.41 
UN-Water regularly releases guidance to help facilitate information sharing on water 
governance mechanisms between states. For instance, they recently released a compendium 
                                                          
41 UN-Water, About UN-Water <http://www.unwater.org/about/en/>. 
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outlining various water quality regulatory frameworks adopted in different jurisdictions, in 
order to assist decision-makers and others involved in water governance by helping them to 
learn from the successes and challenges of different approaches.42 Accordingly, it can be 
seen that there are already mechanisms in place to facilitate state peer learning in this regard. 
 
Despite this limitation, it is possible that enabling Australian citizens to compare Australia’s 
performance could support calls for improved environmental protection. If the right is 
recognised at the international level in the future, it may lead to the elucidation of 
international benchmarks regarding the particular obligations identified. The application of 
human rights indicators could reveal areas where Australia is fulfilling to take adequate steps 
according to its resources to realise the right. This would strengthen calls for improvement, 
as increased environmental protection measures could be characterised as necessary for 
adequately meeting human rights obligations. As noted earlier, some of the benefits 
associated with the use of human rights indicators are their capacity to facilitate comparative 
state reporting, create ‘interstate peer pressure’,43 provide 'feedback on the outcomes of state 
policy’, ‘inform decision making’ and ‘suggest areas for future policy change at the 
government level’.44  
 
However, the United Nations is already in the process of developing indicators to measure 
progress towards a Sustainable Development Goal (‘SDG’) which is focussed specifically 
on water and water management. The SDG requires states to ‘ensure availability and 
sustainable management of water and sanitation for all’.45 A number of the targets identified 
to achieve this goal align with the outlined potential obligations of the HRTHE. For instance, 
one of the targets requires states to ‘protect and restore water-related ecosystems’ by 2020.46 
Whilst another sets a target of improving water quality.47 However, as noted earlier, there 
are differences between the goals, indicators and targets utilised for SD indicators, in 
comparison to those that would be used for HRTHE indicators. Accordingly, whilst the 
predicted degree of overlap does seem to be inevitable in this context, it does not mean that 
                                                          
42 UN-Water, Compendium of Water Quality Regulatory Frameworks: Which Water for Which Use? (2015) 
<http://www.unwater.org/publications/publications-detail/en/c/357645/>. 
43 Welling, above n 121, 941.  
44 Ibid 944.  
45 UN-Water, Monitoring Water and Sanitation in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development: An 
Introductory Guide (2016) 3 <http://www.unwater.org/publications/publications-detail/en/c/379864/>. 
46 Ibid 5. 
47 Ibid 4. 
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HRTHE indicators would be rendered redundant. Moreover, HRTHE indicators have the 
benefit of seeking progress towards the fulfilment of human rights obligations, as opposed 
to aspirational development ‘goals’.   
 
It is possible that as a result of the international dialogue created by human rights indicator 
progression evaluation, Australia may enter into agreements with other countries at the 
international level to adopt strategies to better enable Australia to meet international 
benchmarks and targets. For instance, Australia could be party to an agreement to reduce 
water consumption by a certain percentage by a certain date. Alternatively, it could agree to 
better facilitate access to justice in decision-making concerning water management. The 
potential impacts created by international peer pressure should not be underestimated. To an 
extent, international agreements on measures to improve freshwater governance and the 
management of water environments already exist. Relevant international documents include 
the Ramsar Convention (Convention on Wetlands of International Importance)48 and the 
International Law Association’s 2004 Berlin Rules on Water Resources (‘Berlin Rules’).49  
 
The Berlin Rules are of particular relevance as unlike most international water law 
documents, the Berlin Rules include state duties in relation to domestic freshwater sources 
which are not transboundary. The Rules ‘express the entire body of customary international 
law applicable to the management of waters’.50 Various articles are of relevance to the 
relationship between Australia’s international law obligations and domestic water resources 
management. Reviewing these customary international law obligations relating to 
freshwater governance, it can be seen that Australia is already potentially subject to various 
obligations which may also be imposed by recognition of the HRTHE.51 For instance, it was 
argued earlier that the HRTHE may impose an obligation to manage waters sustainably, 
which reflects the obligation contained under Article 7 of the Rules. Article 27 contains an 
obligation to ‘prevent, eliminate, reduce, or control pollution in order to minimize 
environmental harm’, and Article 28 imposes an obligation to ‘establish water quality 
standards sufficient to protect public health and the aquatic environment and to provide 
                                                          
48 Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially as Waterfowl Habitat, opened for signature 
2 February 1971, 996 UNTS 245 (entered into force 21 December 1975). Australia is a Contracting Party to 
the Convention. 
49 International Law Association, Berlin Rules on Water Resources (2004) 71 ILA 337.   
50 Ibid 8. 
51 For instance, Articles 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 17, 18, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27, 28, and 69.  
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water to satisfy needs’. Both of these obligations were argued to form part of the obligations 
imposed by the HRTHE.  
 
Accordingly, it could be argued that international legal recognition of the HRTHE adds little 
to Australia’s existing obligations under international law in relation to water resources 
management. However, arguably recognition of these obligations as components of a 
broader human rights obligation to protect, respect and fulfil the human right to a healthy 
environment as a Covenant right may prove more effective than recognition as customary 
international law obligations. Moreover, there would inevitably be distinctions between the 
content of the HRTHE as applied to water resources management and the content of existing 
customary international law obligations relating to freshwater governance. In fact, it could 
be argued that international legal recognition of the HRTHE could help to strengthen and 





5.4 Limitations of international legal recognition of the right for 
environmental protection in Australia 
 
Despite the various potential benefits outlined above, international legal recognition of the 
HRTHE may have a limited impact on Australian environmental protection. This is due to 
three main areas of limitation. Firstly, the fact that the right may impose obligations that are 
already largely addressed under international environmental law. Secondly, the fact that a 
number of the identified benefits for environmental protection area already being released 
through other mechanisms. And finally, the fact that Australia has a record of failing to abide 
by various international human rights obligations which have not been translated into 
domestic legislation.  
 
In regards to the first area of limitation, as noted above, Australia is already party to 
numerous hard and soft law international environmental law agreements. These agreements 
span a range of environmental issue areas, including climate change, biodiversity 
conservation, and marine protection. Accordingly, it is possible that the vast majority of the 
obligations imposed by recognition of the HRTHE are already captured under Australia’s 
international environmental law obligations. The main point of distinction lies in the 
available remedies and institutional monitoring and accountability mechanisms for human 
rights obligations vis a vis international environmental law obligations. Handl has criticised 
the prospect of international legal recognition of the HRTHE on the grounds that it would 
focus attention away ‘from the task of building upon already existing structures and 
mechanisms’ under international environmental law, and would ‘result in duplicative 
efforts’ for less gain than would be associated with other possible reforms (such as for 
example, ‘enhancing the formal status of NGOs within existing fora and processes’).52 
However, in response Rodriguez-Rivera argues that the right should be viewed as 
‘complimentary [sic] to international environmental law and not as a parallel or alternative 
scheme.’53 He argues that rather than being ‘redundant’, the right would in fact ‘fill a gap’ 
in international environmental law.54  Accordingly, whilst it is undeniable that the right 
would in some respects operate in a duplicative manner with existing obligations under 
                                                          
52 Günther Handl quoted in Luis E Rodriguez-Rivera, ‘Is the Human Right to Environment Recognized 
Under International Law? It Depends on the Source’ (2001) 12 (1) Columbia Journal of International 
Environmental Law and Policy 1, 35.  
53 Rodriguez-Rivera, ibid. 
54 Ibid.  
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international environmental law, it may also complement and address gaps in international 
environmental law.    
 
The second area of limitation concerns the fact that a number of the benefits associated with 
international legal recognition for environmental protection are already being realised 
through other mechanisms. For instance, Australia is already able to learn from the 
comparative environmental governance experiences of other countries. It is also already 
subject to comparisons against international standards in terms of evaluating environmental 
protection performance. However, there may be distinct additional benefits associated with 
facilitating international peer learning, and increased international scrutiny via the 
mechanism of the HRTHE. For instance, recognition of the right at the international level 
may lead to the elucidation of international benchmarks for achieving realisation of the right 
at the domestic level, which could help to reveal areas where Australia is falling short of 
international standards. Accordingly, there could be benefits associated with the 
implementation of human rights indicators for the HRTHE which are not associated with 
indicators designed to measure Australia’s progress towards sustainable development goals.  
 
In regards to the third area of limitation, the Australian Government has been criticised on a 
number of occasions for its failure to respect its international human rights obligations, 
particularly with regards to the rights of refugees and asylum seekers (discussed earlier). 
Obligations which have been translated into domestic legislation have enjoyed a greater 
degree of fulfilment and compliance (such as obligations to prohibit discrimination on the 
basis of race and gender). Accordingly, in the absence of domestic recognition of the right, 
it is uncertain the extent to which the Australian Government will make progress towards 
fulfilment of the obligations imposed by the HRTHE. Although, as argued above, even a 
failure to adequately take steps towards realisation could result in benefits for environmental 
protection, as it may increase international pressure and scrutiny on Australia.  
 
The next section considers the possible options for domestic legal recognition of the right, 




5.5 Options for domestic legal recognition of the right in Australia 
 
As explained earlier in Chapter Four, the HRTHE is not expressly recognised in the 
Commonwealth Constitution, or in any of the state constitutions or territory self-governing 
legislation. It is similarly absent from federal and state/territory human rights legislation. 
There are various options available for legal recognition of the human right to a healthy 
environment in Australia.55 Eleven options for legal recognition of the right will be explored 
over the course of the subsequent two chapters (summarised in Table 1 overleaf).  
 
The first set of options (1-5) address the possibilities for constitutional recognition of the 
right in Australia. As noted earlier in Chapter Three, globally there has been a trend towards 
constitutional recognition of the right. Chapter Six aims to ascertain whether it would be 
possible for the right to be recognised in the Commonwealth Constitution, state constitutions 
and territory self-governing legislation. Four different options for Commonwealth 
constitutional recognition are considered – recognition of the right under a bill of rights, 
recognition in the Constitution’s preamble, recognition in a new section of the Constitution, 
or recognition in an existing section.  
 
The second set of options (6-11) address the possibilities for legislative recognition of the 
right in Australia. As noted in Chapter One, there is a need for further research into the utility 
of legislative versions of the HRTHE. Three options for Commonwealth legislative 
recognition are explored, including express legislative recognition of the right within a bill 
of rights, implied recognition within a bill of rights, and specific legislation recognising the 
HRTHE. Three options for state/territory legislative recognition are also considered. 
Namely, recognition of the right in state/territory bill of rights legislation as either an express 




                                                          
55 Rowena Cantley-Smith has considered a number of these potential options, and outlined various possible 
ways to incorporate a human right to a healthy environment into Australian law: Rowena Cantley-Smith, 'A 
Human Right to a Healthy Environment' in Paula Gerber and Melissa Castan (eds), Contemporary 
Perspectives on Human Rights Law in Australia (Thomson Reuters, 2013) 447, 472-473. 
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Table 1: Options for Legal Recognition of the Human Right to a Healthy Environment 
in Australia 
 
 Federal State/Territory 
Constitutional Option One (Bill of Rights) 
Recognition of the HRTHE within 
the context of a constitutionally 
entrenched bill of rights, as either 
an independent right or a 
derivative right. 
Option Five 
Recognition of the HRTHE within 
state constitutions and territory self-
governing legislation.  
Option Two (Preamble) 
Recognition of the HRTHE within 
the preamble of the 
Commonwealth Constitution.   
 
Option Three (Existing Chapter) 
Recognition of the HRTHE within 
an existing chapter of the 
Constitution.   
 
Option Four (New Section) 
Recognition of the HRTHE within 
in a new section of the 
Constitution.  
 
Legislative Option Six (Bill of Rights – 
Express Recognition) 
Express recognition of the HRTHE 
within a statutory bill of rights at 
the federal level.  
Option Nine (Bill of Rights – 
Express Recognition ) 
Recognition of the HRTHE within the 
context of existing or new statutory 
bills of rights at the state/territory 
level.  
Option Seven (Bill of Rights – 
Implied Recognition) 
Implied recognition of the HRTHE 
within a statutory bill of rights at 
the federal level.   
Option Ten (Bill of Rights – 
Implied Recognition) 
Recognition of the HRTHE in 
state/territory bills of rights 
legislation as an implied right.  
Option Eight (Specific 
Legislation)  
Legislative recognition of the 
HRTHE within specific federal 
HRTHE legislation.  
Option Eleven (Specific 
Legislation) 
Recognition of the HRTHE within 





5.6 Possible expression of the right  
If the right was not recognised at the international level, yet Australia chose to recognise a 
form of human right to a healthy environment at the domestic level, it would have to decide 
on the expression of the right. There are various possible forms of expression Australia could 
adopt. For instance, in Latvia, the right is expressed as a right to live in a ‘benevolent 
environment’,56 whilst in Mexico, citizens are granted a right to an ‘appropriate ecosystem 
for their development and welfare’.57 The way in which the right is expressed can have 
significant implications for its content. As there is no definitive expression of the right at the 
international level, significant debate exists as to the relative benefits of the possible forms 
of expression. As noted by Shelton, various ‘implications [emerge] from the different 
adjectives’ employed to express the right, such as: ‘’healthy’, ‘safe’, ‘secure’ or ‘clean’’.58 
Collins argues that the most appropriate ‘modifier’ for the right is the phrase ‘healthy and 
ecologically balanced’.59 She advocates for this term on the basis that the word healthy 
‘responds most directly to environmental contamination causing direct human health effects’ 
and the term ‘ecologically balanced’ addresses the destruction of natural habitats.60  
 
Atapattu argues that the right should be framed as a right to a ‘healthy’ environment.61 He 
prefers this formulation for various reasons, including the fact that it is ‘easier to establish’ 
and has the requisite flexibility to adapt to different situations.62 However, agreeing that the 
preferable terminology is a right to a healthy environment, raises further definitional 
questions. In particular, what is a ‘healthy environment’, and what standard of environmental 
quality does it guarantee? To answer these questions, it may be possible to draw guidance 
from international law agreements and declarations pertaining to the relationship between 
human rights and the environment. In order to do this, Wolfe considered the statements made 
in the Draft Principles. 63  However, she found that the Principles do not provide an 
‘indication of a standard for what constitutes “a secure, healthy and ecologically sound 
                                                          
56 Constitution of Latvia, art 115.  
57 Political Constitution of the United Mexican States, art 4. 
58 Dinah L Shelton (ed), Human Rights and the Environment Volume I (Edward Elgar, 2011), x. 
59 Lynda Margaret Collins, ‘Are We There Yet? The Right to Environment in International and European 
Law’ (2007) 3 (2) McGill International Journal Sustainable Development Law & Policy 119, 137. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Sumudu Atapattu, 'The Right to a Healthy Life or the Right to Die Polluted?: The Emergence of a Human 
Right to a Healthy Environment Under International Law' (2002) 16 Tulane Environmental Law Journal 65, 
111. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Draft Declaration of Principles on Human Rights and the Environment, Fatma Zohra Ksentini, Special 
Rapporteur, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/9 (1994) annex 1. 
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environment”.64 Similarly, other relevant statements from the international community fail 
to outline a standard which could be adopted at the national level. 
 
Whilst recourse may be made to science in order to ascertain a theoretically objective 
scientific standard, it is impossible to avoid value judgements in the standard-making 
process. Value judgements are involved at every stage of the process, including how the 
right is expressed, how the standard is defined, and how compliance is assessed.65 As noted 
by Anderson, ‘perceptions of the environment are culturally informed’. 66  Inevitably 
therefore, significant cultural divergence will exist over the meaning of ‘clean’ and ‘healthy’ 
in the environmental context. Defining the right at the national level may therefore 
accordingly be more appropriate as it allows for divergence between cultural conceptions of 
the human-environment relationship. Supporting this argument, Nickel argues that a lack of 
guidance at the international level may not be problematic. He contends that ‘[e]ven if it 
were possible to give a more precise description of the level of acceptable risk, it probably 
would be inappropriate for international institutions to prescribe a single, precise standard 
worldwide’.67 For this reason, he argues that ‘[r]isk standards should be specified further at 
the national level through democratic legislative and regulatory processes, in light of current 
scientific knowledge and fiscal realities.’68 In a similar vein, Kiss and Shelton advocate 
against the delineation of a general definition and support letting ‘human rights supervisory 
institutions and courts develop their own interpretations, as they have done for many other 
human rights’. 69  However, as Boyle notes, this raises an important question over the 
advisability of allowing courts to act as the arbiters of the standard (an issue which will be 
explored further below in Chapters Six and Seven).70  
                                                          
64 Karrie Wolfe, 'Greening the international human rights sphere? Environmental rights and the Draft 
Declaration of Principles on Human Rights and the Environment' (2003) 9 Appeal, Review of Current Law 
and Law Reform 45, 51.  
65 As noted by Boyle, ‘[w]hat constitutes a decent environment is a value judgement, on which reasonable 
people will differ’: Alan Boyle, 'Human Rights and the Environment: Where Next?' (2012) 23 (3) The 
European Journal of International Law 613, 626.  
66 Michael Anderson, 'Human Rights Approaches to Environmental Protection: An Overview' in Alan Boyle 
and Michael Anderson (eds), Human Rights Approaches to Environmental Protection (Clarendon Press, 
1998) 1, 13.  
67 Nickel, James W, 'The Human Right to a Safe Environment: Philosophical Perspectives on Its Scope and 
Justification' (1993) 18 Yale Journal of International Law 281, 285. 
68 Ibid. 




70 Boyle, ibid. 
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Another crucial definitional question pertains to the meaning of the term ‘environment’. As 
May and Daly ask, ‘[d]oes the noun “environment” mean human environment, natural 
environment, or both?”71 For the purposes of this thesis, the environment will be defined to 
mean the ‘environment’ (natural and man-made) in which humans live, as this definition 
appears to be most consistent with the focus of the Covenant rights from which the HRTHE 
may be derived under international law. However, ultimately the definition of the 
‘environment’ for the purposes of a constitutional or legislative provision will depend upon 
the degree of definition of the term within the document recognising the right, and the 
manner in which the term is interpreted by the courts.72 
 
From the foregoing discussion it can be seen that deciding upon the appropriate expression 
of the right is a complicated task, which can have significant implications for the 
interpretation and operation of the right. Arguably, the optimal expression of the right is 
characterisation of the right as a ‘right to a healthy environment’ as that form of expression 
best captures the identified possible content of the right at the international level. If Australia 








                                                          
71 James R May and Erin Daly, 'Vindicating Fundamental Environmental Rights Worldwide' (2009) 11 
Oregon Review of International Law 365, 370. 
72 For a discussion of how courts have interpreted the term ‘environment’ contained in environmental rights 
declarations in other jurisdictions, see:  James R May and Erin Daly, Global Environmental 
Constitutionalism  (Cambridge University Press, 2015) 91-93. 
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5.7 Potential benefits for environmental protection associated with 
domestic legal recognition of the right in Australia 
This section considers whether legal recognition of the right at the domestic level has the 
potential to provide an effective means of assisting Australia to achieve environmental 
protection. As noted by Boyle, there is an important distinction to be made between 
recognising a relationship between the protection of human rights and the protection of the 
environment, and making a claim that recognising a human right to a healthy environment 
is a useful means of achieving environmental protection.73 He explains that ‘…while it may 
be true that adequate environmental quality is an essential condition for the enjoyment of 
human rights, it is less obvious that a substantive human right to environmental quality is an 
essential condition for the protection of the environment.’74 This is a crucial distinction to 
draw, as it is possible that legal recognition of the right to a healthy environment may not 
provide any significant benefits for environmental protection. Redgwell argues that under a 
‘strong rights-based approach…it could be argued that recognition of rights becomes an end 
in itself’.75  
 
 Conversely, the aim of this thesis is to explore whether legal recognition of the right can 
constitute an effective means of achieving the ends of environmental protection. Whilst it 
would obviously be unrealistic to expect one mechanism to address all of the causes and 
consequences of the various challenges facing environmental protection, it is useful to 
consider how domestic legal recognition of the human right to a healthy environment might 
be utilised as a means of improving and aiding environmental protection to some extent. As 
it is not possible for the thesis to consider all of the potential benefits for environmental 
protection associated with domestic legal recognition of the HRTHE, the thesis will be 
restricted to consideration of whether domestic legal recognition is capable of realising a set 
of potential benefits.  
 
                                                          
73 Alan Boyle, 'The Role of International Human Rights Law in the Protection of the Environment' in Alan 
Boyle and Michael Anderson (eds), Human Rights Approaches to Environmental Protection (Clarendon 
Press, 1998) 43, 57. 
74 Ibid.  
75 Catherine Redgwell, 'Life, the Universe and Everything: A Critique of Anthropocentric Rights' in Alan E 
Boyle and Michael R Anderson (eds), Human Rights to Approaches to Environmental Protection (Clarendon 
Press, 1998) 71, 83. 
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The following set of potential environmental protection benefits has been selected:  
1. Emphasis on the fundamental importance of the interrelationship between human 
health and wellbeing and the state of the natural environment;  
2. Stronger basis for environmental laws and policies;  
3. Increased prioritisation of environmental protection considerations in government 
decision-making;  
4. Safeguards against environmental protection rollbacks;  
5. Safety net by filling gaps in environmental legislation;  
6. Avenues to bring legal actions in the interests of environmental protection;  
7. Inform environmental quality standards. 
  
As noted in Chapter One, the rationale for the selection of these benefits is twofold. Firstly, 
a number of these benefits have been associated with domestic legal recognition of the right 
in other jurisdictions.76 Accordingly, it is relevant to consider whether Australia might enjoy 
a similar experience.77 Secondly, as this chapter argues, these benefits all address key aspects 
of the goals of ESD, and assist in addressing some of the key challenges for environmental 
protection discussed earlier. The following section considers how each of these potential 
benefits may be realised through domestic legal recognition of the right, and how they may 
constitute benefits in the Australian context according to the definition of benefits adopted 
in Chapter One. Chapters Six and Seven then consider how these potential benefits may be 
realised in the Australian context, under different forms of legal recognition.  
 
 
                                                          
76 Boyd’s research has confirmed the realisation of the following benefits for environmental protection 
associated with domestic constitutional recognition of the right: stronger environmental laws, creation of a 
safety net to close gaps in environmental law, the prevention of rollbacks on environmental protection, 
improved implementation and enforcement of environmental laws and policies, promotion of environmental 
justice, increased public involvement in environmental governance, increased governmental accountability, 
the creation of a level playing field with social and economic rights, and improved environmental education: 
David R Boyd, The Environmental Rights Revolution: A Global Study of Constitutions, Human Rights and 
the Environment (UBC Press, 2012) 27-32.  
77 In Chapter Seven of David R Boyd, The Right to a Healthy Environment: Revitalizing Canada's 
Constitution (UBC Press, 2012), Boyd explores how a number of the benefits experienced in other 
jurisdictions may be realised if Canada provided constitutional recognition of the right. In particular, he 
considers its ability to strengthen environmental laws, improve enforcement of environmental laws and 
prevent environmental law rollbacks. 
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5.7.1 Emphasis on the fundamental importance of the interrelationship between 
human health and wellbeing and the state of the natural environment 
One of the most significant potential benefits of legal recognition of the right is its ability to 
change the way the environment is valued and the way environmental protection is 
prioritised against competing interests. The right places emphasis on the fundamental 
importance of the interrelationship between human health and wellbeing and the state of the 
natural environment. Explicit recognition of this linkage at the policy level could operate as 
an important precursor to more significant recognition in law and practice. As noted earlier 
in Chapter Two, there are various political challenges facing environmental protection in 
Australia relating to differing views on the nature of the human/environment relationship, 
and differing views on the value and role of the environment. It is possible that through 
placing emphasis on the importance of the interrelationship, domestic legal recognition of 
the right could help to address these issues to some extent. Accordingly, this possible 
consequence of domestic legal recognition can be characterised as a benefit for 
environmental protection in Australia. Chapters Six and Seven will consider how this 
particular benefit may be realised through constitutional and legislative recognition of the 
right.  
 
5.7.2 Stronger basis for environmental laws and policies 
Domestic legal recognition of the right in other countries has been found to provide a 
stronger basis for environmental laws and policies.78 In Australia, domestic recognition may 
achieve this effect via direct impact on legislative power (for instance, where the right 
receives constitutional recognition), or through to its ability to justify arguments for the 
enactment and/or retention of environmental laws and policies. This could help to address 
challenges for environmental protection related to political disagreements over the necessity 
of environmental protection measures. Being able to justify laws and policies on the basis 
of a human rights mandate, could help to strengthen calls for government action on 
environmental protection. As noted earlier in Chapter Two, various commentators advocate 
for reform to Australia’s environmental protection laws and policies. Accordingly, 
increasing legislative power and/or political pressure to enact law reform could be perceived 
as a potential benefit for environmental protection in Australia. 
                                                          
78 Boyd, above n 76, 233.  
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5.7.3 Increased prioritisation of environmental protection considerations in 
government decision-making 
Domestic legal recognition of the right has the potential to elevate the status of 
environmental protection claims above claims made on behalf of other interests. As noted 
by legal philosopher Ronald Dworkin, rights claims can operate as ‘trumps’ in the legal 
system.79 Huffman argues that it is this aspect of rights claims that makes them ‘attractive to 
nature advocates’ as they have the ability to trump ‘ordinary political decisions’.80 Anderson 
argues that both human rights law and environmental law seek to utilise this ‘trump’ 
capacity. He claims that both areas of law have a ‘hidden imperial ambition’ as they ‘both 
potentially touch upon all spheres of human activity, and claim to override or trump other 
considerations’.81 Accordingly, one of the potential benefits for environmental protection 
associated with the characterisation of environmental protection as a human ‘right’ is the 
increased weight such characterisation may give to environmental considerations in 
government decision-making.82 There may be particular advantages to using the language 
of rights when arguing for a heavier weighting of environmental criteria in decision-making 
where human rights claims or human property interests are at issue. 83  Couching 
environmental protection in the well-known and politically powerful language of human 
rights may be more effective in elevating the status of environmental issues, than more 
traditional regulatory language.  
 
Boyle argues that ‘[l]acking the status of a right means that the environment can be trumped 
by those values which have that status, including economic development and natural 
resource exploitation.’84 In other words, by raising environmental protection to the status of 
a right, it may help environmental protection considerations to compete on a more even 
footing with other competing interests. Hiskes provides a persuasive argument for the 
                                                          
79 Ronald Dworkin cited in James L Huffman, 'Do Species and Nature Have Rights?' (1992) 13 Public Land 
Law Review 51, 56.  
80 Huffman, ibid, 75.  
81 Anderson, above n 66, 1. 
82 A similar rationale has been utilised for the proposed adoption of nature rights approaches to 
environmental protection. In response to Christopher Stone’s proposal to represent the interests of natural 
entities using the protection of ‘rights’, Elder argued that Stone’s proposal essentially seemed to be aimed at 
providing a justification for granting a ‘heavier weighting of environmental criteria’ in decision-making: P S 
Elder, 'Legal Rights for Nature - The Wrong Answer to the Right(s) Question' (1984) 22(2) Osgoode Hall 
Law Journal 285, 291.  
83 See further, Christopher Stone, 'Response to Commentators' (2012) 3 Journal of Human Rights and the 
Environment 100, 104.  
84 Boyle, above n 65, 629. 
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benefits of the rhetoric of rights talk for environmental protection, contending that 
‘environmentalism needs a new and more muscular political vocabulary grounded in today’s 
central political ideas of human rights and justice’.85  He argues that through using the 
language of human rights, arguments for environmental protection can be ‘rooted in these 
power words of contemporary politics’ in order to ensure that they ‘cannot be ignored in any 
election or by any government’.86  
 
As identified in Chapter Two, ensuring that an adequate balance is achieved between 
sometimes competing social, economic and environmental interests in environmental 
decision-making is a significant challenge facing environmental protection in Australia. 
Accordingly, if domestic recognition of the HRTHE is capable of assisting in improving the 
consideration of environmental protection considerations in government decision-making it 
could be characterised as a benefit for environmental protection.  
 
5.7.4 Safeguards against environmental protection rollbacks 
As the right is universal and inalienable, it may set a certain standard of environmental 
quality which must be maintained. Accordingly, if a government sought to pursue a course 
of action which could jeopardise the maintenance of this standard, it is possible that the right 
could operate to prevent such a ‘rollback’ on environmental protection. 87  Conca has 
cautioned however that this approach may ‘settle for a minimum standard’.88  He asks 
whether it merely guarantees ‘just enough clean water and breathable air to survive – rather 
than a call for distributive justice?’89  However, arguably, it is precisely this minimum 
standard setting role that could significantly benefit environmental protection. In a US case 
considering the application of a constitutionally recognised state right to a certain standard 
of environmental quality, the Court was asked to consider whether the constitutional 
protection had been violated by a rollback on environmental protection which resulted in 
                                                          
85 Richard P Hiskes, The Human Right to a Green Future: Environmental Rights and Intergenerational 
Justice (Cambridge University Press, 2009), 2.  
86 Ibid.  
87 Boyd, above n 76, 27-32. 
88 Ken Conca, 'Environmental Human Rights: Greening "The Dignity and Worth of the Human Person"' in 






decreased water quality.90 The legislation in question involved an amendment that created 
‘a blanket exception to requirements governing discharges from water wells without regard 
to the degrading effect that the discharges would have on the surrounding or recipient 
environment’.91 The Court concluded that this rollback on environmental protection did 
implicate the right.92 If the right enjoyed a similar operation in Australia, it could potentially 
assist in the achievement of ecologically sustainable development. ESD requires that the 
community’s resources and ecological processes on which life depends are to be maintained 
(discussed above in Chapter Two). Accordingly, by providing a mechanism to ensure that a 
minimum level of environmental health is maintained, domestic legal recognition of the right 
could help to contribute to the realisation of ESD. 
 
5.7.5 Safety net by filling gaps in environmental legislation  
Where existing laws and regulations provide inadequate protection to fulfil the standards set 
by the right or fail to secure vital procedural rights, the right could be used as a means of 
‘filling gaps’ in relevant legislation. 93   In this vein, Anderson argues that a ‘robust 
environmental right can mobilize redress where other remedies have failed’, and ‘may serve 
as the ultimate ‘safety net’ to catch legitimate claims which have fallen through the 
procedural cracks of public and private law.’94 The extent to which this would operate in 
practice is largely dependent on the form of legal recognition adopted. However, if the right 
did perform this function it could benefit environmental protection by identifying and 
addressing environmental protection issues which were being inadequately addressed and 
regulated.  
 
5.7.6 Avenues to bring legal actions in the interests of environmental protection 
Another possible benefit for environmental protection associated with recognition of the 
right is the potential for increasing public participation and accountability in environmental 
management.95 Whilst the value of public participation in environmental decision-making is 
                                                          
90 Montana Environmental Information Center et al v Department of Environmental Quality 260 Mont. 207, 
988 P.2d 1236 (1999) cited in Shelton, above n 3, 24.    
91 Ibid.  
92 Ibid.  
93 Boyd, above n 76, 235. 
94 Anderson, above n 66, 22.  
95 Boyd, above n 76, 239-243. 
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to an extent contested, it is widely considered to be an important aspect of ecologically 
sustainable development. 96  One way that recognition of the right may increase public 
participation and accountability, is by increasing the potential avenues available for bringing 
legal actions on environmental protection grounds. At present, there are various barriers 
facing public interest litigants in Australia, including costs and standing.97 Eurick notes that 
in certain jurisdictions, ‘the right has broadened standing requirements allowing citizens to 
enforce environmental concerns based on the right to a healthful environment.’98 However, 
whether this is viewed as a benefit for environmental protection is ultimately a question of 
perspective.  
 
There is the possibility that taking individual claims to court could, as Brandis was quoted 
earlier as warning, change ‘an argument about social benefit to an argument about individual 
claims’.99 Arguably however, there are distinct benefits associated with enabling individuals 
to bring individual claims to pursue improved environmental protection. Further concerns 
regarding expansion of standing relate to the spectre of the highly litigious public interest 
litigant. However, these concerns must be tempered by recognition of the practical 
impediments to bringing an action - namely, costs and time. Additionally, the ‘floodgates’ 
argument has rarely borne out in practice in other jurisdictions where such provisions have 
been implemented.100 Some of Australia’s most important environmental jurisprudence has 
                                                          
96 For instance, improving public participation in environmental management and protection is one of the 
aims of Australia’s National Strategy for Ecologically Sustainable Development: Department of the 
Environment (Cth), National Strategy for Ecologically Sustainable Development 1992 
<http://www.environment.gov.au/about-us/esd/publications/national-esd-strategy>. 
97 The Environment Defenders Office (Vic) Ltd (now ‘Environmental Justice Australia’) has released a 
report explaining why environmental defenders require public costs protection in environmental litigation. 
The Report explains that ‘[u]ntil recently, there were two major barriers to the ability of individuals to 
challenge improper government decisions’, namely, ‘the doctrines of standing and costs’. The Report argues 
that the extended standing provisions under the EPBC Act have ‘largely remedied’ the problem at the federal 
level. However, as is explained in Chapter Seven, there are proposals afoot to remove this extended standing. 
The Report argues that ‘costs are now the major barrier to environmental litigation in Australia’ as they 
‘price the vast majority of ordinary people and environmental groups out of the courts’. The Report argues 
that this is problematic for environmental protection as it means that cases legitimately challenging 
government decision-making may not make it to court, which could mean that ‘the quality of those decisions 
may suffer; laws may, in effect, be selectively enforced; and ultimately the ability to hold government 
accountable for its actions is undermined’: Rupert Watters, Costing the Earth? The Case for Public Interest 
Costs Protection in Environmental Litigation (2010) Environment Defenders Office (Victoria) Ltd 6 
<https://envirojustice.org.au/sites/default/files/files/Submissions%20and%20reports/protective_costs.pdf>.  
98 Janelle P Eurick, 'The Constitutional Right to a Healthy Environment: Enforcing Environmental Protection 
Through State and Federal Constitutions' (1999-2001) 11 International Legal Perspectives 185, 187.  
99 George Brandis, 'The Debate We Didn't Have to Have: The Proposal for An Australian Bill of Rights' 
(2008) 15 James Cook University Law Review 24, 37.  
100 For example, the Australian Capital Territory Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Research Project has 
stated that ‘[t]he first six years of operation’ of the Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT) ‘have shown that it has 
not led to a flood of litigation, vexatious or otherwise’: Australian Capital Territory Economic, Social and 
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been the result of concerned citizens or groups bringing legal actions in the public interest 
(or sometimes, in their own personal interest), to challenge actions or omissions of the 
government.101 Providing an additional legal tool to aid this work could be conceived as a 
benefit for environmental protection, if one of the key challenges for achieving ecologically 
sustainable development is identified as inadequate enforcement of environmental 
standards.   
 
The significance of broadened standing rules is particularly pronounced where standing 
reform is accompanied by the creation of new causes of action. Further to this point, Eurick 
notes that ‘in some circumstances, the right has provided citizens with new causes of action 
to enforce environmental protection’ and ‘allowed courts to devise new remedies for 
addressing environmental problems.’ 102  In relation to this ‘expansion of rights-based 
litigation’, Anderson argues that it ‘may well displace other forms of legal remedy, such as 
tort law or negotiated settlements, which are better suited to environmental issues.’ 103 
Although this is a possibility, it is arguable whether other forms of legal remedy are 
necessarily better suited to environmental issues. Moreover, it is not necessarily the case that 
litigants would utilise a human rights claim to the exclusion of pursuing other available 
remedies. However, certainly legal recognition of the right, if accompanied by broadened 
standing and the creation of new causes of action, could alter the role of the judiciary in 
relation to the resolution of environmental disputes. For example, Eurick notes that in some 
countries which have provided constitutional recognition of the right, the right has ‘served 
as a check on legislative actions that affect the quality of the environment.’104 This places 
significant discretion in the hands of the judiciary with regards to the interpretation of 
questions which may be political in nature. In this regard, Anderson notes that making moral 
judgements is unavoidable, ‘even where a precise and comprehensive textual definition of a 
right may be agreed upon’.105 He observes that ‘the enforcing body, whether a judge at the 
domestic level or a supervisory committee at the international level, will necessarily be 
                                                          
Cultural Rights Research Project, Australian Capital Territory Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
Research Project Report (2010) 15 <http://regnet.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/uploads/2015-
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101 For various examples, see Environmental Defenders Office (QLD), Court Cases 
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involved in evaluating competing moral claims.’106  Although it can not be denied that 
increasing the scope for judicial interpretation in relation to the types of issues raised by the 
right may involve making ‘moral choices’, as Anderson later acknowledges, ‘such 
adjustments are made between rights and public order, morality, and health on a regular 
basis.’107 Whether or not this is conceived to be an inappropriate expansion of the court’s 
role in this regard is ultimately a question for each jurisdiction and the nature of its particular 
legal/political system. However, increasing avenues to bring legal actions in the interests of 
environmental protection can be perceived as a benefit for environmental protection in 
Australia, given that one of the identified challenges for environmental protection is the lack 
of compliance with, and enforcement of, various environmental protection laws.  
 
5.7.7 Inform environmental quality standards 
As noted above, the HRTHE may create a minimum standard of environmental quality. 
Accordingly, it is possible that legal recognition of the right may inform environmental 
quality standards, such as air quality and water quality standards. As identified in Chapter 
Two, despite the operation of a complex system of laws and policies designed to regulate 
human impacts on environmental health, there are continuing issues with environmental 
quality standards in Australia. Accordingly, if domestic legal recognition of the right is 
capable of assisting in addressing this issue, it may be perceived as offering a benefit for 
environmental protection in this context.  
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5.8 Potential limitations of domestic legal recognition of the right as a tool 
for environmental protection in Australia 
 
Various criticisms of the utility of the HRTHE as a tool for environmental protection have 
been put forward. Some critics argue that debating and implementing legal recognition of 
the right is a redundant and distracting exercise. For instance, Handl argues that ‘while it 
should be self-evident that there is a direct functional relationship between protection of the 
environment and the promotion of human rights, it is much less obvious that environmental 
protection ought to be conceptualized in terms of a generic human right’.108 The utility of 
the right for environmental protection has been called into question on various grounds. 
Some commentators argue that the right is destined for failure due to its inability to address 
the fundamental structural causes of the global ecological crisis. To this end, Weston and 
Bollier argue that it is an ‘inconvenient truth’ that as the HRTHE must operate within an 
‘essentially unregulated’ capitalist system, it is unlikely to be ‘widely recognized and 
honoured across the globe in any formal/official sense’.109 Whilst there are some strengths 
to criticisms made on this basis, they embody an unrealistic expectation as to the right’s 
purpose and operation. Fundamentally, they expect too much of the right.  Advocates do not 
maintain that the right would (or should) be capable of providing some form of panacea for 
all of the structural, social, economic, political and legal challenges facing the achievement 
of ecologically sustainable development. Rather, they contend that the right offers certain 
benefits for environmental protection, within the confines of the existing system.  
 
Other critics question the appropriateness of an approach to environmental protection which 
is so explicitly anthropocentric. Catherine Redgwell explains that there are ‘two distinctive 
strands to such criticisms, broadly identified as deep ecology or environmentalism, and 
animal rights.’110 She concludes that although the response to these criticisms is largely 
dependent ‘on the substance of the right and the interpretive scope given to the 
‘environment’’, recognition of the right does not have as ‘its necessary corollary the denial 
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Antonio Augusto Cancado Trindade (ed), Human Rights, Sustainable Development and the Environment 
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of non-human rights’.111 In other words, human, animal and nature rights are capable of co-
existence. However, as Anderson notes, the ‘tensions’ between and within the human rights 
and environmental protection movements ‘cannot be wished away, despite the fashionable 
view that human rights and environmental protection are interdependent, complementary, 
and indivisible.’112 He argues that the ‘interdependence argument…sometimes serves as a 
moral comforter which temporarily cloaks the extremely difficult questions which must be 
faced’.113 Without ‘wishing away’ these tensions, he notes that it is possible to overcome the 
‘most extreme forms of anthropocentrism’ by drafting environmental rights ‘so as to 
acknowledge and respect non-human entities’.114 As noted by Boyle, environmental human 
rights ‘include protection and preservation of flora and fauna, essential processes and areas 
necessary to maintain biological diversity and ecosystems, as well as conservation and 
sustainable use of nature and natural resources.’115  
 
Accordingly, whilst the right is explicitly anthropocentric, it is capable of accommodating 
the interests of non-human entities. For this reason, its anthropocentric nature should not be 
considered persuasive grounds for rejection of the right. Indeed, many of the right’s benefits 
in fact flow from its ability to characterise environmental concerns as human concerns. 
However, this highlights a further criticism of the right, which relates to the potential dangers 
associated with the adoption of human rights rhetoric. Harding argues that ‘the language of 
human rights may politicize and draw attention to environmental claims in a way that may 
attract more overt opposition from polluters, or even exacerbate government repression’.116 
Although this is certainly a risk, most environmental issues are already heavily politicised, 
irrespective of whether those issues are expressed in the language of human rights.  
 
Finally, it must be acknowledged that the perceived utility of the right as a tool for 
environmental protection is to an extent, a matter of perspective. Whether the consequences 
of domestic legal recognition are perceived as benefits for environmental protection, 
implicitly involves assumptions about the goals of environmental protection and how they 
are best achieved. Even if agreement can be achieved on the goals of environmental 
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protection, opinion may differ on the identification of the key challenges facing 
environmental protection, the causes of those challenges and the best way to address them. 
Some may conceive of the goals of environmental protection as essentially being 
synonymous with the goals of ecologically sustainable development (ESD). Meanwhile, 
others may conceive of the primary goal as being the achievement of rights for all living 
beings, or the goal of returning the environment to a state of environmental health as near as 
possible to pre-human impact. Similar debate exists over the key causes of environmental 
problems, with some attributing blame to the broader capitalist system itself, whilst others 
support the system but cite a lack of compliance and enforcement of existing laws and 
policies as the key issue facing the achievement of environmental protection. Further 
disagreement focusses on the adequacy of available solutions to these issues. For example, 
the utility and desirability of market-based mechanisms, compared with calls for increased 
state regulation.   
 
If it is agreed that achieving ESD is the goal of environmental protection, and that the main 
challenges are related to a lack of government action, it may be possible to conclude that the 
HRTHE with its potential ability to inspire increased government action on environmental 
problems is an ideal solution or tool for environmental protection. However, as discussed 
earlier in Chapter Three, some commentators argue that environmental protection should 
aim to recognise the rights of nature, over and above the rights of human beings where 
necessary. According to that conception of the human-environment relationship, the 
HRTHE may not be an appropriate tool, as it may not further the identified goals of 
environmental protection, or provide a means of addressing the challenges for environmental 
protection identified under that approach. In fact, granting humans a right to a healthy 
environment could be at odds with more ecocentric rights-based conceptions of 
environmental protection.  
 
There is a significant divergence of opinion on important questions regarding the best means 
to achieve improved environmental protection. For instance, debate over who has authority 
to decide what is in the best interests of environmental protection, and whether the 
Commonwealth government should play a greater role in environmental protection. The 
importance and role of non-state actors is also a significant area of contention. It could be 
argued that ensuring access to an adequately funded public interest environmental law 
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community legal centre network is critical for ensuring adequate compliance and 
enforcement with Australia’s environmental laws. This issue came to a head recently in 
response to the Federal Government’s decision to remove federal funding for the national 
network of Environmental Defenders Offices.117 The decision to remove funding was an 
inherently political decision, which was part of a broader reform agenda involving 
devolution of environmental regulation from the Commonwealth to the states, and the 
reduction of ‘green tape’.118 According to the Greens political party, these law and policy 
changes represent a backwards step for environmental protection. 119  However, others 
believe that an adequate level of environmental protection can be achieved with less 
expenditure of funds, less involvement of independent third parties and less regulatory 
oversight.  
 
Essentially therefore, to claim that recognition of the HRTHE could be used as an effective 
tool for environmental protection, is to claim that the right may have certain consequences 
for the environmental protection landscape in Australia which constitute a ‘benefit’ 
according to a particular perspective on what constitutes the best approach to environmental 
protection.  For these reasons, it is critical to appreciate that domestic legal recognition of 
the right may offer one possible means of addressing some of the various challenges facing 
the pursuit of environmental protection at present in Australia. It is most certainly not a 
panacea for all of the problems facing environmental protection.120  
 
Australia’s environmental problems are vast, varied, and according to observed trends, 
relatively persistent. As noted by Professor Ian Lowe, over the past two decades ‘many of 
Australia’s biggest environmental problems have remained the same’.121 He attributes this to 
the fact that certain ‘persistent problems’ have been allowed to continue, largely 
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unchecked.122 Included within this list, are the problems posed by degraded agricultural land, 
native wildlife decline, climate change, and insufficient environmental health monitoring in 
various areas.123 It would be clearly unreasonable to expect that one regulatory approach, or 
one regulatory tool could provide the solution to these varied, persistent and interrelated 
problems. Accordingly, subsequent chapters will only seek to explore the extent to which 
different forms of domestic legal recognition of the HRTHE may be capable of realising the 
identified potential benefits for environmental protection in Australia.  
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What are some potential benefits for environmental protection in Australia associated with 
international legal recognition of the human right to a healthy environment? How could the 
human right to a healthy environment be recognised under Australia’s domestic laws? What 
potential benefits for environmental protection may be associated with domestic legal 
recognition of the right? What are the possible limitations of both forms of recognition?  
 
The aim of this chapter was to ascertain whether there are any potential benefits for 
environmental protection in Australia associated with international and domestic legal 
recognition of the HRTHE. Firstly, the options for international legal recognition of the right 
were considered. It was explained that although there have been proposals to recognise the 
HRTHE within a binding global treaty, it is unlikely that this form of international legal 
recognition will be adopted in the near future. Accordingly, it was concluded that it is more 
likely that the right would be recognised as an implied right under the ICESCR. For this 
reason, the chapter was limited to an exploration of the potential benefits for environmental 
protection in Australia associated with this form of legal recognition.  
 
It was argued that there are three main potential benefits associated with recognition of the 
HRTHE as an ICESCR right which can be identified. Namely, increased scrutiny (especially 
at the international level) of Australia’s environmental and natural resources management 
systems, the opportunity to learn from a global jurisprudence on the implementation of the 
right, and the ability to compare Australia’s environmental performance to other countries. 
The possible realisation of these benefits in the case study context of Australian water 
resources management was then discussed. It was argued that all of the identified benefits 
could be realised to some extent. However, three main limitations of international 
recognition of the right for environmental protection in Australia were identified. Firstly, it 
was identified that the obligations imposed by the HRTHE may be largely duplicative of 
Australia’s existing international environmental law obligations. It was demonstrated in the 
case study context of water management, the obligations imposed by the HRTHE could 
duplicate to a large extent existing obligations under international customary law. However, 
it was argued that this limitation does not render recognition of the right redundant, as 
arguably recognition of these obligations as components of a broader human rights 
obligation to protect, respect and fulfil the right as an ICESCR right may prove more 
effective than the imposition of customary international law obligations. As noted earlier in 
Chapter Three, the HRTHE benefits from the existing monitoring and compliance 
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mechanisms established for human rights more generally. Moreover, it was argued that not 
only might the content of the HRTHE differ in significant ways from these existing 
obligations, but that where there is overlap, the imposition of HRTHE obligations could help 
to strengthen and operationalise these obligations. Accordingly, they could have a 
complementary operation, rather than rendering the obligations imposed by the HRTHE 
redundant.  
 
It was argued that a second area of limitation concerns the fact that a number of the benefits 
associated with international legal recognition of the right are already being realised to an 
extent. For instance, Australia is already able to learn from the comparative environmental 
governance experiences of other countries. It is also already subject to comparisons against 
international standards in terms of evaluating environmental protection performance. 
However, it was argued that there are distinct additional benefits which may be associated 
with facilitating international peer learning, and increased international scrutiny via the 
mechanism of the HRTHE. For instance, it was argued that recognition of the right at the 
international level may lead to the elucidation of international benchmarks for achieving 
realisation of the right at the domestic level, which could help to reveal areas where Australia 
was falling short of international standards. Accordingly, there could be benefits associated 
with the implementation of human rights indicators for the HRTHE which are not associated 
with indicators designed to measure Australia’s progress towards sustainable development 
goals.  
 
A third area of limitation relates to the Australian Government’s record regarding the 
fulfilment of international human rights obligations which have not been recognised under 
domestic legislation. However, it was argued that even non-compliance with the obligations 
imposed by the right could have beneficial impacts for environmental protection as it would 
highlight areas for improvement which could increase international pressure and scrutiny on 
Australia to improve its realisation of the right. 
 
The chapter then turned to consideration of the potential benefits for environmental 
protection in Australia associated with domestic legal recognition of the right. Firstly, the 
options for domestic legal recognition of the right in Australia were outlined, followed by a 
consideration of the possible expression of the right at the domestic level. It was concluded 
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that the optimal expression is characterisation of the right as a ‘right to a healthy 
environment’ as that form of expression best captures the identified possible content of the 
right at the international level. The potential benefits for environmental protection associated 
with domestic legal recognition in Australia were then considered. It was explained that as 
it is not possible for the thesis to consider all of the potential benefits, the thesis is restricted 
to consideration of whether recognition is capable of realising a set of potential benefits 
which have been realised through domestic recognition of the right in other jurisdictions. It 
was concluded that if these potential benefits are able to be realised through domestic legal 
recognition of the right in Australia, it may be able to help address some of the key 
challenges facing the realisation of ESD.  
 
These benefits include the provision of a stronger basis for environmental laws and policies, 
increased prioritisation of environmental protection considerations in government decision-
making, and the creation of expanded avenues to bring legal actions in the interests of 
environmental protection. It was acknowledged that whilst there are various valid criticisms 
of rights-based approaches as a tool for environmental protection, the potential benefits 
identified warrant consideration of recognition of the right in Australia. It was argued that 
various criticisms expect too much of the right, and that it would be unreasonable to expect 
one legal mechanism to address the vast and varied problems facing environmental 
protection in Australia. Accordingly, the subsequent two chapters consider the options for 
domestic legal recognition of the right in Australia, and explore whether the potential 
benefits for environmental protection identified may be realised through forms of 








Constitutional Recognition of the Human Right to a Healthy 
Environment in Australia 
 
Is it possible to recognise the human right to a healthy environment under the Australian 
Constitution? If so, what is the most preferable form of recognition? Can the potential 
benefits for environmental protection identified for domestic legal recognition be realised 
through the preferable form of constitutional recognition? How could these benefits be 
realised in the Australian water management context? What are the potential limitations? 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The Australian Constitution was created 115 years ago, in a vastly different social, political 
and economic context. Women were unable to vote, aboriginal peoples were excluded from 
the national census, and modern international human rights law had yet to come into 
existence. It was born out of a spirit of federalism, motivated primarily by economic 
considerations and a desire to improve conditions for trade between the colonies.1 Although 
the drafters were certainly able to refer to the US model which contained a bill of rights, the 
‘founding fathers’ generally chose to omit express recognition of individual rights in the 
Australian Constitution. It was presumed that the few express rights recognised in the 
Constitution, our system of representative democracy and the common law, would provide 
sufficient protection for fundamental rights held by the people of Australia.2  
 
Over time, the accuracy of this presumption has been called into question. The High Court 
of Australia, which is charged with the interpretation of the Constitution, has ‘implied’ 
certain rights and freedoms into the Constitution in order to facilitate the achievement of 
express provisions. Moreover, the incredible growth of human rights law at the international 
level post World War Two, and the consequent domestic implementation of Australia’s 
human rights obligations through national legislation demonstrates that crucial gaps in 
Australia’s rights protection existed, and continue to exist.  
 
                                                          
1 Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (Cth), Reform of the Federation: White Paper (2014) 16 
<https://federation.dpmc.gov.au/sites/default/files/issues-
paper/issues_paper1_a_federation_for_our_future.rtf>. 
2 George Williams, ‘Critique and Comment: The Victorian Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities: 
Origins and Scope’ (2006) 30 Melbourne University Law Review 880, 881. 
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Whether statutory or constitutional recognition of a bill of rights is the appropriate method 
of addressing any perceived failure to adequately provide legal recognition for fundamental 
human rights, is a question of considerable debate. It is however certain that the absence of 
a bill of rights raises significant issues in regards to the identification and implementation of 
emerging human rights, such as the proposed human right to a healthy environment. 
Accordingly, the purpose of this chapter is to consider broadly the various options for 
constitutional recognition of the right in the Australian context. It argues that a 
constitutionally recognised HRTHE could offer various potential benefits for environmental 
protection in Australia. The potential realisation of these identified benefits in the case study 
context of water resources management is considered, concluding that all of the identified 
benefits may be realised to some extent.  
 
The chapter argues that although Australia would potentially benefit from certain forms of 
constitutional recognition of the right, it is highly unlikely to receive recognition due to the 
challenges posed by the amendment procedure, traditional reluctance to recognise express 
constitutional rights, and the history of resistance towards the inclusion of new provisions 
generally. Accordingly, the subsequent chapter explores options for legislative recognition 





















6.2 Constitutional recognition of the human right to a healthy environment 
Although one hundred and fifty countries around the world provide constitutional 
recognition of the human right to a healthy environment,3 Australia has failed to provide any 
form of legal recognition of the right. Whilst this omission may seem surprising, it can be 
explained through examination of Australia’s broader constitutional context. The Australian 
Constitution was never intended to act as a comprehensive statement of the respective roles 
and duties of each arm and level of government, and the individual rights of Australian 
citizens.  As noted by Chief Justice Gleeson in Roach v Electoral Commissioner (2007) 233 
CLR 162: 
The Australian Constitution was not the product of a legal and political culture, or of historical 
circumstances, that created expectations of extensive limitations upon legislative power for the 
purpose of protecting the rights of individuals. It was not the outcome of a revolution, or a struggle 
against oppression. It was designed to give effect to an agreement for a federal union, under the 
Crown, of the peoples of formerly self-governing British colonies.4 
 
Although the framers of the Australian Constitution were able to look to the Constitution of 
the United States of America as a model, they deliberately chose not to emulate the American 
style of express constitutional rights. This was motivated partly by concern that ‘judicial 
interpretation of abstract rights could have unpredictable and undesirable consequences’.5 
Very few express rights exist in the text of the Constitution, and for various reasons, 
Australians continue to ‘remain wary of constitutionally entrenched rights’.6  
 
In addition to this reticence to recognise constitutional rights, the framers provided very 
minimal express reference to the natural environment. Unlike the majority of the world’s 
nations,7 the Australian Constitution does not contain any declaration as to the importance 
of the environment or the values which should govern environmental protection. Despite the 
critical importance of environmental management in a land characterised by climactic 
instability, responsibility for environmental protection and regulation is not directly 
                                                          
3 David R Boyd, ‘Constitutions, Human Rights, and the Environment: National Approaches’ in Anna Grear 
and Louis J Kotzé (eds), Research Handbook on Human Rights and the Environment (Edward Elgar, 2015), 
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4 Roach v Electoral Commissioner (2007) 233 CLR 162, 172 [1] (Gleeson CJ).  
5 Jeffrey Goldsworthy, 'Introduction' in Tom Campbell, Jeffrey Goldsworthy and Adrienne Stone (eds), 
Protecting Rights Without a Bill of Rights: Institutional Performance and Reform in Australia (Ashgate 
Publishing, 2006) 2, 2. 
6 Ibid 3. 
7 See generally, Christopher Jeffords, 'Constitutional Environmental Human Rights: A Descriptive Analysis 
of 142 National Constitutions' in Lanse Minkler (ed), The State of Economic and Social Human Rights: A 
Global Overview (Cambridge University Press, 2013) 329. 
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addressed under the Constitution.  The failure to address this issue was partially due to the 
presumption that such matters would generally remain within the ambit of state/territory 
jurisdiction. It can also be attributed to the socio-historical context of the document’s 
creation. At the turn of the century, environmental protection was not the mainstream 
governance issue that it is today.    
 
In the absence of express recognition of the right, it may be possible to found a basis for 
implication from the text and structure of the Constitution. However, for various reasons it 
is extremely unlikely that the High Court would recognise an implied constitutional right to 
a healthy environment. In particular, the general reluctance of the Court to engage in this 
interpretive exercise, and the fact that there are arguably no grounds which could act as the 
basis for such an implication. Unlike the Constitution of India, where the Supreme Court has 
been able to derive environmental rights through interpretation of the broader ‘right to life’,8 
the Australian Constitution does not contain any analogous express rights. Implied freedoms 
under the Australian Constitution are best characterised as ‘implied freedoms from 
governmental power’.9  
 
The human right to a healthy environment can be conceptualised as both a negative and 
positive right (a ‘freedom from’ and a ‘right to’). Its positive elements necessarily involve a 
demand on government resources,10 and the High Court has not indicated any intention to 
recognise implied rights of this nature. As noted by Williams and Hume, ‘the Constitution 
protects freedoms from, rather than freedoms to’. 11  The currently recognised implied 
freedom of political communication can be justified as a necessary implication from the text 
of the Constitution (primarily ss 7 and 24). It is difficult to see how a human right to a healthy 
environment could be similarly implied from the text of the document. The High Court has 
                                                          
8 See Mehta v Union of India et al, 1988 A.I.R. 1115; Bandhua Mukti Morcha v Union of India, 3 S.C.C. 161 
(1984); Subhash Kumar v State of Bihar A.I.R. 1991 SC 420. For a discussion of these cases in the broader 
context of other jurisdictions where courts have utilised the right to life as a basis for implication of 
environmental rights, see: Donald K Anton and Dinah L Shelton, Environmental Protection and Human 
Rights (Cambridge University Press 2011) 460-463. 
9 Patrick Keyzer, Constitutional Law (2nd ed, LexisNexis Butterworths 2005) 303.  
10 Williams and Hume note that even the recognition of negative rights can involve government expenditure. 
They cite the example of the constitutional requirement that states maintain a court system, which ‘clearly 
has fiscal consequences’: George Williams and David Hume, Human Rights under the Australian 
Constitution (2nd ed, Oxford University Press 2013) 154. 
11 ibid 153. 
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not recognised any implied economic, social and cultural rights, and it is unlikely that it 
could or would do so in the future.  
 
From the foregoing discussion, it can be concluded that the Australian Constitution does not 
expressly or impliedly recognise the HRTHE. Accordingly, it is necessary to consider the 
options for express constitutional recognition of the right, and express constitutional 





6.3 Options for express constitutional recognition  
It is possible to provide express recognition of the HRTHE under the Australian 
Constitution. However, any addition or alteration to the text of the Constitution must be via 
the amendment procedure outlined under s 128.  The amendment procedure established 
under s 128 is notoriously difficult to satisfy, with only eight out of forty four proposed 
changes meeting the requirements and resulting in amendments to the Constitution. 12 As a 
result, the Constitution has only undergone a few alterations since its creation, despite the 
passage of over a century of important social, economic, political and cultural developments. 
Accordingly, achieving any form of express inclusion of the right will face a significant 
obstacle in s 128.  
 
A further issue relates to the location and nature of its inclusion in the text of the document, 
which may have implications for its operation and effect. In particular, it may dictate whether 
the right would operate as a limit and/or source of Commonwealth power.  As explained 
earlier in Chapter Five, various forms of Commonwealth constitutional recognition are 
available, including incorporation in the Preamble of the document, within Chapter One, 
within a new section dedicated to the topic matter of the ‘environment’, or within the broader 
context of a constitutional bill of rights.13 All of these potential options will be explored in 
the following section, as well as options for recognition of the right in state constitutions and 
territory self-governing legislation.  
 
6.3.1 Option One: Recognition of the right within a constitutionally entrenched Bill of 
Rights 
There are two main options for recognition of the right in a broader constitutional bill of 
rights; recognition of an independent right to a healthy environment, or recognition of rights 
from which the right to a healthy environment may be implied. Recognition of an 
independent right would arguably be more difficult to achieve than recognition of more 
                                                          
12 As noted by the Parliamentary Education Office, ‘[s]ince 1906, when the first referendum was held, 
Australia has held 19 referendums in which 44 separate questions to change the Australian Constitution have 
been put to the people. Only eight changes have been agreed to’: Parliamentary Education Office, How the 
Constitution Can Be Changed (2014) <http://www.peo.gov.au/learning/closer-look/the-australian-
constitution/how-the-constitution-can-be-changed.html >. 
13 It is interesting to compare these constitutional recognition options with the options explored by Boyd in 
the Canadian context: David R Boyd, The Right to a Healthy Environment: Revitalizing Canada's 
Constitution (UBC Press, 2012), ch 8. 
184 
 
traditional social and economic rights (such as the right to life). However, if the right is not 
recognised expressly in a bill of rights, the right’s existence will be dependent upon 
implication via constitutional interpretation. This is a more volatile basis for the right, and 
also leaves the expression of the right at the mercy of judicial interpretation. Pursuing either 
option depends upon successfully entrenching a bill of rights into the Constitution, which 
for reasons canvassed below, is unlikely to occur any time in the near future.  
 
The introduction of a federal constitutional bill of rights into the Australian constitutional 
landscape has captured the minds of constitutional academics, political scientists and 
politicians for over a century. 14  Despite this ongoing debate, there has never been a 
successful attempt to constitutionalise a comprehensive bill of rights under the 
Commonwealth Constitution.15 Proposals for the recognition of certain rights have been put 
forward and debated and in some cases voted upon at referendums. However, since 
federation, no new express rights have been introduced into the Australian Constitution.16 
Although most constitutional commentators, in light of this history, consider the prospect of 
a constitutionally entrenched bill of rights to be highly unlikely, it is nonetheless important 
to consider its merits.  
However, before embarking on this journey, it is useful to heed the words of Webber:  
The debate over bills of rights often falls into simplifications in which rights are starkly pitted against 
majorities. Abstract and highly symbolic arguments dominate the field. And too often the participants 
are either wide-eyed believers in a conception of rights so pristine that disagreement and institutional 
concerns have no place, or fierce prophets of the impending death of democracy.  17 
 
As intimated in the above quote, debate in this field is divided along various lines. Whilst 
some commentators may support the idea of a constitutionally entrenched bill of rights in 
theory, out of pragmatism they accept a legislative bill of rights as an adequate substitute.18 
                                                          
14 As noted by Byrnes, Charlesworth and McKinnon, ‘[a] debate over whether Australia should have some 
kind of bill of rights has proceeded in fits and starts since Federation’: Andrew Byrnes, Hilary Charlesworth 
and Gabrielle McKinnon, Bill of Rights in Australia: History, Politics and Law (UNSW Press Ltd, 2009) 23.  
15 For a summary of Australia’s ‘history of rejection’ in regards to bills of rights proposals, see generally Paul 
Kildea, ‘The Bill of Rights Debate in Australian Political Culture’ (2003) 9 (1) Australian Journal of Human 
Rights 7.   
16 However, in 1977 the existing right to vote in referendums under s 128 was extended to residents of the 
territories.  
17 Jeremy Webber, 'A Modest (but Robust) Defence of Statutory Bills of Rights' in Tom Campbell, Jeffrey 
Goldsworthy and Adrienne Stone (eds), Protecting Rights Without a Bill of Rights: Institutional Performance 
and Reform in Australia (Ashgate Publishing, 2006) 263, 283. 
18 For example, see the comments by former Australian Human Rights Commissioner, Sev Ozdowski: Sev 
Ozdowski, ‘Human Rights – A Challenge for Australia’ (Speech delivered at National Press Club, Sydney, 6 
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Others do not support constitutional entrenchment under any circumstances, but will support 
certain forms of legislative recognition.19 Some remain sceptical of any form of formal 
comprehensive legal recognition of human rights at the federal level, and instead advocate 
for reliance on increased parliamentary scrutiny, human rights institutions and the common 
law.20 At the heart of most of this debate is the issue of democracy, and the implications of 
rights recognition for the respective roles of each arm of government.  Explaining the crux 
of the contention, Galligan and Morton argue that 'the primary effect of adopting a bill of 
rights is institutional, shifting primary responsibility for making decisions about rights 
claims from legislatures to courts.' 21  It is the role of the judiciary with respect to a 
constitutional bill of rights, which incites the most academic conflict. According to critics, 
such as Brandis, it is politicians operating ‘in the open forum of elected and accountable 
Parliaments’ who should be engaging in human rights determinations, rather than the 
‘unelected and largely anonymous judges in the cloistered environs of the courts.'22  
 
Such concerns over the creation of a class of ‘judicial legislators’ have been raised as 
theoretical objections to bills of rights for decades. As noted by Darrow and Alston, a 
‘closely related critique is that the entrenchment of bills of rights leads to the judicialization 
of politics.’ 23  These theoretical concerns must be tempered by consideration of the 
significant overseas experience with legal implementation of bills of rights (both 
constitutionally entrenched, and statutory):  
The New Zealand model provides strong evidence that a Bill of Rights can be effective without 
transferring ultimate power from the legislature to the judiciary. Even in Canada, where the Supreme 
Court is empowered to strike down legislation for inconsistency with the Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms, judges have generally been cautious in developing a rights jurisprudence.  24  
  
                                                          
February 2002) <http://www.humanrights.gov.au/news/speeches/human-rights-challenge-australia-dr-sev-
ozdowski-2002>.  
19 For example, Gibbs argues against a constitutionally entrenched bill of rights, arguing that ‘it is much more 
satisfactory to define rights clearly and precisely by detailed legislation rather than to guarantee so-called 
fundamental rights which are expressed in general terms’: Harry Gibbs, ‘Does Australia Need a Bill of 
Rights?’ (Paper presented at the Sixth Conference of The Samuel Griffith Society, Carlton, 17-19 November 
1995) <http://www.samuelgriffith.org.au/papers/html/volume6/v6chap7.htm>. 
20 For example, see generally: George Brandis, 'The Debate We Didn't Have to Have: The Proposal for An 
Australian Bill of Rights' (2008) 15 James Cook University Law Review 24.  
21 Brian Galligan and F L Morton, 'Australian Exceptionalism: Rights Protection Without a Bill of Rights' in 
Tom Campbell, Jeffrey Goldsworthy and Adrienne Stone (eds), Protecting Rights Without a Bill of Rights: 
Institutional Performance in Australia (Ashgate Publishing, 2006) 17, 17. 
22 Brandis, above n 20, 27. 
23 Mac Darrow and Philip Alston, 'Bill of Rights in Comparative Perspective' in Philip Alston (ed), 
Promoting Human Rights Through Bills of Rights: Comparative Perspectives (Oxford University Press, 
1999) 465, 513. 
24 George Williams, A Bill of Rights for Australia (University of New South Wales Press, 2000), 48. 
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Whilst it is indeed inevitable that the introduction of a bill of rights would result in a modified 
role for the judiciary, it is important to be clear on the current role of Australian judges, with 
respect to the making of policy/value judgements. As noted by a former Chief Justice of the 
High Court, ‘…it would be a mistake to think that judges are wholly unfamiliar with 
considerations of policy and are not affected - albeit to a strictly limited extent - by political, 
social or ethical values in the decisions which they render under the existing constitutional 
regime.’ 25 Acknowledging that policy/value judgements are already made by the judiciary 
at present, however, does not fully address the arguments of critics. Under a bill of rights, 
the role of judges with respect to human rights may be significantly altered. This may have 
impacts not only for the role of the judiciary, but also upon the human rights discourse. For 
instance, Tom Campbell argues that inviting judges to consider the compatibility of 
legislation with human rights may ‘unhelpfully legalise the discourse of human rights’.26  He 
warns that in doing so it may have the effect of ‘…masking the fact that there are significant 
moral disagreements about what the content of human rights law ought to be, disagreements 
that are politically more fundamental than the question of whether an Act is or is not 
compatible with existing human rights law.’ 27 
 
In making a determination as to the compatibility of legislation with a bill of rights, judges 
must cast judgement on the scope, content and priority of relevant rights. As noted by various 
commentators in the field, in many instances these are inescapably political questions. For 
some critics, the judiciary is not the appropriate institution for this task as unlike Parliament, 
the judiciary is made up of unelected and often relatively unrepresentative individuals.28 
Moreover, the nature of the judicial method can be viewed as a problematic means of 
resolving rights conflicts.  Critics have expressed concern that inviting judges to resolve 
these rights conflicts ‘changes the discourse from an argument about how best to allocate 
resources to serve the interests of society as a whole, to an argument about the (asserted) 
rights of a particular individual.’29 Brandis argues that it ‘changes an argument about social 
benefit to an argument about individual claims’, and in doing so ‘it decontextualises what 
                                                          
25 Gerard Brennan, 'The Impact of a Bill of Rights on the Role of the Judiciary: An Australian Perspective' in 
Philip Alston (ed), Promoting Human Rights Through Bills of Rights: Comparative Perspectives (Oxford 
University Press, 1999) 454, 463. 
26 Tom Campbell, 'Does Anyone Win under a Bill of Rights?: A Response to Hilary Charlesworth's 'Who 
Wins under a Bill of Rights?'' (2006) 25(1) The University of Queensland Law Journal 55, 59. 
27 Ibid.  
28 Jenny Morgan, 'A Constitutional Right to (Gender) Equality: What's the Difference?' in Glenn Patmore and 
Gary Jungwirth (eds), The Big Makeover: A New Australian Constitution (Pluto Press, 2002) 166, 167. 
29 Brandis, above n 20, 37. 
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should be a decision about public policy, in which the claims of all stakeholders are weighed 
against each other and placed in the context of overall social benefit, and replaces it with a 
litigious process in which all such considerations must yield to a claim of right, once 
established, and in which there are no - or very limited - opportunities for the voices of other 
interests to be heard.’30 Arguably, these issues are of less relevance in the context of a 
constitutionally recognised HRTHE, given that the right is implicitly directed towards 
consideration of overall social benefit, as it seeks to maintain a standard of environmental 
health that will benefit all members of society.  
 
Further concerns relate to the potential for judges to utilise broad rights declarations to 
pursue their own agendas (‘judicial activism’), and the risk of undesirable and unintended 
consequences flowing from judicial interpretation. As a democratic federal nation, with a 
constitutionally entrenched bill of rights, the United States provides a useful insight into the 
impact of a constitutional bill of rights on the role of the judiciary. The United States 
Constitution contains ten ‘amendments’ which collectively form the well-known ‘Bills Of 
Rights’, including the rights to freedom of religion and expression. The US Supreme Court 
has the power to invalidate any legislation which is found to be inconsistent with the rights 
contained in the Constitution, and has exercised this power on countless occasions. 
However, critics from various political perspectives have criticised the way in which the 
Supreme Court exercises its power.  
 
Some have accused the Supreme Court of ‘judicial activism’, whilst others have condemned 
the Court for its reticence to step in and remedy failures of the political process.31 Although 
it is difficult to define ‘judicial activism’, common to all definitions is the notion that it 
involves the judiciary acting outside the scope of its appropriate role. For example, it is not 
considered appropriate for judges to decide cases with a view to achieving ‘desired social 
results’.32 Rather, they should make decisions according to the rules and principles which 
have been established to guide their interpretation and application of the law. Judicial 
                                                          
30 Ibid. 
31 For discussion of the different perspectives, see generally: Geoffrey R Stone, 'Citizens United and 
Conservative Judicial Activism' (2012) 2 University of Illinois Law Review 485; William P Marshall, 
'Conservatives and the Seven Sins of Judicial Activism' (2002) 73 University of Colorado Law Review 1217.  
32 French citing Schlesinger in Robert French, ‘Judicial Activism – The Boundaries of the Judicial Role’ 




activism may manifest in various different forms, including the ‘invalidation of the arguably 
constitutional actions of other branches’, a ‘failure to adhere to precedent’, the creation of 
‘judicial legislation’, ‘departures from accepted interpretive methodology’ and the use of 
‘result oriented judging’.33 Even if these hallmarks of judicial activism are present, it is often 
the case that significant disagreement is raised by claims of impropriety – both as to whether 
activism has taken place, and whether it is disagreeable.  
 
As noted by American law Professor Geoffrey Stone, reactions to actual and perceived 
judicial activism are often dependent on the political perspective of the observer. He 
observes that ‘…at some times in our history, judicial activism has been embraced by 
conservatives and criticized by liberals, and at other times, judicial activism has been 
embraced by liberals and criticized by conservatives.’34 Generally, Supreme Court judges 
attempt to avoid accusations of activism, by maintaining that they are simply declaring the 
law, and interpreting the intentions of the framers.35  However, as noted by Stone, this 
theoretical dedication to discovering and applying the intentions of the founders is 
problematic in practice as the founders did not necessarily share a unanimous conception of 
the scope and content of the rights contained in the Constitution.36 And even if they did, the 
ambiguity of their expression leaves room for judges to ‘project onto the Framers their own 
personal and political preferences.’37  
 
He argues that ‘the result is an unprincipled and often patently disingenuous 
jurisprudence’.38 To support this argument, he examined the outcomes of ‘cases in which 
the conservative Justices tend to be judicially restrained and deferential and those in which 
they take an activist approach.’39 He argues that from this analysis ‘two obvious patterns’ 
emerge. Firstly, that the ‘conservative Justices have generally been very deferential in cases 
in which minorities…challenge the Constitutionality of government action that 
disadvantages them’.40 He argues that these are ‘precisely the cases in which activist judicial 
                                                          
33 Keenan D Kmiec, ‘The Origin and Current Meanings of Judicial Activism’ (2004) 92 (5) California Law 
Review 1441, 1444. See also the indicia of judicial activism put forward by Marshall, above n 31, 1220.  
34 Geoffrey R Stone, 'Citizens United and Conservative Judicial Activism' (2012) 2 University of Illinois Law 
Review 485, 499. 
35 Ibid 495.  
36 Ibid.  
37 Ibid.  
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid 499. 
40 Ibid.  
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scrutiny is most appropriate’. 41  Secondly, he observes that ‘these same Justices have 
generally been most active in protecting the interests of corporations, commercial 
advertisers, gun owners, whites challenging affirmative action programs, the Boy Scouts 
when they claim a First Amendment right to exclude gay scoutmasters, and George W. Bush 
in the 2000 presidential election’.42 
 
He argues that the only way to explain these patterns is ‘as the product of personal and 
ideological preferences’: 
[t]hese patterns cannot plausibly be explained by considerations of either judicial restraint or 
originalism. Moreover, they are patterns that cannot be explained in any principled manner. These 
results can only be explained as the product of personal and ideological preferences about such matters 
as guns, corporations, gays, commercial activity, religion, and George W. Bush. This is, to say the 
least, a worrisome state of affairs because at the same time that conservatives have managed to 
hoodwink the American people into believing that they are being principled, restrained, and 
originalist, they are in fact importing their own idiosyncratic values and beliefs into Constitutional 
law in an aggressive and unprincipled manner.43 
 
Concluding with a similar finding of conservative judicial activism in the Supreme Court 
record, Marshall recognises the importance of acknowledging that the meanings of 
‘conservative’ and ‘judicial activism’ are not ‘free from ambiguity’,44  and that ‘a non-
conservative result…can be the product of a conservative opinion’.45 He clarifies that ‘an 
activist decision’ is not ‘necessarily “wrong”’ and that a ‘decision that exhibits restraint’ is 
not ‘necessarily correct’.46 This distinction is crucial, as it highlights the implicit political 
judgements which pervade not only the judgments, but also the discussions surrounding 
claims of judicial activism. According to a case analysis study conducted by a US judge, 
‘activism’ (according to the author’s definition) occurs equally between ‘liberal’ and 
‘conservative’ judges.47  
 
From the above discussion, it can be seen that it is possible to interpret the constitutional 
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court as evidencing a trend towards a degree of judicial 
activism. Although not all commentators would agree upon this characterisation, the 
potential for ‘creative’ judicial interpretation which is created by the recognition of broad 




44 Marshall, above n 31, 1217. 
45 Ibid 1219. 
46 Ibid 1221.  
47 Frank H Easterbrook, 'Do Liberals and Conservatives Differ in Judicial Activism?' (2002) 73 University of 
Colorado Law Review 1401, 1409.  
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and ill-defined rights is clearly apparent. Whether this would pose a problem in the 
Australian context is a question of some debate. Even under existing arrangements, the High 
Court has fallen victim to accusations of judicial activism. A prime example of this alleged 
judicial creativity can be found in the case of Mabo v Queensland [No 2] (1992) 175 CLR 
1 (‘Mabo’), where the High Court famously recognised native title.  Although the decision 
in Mabo went some way towards remediating one aspect of the great historical injustice 
suffered by Australia’s aboriginal peoples, not all judicial activism has such positive 
consequences. In the words of Craven, judicial activism can be ‘potentially socially 
dangerous for precisely the reason that the judges are ill-equipped to discharge any major 
policy role.’48  
 
Accordingly, it is necessary to acknowledge the possibility that entrenching a constitutional 
bill of rights could invite further and more problematic examples of judicial activism by the 
High Court. The US model of judicial interpretation in ‘rights’ cases is quite alien to the 
Australian judiciary’s approach, which is arguably more deferential to the notion of 
parliamentary sovereignty. For example, in a recent US District Court case concerning the 
constitutional validity of a ban on same-sex marriage, the trial judge concluded that the state 
ban violated a number of federal constitutional rights. In doing so, the judge made various 
comments about the morality of the ban, concluding his judgment with the comment, ‘[w]e 
are a better people than what these laws represent, and it is time to discard them into the ash 
heap of history’.49 The tenor of the entire judgment indicated that the judge was motivated 
by certain views as to the morality of same-sex unions, and the ethical implications of their 
prohibition. This can be contrasted quite significantly with the judicial commentary in the 
2013 High Court challenge to the Australian Capital Territory’s same-sex marriage 
legislation.50 In that case, the High Court considered whether there was an inconsistency 
between the territory’s legislation (which provided for same-sex marriage) and the 
Commonwealth’s Marriage Act 1961 (Cth), which restricts marriage to a union between a 
man and a woman. 51  The Court held that the Commonwealth legislation was a 
                                                          
48 Constitutional lawyer Greg Craven argues that the decisions of Mabo and Wik, ‘reveal clearly enough the 
incapacity of the courts to enunciate enduring, comprehensive solutions to complex policy problems.’ Greg 
Craven, 'Reflections on Judicial Activism: More in Sorrow than in Anger' (Paper presented at the Upholding 
the Australian Constitution, Perth, Western Australia, 1997) 
<http://www.samuelgriffith.org.au/papers/html/volume9/v9chap9.htm>. 
49 Whitewood v Wolf 1:13-cv-1861, 39 (MD Penn, 2014).  
50 Commonwealth v Australian Capital Territory (2013) 250 CLR 441.  
51 Marriage Act 1961 (Cth) s 5 (1). 
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‘comprehensive and exhaustive statement of the law of marriage’, and accordingly the 
territory legislation operated in the same field and was invalid to the extent of the 
inconsistency.52 Unlike the US judges considering the constitutional validity of state same-
sex marriage legislation, the judges of the Australian High Court were limited to specific 
questions of constitutional interpretation, primarily focusing on the meanings of the 
constitutional terms in question. In the absence of a bill of rights, the human rights 
implications of overturning same-sex marriage legislation were not the focus of judicial 
attention. 
 
The case is most significant because of its clarification of the scope of Commonwealth 
legislative power with respect to marriage. It confirmed that under the Australian 
Constitution, the Commonwealth Parliament has the ability to pass laws with respect to both 
opposite sex and same-sex marriage, leaving scope for a future Commonwealth Parliament 
to legislate to legalise same-sex marriage. In other words, the Court clarified the scope of 
the Commonwealth Parliament’s legislative power, but did not pass comment on whether it 
was appropriate from a human rights perspective to utilise that power to deny the operation 
of territory same-sex marriage legislation. This is very much in keeping with the Australian 
system of government, which does not encourage the judiciary to engage in political 
questions which are believed to be better suited for the elected representatives in parliament 
to determine. Ironically, had the judges wished to employ ‘outcome’ based reasoning, 
motivated by a politically progressive (‘liberal’) belief in the validity of same-sex marriage, 
they would have had to employ conservative judicial reasoning to achieve that effect (i.e. 
they would have had to interpret the marriage power under the Constitution as only referring 
to heterosexual marriage).53 In holding that ‘marriage’ for the purposes of the constitutional 
expression under s 51 included ‘same-sex marriage’, the Court adopted a more modern and 
                                                          
52 Commonwealth v Australian Capital Territory (2013) 250 CLR 441, 442. 
53 However, note the argument by Twomey that the Court adopted an ‘intermediate’ position between an 
originalist and contemporary interpretation, by reasoning that as the framers would have considered other 
forms of marriage (for example, polygamy) as falling within the concept of ‘marriage’ at the time of the 
drafting of the Constitution, it was not restricted to the traditional understanding of marriage as being an 
exclusive union between one man and one woman. Accordingly, therefore marriage between two men or two 
women, could have fallen within that broader understanding of ‘marriage’. Although this falls short of 
constituting a ‘contemporary’ approach to constitutional interpretation, it was certainly open to the Court to 
adopt a much more literal interpretation of the term’s meaning: Anne Twomey, 'ACT Law Delivers Neither 




expansive view of the meaning of ‘marriage’, which arguably runs counter to the concept 
that would have existed in the minds of the Constitution’s turn of the century drafters.54  
 
The above case comparison demonstrates the potential impact a bill of rights could have 
upon the role of the judiciary in Australia, and the implications for the scope of Parliament’s 
legislative power. Whether the introduction of a bill of rights would result in inappropriate 
‘judicial activism’ is largely dependent on the adequacy of the safeguards in place to control 
activism. Safeguards include the requirement to provide reasons, the appeal process, the 
need to reach a majority verdict, the doctrine of precedent and the ability to dissent. Despite 
the existence of these safeguards, a 2011 study of High Court cases from the 1990s found 
that ‘attitudinal voting’ (where judges are ‘substantially influenced by ideology in decision 
making’) was present ‘in judicial review cases in the 1990s at the high courts of the United 
States, Australia, and Canada’.55 This is a very interesting result considering the different 
judicial appointment processes, legal systems and rights regimes in each of these federal 
nations. The common finding of activism supports the comment made by former High Court 
judge Michael Kirby that,‘[a]ctivism to some degree is inherent in the judicial function’.56 
 
The fact that judicial activism occurs in the absence of a bill of rights arguably says little 
about its possible prevalence under a bill of rights. However, it does indicate that the popular 
fiction that judges in Australia simply ‘declare’ and do not ‘make’ law is precisely that – a 
fiction. This conclusion reduces the weight of arguments against a bill of rights which are 
largely based upon objection to the politicisation of the judiciary. Judges in Australia are 
appointed by the executive branch of government, and they bring their own ideologies to the 
bench which influence the way they interpret and apply the law. Although the Australian 
judiciary is certainly more independent and less politicised than its counterparts in other 
countries (such as the US), it would be inaccurate to claim that a bill of rights would invite 
judges to bring their own personal values, morals and ethics into their decision making, when 
the reality is that they are already doing so. However, it would certainly require them to 
openly engage with moral and political questions with an openness, authority and effect that 
they are currently unable to employ. As noted by Joseph and Castan, ‘…the vesting of 
                                                          
54 Ibid. 
55 David L Weiden, 'Judicial Politicization, Ideology, and Activism at the High Courts of the United States, 
Canada, and Australia' (2011) 64 (2) Political Research Quarterly 335, 344. 
56 Michael Kirby, ‘Judicial Activism: Power Without Responsibility? No, Appropriate Activism Conforming 
to Duty’ (2006) 30 Melbourne University Law Review 576, 592. 
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considerable power in the United States judiciary under the American Bill of Rights has led 
to the unelected Supreme Court being the ultimate arbiter of inherently political, moral and 
emotional issues such as the constitutionality (and therefore legality) of abortion, capital 
punishment and even the resolution of the presidential election in 2000.’57  
 
Altering the nature of the judicial role in this manner would be particularly significant as the 
judiciary would be granted the power to invalidate legislation on the grounds of 
incompatibility/inconsistency with human rights. Granting judges such power would 
represent a serious departure from the status quo, one which it is unlikely that the Australian 
public would support. At present, it is the role of the Commonwealth Parliament to consider 
the potential compatibility of proposed laws with human rights standards. This is effected 
through a parliamentary scrutiny committee, tasked with the duty of ascertaining the 
compatibility of proposed legislation with Australia’s human rights obligations.58 However, 
even this parliamentary body is limited in its capacity to prevent the passage of laws which 
violate these rights, as the Parliament retains the power to pass legislation which has been 
identified as incompatible. In light of this reticence to limit the scope of Commonwealth 
legislative power on human rights grounds, it is questionable whether an expansion of 
judicial review under a constitutionally entrenched bill of rights would be politically 
acceptable.  
 
6.3.2 Option Two: Recognition of the right within the Preamble of the Constitution  
The Preamble of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (Imp) is not an 
inspirational statement of Australia’s core beliefs, values and identity. Rather, it is a 
relatively brief summary of certain fundamental aspects of the purpose and nature of the 
Constitution and the union it sought to effect.59 McKenna, Simpson and Williams highlight 
two aspects of the Preamble which limit its potential as an aid for constitutional 
interpretation or the basis of any implied limits on Commonwealth power. Firstly, they argue 
that it ‘offers rather slim pickings for judges seeking interpretive assistance’, as it is a ‘bland, 
largely inconsequential collection of sentiments that could only have a limited and sporadic 
                                                          
57 Sarah Joseph and Melissa Castan, Federal Constitutional Law: A Contemporary View (Thomson Reuters, 
3rd ed, 2010) 4. 
58 The Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights was established under the Human Rights 
(Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011 (Cth).  
59 John Quick and Robert Randolph Garran, The Annotated Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth 
(Angus & Robertson, 1901).  
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relevance to the array of Constitutional problems currently facing the Court’.60 Secondly, 
they note that the Preamble’s location ‘outside the operative provisions of the 
Constitution…renders it a dubious source of guidance, at least where assistance might be 
found within the text or structure of the Constitution itself’.61 
 
Various attempts to increase the relevance and significance of the Preamble have been 
pursued, including calls for recognition of groups who were marginalised during the drafting 
of the Constitution (such as women and aboriginal Australians). However, modifying the 
text and/or function of the Preamble would face significant hurdles.  Agreement would need 
to be achieved on several potentially contentious issues including the content, expression, 
location and operation of the Preamble. McKenna, Simpson and Williams have summarised 
these challenges. Firstly, they explain that there are challenges associated with achieving 
agreement on what is/is not included in the Preamble, how it is expressed, and where it is 
located (at the beginning of the Constitution itself, or in the Imperial Act that establishes the 
Constitution).62 Secondly, they explain that there are challenges associated with achieving 
agreement on the operation of the Preamble. Namely, whether it will be ‘merely symbolic’, 
or whether the provision will be justiciable and therefore of relevance for constitutional 
interpretation.63 Finally, they explain that there are challenges regarding establishing the 
correct legal procedure for amendment.64 They argue that even if a new preamble was 
justiciable, it ‘could not give rise to substantive rights’ which have ‘no textual foundation in 
the Constitution’:  
                                                          
60 Mark McKenna, Amelia Simpson and George Williams, 'First Words: The Preamble to the Australian 
Constitution' (2001) 24(2) University of New South Wales Law Journal 382, 392. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid 383. 
63 Ibid.  
64 McKenna has outlined the legal issues associated with alteration of the Preamble:‘The process of altering 
the preamble is also complicated by various legal technicalities. There is considerable doubt as to whether 
Section 128 can be employed to alter the preamble. Indeed, any attempt to do so would go against the 
orthodox view that Section 128 can only be used to amend the Constitution itself. Aside from relying on the 
unlikely request and consent of all State governments to Commonwealth amendment of the Constitution Act 
[under Sub-Section 15(1) of the Australia Act 1986] or risking a High Court challenge to the employment of 
Section 128, the advice tendered to the Republic Advisory Committee by the Acting Solicitor-General in 
1993 indicated there was one remaining alternative. This would involve a referendum under Section 128 
requesting the people to confer upon the Commonwealth the power to amend the Constitution Act via 
amendment of the Statute of Westminster. Essentially this would mean that the proposed alterations to the 
existing preamble would also be included in the referendum question. This method, while risking States' 
rights objections, still seems the most viable and least complicated means of altering the preamble.’ Mark 
McKenna, 'The Need for a New Preamble to the Australian Constitution and/or a Bill of Rights' (Parliament 





Even if a new preamble were drafted to include contemporary values and aspirations, and placed at 
the front of the Constitution itself, it could not give rise to substantive rights, having no textual 
foundation in the Constitution…It seems highly unlikely that a justiciable preamble could itself bring 




This is not to say however, that a sufficiently worded Preamble could not involve the express 
recognition of new rights. Falling short of the inclusion of a ‘Bill of Rights’, it would be 
possible to recognise certain fundamental rights and values in a new Preamble contained 
within the Constitution. The legal effect of recognising a human right to a healthy 
environment in a new Preamble would be contingent on various factors, including its specific 
expression and any other provisions qualifying its application. Given the challenges 
outlined, and the uncertain legal consequences of recognition, arguably this option is not the 
most preferable means of recognising the right.  
 
6.3.3 Option Three: Recognition of the right within an existing chapter of the 
Constitution 
Of the eight chapters of the Commonwealth Constitution, the most relevant chapter for 
inclusion of the HRTHE is Chapter One (‘The Parliament’). Chapter One of the Constitution 
concerns the structure and powers of the Commonwealth Parliament. At present, there is no 
direct legislative power granted to the Commonwealth over the subject matter of the 
‘environment’. However, it is certainly possible to create such a power under s 51 via the s 
128 amendment procedure (discussed above). Arguably, in order to enable the 
Commonwealth to fulfil its obligations under a human right to a healthy environment, the 
power to pass laws directly with respect to the environment is required. At present, the 
Parliament relies upon various indirect powers to pass legislation addressing environmental 
management and protection. Granting the Commonwealth direct power over the 
environment could have significant implications for the balance of powers between the 
state/territory and federal governments. As explained in Chapter Two, currently a system of 
co-operative federalism is in operation, whereby the Commonwealth and the state/territory 
governments share responsibility over various environmental matters. However, granting 
the Commonwealth increased legislative power over the environment does not mean that the 
Commonwealth would necessarily make use of this increased power. Arguably, it already 
has the potential legislative power to govern most areas of environmental management, but 
chooses not to realise this potential in favour of a more co-operative approach. In fact, in 
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various areas the Commonwealth has opted to devolve responsibility back to the 
states/territories (for example, under the Environment Protection and Biodiversity 
Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) assessment and approval processes).66 
 
The case of Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983) 158 CLR 1 (‘Tasmanian Dam Case’) 
provides a prime example of the potential impact of such an expansion of Commonwealth 
power. The Commonwealth legislation at issue sought to implement international 
environmental law obligations contained under an international convention, which Australia 
had ratified. Utilising the external affairs power under the Constitution as one of the main 
sources of legislative power to pass the Act, the Commonwealth argued that the law could 
be characterised as a law with respect to ‘external affairs’. Accordingly, a significant amount 
of judicial discussion and legal argument was expended on determining whether the Act 
could be characterised as such a law, and if so, whether the manner of execution was 
appropriate and adapted to the ends sought to be achieved. Additionally, the judgment 
explored the arguments in relation to various other heads of legislative power which the 
Commonwealth was seeking to rely upon. Arguably, it would have been preferable for the 
court to have expended its thought and analysis on a consideration of whether the law was a 
law with respect to the subject matter of environmental management and protection, rather 
than concern itself with legal debates over indirect matters such as, for example, whether the 
Hydro-Electric Commission fell within the meaning of a ‘trading corporation’ for the 
purposes of the ‘corporations’ power under s 51(xx) of the Constitution.  
 
The proposed environment power would need to be qualified by express recognition of the 
HRTHE in some form. Accordingly, the Commonwealth would have the power to legislate 
with respect to the environment, in consistency with the human right to a healthy 
environment. In this sense, the HRTHE could operate as a form of limitation on the scope 
of Commonwealth legislative power. However, this would not be a comprehensive means 
of protecting the right, as it would only apply to limit the Parliament’s legislative power with 
respect to the topic matter of the ‘environment’. Recognising the right within the context of 
a constitutionally entrenched bill of rights would apply to the Commonwealth’s legislative 
and executive power more generally, and would therefore more comprehensively protect the 
                                                          
66 For example, through bilateral agreements: Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 
1999 (Cth) s 44. 
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right. Moreover, it is unlikely in light of Australia’s environmental regulation history that 
the Commonwealth would be successful in seeking to gain a general legislative power over 
the environment.  
 
6.3.4 Option Four: Recognition of the right within a new chapter of the Constitution 
At present, the Constitution is silent with respect to the principles and values which should 
govern the management of the Australian environment. It would be possible to insert a new 
section which outlined these general principles, and included recognition of the HRTHE. 
Elevating principles and values to the status of constitutional statements could have 
significant implications for Australian natural resources management and environmental 
protection legislation. However, introducing a new section on the politically controversial 
topic of environmental management would be extremely difficult to effect, both in terms of 
achieving agreement on its necessity, and deciding upon its content.  
 
Historically, amendment proposals have only sought to effect incremental reforms to the text 
of the document. Introducing an entirely new section would constitute a significant departure 
from this amendment trend. Moreover, it would seem potentially inconsistent with the focus 
and nature of the document, which is currently devoted to outlining the structure of 
government in Australia. It is not focussed on outlining general principles for particular 
governance areas. Accordingly, creating a section specifically outlining governance 
principles for the particular area of environmental management and protection may seem 
incongruous. For the above reasons, creating an entirely new section may be viewed as 
unnecessary, potentially problematic, and not in keeping with the general approach of the 
overall document. 
 
6.3.5 Option Five: Recognition of the right within state constitutions and territory self-
governing legislation  
It may be possible to recognise the HRTHE in the constitutions of the states of Australia, 
and the self-governing legislation for the Australian Capital Territory (‘ACT’) and the 
Northern Territory. At present, none of the state constitutions or the Commonwealth 
legislation granting self-government to the territories contain a bill of rights. Most 
amendments to state constitutions can be made via normal legislative amendment 
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procedures.67 Accordingly, if sufficient political support could be established in the state 
parliaments, it would be possible to insert bills of rights into the state constitutions. 
Similarly, it would be possible to incorporate bills of rights into the self-governing 
legislation for the territories if sufficient support existed in the Commonwealth Parliament.  
 
If these amendments were made, and a HRTHE was included within the introduced bills of 
rights, similar consequences would flow for state/territory governments as for the 
Commonwealth under a Commonwealth constitutionally entrenched bill of rights. Namely, 
the judiciary would be granted the power to invalidate state/territory legislation and 
executive decision making in breach of the right, and parliaments would need to make laws 
in accordance with the right. Recognising the HRTHE at this level could be particularly 
significant for the realisation of the right, as environmental management and protection is 
primarily a state/territory responsibility (discussed in Chapter Two). However, given the fact 
that only one state and one territory have thus far passed limited legislative human rights 
charters, it would seem that constitutional recognition at the state/territory level is unlikely 





                                                          
67 John Waugh, ‘Australia’s State Constitutions, Reform and the Republic’ (1996) 3 (1) Agenda 59, 61.  
68 These charters are discussed in further detail in Chapter Seven. 
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6.4 Preferable form of constitutional recognition  
In light of the foregoing discussion, it can be concluded that Options Two, Three and Four 
are the least preferable options for constitutional recognition. Option Two (recognition in 
the Preamble) faces too many uncertainties and challenges. For instance, uncertainty over 
whether it could give rise to substantive justiciable rights, and challenges relating to the 
necessary procedures for effective amendment. Option Three (recognition under s 51) 
involves the creation of a new Commonwealth legislative power over the topic matter of the 
environment generally, limited by recognition of the HRTHE. Whilst this could be beneficial 
for ensuring adequate recognition and protection of the right (by facilitating the passage of 
Commonwealth environmental protection legislation), it was argued that it would be very 
unlikely to receive support given the history of Commonwealth/state/territory relations in 
regards to the division of power in this context. Moreover, it was noted that the right’s 
operation under this recognition option would be limited, as it would only apply to the 
specific legislative power created.  
 
Option Four involves the creation of a new section devoted to environmental governance. It 
was argued that it would be incongruous with the existing structure and focus of the 
document to include a new section specifically directed to one governance area. Moreover, 
all three of these options do not enable recognition of the right within the broader context of 
the recognition of other human rights. As Options One and Five enable recognition of the 
right within the context of the recognition of other civil and political and social, economic 
and cultural rights, it is submitted that they are the preferable options for legal recognition. 
Additionally, they are more comprehensive, as they enable the right to apply more broadly. 
For this reason, the following sections consider the potential benefits for environmental 
protection associated with constitutional recognition of the human right to a healthy 
environment as an independent constitutionally entrenched right contained within a broader 






6.5 Potential benefits for environmental protection associated with 
constitutional recognition of the human right to a healthy environment  
The benefits of constitutional protection of environmental rights is a hotly debated topic.69 
Some commentators view such recognition as merely aspirational, whilst others maintain 
that it is one of the most powerful legal tools available for achieving superior environmental 
protection. Boyd belongs to the latter camp, and argues that ‘constitutional provisions 
requiring environmental protection appear to provide a range of benefits, including stronger 
laws, enhanced public participation, and improved environmental performance’.70 He notes 
that over ‘the past four decades, there has been a remarkable and ongoing shift toward 
constitutional recognition of the importance of protecting the environment.'71 At present, 
150 out of 193 of the world’s Constitutions ‘include explicit references to environmental 
rights and/or environmental responsibilities...'72  
  
The preference and rationale for constitutional recognition of environmental rights has been 
examined by Hayward. He notes that the ‘most general rationale for taking a constitutional 
approach to environmental protection…is that the seriousness, extensiveness, and 
complexity of environmental problems are such as to prompt a need for concerted, 
coordinated political action aimed at protecting all members of populations on an enduring 
basis.'73 As a result of his research into the constitutional experience of various jurisdictions, 
Hayward concludes that ‘providing for environmental protection at the constitutional level 
has a number of potential advantages’. 74  He argues that constitutional recognition 
‘entrenches a recognition of the importance of environmental protection’.75 In other words, 
it raises the value of environmental protection to the status of supreme law, making it more 
difficult to resile from than a value statement made in an ordinary piece of legislation. He 
further argues that it ‘offers the possibility of unifying principles for legislation and 
regulation’ and ‘secures these principles against the vicissitudes of routine politics, while at 
                                                          
69 For a detailed discussion of the value of environmental constitutionalism, see: James R May and Erin Daly, 
Global Environmental Constitutionalism (Cambridge University Press, 2015).  
70 David R Boyd, The Environmental Rights Revolution: A Global Study of Constitutions, Human Rights and 
the Environment (UBC Press, 2012) 7. 
71 Ibid 47. 
72 David R Boyd, ‘Constitutions, Human Rights, and the Environment: National Approaches’ in Anna Grear 
and Louis J Kotzé (eds), Research Handbook on Human Rights and the Environment (Edward Elgar, 2015), 
170, 172. 
73 Tim Hayward, Constitutional Environmental Rights (Oxford University Press, 2005), 5. 




the same time enhancing possibilities of democratic participation in environmental decision-
making processes'.76  In regards to securing ‘these principles against the vicissitudes of 
routine politics’, he argues that constitutional recognition means that environmental 
protection does not need to ‘depend on narrow majorities in legislative bodies'.77 In his view, 
‘this is an important consideration’, as ‘costly’ or ‘unpopular’ approaches to environmental 
protection may provide ‘governments whose eye is on the next election’ with an ‘incentive 
to cut back on them’.78  
 
Accordingly, a constitutionally protected right may assist in the prevention of ‘rollbacks’ on 
environmental protection. 79  Over the past few years, there have been a number of 
modifications to Australian environmental protection laws, policies, and institutions under 
the federal coalition government. A number of these reforms could be characterised as 
rollbacks on environmental protection. At the very least, they highlight that the degree and 
nature of environmental protection in Australia is a matter of political debate and discretion. 
Environmental protection is not a right in Australia, even though it may be argued to be a 
widely held public expectation. 
 
As noted by May, deciding whether to constitutionalise environmental rights ‘begs the value 
of constitutionalism'.80 It is debatable whether constitutionally recognising rights is the most 
effective means of ensuring their protection and realisation. Rather than recognising the right 
under the Constitution, it would be possible to recognise the right under ordinary legislation. 
However, Boyd contends that there are significant and important differences between 
constitutional and legislative recognition. He argues that whilst ' the difference may not be 
immediately apparent, constitutional and legislated environmental rights are like Siberian 
tigers and Siamese cats - related, but with dramatically different degrees of strength.'81 In his 
view, by its very nature, a constitutional right ‘is likely to have far greater legal, symbolic, 
and practical importance than a legislated right.'82 Daly and May concur, arguing that there 
are distinct benefits associated with constitutionalism which are not associated with other 
                                                          
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid 6. 
78 Ibid 7. 
79 Ibid 236. 
80 James R May, ‘Constituting Fundamental Environmental Rights Worldwide’ (2006) 23 (1) Pace 
Environmental Law Review 113, 116.  
81 David R Boyd, The Right to a Healthy Environment: Revitalizing Canada's Constitution (UBC Press, 
2012) 55. 
82 Ibid.  
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forms of recognition.83 In particular, they contend that constitutional environmental rights 
are ‘more durable than non-entrenched rights’ and they perform a ‘normative function that 
is superior to other domestic legal approaches’.84  
 
Boyd’s research into the constitutional recognition of the HRTHE in jurisdictions around 
the world provides support for these arguments. His research has revealed that 
‘constitutional environmental rights are delivering many of the anticipated benefits and few 
of the potential drawbacks forecast by legal experts’.85  He argues that these benefits include 
‘…stronger environmental laws, increased public participation, and ecologically conscious 
court decisions’, as well as the prevention of environmental protection rollbacks by the state 
and improved implementation and enforcement of existing laws.86 In particular, he contends 
that the right has proven to be an effective tool for increasing government accountability and 
transparency.87 
 
Interestingly, Boyd has observed a trend indicating that nations with common law legal 
systems are less likely to provide constitutional recognition of the right. Although there is 
no definitive explanation for the trend, he notes that it raises ‘several important questions’, 
including:88 
Are common-law nations simply emulating the British and American approach to constitutional 
rights, which is averse to social, economic, and cultural rights as well as the right to a healthy 
environment? Is the objection based on the issue of justiciability, or do powerful elites in these nations 
block progress because of fears related to the redistribution of power and resources? Is the common-
law legal system an impediment to environmental sustainability? If so, how can this systemic 
institutional weakness be overcome?’  
 
Arguably, the reluctance to provide constitutional recognition for the right in Australia may 
not stem from ‘systemic institutional weakness’, but in fact, quite the opposite. As a strong 
democracy, with an independent judiciary, a relatively free press, a generally well-educated 
populace and a reputation free from any significant allegations of government corruption, 
Australia can lay claim to systemic institutional strength. Many of the benefits for 
                                                          
83 Erin Daly and James R. May, ‘Comparative environmental constitutionalism’ (2015) 6 Jindal Global Law 
Review 9, 20.  
84 Ibid. 
85 Boyd, above n 70, 249. 
86 Ibid.  
87 Ibid.  
88 Boyd, above n 70, 288. 
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environmental protection which Boyd cites as a product of constitutional recognition of the 
right, are considered to be essential elements of a healthily functioning Australian political 
and legal system. Public participation in government decision-making, adequate law 
enforcement and institutional mechanisms to ensure government accountability can all be 
viewed as fundamental elements of a functional first world democracy. For the most part, 
Australians can expect that many of these benefits for environmental protection will manifest 
as a by-product of our broader system of responsible and representative government in a 
democracy based upon the rule of law. However, as recent rollbacks on environmental 
protection have demonstrated, in the absence of a legal mandate (constitutional or 
legislative) to protect, respect and fulfil the HRTHE, it is possible for the government to 
remove and undermine the systems in place to achieve environmental protection.89 The 
HRTHE could potentially operate as a legal ‘backstop’ to prevent rollbacks by the state, and 
could be utilised as a tool by environmental protection advocates to encourage government 
action.  
 
If the proposed form of constitutional recognition was adopted, the HRTHE would be 
recognised as an individual express right within a constitutionally entrenched bill of rights 
contained within the Commonwealth Constitution. Accordingly, the right would have to be 
taken into consideration by the federal executive, legislature and judiciary in their decision-
making processes. The following section considers whether some of the theoretical benefits 
outlined in Chapter Five may be realised through the form of constitutional recognition 
proposed. These potential benefits, as identified by Boyd, are drawn from the benefits 
associated with constitutional recognition of the right in various countries. Boyd’s 
comparative analysis of numerous nations which have provided constitutional recognition 
of the right in some form reveals that there are a number of benefits associated with 
constitutional recognition of the right.  
 
In particular, his research found that constitutional recognition of the HRTHE can serve to 
‘strengthen environmental laws’,90 and prevent ‘rollbacks’ on environmental protection.91 
In addition to the right’s impact on legislation, according to Boyd it has also proven to be 
                                                          
89 It must be acknowledged that the reforms referred to may not be perceived as rollbacks on environmental 
protection by some commentators.  
90 Boyd, above n 70, 233. 
91 Ibid 236. 
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effective in increasing public engagement with environmental governance through litigation. 
For example, he notes that the right can be utilised by ‘public interest litigants to close gaps 
in environmental law’, 92  and litigation utilising the right ‘can facilitate increased 
implementation and enforcement of environmental laws and policies’.93 In order to scope 
the analysis, the potential realisation of the identified benefits in the case study context of 
water resources management will be explored.  
 
6.5.1 Emphasis on the fundamental importance of the interrelationship between 
human health and wellbeing and the state of the natural environment 
It is possible that constitutional recognition could encourage further emphasis on the 
fundamental importance of the interrelationship between human health and wellbeing and 
the state of the natural environment. Although this linkage is already recognised to an extent, 
formal recognition under the Constitution could possibly encourage greater emphasis on the 
interrelationship. A constitutional statement outlining the importance of environmental 
protection to the Australian public would certainly have a significant impact on the way in 
which the human/environment relationship is viewed. The possibility of constitutional 
invalidity could encourage executive and legislative decision-makers to adequately 
emphasise the linkage in laws, policies and decision-making. At present, there is no 
constitutional guidance on principles and values to guide the creation of environmental 
policy and legislation in Australia. Guidance is often drawn from international 
environmental declarations outlining fundamental principles, such as the principles of 
sustainable development, which are then implemented at the domestic level in environmental 
laws and policies.94 There may be some benefits which could flow from constitutional 
guidance, in terms of establishing a sustainable development framework at the highest level 
of Australian law.  
 
In the case study context of water resources management, the link between human health 
and the health of the natural environment is particularly pronounced, as humans directly 
consume water and rely upon water to grow food. Accordingly, a constitutional statement 
recognising the importance of the interrelationship could help to ensure that human rights 
                                                          
92 Ibid 235. 
93 Ibid 237. 
94 The Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) is a prime example.  
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implications are adequately recognised and addressed in water resources management laws 
and policies.  
 
6.5.2 Stronger basis for environmental laws and policies 
According to Boyd, one of the key advantages of a constitutional HRTHE is its positive 
influence on the development and application of environmental laws.95 As demonstrated 
above, constitutional recognition of the right in Australia could have various consequences 
for environmental legislation. Firstly, it might help to clarify the respective roles of 
federal/state/territory governments in environmental protection and management, which 
would have implications for which level of government regulates environmental protection 
matters.96 As noted in Chapter Two, currently responsibility for environmental protection 
and natural resources management is shared between three levels of government. Although 
the federal government has adopted significant responsibility over numerous environmental 
matters, most environment and planning decisions remain within the authority of the 
states/territories. Accordingly, recognising a human right to a healthy environment at the 
federal level could potentially result in a significant alteration to the federal balance of power 
in this area. Providing a constitutional statement outlining the responsibility of the federal 
government to safeguard the health of the natural environment, could help to justify further 
federal action on environmental protection. 
 
Although it is a matter of debate whether Commonwealth or state/territory management of 
the environment is preferable, there is significant support amongst Australian environmental 
law commentators for an increased role for the Commonwealth in environmental protection. 
They view federal oversight and direction as a necessary regulatory response to national 
environmental issues, and highlight the questionable track record of state/territory 
governments with respect to many key natural resource management issues.97 Moreover, as 
                                                          
95 Boyd, above n 70, 233-235. 
96 Boyd has discussed the possible benefits associated with the right’s clarification of the role of the federal 
government in environmental protection in Canada:  David R Boyd, The Importance of Constitutional 
Recognition of the Right to a Healthy Environment: Executive Summary (2013)  9-12 
<http://davidsuzuki.org/publications/2013/11/DSF%20White%20Paper%201--2013.pdf>. 
97 See for example Rachel Walmsley and Elizabeth McKinnon, ‘In Defence of Environmental Laws: 
ANEDO and COAG’s Environmental Reform Agenda’ (2012) 3 National Environmental Law Review 32, 
34. Walmsley and McKinnon argue that ‘[n]ot only does the Commonwealth generally have higher standards 
in environmental regulation, but it is better placed (and often better resourced) to manage the environment in 
the national interest and maintain an arms-length approach to considering projects. This includes where the 
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noted by Lee Godden, some ‘see Commonwealth approval as a necessary check and balance 
to avoid a conflict of interest - especially where state governments are involved as 
proponents or are otherwise actively supporting projects’.98 At the very least, clarification 
of the respective roles of the various levels of government would be undeniably useful, 
especially in areas where there has been hesitation over the adoption of responsibility.  
 
This has been a significant area of contention in the context of water resources management 
in Australia, given increasing Commonwealth involvement over the past few decades. If 
recognition of the right under a bill of rights was accompanied by recognition of a new head 
of legislative power on the topic matter of the environment, it could clarify that the 
Commonwealth has direct legislative power with respect to water resources management. 
This could have important implications for the strength and authority of Commonwealth 
water management laws and policies. It could also impact on the scope of Commonwealth 
water management legislation, as the Commonwealth would no longer be restricted to 
reliance on other heads of legislative power (such as the external affairs power and the 
corporations power) to pass legislation governing water resources.  
 
In order to pass the Water Act 2007 (Cth), the Commonwealth had to rely upon a number of 
heads of legislative power, and a referral of powers from the Basin states.99 The source of 
the Commonwealth’s legislative power limits the scope of the legislation, as the legislation 
has to be capable of being supported by these heads of power. Moreover, the states have the 
capacity to revoke their referral of powers,100 creating a vulnerability in the legislation. If a 
head of legislative power was introduced that enabled the Commonwealth to legislate 
directly on the subject matter of the environment it would help to strengthen the basis of 
environmental laws, and potentially also help to increase their regulatory reach by removing 
the limitations currently imposed by reliance on indirect heads of power.  
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98 Lee Godden, Jacqueline Peel and Lisa Caripis, 'Commonwealth Should Keep Final Say on Environment' 
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nationhood power: Kate Stoeckel, Romany Webb, Luke Woodward and Amy Hankinson, Australian Water 




The constitutional limitations imposed on the Water Act 2007 (Cth) are evident in both the 
structure and operation of the legislation, and arguably the Act would have been 
strengthened by reliance on a direct head of legislative power. Although reducing constraints 
on increased Commonwealth action is not universally viewed as a positive for environmental 
protection, it would certainly help to facilitate national responses to national environmental 
problems. Due to the nature of water as a transboundary and vital natural resource, it is 
crucial that national water management issues receive a national regulatory response. By 
facilitating the passage of national water management laws and policies, constitutional 
recognition of the right could therefore be viewed as offering potential benefits for 
environmental protection in this context.  
 
Recognition of a constitutional right may also help to strengthen environmental laws and 
policies through the knowledge that the judiciary would be empowered to invalidate 
legislative and executive action held to be inconsistent with the right. This could strengthen 
both the development and implementation of environmental laws and policies, as it would 
create a significant legal consequence for government failure to respect the right.  
 
6.5.3 Increased prioritisation of environmental protection considerations in 
government decision-making 
One of the key challenges facing environmental protection efforts in Australia, is the issue 
of how to balance sometimes competing economic, social and environmental interests. 
Elevating an environmental protection mandate to the status of a constitutional right could 
help to increase prioritisation of environmental protection considerations in government 
decision-making. Awareness that a relevant decision could be invalidated on the grounds of 
inconsistency with the right could impact on policy, legislative and executive decision-
making processes. As noted by Williams and Burton, ‘a government does not want to see 
legislation it introduces and supports struck down or questioned’. 101  In this regard, 
constitutional recognition of the right could have a proactive impact, as it may operate to 
prevent the introduction of incompatible legislation. As noted earlier, the right may operate 
to effectively limit the scope of Commonwealth legislative power, and a government aware 
of these limitations may legislate more carefully to ensure consistency with the right. As 
                                                          
101 George Williams and Lisa Burton, ‘Australia’s Exclusive Parliamentary Model of Rights Protection’ 
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consideration of the right may strengthen the relative weight of environmental protection 
considerations vis a vis other considerations, it is possible that constitutional recognition 
could therefore assist in increasing prioritisation of these considerations in government 
decision-making.  
 
In the case study context, as discussed in Chapter Two, one of the key issues facing water 
management law and policy is the issue of how to balance competing rights and interests in 
water resources. As discussed in Chapter Five, the right may operate as a ‘trump’, enabling 
environmental protection considerations to trump competing considerations where 
necessary. Having the weight and authority of being able to reference a constitutional right 
could help to provide government decision-makers in this context with grounds to better 
prioritise environmental protection considerations. This could for instance impact on 
decisions relating to how environmental water holdings are managed, and how water 
planning provides for environmental water. It could also impact on the nature and extent of 
limitations on private water allocations. Although the precise impact cannot be known until 
the right’s content has been clarified, it is certainly possible that constitutional recognition 
of the HRTHE could assist in increasing prioritisation of environmental protection 
considerations in government decision-making.   
 
6.5.4 Safeguards against environmental protection rollbacks 
One of the posited benefits of legal recognition of the HRTHE is protection against 
‘rollbacks’ on environmental protection, as the right could operate as a backstop to prevent 
governments from winding back environmental protection measures.102 A constitutionally 
recognised right could operate in this manner, as decisions to remove environmental 
protection measures could be characterised as breaches of the constitutionally protected right 
to a healthy environment. Until the content of the right is known, it is difficult to ascertain 
precisely what the right guarantees as a minimum entitlement. However, as argued earlier it 
is likely that the right would guarantee a certain minimum level of environmental health, 
and would oblige the government to maintain adequate systems for achieving sustainable 
environmental management. In the water resources context, rollbacks could accordingly 
include actions that threaten the sustainability of water resources, such as over-allocations 
                                                          
102 Boyd’s research has demonstrated that this ‘theoretical advantage’ has been proven in practice in relation 
to constitutional recognition of the right: Boyd, above n 70, 236. 
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of water access entitlements, and permits to pollute. Depending on the content of the right, 
it could also potentially include rollbacks on procedural aspects of the right, such as the right 
to access environmental justice or information about the environment. It would arguably be 
more difficult for a government to justify such rollbacks if these rollbacks were characterised 
as potential human rights violations. The potential operation of the right as a limitation on 
Commonwealth power in this regard can be demonstrated by consideration of the operation 
of the right to vote, which has been held to limit the scope of Commonwealth legislative 
power.  
 
In Roach v Electoral Commissioner (2007) 233 CLR 162, the High Court declared 
amendments to Commonwealth legislation invalid which prohibited people serving any 
sentence of imprisonment from voting in federal elections. The Court reasoned that as the 
Constitution provides for a system of representative government and expressly dictates that 
the houses of the Commonwealth parliament must be ‘directly chosen by the people’ (ss 7 
& 24), there must be a sufficient rationale for determining the circumstances  under which 
an individual’s right to vote may be removed.103 Prior to the amendments, the legislation had 
only operated to prohibit people serving a sentence of imprisonment of three years or longer 
from voting. The Court accepted that basing exclusion on the length of the sentence 
constituted a sufficient reason for exclusion, as their conduct had presumably demonstrated 
‘such a rejection of civic responsibility as to warrant temporary withdrawal of a civic 
right’.104 However, denying the right to vote to all prisoners constituted an abandonment of 
‘any attempt to identify prisoners who have committed serious crimes by reference to either 
the term of imprisonment imposed or the maximum penalty for the offence’.105 According 
to the Court, this ‘broke the rational connection necessary to reconcile the 
disenfranchisement with the constitutional imperative of choice by the people’.106  
 
Accordingly, it can be seen that the constitutionally protected right to vote operated to limit 
the scope of Commonwealth legislative power. Similarly, a constitutionally protected right 
to a healthy environment could operate to limit the scope of Commonwealth legislative 
power on various subject matters. For example, if the content of the right is interpreted to 
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include both substantive and procedural aspects, legislation purporting to limit the rights of 
individuals to access information about the state of the environment, or to protest in response 
to environmental decision-making could be held to be inconsistent with the right. If the right 
is conceived as setting a minimum standard of environmental quality, it could be utilised as 
a means of preventing and invalidating legislation or executive action which sought to 
undermine this standard in some way. Although the precise operation of a constitutionally 
recognised HRTHE is dependent on the content of the right, it is possible that it may operate 
to prevent and address rollbacks on environmental protection. 
 
6.5.5 Safety net by filling gaps in environmental legislation 
One of the identified benefits for environmental protection associated with constitutional 
recognition of the right, is the right’s ability to provide a ‘safety net’ by ‘filling gaps’ in 
legislation.107 Through the process of constitutional interpretation, it is possible that the 
court could use the constitutional right to ‘fill gaps’ in environmental legislation. Gaps in 
legislation may occur where legislation fails to adequately address emerging and complex 
threats to environmental health. By recognising the right under the Constitution, the court 
may be able to provide remedies to address such gaps. A prime example in the water 
resources context for instance could be the threat to groundwater resources posed by coal-
seam gas mining. Whilst a legal and policy response has now been mounted to address the 
issue, in the absence of such a response the right could potentially have operated to fill the 
gap that existed in the legal framework.108 In order to respect the right, serious threats to 
crucial natural resources must be adequately regulated. Although it is not yet possible to 
determine exactly how constitutional interpretation of the right could be utilised to fulfil this 
gap-filling function, it is certainly possible that constitutional recognition of the right could 
assist in addressing gaps in Australia’s system for environmental protection.  
 
6.5.6 Avenues to bring legal actions in the interests of environmental protection 
Another identified benefit associated with constitutional recognition of the HRTHE is 
increased public involvement in environmental protection, leading to increased 
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accountability.109 It is possible that a constitutionally recognised HRTHE could create a new 
legal cause of action which could enable relevant individuals to challenge government 
decision-making in the interests of environmental protection.110 Although various avenues 
for legal recourse exist to seek remedy for environmental harm, environmental protection 
advocates continue to encounter various barriers to their attempts to bring legal actions in 
the public interest (such as the issues associated with costs and standing discussed in Chapter 
Five). Providing advocates with the opportunity to bring actions challenging the validity of 
legislative and executive action on the basis of a breach of a constitutionally protected 
fundamental human right could significantly expand the legal options available for public 
participation in the enforcement of environmental protection standards.  
 
At present, environmental protection advocates often utilise indirect arguments to challenge 
or uphold legislation in the interests of environmental protection.  Similarly, opponents of 
legislative regimes aimed at improving environmental protection are able to challenge 
legislative and executive action on indirect grounds. Two illustrative examples from the 
water management context are the previously mentioned cases of ICM Agriculture Pty Ltd 
v Commonwealth (2009) 240 CLR 140 (‘ICM’) and Arnold v Minister Administering the 
Water Management Act 2000 (2010) 240 CLR 242 (‘Arnold’), where Commonwealth 
legislation modifying water entitlements was challenged on the basis that it either 
contravened the constitutional guarantee to provide adequate compensation for the 
acquisition of property, and/or constituted an invalid exercise of executive/legislative power 
in contravention of s 100 of the Constitution.  
 
Accordingly, although what the plaintiffs opposed was the extent of reduction of agricultural 
water entitlements in order to provide water for the environment, they challenged the law on 
indirect grounds. Instead of being able to invite the Court to answer the question of whether 
or not the law upheld or violated a right to a healthy environment, the Court was asked to 
consider whether the reduction in water entitlements constituted an ‘acquisition of property’. 
This led to a complex discussion as to the meaning of ‘acquisition’ and the meaning of 
‘property’ within the meaning of the provision under the Constitution. Although issues 
                                                          
109 Boyd, above n 70, 239-241. 
110 However, it must be noted that the ‘High Court has not…recognised that the Constitution could itself 
create and sustain causes of action and remedies independently of the common law’: Williams and Hume, 
above n 10, 157. 
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relating to the overall environmental protection aims of the legislative scheme (to return 
water systems to a state of environmental health) were considered in the course of this 
analysis, the main focus was not placed on the heart of the dispute, which was essentially a 
conflict between private interests in water use and the public interest in environmental 
protection.  
 
It is a matter of debate as to whether it would be preferable from an environmental protection 
perspective for the judiciary to actively engage with these issues directly. To do so would 
raise important questions regarding the competency of the judiciary to pass judgment on 
questions of distributive justice, on often complex and politically contentious issues. 
Arguably, it is more appropriate that the judiciary is limited to consideration of legal 
grounds, as it ensures that key policy and planning decisions about environmental 
management are left to the political arms of government. However, it could certainly open 
up more avenues to bring legal actions directly in the interests of environmental protection. 
The possibility of litigation could have a positive proactive impact by encouraging 
lawmakers and decision-makers to act in a manner consistent with the right. The potential 
for legal challenge could accordingly act as an accountability mechanism, which might 
prevent the passage of incompatible laws, or the making of inconsistent decisions.  
 
The right may also further avenues to pursue environmental protection through assisting 
arguments to expand standing. At present, the common law test for standing requires the 
parties to have a ‘special interest’ in the subject matter of the proceeding. 111  A key 
requirement is that they must be able to demonstrate an interest over and above that of a 
general member of the public.112 The HRTHE recognises that environmental protection is in 
the interests of all human beings. Accordingly, constitutional recognition of the right could 
help to demonstrate that in proceedings concerning environmental protection it is 
unnecessary to establish a ‘special’ interest over and above that of general members of the 
public, as all members of the public share an interest in maintaining a healthy environment. 
The requirement to establish a special interest has proven challenging for various individuals 
and organisations seeking to establish standing in environmental protection cases. 
                                                          
111 Australian Conservation Foundation Inc v Commonwealth (1980) 146 CLR 493.  
112 Ibid.  
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Expanding standing could significantly assist environmental protection advocates to enforce 
environmental protection legislation, and to challenge government decision-making.  
 
6.5.7 Inform environmental quality standards 
The human right to a healthy environment recognises that human beings have the right to 
live in a natural environment which is conducive to human health and wellbeing. 
Accordingly, it may guarantee a certain minimum standard of environmental quality.113 
Constitutionally entrenching the HRTHE could be viewed as a means of constitutionally 
guaranteeing a minimum standard of environmental quality. In order to meet this standard, 
the government would need to pass legislation to ensure the achievement of adequate 
environmental quality standards. In Australia, there is no federal environmental protection 
authority with the power to set national binding environmental quality standards and 
pollution regulations. It is possible that constitutional recognition could inspire the 
Commonwealth to enact federal legislation which stipulated national legislation creating 
such mandatory standards and pollution reduction targets, to be implemented and enforced 
either by a newly formed Commonwealth Environmental Protection Authority (EPA), or by 
state/territory EPAs.114  
 
In the case study context of water quality management, there are various means available to 
the Commonwealth to increase its role in this regard. One potential avenue would be for the 
Commonwealth to adopt the American model, which would involve the establishment of a 
federal EPA, with the power to set national water quality standards and pollution 
regulations. 115  Unlike Australia, in the American system the Federal government has 
established a legislative regime to regulate water pollution, enforced by a federal 
                                                          
113 Boyd argues that ‘[t]he right to a healthy environment should, in theory, provide a minimum standard of 
environmental quality for all members of society’: Boyd, above n 96, 22.  
114 In the water quality context see generally, Anthony Moeller and Jennifer McKay, 'Is there Power in the 
Australian Constitution to make Federal Laws for Water Quality?' (2000) 17 (4) Environmental and Planning 
Law Journal 294. See also the recommendation by Professor Rob Fowler advocating for the introduction of a 
Commonwealth EPA on the grounds that ‘a strong and independent Federal EPA is the best way to 
depoliticise environmental assessment, and guarantee the integrity of the process’: Rob Fowler cited in ABC, 
Federal EPA Would Depoliticise Environmental Assessment – Expert, 28 May 2014 
<http://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/breakfast/federal-epa-would-depoliticse-environmental-
assessment---expert/5482980>. 
115 This proposal was put forward by Roberts and Craig: A M Roberts and R K Craig, ‘Regulatory Reform 
Requirements to Address Diffuse Source Water Quality Problems in Australia: Learning from US 
Experiences’ (2014) 21 (1) Australasian Journal of Environmental Management 1, 8.  
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Environment Protection Agency. 116  Australia does not have an equivalent national 
environmental regulatory authority, or an equivalent piece of federal water pollution 
legislation. Increasingly, there have been calls for more Commonwealth involvement in 
environmental matters generally, and water management specifically. 117  Achieving this 
however will involve overcoming significant constitutional, political and practical hurdles. 
However, unlike the American model, any Australian model would ideally ensure that the 
EPA has sufficient power to compel states to comply with federal water pollution reduction 
targets (rather than simply relying upon the threat of ‘losing federal grant money’ as is 
currently the case under the American system).118 Adopting this approach would involve a 
significant departure from the current model of co-operative federalism regarding natural 
resource management in general, and water pollution in particular.  
 
Alternatively, the Commonwealth could enact federal water quality legislation stipulating 
mandatory water quality standards and pollution reduction targets, to be implemented and 
enforced by state EPA’s.119 In order to abide by these national standards and pollution 
reduction targets, the States would have to implement policies, laws and programs designed 
to reduce water pollution. 120  Adopting one of these possible approaches could assist 
environmental protection in this context, given the shortcomings of the current approach in 
regards to various water quality and pollution problems, such as the problem of diffuse 
source water pollution. As explained by Gunningham and Sinclair, ‘policy-makers have 
chosen to address [diffuse source water pollution from agriculture] largely through 
                                                          
116 United States Environmental Protection Agency, Summary of the Clean Water Act  
<http://www.epa.gov/lawsregs/laws/cwa.html>. 
117 Although it must be noted that there are numerous entities/individuals opposed to the Commonwealth 
expanding its role.  
118 Rebecca Nelson, 'Regulating Nonpoint Source Pollution in the US: A Regulatory Theory Approach to 
Lessons and Research Paths for Australia' (2011) 35 University of Western Australia Law Review 340, 356. 
There have been numerous criticisms made of the American approach to diffuse source water pollution 
management. For example, see Albert Ettinger,‘Water Pollution, Agriculture, and the Law (or Lack of Law)’ 
(Paper presented at the 2009 Governor's Conference on the Management of the Illinois River System 
'Looking Back, Moving Forward', October 20-22, 2009) 
<http://ilrdss.sws.uiuc.edu/pubs/govconf2009/Plenary2/Ettinger.pdf>. 
119 Moeller and McKay, above n 114.  
120 There is a significant body of literature dedicated to assessing the effectiveness of various 
policies/laws/programs to address diffuse source pollution in the US. See, eg, Carolyn M. Johns, Effective 
Policy Regimes for the Management of Non-point Source Water Pollution: Ontario and the US in 
Comparative Perspective (2001) <https://ozone.scholarsportal.info/bitstream/1873/8143/1/10294253.pdf>; J 
M Gerstein, D J  Lewis, K Rodrigues, J M Harper, J Kabashima, State and Federal Approach to Control of 
Nonpoint Sources of Pollution (2006) University of California Agriculture and Natural Resources 
Communication Services Publication 8203 <http://anrcatalog.ucdavis.edu/pdf/8203.pdf>. 
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voluntarism’, which they argue is ‘politically acceptable’ but has proven to be ‘manifestly 
unsuccessful’.121  
 
Voluntary ‘beyond compliance’ measures in the context of diffuse source water pollution 
from the agricultural industry include such things as voluntarily opting for less 
environmentally harmful fertilisers, implementing land use changes which would reduce 
run-off containing pollutants into waterways and reducing the quantity and frequency of 
fertiliser use.122 In the absence of sufficient incentives to undertake these voluntary (and 
generally more expensive) measures, it is extremely optimistic to presume that a voluntary 
system would be sufficient to encourage effective action. In Australia and the MDB in 
particular, voluntarism has proven to be a less than ideal approach. Accordingly, approaches 
which are more coercive could potentially help to address the issues created by reliance on 
industry voluntarism. If constitutional recognition of the HRTHE could help to facilitate the 
adoption of these approaches, it could assist in addressing these challenges. As this example 
demonstrates, constitutional recognition of the HRTHE could impact both on the content of 
environmental quality standards, and their implementation.  
  
                                                          
121 Neil Gunningham and Darren Sinclair, ‘Policy Instrument Choice and Diffuse Source Pollution’ (2005) 
17 (1) Journal of Environmental Law 51, 80. For an interesting discussion about ‘beyond compliance’ 
measures adopted by businesses and the concept of ‘bounded rationality’ see Neil Gunningham and Darren 
Sinclair, ‘Designing Smart Regulation’ in Bridget M Hutter, A Reader in Environmental Law (Oxford 
University Press, 1999) 305, 322. 
122 Gunningham and Sinclair (2005), ibid 61-64.  
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6.6 Limitations of a constitutional right as a tool for environmental 
protection in Australia 
The previous section considered the legal consequences which might result from the form 
of constitutional recognition proposed, and demonstrated that a number of the legal 
consequences which may flow from constitutional recognition of the right could be 
perceived to operate as benefits for environmental protection in Australia. In particular, a 
potentially increased scope for Commonwealth intervention in environmental protection, 
increased governmental accountability through expanded options for public interest 
environmental litigation, and constitutional guidance for environmental legislation. Whilst 
there are certainly a number of ascertainable potential benefits associated with constitutional 
recognition of the HRTHE, there may be some limitations regarding the utility of the right 
as a tool for environmental protection. It is important to consider two main criticisms, 
namely, that the right may prove to be either redundant or dangerous in its operation.  
 
6.6.1 Redundant or dangerous 
If the experience with other express constitutional rights is any indication, a constitutionally 
recognised HRTHE is unlikely to be redundant. Despite the often conservative interpretive 
approaches adopted by the High Court, existing express constitutional rights have had 
various significant impacts on the Australian political and legal systems. For instance, as a 
result of the existence of a constitutional right to trial by jury for indictable Commonwealth 
offences (s 80), criminal defendants have been able to challenge the compatibility of jury 
practice with the constitutional right. 123  Unlike statutory recognition of the right, 
constitutional recognition empowers the court to invalidate executive and legislative action 
which violates the right (and presumably also fails a test of proportionality). If accompanied 
by the creation of a legislative power over the subject matter of the ‘environment’, it may 
also empower the legislature to pass laws to help realise the right. It is however important to 
note that depending on how the right is recognised, express constitutional recognition of the 
right under the Commonwealth Constitution may not bind the states. As the majority of 
environmental policy, planning and assessment and approval processes take place at the 
state/territory level, this could impact on the utility of the right as a tool for environmental 
                                                          
123 Joseph and Castan, above n 57, 406-413. 
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protection.124 For this reason, it has also been recommended that the states and territories 
recognise the right within their constitutions and self-governing legislation respectively.  
 
It is possible that far from being redundant, the right could be considered ‘dangerous’. A key 
concern in this respect relates to the role of the judiciary. As noted earlier, enacting a 
constitutionally entrenched bill of rights could significantly modify the role of the judiciary 
in environmental decision-making. Courts have taken a very active role in regards to 
implementation of the right in various countries where the right has received constitutional 
recognition, including Costa Rica, Argentina and the Philippines. For example, in Costa 
Rica, the Constitutional Chamber has interpreted the scope of the right ‘broadly’:  
It has held that the right requires not only that the State refrain from direct violations, but also that it 
protect against violations from others, and in this regard, it has underscored the role of the State as the 
guarantor for the protection and safeguarding of the environment and natural resources.  Although 
plaintiffs may not necessarily demand that the State take a particular course of action, they are entitled 
to insist that the State adopt measures that are suitable for the protection of the right.125 
 
In the report on his mission to Costa Rica, the Independent Expert on the issue of human 
rights obligations relating to the enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable 
environment, noted that the Court has utilised its powers to invalidate legislative and 
executive action in reliance on violations of the right.126 This constitutional jurisprudence 
has directly impacted on the way in which the parliament and the executive have chosen to 
address environmental protection in specific contexts.  
 
To understand how the Australian judiciary may interpret a constitutionally entrenched 
HRTHE, it is useful to examine the High Court’s approach to the interpretation of existing 
express constitutional rights. Whilst existing constitutional rights are not analogous in form 
or nature to the proposed HRTHE, the interpretive approach adopted by the Court is 
representative of the Court’s general approach to rights interpretation. Joseph and Castan 
argue that with the exception of the interpretation of s 51 (xxxi), ‘the express constitutional 
                                                          
124 However, through the operation of s 109 of the Constitution, any state legislation which was inconsistent 
with federal legislation passed to protect the right, would be invalid to the extent of the inconsistency. 
125 John Knox, Report of the Independent Expert on the issue of human rights obligations relating to the 
enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment on his mission to Costa Rica (28 July-1 





rights have a history of narrow, even pedantic, interpretation’.127 It is accordingly unlikely 
that the Court would adopt a more expansive interpretative approach in regards to the 
HRTHE. Indeed, it is more likely that the Court would adopt a more conservative approach 
to the interpretation of the right, given that it would be the first and only right of its nature 
within the Constitution.  
 
However, regardless of the interpretive approach adopted, it is true that the Court would be 
charged with the interpretation of the meaning of the term ‘right to a healthy environment’, 
and its application to specific cases. Accordingly, the Court would be granted significant 
power with respect to the nature, scope and operation of the right. The Court adopts various 
interpretive approaches to determine the meaning of constitutional terms. As a result of this 
interpretive disagreement, the meaning of key constitutional terms can evolve over time. The 
application of different tests and approaches can result in significantly different substantive 
outcomes. For instance, the High Court’s interpretation of the term ‘religion’ under s 116 of 
the Constitution has resulted in a wide range of purportedly religious groups falling within 
the definition of the term.128 However, it would have been open to the Court to adopt a more 
restrictive interpretation, thus excluding more groups from the application of the section. 
Similarly, in the context of the proposed HRTHE, the Court would be tasked with 
determining the definitions of the key terms of the provision creating the right.  
 
It is accordingly possible that the right could be inappropriately used as a vehicle by activist 
judges to invalidate laws passed by the Parliament, in order to achieve policy objectives. In 
this sense constitutional recognition of the right could be viewed as ‘dangerous’, as it is open 
to abuse. However, the history of the High Court’s jurisprudence on express constitutional 
rights indicates that judicial activism in this regard is unlikely. Even where the Court has 
indicated a willingness to engage in interpretive creativity with the elucidation of ‘implied’ 
freedoms, it has adopted a conservative approach to their development. Moreover, a 
constitutionally entrenched HRTHE would possibly be subject to a test of proportionality.129  
This would act as a restraint on the ability of the Court to invalidate laws where there is 
                                                          
127 Joseph and Castan, above n 57, 427.  
128 Ibid 415. 
129 For an explanation of the approaches to proportionality in Australian rights jurisprudence, see: Gabrielle 
Appleby, ‘Proportionality and Federalism: Can Australia learn from the European Community, the US and 
Canada?’ (2009) 26 (1) University of Tasmania Law Review 1.  
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‘prima facie incompatibility’. 130  The combined effect of a conservative interpretive 
approach, and a proportionality test, would limit the potential ‘dangers’ associated with 
judicial interpretation and application of the right.  
 
Further concern may relate to the right’s possible impact on the federal balance of power 
between the Commonwealth and state/territory governments. Ultimately, the specific 
dangers in this regard are dependent on the form of recognition adopted. For instance, 
granting the Commonwealth a head of legislative power over the ‘environment’ as a subject 
matter directly would have significant consequences for the federal division of power in the 
environmental protection context. Whereas, recognising the right within the context of a 
broader constitutionally entrenched bill of rights would arguably have less consequences for 
the federal division of power, and more consequences for the separation of powers between 
the different arms of government.   
 
A further concern relates to ‘unintended or unlikely consequences’ flowing from 
recognition.131 As noted by former High Court judge, Ian Callinan, in other jurisdictions 
where constitutional rights have been adopted in a bill of rights, unintended consequences 
have resulted. 132  This is an inevitable consequence of the adoption of constitutionally 
entrenched rights, and only supports an argument against constitutional recognition of 
human rights more generally. Accordingly, it does not mitigate in particular against 
constitutional recognition of the HRTHE. However, it must be recognised that given the 
broad and complex nature of environmental protection, it is difficult to predict the full range 
of consequences which may result from recognition.  
 
6.6.2 Likelihood of constitutional recognition 
Regardless of whether constitutional recognition of the right would be useful, redundant or 
dangerous, it is unlikely that the HRTHE would receive constitutional recognition in 
Australia in any form. This can be attributed to three main factors. Firstly, the amendment 
procedure outlined under s 128 creates a significant hurdle to reform. As discussed earlier, 
                                                          
130 Joseph and Castan, above n 57, 511. 
131 I D F Callinan and Amanda Stoker, ‘Politicizing the Judges: Human Rights Legislation’ (2011) 30 




the s 128 amendment procedure renders it very difficult to amend the Constitution, as it 
requires a high level of agreement. Achieving this level of agreement in relation to such a 
politically contentious reform would appear to be highly unlikely. Secondly, there has been 
a historical reluctance to entrench express rights in the Constitution via referendum. As noted 
by Stone and Barry, there have been two proposals taken to referendum involving the 
introduction of express rights into the Constitution, and they were both unsuccessful.133 It is 
accordingly unlikely that a more significant expansion of rights recognition would succeed. 
Finally, the potentially controversial nature of the right may mean that even if a 
constitutionally entrenched bill of rights was introduced, the HRTHE would not be included. 
It is most likely that only civil and political rights would be recognised, and that any 
recognition of economic, social and cultural rights would be limited to more established 
rights.  
  
                                                          
133 Bruce Stone and Nicholas Barry, ‘Constitutional Design and Australian Exceptionalism in the Adoption 




Is it possible to recognise the human right to a healthy environment under the Australian 
Constitution? If so, what is the most preferable form of recognition? Can the potential 
benefits for environmental protection identified for domestic legal recognition be realised 
through the preferable form of constitutional recognition? How could these benefits be 
realised in the Australian water management context? What are the potential limitations? 
 
The purpose of this chapter was to determine whether it is possible to recognise the human 
right to a healthy environment under the Australian Constitution, and if so, whether there 
are any potential benefits for environmental protection associated with such recognition. It 
was concluded that it is possible for Australia to expressly recognise the human right to a 
healthy environment under the Australian Constitution, via the amendment procedure 
outlined under s 128. It was explained that the right could be recognised in a constitutionally 
entrenched bill of rights, or as an independent right contained within another section of the 
Constitution (the Preamble, an existing chapter, or a new section). It was argued that 
recognition of the HRTHE within a constitutionally entrenched bill of rights would be the 
most preferable form of recognition, as it would enable the right to be recognised in the 
context of other human rights. There are a number of potential consequences which could 
flow from this form of constitutional recognition of the right, including clarification of 
federal and state/territory roles in environmental management and protection, and 
modification of the scope of Commonwealth legislative power.  
 
It was argued that a number of the consequences of constitutional recognition of the right 
could help realise the potential benefits for environmental protection associated with legal 
recognition of the right outlined in Chapter Five. In particular, it was contended that 
constitutional recognition of the right may help to strengthen environmental laws and 
policies, increase avenues for public participation in environmental decision-making, and 
increase prioritisation of environmental protection considerations in government decision-
making, laws and policies. Consideration of the potential realisation of these identified 
benefits in the case study context of water resources management supported these 
conclusions. Possible criticisms of the right were considered, including the claims that the 
right may prove to be either redundant or dangerous in its operation. It was argued that the 
right would be unlikely to prove redundant in its operation, in light of the significant impact 
of existing constitutional rights and freedoms on the Australian legal and political systems, 
and experience with operation of the right in other jurisdictions. Moreover, given the role of 
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the judiciary in relation to the interpretation and application of the right, it was argued that 
constitutional recognition could have potentially significant impacts on environmental 
protection in Australia. Whilst it was recognised that this modified role for the judiciary 
could be viewed as ‘dangerous’ as it may create opportunities for judicial activism, it was 
argued that the judiciary would be more likely to adopt a conservative approach to 
interpretation and application of the right. However, it was acknowledged that constitutional 
recognition of the right would involve the judiciary in potentially politically contentious 
environmental policy questions which would constitute a significant departure from the 
status quo. This modified judicial role may not necessarily be viewed as beneficial for 
environmental protection, although it would certainly increase opportunities to challenge 
government decision-making in the environmental protection context.  
 
Despite the potential identified benefits associated with constitutional recognition, it was 
concluded that any form of constitutional recognition would be highly unlikely at present. 
This was attributed to three main factors, including the difficulties posed by the amendment 
procedure under s 128, the historical reluctance to entrench express rights in the Constitution 
via referendum, and the potentially controversial nature of the right. Accordingly, the next 














Legislative Recognition of the Human Right to a Healthy 
Environment in Australia 
 
Is it possible to provide legislative recognition of the human right to a healthy environment 
in Australia? If so, what is the most preferable form of legislative recognition? Can the 
potential benefits for environmental protection identified for domestic legal recognition be 
realised through the preferable form of legislative recognition? How could these benefits be 




Although constitutional recognition of the human right to a healthy environment in Australia 
is highly unlikely at present, it is possible to recognise the right within federal and 
state/territory legislation. Legislative recognition of human rights has been the preferred 
method of legal recognition in Australia. 1  However, recognition has favoured civil and 
political, rather than economic, social and cultural rights. As an ESC right, the right to a 
healthy environment would inevitably face various obstacles to its recognition, especially if 
it were deemed justiciable.   
 
This chapter explains that there are various options for legislative recognition of the human 
right to a healthy environment in Australia. Recognition could occur at the Commonwealth 
or state/territory levels, and in various different forms. Whilst Chapter Six considered the 
options for constitutional recognition, this chapter concentrates exclusively on the options for 
legislative recognition (Options 6-11). The aim of this chapter is to explore the potential 
options available, with a view to identifying the most preferable form of legislative 
recognition in the current political climate. It is argued that federal and state/territory statutory 
recognition of a dialogue model bill of rights recognising an independent human right to a 
healthy environment is the most preferable form of legislative recognition for various reasons, 
including the fact that it enables the right to be recognised in the context of other human rights. 
The chapter considers how implementing the dialogue model could potentially impact on 
environmental protection by considering whether the set of benefits discussed in Chapter Five 
                                                          
1 For example: Age Discrimination Act 2004 (Cth); Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth); Sex 
Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth); Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth). 
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may be realised in this context. In order to evaluate the realisation of these potential benefits 
in a specific environmental protection context, it considers how the identified benefits may be 
realised in the water management context. It is argued that various potential benefits may be 
realised, including increased consideration and prioritisation of environmental protection 
considerations in government decision-making and potentially increased avenues to challenge 
government decision-making. Finally, the chapter evaluates the limitations of the proposed 
form of legislative recognition of the right as a tool for environmental protection. In particular, 
it addresses concerns that the right may prove to be redundant or dangerous in its operation.2   
 
It is concluded that whilst there are some potential benefits associated with legal recognition, 
the right is a limited legal tool for improving environmental protection. This is due partly to 
the nature of the proposed form of legal recognition (the dialogue model), and partly to the 
broad systemic nature of many of the challenges currently facing environmental protection. It 
is argued that in many instances, systemic or cultural change is required in order to adequately 
address environmental protection challenges. Whilst recognition of the right may be capable 
of providing an impetus for such change, it cannot of itself address many of the key problems 
impeding the achievement of ecologically sustainable development. However, 
acknowledging its limitations and potential drawbacks, it is argued that the right could prove 
to be a useful additional mechanism for assisting environmental protection in Australia.3  
  
                                                          
2 Boyd lists ‘redundant’ as one of the main criticisms of the constitutional right to a healthy environment: 
David R Boyd, The Environmental Rights Revolution: A Global Study of Constitutions, Human Rights and the 
Environment (UBC Press, 2012) 33.  
3 Boyd reached a similar conclusion in regards to constitutional recognition of the right: ‘Nobody is suggesting 
that the constitutional right to a healthy environment is a silver bullet capable, on its own, of securing a 
sustainable future. Instead, constitutional recognition of the right to a healthy environment should be viewed as 
a useful additional tool for the societal actors engaged in the process of attempting to transform today’s 
unsustainable societies’: ibid 287. 
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7.2 Commonwealth legislative power 
In order to evaluate the options for legislative recognition of the right at the Commonwealth 
level, it is first necessary to determine whether the Commonwealth Parliament possesses the 
requisite legislative power to pass legislation recognising the right. There are various heads 
of legislative power under the Australian Constitution which may possibly enable the 
Commonwealth to pass legislation recognising the human right to a healthy environment.4 
However, this chapter focusses on the main potential source of legislative power, namely the 
external affairs power under s 51 (xxix) of the Constitution.    
 
7.2.1 External affairs power  
The Commonwealth Parliament has legislative power to pass ‘laws for the peace, order, and 
good government of the Commonwealth’ with respect to the subject matter of ‘external 
affairs’. 5   Despite the existence of a significant body of judicial commentary on the 
interpretation of the term ‘external affairs’, the High Court has failed to fully elucidate the 
meaning and scope of the power. Although the adoption of different interpretive approaches 
has produced varying conclusions about the scope of the power, a general trend towards the 
expansion of Commonwealth power can be discerned. Over the past 30 years, the power has 
been considered in various cases, and accepted by the Court as supporting a diversity of 
legislation. This has ranged from laws giving effect to international legal obligations agreed 
to under international treaties,6 to laws retrospectively criminalising past conduct committed 
in another country by individuals who were not Australian citizens at the time of committing 
the offence.7  
 
In light of the broad scope of the power, Sir Harry Gibbs has argued that it ‘is hardly an 
exaggeration to say that it would not make any practical difference if the word ‘anything’ 
                                                          
4 Pamela Tate has summarised the situation with respect to potential sources of legislative power for a federal 
Charter of Rights, concluding that the external affairs power would most likely be the ‘principal source of 
power’. She argues that it is possible but unlikely that the implied nationhood power could be of relevance, and 
states that it is also ‘unlikely that the corporations power would play any, or any central, role’, as well as any 
‘of the other enumerated powers in s 51 of the Constitution’. However, she does note the potential relevance of 
the race power ‘if special indigenous rights are recognised’: Pamela Tate, ‘Human Rights in Australia: What 
Would a Federal Charter of Rights Look Like?’ (2009-10) 13 Southern Cross University Law Review 1, 10.  
5 Australian Constitution, s 51 (xxix).  
6 Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983) 158 CLR 1. 
7 Polyukovich v The Commonwealth (1991) 172 CLR 501.  
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were substituted for ‘external affairs’’. 8  Although there is some truth to this statement, 
especially given the broad range of topics covered by the ever increasing number of treaties 
at the international level,9 various judges have attempted to put forward definitions to delimit 
the scope of the power. One leading example is drawn from Commonwealth v Tasmania 
(1983) 158 CLR 1 (‘Tasmanian Dam Case’), where Justice Mason stated that ‘to be a law 
with respect to external affairs it is sufficient that it’:  
(a) implements any international law, or 
(b) implements any treaty or convention whether general (multilateral) or particular, or 
(c) implements any recommendation or request of the United Nations Organization or subsidiary 
organizations such as the World Health Organization, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization or the International Labour Organization, 
or 
(d) fosters (or inhibits) relations between Australia or political entities, bodies or persons within 
Australia and other nation States, entities, groups or persons external to Australia, or 
(e) deals with circumstances or things outside Australia, or 
(f) deals with circumstances or things inside Australia of international concern.  10 
 
As can be seen from this broad definition, the scope of the power is potentially far ranging, 
extending beyond the geographical jurisdiction of Australia. Although there is significant 
debate as to the parameters of the power’s scope, there are generally considered to be four 
main categories which may be used to establish that legislation can be supported by the 
external affairs power. 11  Namely, extraterritorial power, relations with other countries, 
implementation of treaties, and matters of international concern. 12  Recognition of an 
obligation under customary international law may also enliven the power.13 Of the main four 
available categories, the latter three are most relevant to the implementation of the human 
right to a healthy environment. Each of these categories and customary international law will 
be considered in turn, in order to determine whether they could act as the basis for legislation 
recognising the right. To defend the validity of legislation implementing the right, the 
Commonwealth would only be required to establish one possible source of the right. 
Conversely, anyone wishing to challenge legislation recognising the right would need to 
disprove the application of all available heads of legislative power. Accordingly, in order to 
demonstrate that the Commonwealth has the legislative power to pass legislation recognising 
                                                          
8 Gibbs cited in George Winterton, ‘A Framework for Reforming the External Affairs Power’ (Paper presented 
at the Fifth Conference of The Samuel Griffith Society, Sydney, 1995) 
<http://www.samuelgriffith.org.au/papers/html/volume5/v5chap2.htm>. 
9 Sarah Joseph and Melissa Castan, Federal Constitutional Law: A Contemporary View (Thomson Reuters, 3rd 
ed, 2010) 141. 
10 Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983) 158 CLR 1, 171 (Mason J).  
11 Joseph and Castan, above n 9, 115. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid 140. 
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the right, it is only necessary to demonstrate that at least one possible head of legislative power 
is available.  
 
7.2.1.1 Implementation of treaties 
For an international treaty ratified by the Commonwealth Executive to pass into law in 
Australia it must be enacted into Australian law through the legislative process.14 The external 
affairs power has been used to justify legislation implementing a range of international treaty 
obligations, including environmental law treaties (such as the Convention Concerning the 
Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage), 15 and human rights treaties. 16 
However, whilst it has been established through a series of high profile High Court decisions 
that the Commonwealth can rely upon the external affairs power to ‘implement all of its treaty 
obligations regardless of their subject matter’, there are a number of preconditions to the 
operation of the rule.17 In particular, there has been judicial discussion concerning the possible 
requirement that the law in question must implement a treaty ‘obligation’.18 However, the 
Court’s validation of legislation implementing non obligatory treaty provisions in Victoria v 
Commonwealth (1996) 187 CLR 416, casts doubt on the necessity of this requirement.19 
Moreover, in the earlier case of Richardson v Forestry Commission (1988) 164 CLR 261, the 
majority stated that as ‘the external affairs power is a plenary power, it extends to support a 
law calculated to discharge not only Australia’s known obligations but also Australia’s 
reasonably apprehended obligations’.20 Accordingly, as a result of this authority, it is now 
possible for the Commonwealth to pass legislation which implements non obligatory treaty 
provisions, and treaty obligations which are ‘reasonably apprehended to exist’.21 However, 
there are limits to this power. The treaty provisions must evince a certain degree of 
                                                          
14 Ibid 124. 
15 Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, opened for signature 23 
November 1972, 1037 UNTS 151 (entered into force 15 December 1975). The Convention was implemented 
domestically through the passage of Commonwealth legislation, World Heritage Properties Conservation Act 
1983 (Cth). The constitutional validity of the legislation was challenged in Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983) 
158 CLR 1. Although the majority of the Act survived this challenge, the legislation has been repealed and 
replaced by the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth).  
16 For instance, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened 
for signature 21 December 1965, UNTS 660 195 (entered into force 4 January 1969) was domestically 
implemented through the passage of Commonwealth legislation: Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth). 
17 Joseph and Castan, above n 9, 128. 
18 See the discussion of this jurisprudence in ibid, 128-131.  
19 Ibid 131. 




‘specificity’, as maintaining otherwise would allow the Commonwealth to legislate for the 
implementation of broad and vague aspirations contained within international treaties.22  
 
As discussed earlier, there is no international treaty explicitly recognising the human right to 
a healthy environment. However, there are various treaties dealing with the subjects of both 
environmental protection and human rights more generally, which Australia has signed and 
ratified. If the right can be sourced from obligations contained within some of these treaties 
(or obligations ‘reasonably apprehended to exist’), it may be possible for the Commonwealth 
to pass laws to ensure their domestic implementation. As discussed earlier in Chapter Four, 
the right can be viewed as a derivative right from various rights contained within the ICESCR. 
Accordingly, legislation recognising the right to a healthy environment could potentially be 
supported as a legitimate exercise of the external affairs power, on the basis of the 
implementation of these treaty obligations. Although there is no express obligation to 
recognise the human right to a healthy environment, the obligation could be viewed as 
incidental to the implementation of the obligations to recognise and protect the rights to life, 
property and health under the ICESCR.  
 
If the interpretation of the ICESCR adopted is not accepted, it is possible that the power could 
be enlivened on the basis of draft declarations or recommendations recognising the HRTHE. 
For instance, as discussed in Chapter Five, the Draft Principles on Human Rights and the 
Environment (‘Draft Principles’) state that ‘[a]ll persons have the right to a secure, healthy 
and ecologically sound environment.’23 However, it is uncertain whether a statement made in 
a document prepared by a group of human rights experts which has not been formally adopted 
by a UN body would suffice to justify the passage of legislation. Other potentially relevant 
international statements may face similar challenges. Accordingly, reliance on the obligations 
created under the ICESCR would be preferable, as the Covenant is a treaty establishing state 
obligations capable of enlivening the power. However, there may be issues as to specificity, 
given the inherently broad nature of the HRTHE and its lack of explicit recognition. In 
Victoria v Commonwealth (1996) 187 CLR 416, it was explained that ‘[t]he law must 
prescribe a regime that the treaty has itself defined with sufficient specificity to direct the 
                                                          
22 Victoria v Commonwealth (1996) 187 CLR 416, 486. 
23 Draft Declaration of Principles on Human Rights and the Environment, Fatma Zohra Ksentini, Special 
Rapporteur, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/9 (1994) annex 1 [Principle 2]. 
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general course to be taken by the signatory states.’24 For this reason, it would be ideal if the 
international community outlined the scope, content and nature of the right in a binding 
international treaty. Whilst this does not appear likely to occur in the near future, as the 
foregoing discussion has demonstrated it is possible that this particular category of the 
external affairs power could be relied upon to provide legislative power for domestic 
legislation recognising the right.  
 
7.2.1.2 Relations with other countries/international institutions 
The Commonwealth may utilise the external affairs power to pass laws with respect to 
Australia’s relationships with other countries, and international organisations.25 Arguably, a 
law recognising the human right to a healthy environment would have few direct impacts on 
Australia’s relationships with other countries, except insofar as it may impact on trade with 
other countries and agreements made under international environmental law. It is however 
possible that as Australia’s natural environment is part of the global environment, legislation 
impacting on the management of the Australian environment could potentially be considered 
a law with respect to Australia’s relationships with other countries. Recognising the right 
would have implications for various environmental protection issues which have international 
implications (such as air quality, marine conservation, and climate change).  However, it is 
more likely that an argument based on the impact of the law on Australia’s relationships with 
international organisations (such as the UN) could be sustained. Australia is a party to various 
international environmental law agreements, which require Australia to sustainably manage 
the natural environment. Passing legislation recognising the HRTHE could accordingly 
impact on Australia’s relationship with relevant United Nations bodies. Whilst this is certainly 
a possible avenue to enliven the power, arguably it constitutes a weaker basis than reliance on 
implementation of treaty obligations.  
 
7.2.1.3 Matters of international concern 
 
The inclusion of ‘matters of international concern’ as a separate category for establishing that 
a law relates to ‘external affairs’, is a matter of significant debate. Joseph and Castan argue 
that it may ‘provide an additional basis for grounding Commonwealth laws which implement 
                                                          
24 Victoria v Commonwealth (1996) 187 CLR 416, 486. 
25 R v Sharkey (1949) 79 CLR 121; Koowarta v Bjelke-Petersen (1982) 153 CLR 168; Thomas v Mowbray 
(2007) 233 CLR 307.  
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non-binding standards emanating from international bodies.’ 26  However, despite this 
potential in theory, it has never ‘been decisive in establishing the validity of legislation’.27 
Some commentators doubt its potential to expand the scope of the external affairs power. For 
example, Edson argues that it is ‘largely superfluous’ as an additional category,28 as in most 
instances where a matter can fall within the scope of the category, it can also fall within the 
scope of another more established category. She argues that the category is probably only 
capable of producing a potential expansion of the power if the phrase is defined to mean ‘a 
topic of debate, discussion or negotiation in the international arena’.29 Such an interpretation 
would grant the power an even broader scope than it already enjoys.  
For present purposes, acknowledging the possibility that the category may add something to 
the scope of the power, it is relevant to consider its application in this context. It is clear that 
a strong argument can be mounted to support the characterisation of the health of the natural 
environment as a ‘matter of international concern’. Although it can be argued that the health 
of Australia’s environment is a matter of domestic rather than international concern, as noted 
by Joseph and Castan, ‘the acceleration of globalisation in all of its forms…means that more 
matters are being internationalised, and concomitantly fewer matters are truly “internal” 
affairs.’30  Over the past half century, there has been a significant international trend towards 
the recognition of the importance of environmental protection, and the relationship between 
environmental protection and the protection of fundamental human rights.  However, it is 
uncertain what evidence and degree of ‘international concern’ constitutes a sufficient basis 
for the exercise of the external affairs power. Guidance can be drawn from cases where the 
issue has received judicial attention, such as the case of XYZ v Commonwealth (2006) 227 
CLR 532 (‘XYZ’). In an attempt to establish that the object of Commonwealth legislation 
(‘sexual tourism’) was a ‘matter of international concern’ in XYZ the Commonwealth argued 
that over thirty countries have legislated to address the issue.31 As the Court was not required 
to decide the issue in that case, the question as to whether the evidence put forward by the 
Commonwealth would have sufficed to establish the issue as a matter of international concern 
remained unresolved. However, it is useful to consider the nature of the evidence put forward, 
                                                          
26 Joseph and Castan, above n 9,137 
27 Ibid 140 
28 Elise Edson, ‘Section 51 (xxix) of the Australian Constitution and ‘Matters of International Concern’: Is 
There Anything to be Concerned About?’ (2008) 29 Adelaide Law Review 269, 270. 
29 Ibid 271. 
30 Ibid 142. 
31 XYZ v Commonwealth (2006) 227 CLR 532, 606.  
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as a means of attempting to discern the type of evidence which may be relevant in the context 
of the human right to a healthy environment.  
 
The Commonwealth put forward a range of evidence in order to establish that sexual tourism 
constitutes a ‘matter of international concern’ for the purposes of the external affairs power. 
This included the adoption of the Convention on the Rights of the Child and its Optional 
Protocol, appointment of a Special Rapporteur on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and 
Child Pornography, adoption of UN resolutions on ‘international responses to transnational 
problems of child abuse’, and the signing of Memoranda of Understanding with various 
countries ‘designed to combat child sexual abuse committed by Australian nationals in such 
countries’.32 They also submitted evidence of the ‘enactment of a large number of nation 
states of legislation providing for criminal offences in respect of sexual conduct of their 
nationals with children outside the national borders of the states concerned’ and a report 
published by an Australian parliamentary committee on the Bill that introduced the legislation 
creating the offence in question.33 Utilising this evidence as a guide, it can be seen that 
potentially relevant evidence to establish a matter as a matter of international concern includes 
the adoption of international treaties on the subject, the appointment of international human 
rights experts to examine the issue, the adoption of UN resolutions, and legislative actions 
taken at the national level.  
 
In comparison to the evidence of international concern offered in XYZ, it can be argued that 
the expression of international concern about the state of the natural environment and its 
relevance to human rights protection has been even more substantial, both in terms of 
jurisdictional reach, and the extent of action taken. Potentially relevant evidence that the 
human right to a healthy environment constitutes a matter of international concern for the 
purposes of the external affairs power under the Constitution, could include the following:  
- The appointment of two Special Rapporteurs on the subject of ‘Human Rights and the 
Environment’ by the UN (Madame Ksentini 1989-1994, and Mr John Knox 2015-
present). The current Special Rapporteur was appointed from 2012-2015 as an 
                                                          
32 Ibid 573 (citations omitted).  
33 Ibid.  
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Independent Expert on human rights obligations relating to the enjoyment of a safe, 
clean, healthy and sustainable environment.34  
- Creation of a Draft Declaration of Principles on Human Rights and the Environment 
(1994);35  
- The adoption of resolutions and statements by UN human rights bodies on the 
relationship between human rights and the environment;36 
- Recognition of the right to a healthy environment in the national laws of various 
jurisdictions around the world;37  
- Creation of international ‘soft law’ statements recognising the relationship between 
human rights protection and the protection of the natural environment.38  
However, even if it were possible to successfully establish that the human right to a healthy 
environment could constitute a ‘matter of international concern’, the fact remains that this 
particular category has ‘never been decisive in establishing the validity of legislation’.39 
Accordingly, it is of questionable likelihood that reliance upon this particular category would 
succeed in enlivening the power. It is more likely that the Commonwealth would be able to 
utilise the possible evidence of international concern to bolster arguments that a law 




                                                          
34 United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and 
the Environment (Former Independent Expert on Human Rights and the Environment 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Environment/SREnvironment/Pages/SRenvironmentIndex.aspx>. 
35 Draft Declaration of Principles on Human Rights and the Environment, Fatma Zohra Ksentini, Special 
Rapporteur, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/9 (1994) annex 1. 
36 As noted by the United Nations Environment Programme, ‘[i]n a series of resolutions, the former United 
Nations Commission on Human Rights and the United Nations Human Rights Council have drawn attention to 
the relationship between a safe and healthy environment and the enjoyment of human rights. Most recently, the 
Human Rights Council in its resolution 7/23 of March 2008 and resolution 10/4 of March 2009 focused 
specifically on human rights and climate change, noting that climate change-related effects have a range of 
direct and indirect implications for the effective enjoyment of human rights.’ United Nations Environment 




37 See generally Boyd, above n 2.  
38 These include the Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, UN Doc 
A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1 (1972), and Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 31 ILM 874 
(1992).  
39 Joseph and Castan, above n 9, 140. 
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7.2.1.4 Customary international law  
If it can be established that the right has reached the status of customary international law 
(considered earlier in Chapter Four), a law recognising the right could potentially be supported 
by the external affairs power. However, as was noted earlier in Chapter Four, there is 
significant debate as to whether the right can be established under customary international 
law. Accordingly, it is unlikely that the Commonwealth would place significant reliance on 
this possible category.  
 
7.2.2 Likelihood of establishing Commonwealth legislative power to recognise the right 
As the foregoing discussion has demonstrated, it is possible for the Commonwealth 
Parliament to establish an argument to justify the exercise of legislative power to pass 
legislation recognising the human right to a healthy environment. Of the available heads of 
legislative power, the most relevant power to rely upon is the external affairs power. Such 
reliance could be based on various grounds, including the characterisation of such a law as a 
law with respect to the implementation of treaty obligations, relations with other 
countries/international organisations, and/or potentially also as responding to a ‘matter of 
international concern’. It was argued that the Commonwealth should focus on the argument 
that a law recognising the human right to a healthy environment is a valid exercise of the 
Commonwealth’s ability to pass domestic legislation as a means of implementing Australia’s 
treaty obligations. It was further argued that the most relevant treaty is the ICESCR, which 
contains rights from which the human right to a healthy environment may be derived. Reliance 
upon the other potential categories could also be attempted, however doing so would possibly 
be more contentious than reliance upon the implementation of treaty obligations.  
 
The following section considers the various forms of legislative recognition which may be 
available to the Commonwealth. The constitutional validity of the forms of implementation 
at the Commonwealth level are contingent upon whether they adequately conform to the 
treaty’s object and purpose (if that is held to be the justification for the exercise of the external 
affairs power), and whether the law is reasonably ‘appropriate and adapted’ to the 
achievement of that purpose.40 Legislation directed towards the topic of a treaty obligation 
which contravenes its purpose, and/or seeks to pursue a disproportionate means of pursuing 
                                                          
40 Ibid 508-515.  
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that purpose, will not be supported by the external affairs power.41 Moreover, as noted by 
Gibbs, ‘[t]he Commonwealth Parliament could not amend a statute containing a bill of rights 
which was passed to give effect to a treaty, if to do so meant that the statute no longer 
conformed to the treaty or went beyond it or was inconsistent with it.’42 Accordingly, the 
source of legislative power for the legislation could act as a limit on the legislature’s power 






                                                          
41 Ibid 134. 
42 Harry Gibbs, ‘Does Australia Need a Bill of Rights?’ (Paper presented at the Sixth Conference of The 
Samuel Griffith Society, Carlton, 17-19 November 1995) 
<http://www.samuelgriffith.org.au/papers/html/volume6/v6chap7.htm>. 
43 As explained by Gibbs (ibid), ‘[i]n other words, although the Commonwealth Parliament could 
repeal such a statute, its power to amend it would be limited.’ 
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7.3 Options for Commonwealth legislative recognition  
 
As mentioned above, there are three main options for legislative recognition of the human 
right to a healthy environment at the Commonwealth level: recognition as an independent 
right within a statutory bill of rights, recognition as a derivative right under a statutory bill of 
rights, and recognition as an independent right under specific legislation.  
 
7.3.1 Option Six: Express recognition of the right under a federal statutory bill of rights 
Recognising the right as an independent right under a statutory bill of rights is the most 
ambitious form of federal legislative recognition available. Although various proposals for a 
Commonwealth Human Rights Act have been raised over the years, none have been 
implemented in law.  In 2009, the National Human Rights Consultation Committee was tasked 
with the responsibility of considering numerous submissions from across Australia regarding 
the necessity and desirability of introducing a federal Human Rights Act and other possible 
options for increasing the recognition and protection of human rights. In its final report to the 
Attorney-General, the Committee made a number of recommendations which focused upon 
increasing the consideration of human rights by all arms of government.44 In particular, the 
Committee recommended introducing a mechanism to enable the Parliament to scrutinise 
legislation to ensure its compatibility with Australia’s human rights obligations. 45  This 
recommendation was similar to the mechanism which is already in place under the Australian 
Capital Territory’s Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT).46  
 
The Committee further recommended the adoption of a federal Human Rights Act containing 
a number of mechanisms designed to ensure that human rights are taken into consideration at 
every stage of government decision-making. 47  In response to the Committee’s 
recommendations, the Attorney-General launched ‘Australia’s Human Rights Framework’, 
which is essentially a range of policy measures aimed at increasing the protection of human 
rights in Australia.48 Included within these measures was the introduction of a Parliamentary 
                                                          
44 National Human Rights Consultation Committee, National Human Rights Consultation Report (2009) 
<http://www.humanrightsconsultation.gov.au/www/nhrcc/nhrcc.nsf/Page/Report>.  
45 Ibid [Recommendation 6].  
46 Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT) ss 37-39.  
47 National Human Rights Consultation Committee, above n 44.   
48  Attorney-General’s Department, Australian Government, Australia’s Human Rights Framework (2010) 
<http://www.ag.gov.au/humanrightsframework>.   
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Joint Committee on Human Rights, which was subsequently established in 2012. Since its 
establishment, each new bill and disallowable legislative instrument has been required to be 
accompanied by a statement of compatibility.49 In the opinion of the Chair of the Committee, 
‘the requirement to produce a statement of compatibility is having tangible results’.50 He 
argues that it ‘is clear that government agencies and Ministers are gradually getting better at 
thinking about human rights impacts as part of the legislative process and this is starting to be 
reflected in the statements that come before the committee.’51 However, despite these positive 
developments, some critics argue that the Committee’s work ‘will make little difference to 
the protection of human rights at the community level.’52  
 
Professor George Williams argues that, in fact, it ‘will even more starkly demonstrate how 
self-regulation by politicians, when it comes to human rights, is the problem, and not the 
solution’. 53  Arguably, the requirement to produce statements of compatibility strikes a 
politically acceptable balance which increases human rights awareness and accountability, 
without posing a serious challenge to the well-entrenched tradition of parliamentary 
sovereignty. In the words of former High Court judge, The Hon Michael Kirby: 
In part, it is simply the crude fact that those who presently enjoy power in a society such as Australia 
(politicians and media) are reluctant to surrender any part of that power lest that surrender later come back 
to bite them in the form of a court proceeding that declares the need for a response in respect of their conduct 
that breaches or ignores universal human rights.’54  
 
Williams and Burton argue that ‘the likelihood that Australia’s exclusive parliamentary model 
will produce strong and effective human rights protection is low’.55 Whilst they identify 
various factors contributing to the weakness of the approach, they argue that the most ‘basic 
                                                          
49 Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011 (Cth), ss 8-9.  
50 Harry Jenkins, Human Rights Compatibility: Parliamentary Scrutiny and Human Rights in Australia 
(Speech delivered by Harry Jenkins, NSW Bar Association Human Rights Committee Professional 




51 Ibid.  
52 George Williams cited in Michael Kirby, ‘National Human Rights Framework Developments’ (2010) 52 
Human Rights Law Resource Centre Bulletin <www.hrlc.org.au/files/HRLRC-Bulletin-08.10.doc>. 
53 Ibid.  
54 Michael Kirby, ‘Protecting Human Rights in Australia Without a Charter’ (2011) 37 (2) Commonwealth 
Law Bulletin 255, 272. 
55 George Williams and Lisa Burton, ‘Australia’s Exclusive Parliamentary Model of Rights Protection’ (2013) 
34 (1) Statute Law Review 58, 94. 
238 
 
flaw’ is the fact that the approach ‘fails to provide any independent external check upon the 
work of Parliament’.56 In other words, the absence of judicial contribution to the process 
‘removes one of the most important incentives for Parliament to comply…’57  
 
Adopting the National Human Rights Consultation Committee’s recommendation to 
introduce a federal Human Rights Act could help remedy this weakness, and improve human 
rights protection and accountability in Australia. However, the extent to which it could do so 
is largely dependent on the model adopted. The Committee discussed the adoption of the 
‘dialogue’ model, which is currently in operation in New Zealand, the United Kingdom and 
in the two state/territory jurisdictions in Australia which have adopted human rights charters 
(ACT and VIC). The dialogue model involves all three arms of government engaging in a 
‘dialogue’, with each assigned particular roles in the process of debating human rights 
recognition and protection.58 The executive arm of government ‘is required to act in a manner 
consistent with human rights in its decision making and can face court action if it fails to do 
so’.59 Ideally, this requirement helps lead to the creation of a human rights culture within 
government administration, operating to prevent human rights breaches. The legislature is not 
bound in this way, as it has the ability to pass legislation which has been identified as 
inconsistent with human rights.60 This reflects the current system in Australia, whereby the 
Commonwealth Parliament is able to pass legislation which has been identified as 
incompatible with human rights by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights. 
However, unlike the current system, under a dialogue model the judiciary would be 
empowered to make declarations of incompatibility. Although the Parliament retains the 




Accordingly, if the dialogue model is adopted, it would still be possible for legislation which 
is incompatible with human rights protected under a Bill of Rights to continue to operate. As 
the legislature maintains the ‘final say’, even if the court issues a declaration of 
incompatibility, it is open to the political arms of government to ignore this declaration and 
                                                          
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid.  
58 National Human Rights Consultation Committee, above n 44.  
59 Ibid.  
60 Ibid.  
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maintain the operation of the law in question.61 Whether this is viewed as problematic or 
positive for human rights protection, is dependent on the perceived appropriate roles for the 
respective arms of government. As discussed in the previous chapter, some of the strongest 
criticisms against the adoption of a constitutionally entrenched bill of rights are based on 
opposition to the perceived inappropriate extension of judicial power, as it enables the 
judiciary to invalidate democratically enacted laws on the basis of human rights 
considerations.  
 
However, even under a dialogue model, a bill of rights could give the judiciary significant 
power, both in terms of judicial interpretation of the law, and the granting of remedies for 
human rights breaches by the executive. For example, section 32 (1) of the Charter of Human 
Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) states that, ‘[s]o far as it is possible to do so 
consistently with their purpose, all statutory provisions must be interpreted in a way that is 
compatible with human rights.’ The 2013 Report on the Operation of the Charter of Human 
Rights and Responsibilities released by the Victorian Equal Opportunity and Human Rights 
Commission documents the various ways in which Victorian courts and tribunals have utilised 
charter rights in their interpretation of the state’s laws.62 It explains that in various cases, the 
existence of the Charter has impacted on the eventual outcome of the case.63  
 
Accordingly, the potential impact of a federal statutory bill of rights on both human rights 
protection and the respective roles of the arms of government should not be underestimated. 
Accordingly, recognition of the HRTHE under a statutory bill of rights based on the dialogue 
model could offer an effective means of protecting the right.  It would also possess the benefit 
of recognising the right within the context of broader human rights recognition, which would 




                                                          
61 Additionally, a bill of rights may provide for express ‘override declarations’ in legislation, as per the 
provision contained under s 31 of the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic).  
62 Victorian Equal Opportunity & Human Rights Commission, 2013 Report on the Operation of the Charter of 
Human Rights and Responsibilities (2013) <http://www.humanrightscommission.vic.gov.au/index.php/our-
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63 Ibid 54.  
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7.3.2 Option Seven: Implied recognition of the right under a federal statutory bill of 
rights 
Recognising the right as a derivative right under a federal statutory bill of rights would face 
the same challenges and criticisms raised in response to the introduction of a bill of rights 
more generally.  However, unlike express recognition of an individual right, recognising the 
right as a derivative right of other more established human rights, would be potentially easier 
to pass into law. Rather than attempting to achieve recognition of the HRTHE in the context 
of a broader bill of rights, the right could be recognised as an implied right by virtue of the 
express recognition of other more established ESC rights, such as the rights to health and an 
adequate standard of living. Despite this benefit, recognition of the right as a derivative right 
may be problematic for a number of reasons. Primarily, there is no guarantee that the Court 
would interpret other rights (or combinations thereof) as creating an implied right to a healthy 
environment. Accordingly, the very existence of the right would be at the discretion of the 
judiciary. This is a fragile basis for recognition, which would render the right’s existence and 
expression subject to judicial interpretation. Accordingly, whilst it may be easier to advocate 
for express recognition of more established ESC rights from which the right may be implied, 
it is not the most preferable form of recognition in light of its inherent instability.  
 
7.3.3 Option Eight: Express recognition of the right under specific Commonwealth 
human right to a healthy environment legislation  
Recognising the right as an independent right under specific human right to a healthy 
environment legislation avoids the issues posed by recognition as a derivative right, and the 
challenges involved in securing recognition of a comprehensive statutory bill of rights. 
Moreover, it would be consistent with the general trend at the federal level towards 
recognition of human rights in specific legislation.64 Despite these benefits, an independent 
right recognised under specific legislation would not be informed by the interrelated and 
interdependent ESC rights recognised under the ICESCR. Arguably, it is preferable for the 
right to a healthy environment to be recognised within this broader context, rather than as an 
isolated right. Recognising the right within the context of other ESC and CP rights respects 
and upholds the nature of human rights as fundamentally and inextricably ‘interrelated, 
                                                          
64 For example, s 3 (a) of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) explains that one of the objects of the Act is to 
‘give effect to certain provisions of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women and to provisions of other relevant international instruments.’ 
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interdependent and indivisible’.65 Whilst certain CP rights recognised at the international 
level have been implemented domestically under specific legislation, arguably these rights 
are more suitable for isolated recognition. In contrast, the HRTHE is fundamentally related to 
the rights to life, food, water, health, property, and an adequate standard of living.  
Accordingly, any recognition option that does not allow for the right to operate within this 
broader context would not be ideal.  
 
Moreover, it is unlikely that if the legislature was willing to recognise a relatively politically 
contentious and emerging right such as the HRTHE, that it would be unwilling to recognise a 





                                                          




7.4 State and territory legislative power 
In order to consider the options for legislative recognition of the right at the state/territory 
level, it is first necessary to determine whether the state/territory legislatures have legislative 
power to pass legislation recognising the human right to a healthy environment. The states 
have plenary legislative power, meaning that they are able to legislate with respect to any 
matters which do not fall within exclusive Commonwealth legislative power.66 However, their 
legislative power is also limited by the operation of s 109 of the Commonwealth Constitution, 
which enables the court to invalidate state legislation to the extent of any inconsistency with 
Commonwealth legislation. Accordingly, the states do have legislative power to legislate with 
respect to the human right to a healthy environment under their general legislative power. 
However, the valid operation of any such legislation would be contingent upon its consistency 
with Commonwealth legislation. Moreover, the application of the legislation would be 
restricted to state laws, as it could not impact on the operation of Commonwealth laws, or the 
laws of other states.  
 
The territories are also likely to possess the requisite legislative power to recognise the right. 
Both of the main territory jurisdictions, the ACT and the NT, have been granted self-
government by the Commonwealth.  However, the Constitution only permits the 
Commonwealth to confer upon the territories the same legislative powers enjoyed by the 
Commonwealth (with some exceptions).67 Under the Commonwealth legislation granting the 
Northern Territory self-government, the Legislative Assembly of the NT has been given 
legislative power to ‘make laws for the peace, order and good government of the Territory’, 
subject to the Act.68 Similarly, under the legislation creating self-government for the ACT, 
the ACT Legislative Assembly has ‘power to make laws for the peace, order and good 
government of the Territory’.69 
 
This legislative power is subject to various limitations relating to Commonwealth legislative 
power, inconsistency rules and jurisdictional reach. Unlike legislation passed by state 
                                                          
66 Patrick Keyzer, Constitutional Law (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2nd ed, 2005) 78. 
67 Anne Twomey, ‘Inconsistency Between Commonwealth and Territory Laws’ (2014) 42 (3) Federal Law 
Review 421, 424. 
68 Northern Territory (Self-Government) Act 1978 (Cth), s 6. 
69 Australian Capital Territory (Self-Government) Act 1988 (Cth), s 22 (1).  
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parliaments, legislation passed by territory parliaments is subject to amendment and 
invalidation by the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth is also able to amend the scope of 
territory legislative power.70 Given the scope and nature of the territories legislative power, it 
is likely that both the ACT and the NT would be able to pass legislation recognising the 
HRTHE. The ACT has already exercised this legislative power by passing human rights 
legislation, and it would be possible for an ESC right such as the HRTHE to be incorporated 




                                                          
70 For an example of the exercise of the Commonwealth’s power to limit the scope of territory legislative 
power, see: Euthanasia Laws Act 1997 (Cth). 
71 See Australian Capital Territory Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Research Project, Australian Capital 




7.5 Options for state and territory legislative recognition  
As mentioned above, there are three main options for legislative recognition of the human 
right to a healthy environment at the state/territory level. Namely, recognition as an 
independent right under a statutory bill of rights, recognition as a derivative right under a 
statutory bill of rights, or recognition as an independent right under specific legislation.  
 
7.5.1 Option Nine: Express recognition of the right under state/territory bill of rights 
legislation 
Five of Australia’s states and all of its territories (bar the ACT) have not enacted a statutory 
bill of rights. Only one state (Victoria) has already legislated to recognise a charter of rights, 
the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic).  
The Charter’s purposes are stated under the Act:  
The main purpose of this Charter is to protect and promote human rights by— 
(a) setting out the human rights that Parliament specifically seeks to protect and promote; and  
(b) ensuring that all statutory provisions, whenever enacted, are interpreted so far as is possible 
in a way that is compatible with human rights; and  
(c) imposing an obligation on all public authorities to act in a way that is compatible with 
human rights; and  
(d) requiring statements of compatibility with human rights to be prepared in respect of all 
Bills introduced into Parliament and enabling the Scrutiny of Acts and Regulations Committee 
to report on such compatibility; and  
(e) conferring jurisdiction on the Supreme Court to declare that a statutory provision cannot 





As can be seen from the legislation’s purposes, the Charter is based on the dialogue model 
discussed earlier. It does not grant courts the power to invalidate legislation on human rights 
grounds. However, it does require that the courts interpret legislation compatibly with human 
rights, and confers upon them the power to make a declaration of inconsistent interpretation. 
The Australian Capital Territory (ACT) has introduced similar human rights legislation, in 
the form of the Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT). Both pieces of legislation concentrate on civil 
and political rights, with the exception of the right to education recognised under the ACT 
legislation. In a review of the Victorian Charter by the Victorian Scrutiny of Acts and 
Regulations Committee (SARC), the SARC did not support the Law Institute of Victoria‘s 
submission to include social and economic rights in the Charter. 73  Similarly, the ACT 
                                                          
72 Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic), s 2.  
73 Scrutiny of Acts and Regulations Committee (Vic), Review of the Charter of Human Rights and 
Responsibilities Act 2006 (2011) 52 
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Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Research Project released a report in 2010 which 
recommended in favour of the inclusion of ESC rights guarantees in the Human Rights Act 
2004 (ACT), on the grounds that it would be both ‘desirable and feasible’.74 Apart from the 
one ESC right referred to above, there has been no reform on this front.  Accordingly, 
recognition of the human right to a healthy environment would represent a significant 
departure from the status quo, as it is not only an economic, social and cultural right, but it is 
also a less well accepted emerging right at the international level.  
 
The introduction of state bills of rights has been discussed in other jurisdictions. Notably, in 
Tasmania, the Tasmania Law Reform Institute (TLRI) released a report in 2007 titled, A 
Charter of Rights for Tasmania which recommended the adoption of a Tasmanian Charter.75 
However, despite a large degree of public support for a Charter, and strong public opinion 
that human rights are inadequately protected in the state (95% of submissions received),76 
Tasmania is yet to enact a comprehensive bill of rights.77 Similar levels of public support, 
academic debate and political inaction have been experienced in other state jurisdictions. 
Despite this, achieving the enactment of state/territory bills of rights seems unlikely at present. 
However, it remains one of the most preferable forms of recognition, as it would situate 
recognition of the HRTHE within the context of the recognition of other ESC rights.  
 
7.5.2 Option Ten: Implied recognition of the right under state/territory bill of rights 
legislation 
As discussed in Chapter Four, there are various human rights from which the human right to 
a healthy environment may be implied, including the rights to health and an adequate standard 
of living. As both of the existing rights charters at the state/territory level do not include ESC 
rights (with the exception of the right to education under the ACT legislation), under current 
                                                          
<http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/images/stories/committees/sarc/charter_review/report_response/20110914
_sarc.charterreviewreport.pdf>. 
74 ACT Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Research Project, ACT Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
Research Project Report (2010), 11 < 
http://acthra.anu.edu.au/documents/ACTESCR_project_final_report.pdf>. 
75 Tasmania Law Reform Institute, A Charter of Rights for Tasmania (2007) 
<http://www.utas.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0003/283728/Human_Rights_A4_Final_10_Oct_2007_revised
.pdf>. 
76 Ibid 20.  
77 However, in 2010, the Tasmanian State Government initiated a Human Rights Charter consultation process, 
seeking community views on the possible introduction of a Charter. No reform has followed as a result.  
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law any implication of the human right to a healthy environment would have to be made upon 
the basis of civil and political rights.78 The most relevant right under the Victorian Charter is 
the ‘right to life’ recognised under s 9. It has been suggested that the right to water could be 
interpreted as falling within the scope of the right to life protected under the Charter.79 
Accordingly, it is perhaps possible that the HRTHE could be similarly implied. However, this 
interpretation seems unlikely given the focus and scope of the right to life under the Charter, 
which is based on the ICCPR formulation of the right. The scope of the right has been 
interpreted relatively narrowly at the state level in Victoria and at the international level. 
Interpretation has focussed principally on the continuance of human life (for example, 
protection against arbitrary killing), and the protection of bodily integrity.80 Whilst it may be 
possible to interpret the right as having a broader scope (which could extend to the conditions 
necessary to realise the right, such as a healthy environment), such a broad interpretation is 
unlikely given the current focus of right to life case law and jurisprudence. Moreover, as noted 
by Cantley-Smith, ‘an immediate limitation on such an approach is the fact that such action 
clearly requires the existence of an appropriate case/s’.81 She observes that:  
Given the current paucity of human rights cases, it may be necessary for environmental and/or human 
rights advocates and NGOs to consider running a test case in Australian courts, as a way of getting 
recognition of a human right to a healthy environment.82  
 
This highlights the problematic nature of relying upon judicial interpretation of other rights 
to achieve recognition of the human right to a healthy environment. Achieving confirmation 
of its very existence is contingent upon finding the right case and the right judge. Even if it is 
recognised, discussion as to its scope must necessarily take place within the context of the 
scope of other rights. For example, rather than asking what recognition of the right to a healthy 
environment requires, the court would be required to ask what recognition of the right to life 
or property or health requires and how protection of the natural environment furthers their 
fulfilment. Accordingly, for the same reasons listed above in the Commonwealth context, 
                                                          
78 It is likely that if charters were introduced in the other state/territory jurisdictions, they would also exclude 
ESC rights. 
79 Magdalena McGuire, 'South African Constitutional Court Considers the Right to Sufficient Water and a 
Dignified Life' (2009)   <http://hrlc.org.au/city-of-johannesburg-and-others-v-mazibuko-and-others-48908-
2009-zasca-20-25-march-2009/> 
80 Victorian Equal Opportunity & Human Rights Commission, ‘Section 9 – Right to Life Fact Sheet’ (2013) 
<http://www.humanrightscommission.vic.gov.au/media/k2/attachments/Charter_FS_IND_SECT_9.pdf> 
81 Cantley-Smith, Rowena, 'A Human Right to a Healthy Environment' in Paula Gerber and Melissa 
Castan (eds), Contemporary Perspectives on Human Rights Law in Australia (Thomson Reuters, 
2013) 447, 473. 
82 Ibid.  
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implied recognition of the right at the state/territory level would not constitute the most 
preferable recognition option.  
 
7.5.3 Option Eleven: Express recognition of the right under specific state/territory 
human right to a healthy environment legislation 
Recognising the right as an independent right under specific human right to a healthy 
environment legislation is less ambitious than attempting to pass state/territory charters where 
they do not already exist, or to introduce ESC rights into existing charters. However, arguably 
it makes little sense for state legislatures to pass specific legislation on the right in the absence 
of the express recognition of other more established human rights. Moreover, in jurisdictions 
which already contain rights charters, the introduction of specific right to a healthy 
environment legislation might seem incongruous in a system where proposals to include ESC 







7.6 Preferable form of legislative recognition 
 
At the Commonwealth level, arguably the most preferable form of legislative recognition is 
recognition of an independent human right to a healthy environment in a statutory bill of 
rights. Although this is an ambitious recognition option, it would provide the most 
comprehensive recognition of the right, within the context of recognition of other human 
rights. The other potential options for Commonwealth recognition are limited for various 
reasons. Implied recognition renders the existence and interpretation of the right at the mercy 
of the judiciary, whilst express recognition under specific HRTHE legislation would force the 
right to operate in isolation from other ESC rights. At the state/territory level, for the same 
reasons, introducing the right into existing and proposed state/territory rights charters is 
arguably the most preferable form of legislative recognition.  
 
Although relying upon recognition by derivation from other rights is perhaps the most 
politically feasible option at present, express recognition of an independent right at both levels 
of government is preferable as it is bypasses the problematic aspects of implied recognition 
and provides stronger protection for the right. It is however acknowledged that any form of 
legislative recognition of a bill of rights generally, or the HRTHE specifically, is unlikely to 
occur in the near future.    
 
In terms of the appropriate model for recognition, it has been argued that the preferable model 
for the proposed charters of rights is implementation of the dialogue model. This is for two 
main reasons. Firstly, the dialogue model represents a political compromise between 
increasing human rights protection, whilst maintaining parliamentary supremacy. It is 
unlikely that any greater incursion on the scope of governmental power would receive support, 
in light of the history of political reluctance in this regard. Secondly, the dialogue model has 
already been successfully adopted in two Australian jurisdictions. Accordingly, there is 




7.7 Potential benefits of legislative recognition of the human right to a 
healthy environment for environmental protection in Australia 
If the proposed forms of legislative recognition were adopted, they would have various 
impacts on government decision-making processes in Australia which could be characterised 
as beneficial for environmental protection. Firstly, during the legislative process, proposed 
legislation would be scrutinised for consistency with the right, through the issuing of 
statements of compatibility. This could proactively prevent the introduction of legislation 
which jeopardises the government’s ability to protect, respect and fulfil the right. Secondly, 
it could require all public authorities to act in a way that is compatible with the right. This 
could have implications for the actions of key government agencies involved in environmental 
management. Thirdly, it could ensure that the court interpreted legislation in a manner which 
was compatible with the right, and in instances where such an interpretation was not possible, 
they could issue a declaration of inconsistent interpretation. This would encourage a dialogue 
between the legislature, executive and the judiciary on the legislation’s impact on the right.  
 
As the right would be considered during the creation, implementation and interpretation of 
legislation, the government would be better able to prevent and respond to breaches of the 
right. This safety net of protection would not suffice to address all potential and actual 
breaches of the right, or even guarantee its fulfilment. However, it would ensure that the right 
enters the legal and policy discourse on issues which consider natural resource management 
and sustainable development. In particular, couching sustainability concerns in the language 
of human rights may further enable principled scrutiny of proposed legislation, to the benefit 
of improved environmental protection. Any impacts not caught at that stage, could be 
addressed through the dialogue created by the obligations imposed on the executive, and the 
jurisdiction conferred on the judiciary to take into consideration human rights considerations 
in their decision-making processes. Having awareness of the obligation to respect the right in 
their actions, could have implications for how members of the executive make crucial 
decisions which impact on the natural environment. The practical impact of the Victorian 
Charter in this regard, is testament to the legal, policy, and political changes which can be 
effectuated by the introduction of a charter of rights. As experience with the Charter has 
demonstrated, where existing laws and regulations fail to adequately protect the object of a 
human right (for example, women, children, people with disabilities, etc…), the relatively 
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broad scope and application of human rights guarantees can operate to address gaps in the 
legal regime. In an environmental law landscape characterised by complexity and procedural 
specificity, it is possible that the right could be utilised as a tool to address the broader 
implications of actions, in instances where recourse to traditional legal mechanisms offer little 
remedy.  
 
The following section considers the extent to which the potential benefits for environmental 
protection associated with domestic legal recognition identified in Chapter Five could be 
realised through the proposed form of legislative recognition. Although comprehensive 
exploration of these potential consequences is beyond the scope of the thesis, this section aims 
to explore possible ways in which legislative recognition of the HRTHE may realise the 
potential benefits identified. The case study of water resources management has been utilised 
throughout to further elucidate the possible operation of the right in this regard.  
 
7.7.1 Emphasis on the fundamental importance of the interrelationship between human 
health and wellbeing and the state of the natural environment 
It is possible that formal legislative recognition of the right would encourage further emphasis 
on the fundamental importance of the interrelationship between human health and wellbeing 
and the state of the natural environment. By scrutinising legislation impacting on the 
relationship between human health and the state of the natural environment for compatibility 
with the HRTHE, the issue would be raised as a matter for parliamentary debate. This could 
possibly result in more explicit legislative recognition of the linkage between human 
health/wellbeing and environmental protection. For example, it could lead to recognition of 
the linkage in the preamble of legislation, which could have an impact on later interpretation 
and application of the legislation. The HRTHE is already considered during the legislative 
process to an extent at the federal level, due to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human 
Right’s recognition of the right’s incorporation through the right to health under the ICESCR. 
However, legislative recognition in state/territory bills of rights would ensure that the right is 
also considered in the development of state/territory legislation. Mandating consideration of 
the right during the legislative process could encourage a more consistent and considered 
understanding of the interrelationship between human health and the health of the natural 
environment. Improving this understanding could prove to be beneficial for environmental 
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protection as failure to recognise interdependencies between nature and humankind can 
undermine the effectiveness of environmental protection laws and policies.  
 
Given that human beings are dependent on water for their survival, recognition of this linkage 
is particularly crucial in the water resources management context. Water management 
legislation at the Commonwealth and state/territory levels already recognises the linkage to 
an extent. For example, the Water Act 2007 (Cth) requires the Basin Plan to be prepared 
having regard to the ‘critical human water needs’ of Basin communities.83 However, outlining 
the importance of the relationship in the proposed human rights charters would ensure that all 
introduced legislation would be considered for compatibility with the right. This does not 
occur at present,84 even in jurisdictions where human rights charters are in operation. For 
instance, at the state/territory level, the two jurisdictions (ACT and VIC) with rights charters 
are already involved in scrutinising legislation for compatibility with human rights.85  
 
However, as the legislation does not recognise ESC rights (with the exception of the right to 
education in the ACT legislation), the Victorian and ACT Parliaments do not scrutinise 
legislation for compatibility with the HRTHE or any of the rights from which it may be 
derived (such as, the right to health). Accordingly, in 2014 when the Victorian government 
presented a bill to reform the state’s principal water resources management legislation, the 
HRTHE was not considered in the compatibility statement accompanying the bill.86 If the 
HRTHE was recognised in the Victorian Charter, proposals to reform the state’s water 
resources management regime would need to be assessed for compatibility with the right. 
Arguably, this requirement would encourage greater emphasis on the importance of the 
relationship between human and environmental health, which could be viewed as constituting 
a benefit for environmental protection. Accordingly, as can be seen, legislative recognition of 
the HRTHE may help to emphasise the interrelationship between human and environmental 
health through requiring consideration of the HRTHE in executive, legislative and judicial 
decision-making.  
                                                          
83 Water Act 2007 (Cth), s 86A. 
84 With the exception of limited consideration by the federal Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights 
discussed below.  
85 Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (VIC), s 28; Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT) s 37. 
86 Water Bill 2014 (Vic). 
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7.7.2 Stronger basis for environmental laws and policies 
According to Boyd, one of the key advantages of a constitutional HRTHE is its positive 
influence on the development and application of environmental laws.87 Whilst recognising 
the HRTHE in statutory bills of rights would not act as a source of additional legislative 
power, it could operate to provide a stronger basis for environmental laws and policies where 
the necessity of such measures are challenged in light of competing priorities and interests. 
For example, a parliamentarian bringing forward proposed legislation could argue that the 
legislation helps to achieve realisation of the HRTHE. Similarly, government ministers could 
justify policies designed to improve environmental protection on the same grounds. Adding 
this human rights dimension to calls for increased/improved environmental protection could 
strengthen the likelihood of garnering support for proposed laws and policies. As discussed 
earlier in Chapter Three, employing ‘rights talk’ can help to elevate the status of an issue by 
utilising the powerful connotations associated with the language of rights.  
 
Accordingly, the proposed form of legislative recognition could operate to provide a stronger 
basis for environmental laws and policies where the necessity of such measures are challenged 
in light of competing priorities and interests. Earlier in Chapter Two in the case study context 
of water management, it was explained that a limited ‘water trigger’ was introduced into the 
EPBC Act in order to enable Commonwealth approval and assessment of impacts of proposed 
coal seam gas and large coal mining developments on water resources. The necessity of 
Commonwealth oversight in this area was questioned by the Coalition Government, who 
sought to amend the EPBC Act to allow for the states/territories to be accredited for approval 
decisions in relation to large coal mining and coal seam gas developments likely to have a 
significant impact on a water resource.88 The water trigger is currently the only MNES which 
must be assessed and approved by the Commonwealth only.89 An Independent Review into 
the operation of the trigger is currently being conducted in order to evaluate the 
                                                          
87 Boyd, above n 2, 233-235. 
88 Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Amendment (Bilateral Agreement Implementation) 
Bill 2014 (Cth). Originally, the government proposed devolving responsibility to state/territory governments 
through the use of bilateral agreements. However, in response to significant concern, the government put 
forward amendments which alter the proposed provisions in order to maintain the Commonwealth’s role in 
relation to the water trigger: See, Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 14 September 2015 (Simon 
Birmingham). 




appropriateness and effectiveness of the reform.90 If the HRTHE had been recognised, it is 
possible that it could have been utilised to strengthen arguments for the retention of the trigger, 
on the grounds that the trigger seeks to ensure Commonwealth regulation of an issue that 
poses a significant threat to the health of a crucial national environmental resource necessary 
for the maintenance of human life and a healthy environment (water). Accordingly, whilst 
unlike constitutional recognition of the right, legislative recognition of the HRTHE would not 
be capable of strengthening environmental laws and policies through the prospect of judicial 
invalidation, or through the modification of legislative power, it could strengthen laws and 
policies through its impacts on the government decision-making process.  
 
7.7.3 Increased prioritisation of environmental protection considerations in government 
decision-making 
One of the key challenges facing environmental protection efforts in Australia, is the issue of 
how to balance competing economic, social and environmental interests. Under the dialogue 
model proposed, members of the executive/administration would have to take the HRTHE 
into consideration in the exercise of their powers. For example, this might mean that in 
determining whether to cancel or grant a licence, or whether to approve an environmental 
plan, or an environmental impact assessment, government decision-makers would need to 
consider the compatibility of their decisions with the HRTHE. Failure to do so could 
constitute grounds for judicial review. It is possible that this increased consideration of 
environmental protection considerations could lead to their increased prioritisation in 
government decision-making. This could also be the case in regards to consideration of the 
right during the legislative process, and subsequent interpretation of legislation by the courts. 
If the right is expressly considered during parliamentary debate and stated to be one of the 
motivations for enacting particular legislation, reference could be made to those statements 
during the process of statutory interpretation by the courts. This could have a particularly 
significant impact where legislation provides for the exercise of a discretion involving the 
balancing of competing economic, social and environmental considerations. In order to 
ascertain the ‘purpose’ of the legislation, judges could consult the second reading speeches 
introducing the legislation into parliament to determine how parliament intended the 
competing factors to be prioritised. Given the HRTHE’s focus on maintaining the health of 
                                                          
90 Department of the Environment (Cth), ‘Independent Review of the 2013 EPBC Act Amendment – Water 
Trigger’ (2016) <https://www.environment.gov.au/epbc/what-is-protected/water-resources/review>. 
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the natural environment at present and into the future, if legislation has as its purpose the 
realisation of the right, it could operate in favour of an interpretation of the legislation which 
prioritises environmental protection. 
 
One of the key reforms associated with the introduction of bills of rights adopting the dialogue 
model, is the requirement of scrutiny of proposed legislation for consistency with human 
rights. This already exists to an extent at the federal level, by virtue of the introduction of the 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights which is dedicated to examining federal 
legislation for compatibility with human rights. The legislation which established the 
Committee created a requirement that each new Bill introduced into Parliament must be 
accompanied by a statement of compatibility outlining the compatibility of the Bill with 
human rights.91 It must be noted however that the Act specifically states that failure to comply 
with this requirement ‘does not affect the validity, operation or enforcement of the Act or any 
other provision of a law of the Commonwealth’.92  
 
In other words, whilst the Committee has the power to highlight and examine compatibility 
with human rights standards, it does not have the power to mandate modifications by 
Parliament in order to reconcile identified incompatibilities. Although the Committee has 
considered the human right to a healthy environment during its scrutiny process,93 it has failed 
to consider the right in instances where arguably the right was engaged by the proposed 
legislation. This was demonstrated recently when the Committee considered a Bill seeking to 
amend the Water Act 2007 (Cth), by inter alia imposing ‘a statutory limit of 1500 gigalitres 
on Commonwealth purchases of surface water across the Murray-Darling Basin’.94 The Bill 
was accompanied by a statement of compatibility, in accordance with Part 3 of the Human 
Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011 (Cth).  
 
The statement of compatibility identifies that the Bill engaged the right to an adequate 
standard of living, and the right to health.95 As discussed earlier in Chapter Four, the right to 
                                                          
91 Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011 (Cth), s 8. 
92 Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011 (Cth), s 8 (5). 
93 Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights, Twenty-Seventh Report of the 44th Parliament (2015) 4 
[1.19]. 
94 Explanatory Memorandum, Water Amendment Bill 2015 (Cth), 1. 
95 Ibid [13]. 
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a healthy environment can be derived by implication from these rights. Whilst the statement 
does not acknowledge the HRTHE, it does acknowledge the related implied right to water 
(recognised by the UNCESCR).96 The statement concluded that the proposed amendments to 
the Water Act 2007 (Cth) contained in the Bill will ‘continue to support the human right to 
water’. 97  It emphasised that consideration of the Bill’s compatibility with human rights 
standards, must take into account the ‘overall framework’ of the legislation, which the 
statement argued ‘supports access to sufficient, safe, acceptable and physically accessible 
water for personal and domestic uses’.98 The Committee considered the Bill, and concluded 
that the Bill did not ‘require additional comment’ as it either did ‘not engage human rights’ 
or engaged rights but did ‘not promote or limit rights’.99  
 
If a federal bill of rights was introduced, the mandate of the Committee would necessarily 
need to be altered to include consideration of the rights recognised under the legislation. At 
present, the Committee is limited to consideration of rights recognised under specified 
international instruments (including the ICCPR and the ICESCR). 100  Accordingly, by 
recognising the HRTHE in the bill of rights, the Committee would be required to consider the 
right when scrutinising relevant legislation, such as the Water Amendment Bill 2015 (Cth). 
Although it was recognised earlier that the Committee has considered the HRTHE during its 
scrutiny process, recognition of the HRTHE in a federal bill of rights might clarify the content 
and therefore relevance and application of the right. It is therefore useful to consider whether 
consideration of the HRTHE may have impacted on the Committee’s ultimate conclusion that 
the proposed amendments would not limit rights. In other words, whether consideration of the 
HRTHE may have influenced the Committee to conclude that the Bill did limit a right.  
 
The Bill was introduced by the Federal Government, as a means of delivering on its 
commitment to place a cap on water purchases in the MDB.101 In their dissenting report to the 
Senate Environment and Communications Legislation Committee, The Australian Greens 
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101 Greg Hunt, Barnaby Joyce and Bob Baldwin, ‘Bill to Cap Water Buyback to 1500GL Introduced to 




objected to the Bill on the grounds that it ‘undermines the very Act it seeks to amend by 
overriding the Commonwealth’s obligations to achieve the Sustainable Diversion Limits 
mandated in the Murray-Darling Basin Plan by limiting how much water it may buy back 
from willing sellers’.102 Various other groups and organisations supported this position, and 
argued against the adoption of the amendments.103 However, the reform was supported by the 
NSW Irrigators Council who argued that the cap would help minimise what they view as the 
‘damaging economic impacts’ of the Basin Plan.104  
 
Accordingly, the cap can be viewed as a form of compromise between the competing water 
users of the MDB (such as, irrigators, residents, and the environment). The rights considered 
in the statement of compatibility were the rights to health, an adequate standard of living and 
the right to water. If the HRTHE had also been considered, it may have encouraged greater 
consideration or prioritisation of environmental protection factors over social and economic 
concerns. Prioritising environmental protection may have operated against the adoption of a 
‘cap’ and towards the adoption of a flexible target (i.e. enabling the Commonwealth to 
purchase/buyback more water for the environment). Accordingly, it is possible that 
consideration of the HRTHE could have assisted in the prioritisation of environmental 
protection considerations.  
 
Another way that legislative recognition of the HRTHE may operate to increase the 
prioritisation of environmental considerations in government decision-making is by providing 
a justification for necessary encroachments on private property rights. In the Australian Law 
Reform Commission’s Interim Report exploring encroachments by Commonwealth 
legislation on traditional rights and freedoms, the Commission considered possible 
encroachments on property rights by Commonwealth environmental laws.105 The Commission 
                                                          
102 Australian Greens, ‘Dissenting Report’ (2015) Senate Environment and Communications Legislation 
Committee Water Amendment Bill 2015 [Provisions] Report [1.3] 
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103 Bill McCormick and Sophie Power, ‘Water Amendment Bill 2015’ (2015) Bills Digest no. 20 2015-16 
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noted that various Commonwealth environmental laws could ‘be seen as interfering with real 
property rights’.106  
 
They listed a number of examples, including the ‘regulation of land use, development and 
activities’, and ‘restrictions on the assignment/sale of tradeable resource-use property 
rights’.107 In particular, the EPBC Act was raised as a specific concern. The Commission 
explained that the EPBC Act’s ‘justification’ for interference with property rights is the 
‘requirement for an action to have, or be likely to have, a ‘significant’ impact’, as this 
requirement seeks to reach ‘a balance between an owner’s rights and the public interest’.108 
The National Farmer’s Federation argued that the Act’s interference with property rights ‘may 
be unjustified’ however, as it is ‘having a significant financial impact on farmers as a 
consequence of the limitations it places on property development and land use change’.109  It 
may be possible that recognition of the HRTHE could assist in further justifying legislative 
encroachment on private property rights, where interference is necessary for environmental 
protection. As noted earlier in Chapter Three, there may be certain benefits associated with 
the use of ‘rights talk’ where environmental protection interests have to compete with property 
interests.  
 
One of the laws that was specifically referred to in the Interim Report was the operation of 
the Water Act 2007 (Cth). The Commission noted that the National Farmer’s Federation had 
submitted that the reduction in water access entitlements effected under the legislation when 
‘unaccompanied by compensation at market rates’ constitutes an ‘unjustifiable interference 
with property rights’.110 Despite this claim, the Commission noted that the legislation has 
features which seek to ‘address any unjustifiable interference with property rights’, and 
accordingly that ‘some might say that the operation of the Water Act does not amount to an 
unjustifiable interference with property rights’.111 It is possible that legislative recognition of 
the HRTHE may assist in issues of this nature, as institutions such as the Commission would 
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be able to cite the right as a justification for government interference with private property 
rights in the broader interest of ensuring adequate environmental protection.  
 
Further examples of instances where legislative recognition of the HRTHE may have assisted 
in justifying encroachments on private property interests are provided by the cases of Arnold 
and ICM (discussed earlier in Chapter Two).112 Both of these cases involved challenges to 
water management legislation which sought to improve protection of water resources by 
limiting private property access rights to the resource. It was noted that the outcomes of these 
cases demonstrate that where legislation governing the management of water resources has a 
clear protective aim judges will interpret that legislation in accordance with Parliament’s 
intention to prioritise the protection of the environment, even where doing so may result in 
negative social/economic consequences for individuals, or communities. In ICM, it was 
confirmed that if altering the nature of private rights to the resource is necessary to achieve 
sustainable management, then that falls within the scope of the government’s power.  
 
In the case of Arnold, the NSW Land and Environment Court was asked to review the 
lawfulness of a water sharing plan and an associated regulation made pursuant to the Water 
Management Act 2000 (NSW) which reduced groundwater extraction entitlements. The Act 
contains a set of ‘water management principles’ which persons exercising functions under the 
Act must ‘take all reasonable steps’ to act in accordance with.113 These principles require, 
inter alia, that ‘the cumulative impacts of water management licences and approvals and other 
activities on water sources and their dependent ecosystems, should be considered and 
minimised’, 114  that ‘the social and economic benefits to the community should be 
maximised’,115 and in relation to water sharing, that ‘sharing of water from a water source 
must protect the water source and its dependent ecosystems’.116  
 
The judge refused to accept the submission put forward by the applicant that in making the 
Plan the Minister was ‘under a duty to maximise the social and economic benefit to the 
                                                          
112 Arnold v Minister Administering the Water Management Act 2000 (No 6) [2013] NSWLEC 73; 
ICM Agriculture Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (2009) 240 CLR 140. 
113 Water Management Act 2000 (NSW), s 9 (1) (a). 
114 Water Management Act 2000 (NSW), s 5 (1) (d). 
115 Water Management Act 2000 (NSW), s 5 (1) (g). 
116 Water Management Act 2000 (NSW), s 5 (3) (a). 
259 
 
community’.117 Rather, he was of the view that ‘the Minister’s obligation…is to take all 
reasonable steps to generally promote [the] principles as a whole’.118 His honour found that 
the Minister had upheld this duty, by recognising that ‘entitlements had to be reduced to 
ensure the sustainable long-term use of the resource’. 119  In interpreting the Water 
Management Act 2000 (NSW), he noted that:120  
The concept of socio-economic impacts in the 2000 Act itself is very broad. Section 3(c) provides that 
one of the Act's objects is "to recognise and foster the significant social and economic benefits to the 
State that result from the sustainable and efficient use of water", including "benefits to the 
environment". Thus, the legislature has recognised that social and economic benefits may include 
environmental benefits. When considering the socio economic impacts of a proposed plan, the Minister 
is therefore entitled to consider that the environmental benefits may also have a positive socio-economic 
impact. 
 
In Arnold, the Court’s decision effectively supported the government’s decision to prioritise 
environmental protection of the water resource in order to achieve the long term sustainability 
of the resource (which is ultimately in the interest of all users). Had the court decided 
differently (i.e. interpreted the duty as requiring the Minister to maximise the social/economic 
benefit) it would have impacted on the Government’s ability to regulate the resource 
sustainably. The judge held that in making water sharing plans, the legislation required the 
Minister to ‘give priority to protection of the water source’, and to apply the principles of 
ecologically sustainable development.121 This legislative mandate sufficiently justified the 
incursion on private property rights. Accordingly, it is difficult to see how recognition of the 
HRTHE could have significantly altered the ultimate decisions in either ICM or Arnold. 
Encroachments on private property rights in order to prioritise environmental protection were 
sufficiently justified utilising legislative intent to pursue sustainable management, and 
through the application of the principles of ESD. However, it is possible that in other instances 
recourse to the HRTHE would assist the court in determining how to justify limitations on 
property rights on environmental protection grounds. Accordingly, it can be seen that 
consideration of the HRTHE in executive, legislative and judicial decision-making could help 
to increase contemplation and prioritisation of environmental protection considerations.  
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7.7.4 Safeguards against environmental protection rollbacks 
One of the posited benefits of legal recognition of the HRTHE is protection against rollbacks 
on environmental protection, as the right could operate as a backstop to prevent governments 
from winding back environmental protection measures. 122  Such rollbacks could be 
characterised as failures to take reasonable steps towards progressive realisation of the right. 
This characterisation could assist in providing substance to arguments advocating for the 
retention of environmental protection measures which have proven effective. In the water 
management context, it could be argued that the removal of the National Water Commission 
constitutes a ‘rollback’ on environmental protection, as the Commission was fulfilling 
important functions in regards to the monitoring and assessment of Australia’s key water 
reforms. In making the decision to remove the Commission, the Government did not consider 
the potential impact of its removal on the HRTHE. The statement of compatibility 
accompanying the legislation seeking to abolish the Commission in fact claimed that the Bill 
was compatible with human rights, as none of the rights and freedoms recognised in the 
relevant international instruments were engaged.123 The Parliamentary Joint Committee on 
Human Rights considered the proposed legislation, and concurred with this conclusion.124 
 
It is likely that had the HRTHE been considered, it would have been engaged by this proposed 
legislation, as eliminating the National Water Commission impacts on Australia’s system for 
water management. Whilst the statement of compatibility characterised this as a ‘machinery 
of government’ reform which was allegedly therefore outside of the scope of human rights 
consideration,125 it can be argued that this change in the ‘machinery of government’ is relevant 
to how Australia’s water resources are managed and therefore impacts on the realisation of 
the HRTHE. The Commission performed independent advice, monitoring, audit and 
assessment functions.126  Although most of these functions have been redirected to other 
agencies, there were arguably distinct advantages associated with the concentration of these 
functions in the NWC. As noted by one commentator, ‘no government agency has the 
                                                          
122 Boyd’s research has demonstrated that this ‘theoretical advantage’ has been proven in practice in relation to 
constitutional recognition of the right: Boyd, above n 2, 236. 
123 Explanatory Memorandum, National Water Commission (Abolition) Bill 2014 (Cth), [14] – [17]. 
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126 National Water Commission, Role and Functions (2015) < http://www.nwc.gov.au/organisation/role>. 
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independence and the scope’ enjoyed by the Commission.127 Removing the Commission from 
the regulatory regime, creates gaps which have not been adequately addressed by the 
transferral of certain functions to other agencies. For instance, a number of key functions of 
the Commission in relation to the implementation of the National Water Initiative have not 
been transferred.128 As noted by Stuart Khan, ‘without the National Water Commission, there 
is no obvious responsible body to make an independent expert assessment’ on adherence to 
the NWI principles when new government policies are announced.129 Moreover, he argues 
that in the absence of the Commission, ‘there is now no clear avenue through which to drive 
and harness the benefits from national coordination in water reform’.130 Accordingly, whilst 
the abolition of the NWC may in form appear to be merely a ‘machinery of government’ 
change, it has substantive impacts on the regime for water management in Australia. 
Accordingly, it is of relevance to the realisation of the human right to a healthy environment, 
as it impacts on the way in which water resources are protected. However, it is not possible 
to accurately determine whether consideration of the HRTHE would have had any influence 
on the ultimate decision to pass the legislation and abolish the Commission. 
 
Whilst it could possibly be argued that removal of the NWC weakens water resources 
monitoring and water policy review, it is not possible to state that recognition of the HRTHE 
requires the continued operation of institutions such as the NWC. The right simply establishes 
certain obligations, which the government is obliged to progressively realise according to 
means it considers appropriate. However, as legal recognition of the right would mean that 
proposed policy and legislative changes would have to be scrutinised for consistency with the 
right, it would certainly open up discussions about the implications of reforms for the 
realisation of the right. For instance, couching the removal of the NWC as a ‘rollback’ on a 
key aspect of Australia’s fulfilment of the obligations imposed by the HRTHE would arguably 
have more suasion than simply couching its removal as a ‘machinery of government’ reform. 
In this regard, legislative recognition of the right could assist in providing substance to 
arguments advocating for the retention of environmental protection measures which have 
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proven effective. However, unlike constitutional recognition of the right, legislative 
recognition would not enable the judiciary to invalidate legislative or executive decision-
making resulting in rollbacks on environmental protection, and it would not limit the scope 
of Commonwealth legislative power to prevent rollbacks.  
 
7.7.5 Safety net by filling gaps in environmental legislation 
The HRTHE could potentially operate to provide a safety net for environmental protection in 
instances where environmental protection and management legislation falls silent on how to 
resolve an ambiguity in the legislation, or fails to address a new environmental protection 
issue.131 This could potentially be effected through the impacts of recognition on the judicial 
role with respect to statutory interpretation. One of the main aspects of the proposed form of 
legislative recognition of the right, is the introduction of provisions which guide the court’s 
consideration of human rights in the interpretation of legislation.   
 
Adoption of a federal statutory bill of rights based on the dialogue model would involve the 
inclusion of a provision addressing statutory interpretation. Division 3 of the Victorian 
Charter addresses interpretation of laws, and requires all statutory provisions to be interpreted 
in a way that is compatible with human rights (so far as it is possible to do so consistently 
with their purpose).132 Additionally, in interpreting a statutory provision, the Charter enables 
judges to consider‘[i]nternational law and the judgments of domestic, foreign and 
international courts and tribunals relevant to a human right’.133 It also empowers the Supreme 
Court of Victoria to make declarations of ‘inconsistent interpretation’ where it ‘is of the 
opinion that a statutory provision cannot be interpreted consistently with a human right’.134 
Although the Minister is required to respond to declarations,135 they do not affect the validity 
of the law.136  
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The nature and validity of ss 32 (interpretation provision) and 36 (declaration of inconsistent 
interpretation provision) of the Charter were considered in the High Court case of Momcilovic 
v The Queen (2011) 245 CLR 1 (‘Momcilovic’). The case considered, inter alia, the 
constitutional validity of the Charter sections in question, in response to the Court of Appeal 
of the Supreme Court of Victoria issuing its first declaration of inconsistent interpretation. A 
majority of the Court held that the provisions were constitutionally valid, on various grounds. 
Whilst Chief Justice French concluded that s 32 was a ‘valid rule of statutory 
interpretation’,137 Justice Heydon found that the provision was invalid, as in his view it 
‘commands the courts not to apply statutory provisions but to remake them — an act of 
legislation.’138 Accordingly, he viewed the provision (and related sections) as inviting the 
Court to engage in an inappropriate interpretation process.  
 
In regards to s 36, similar judicial divergence existed. French CJ concluded that declarations 
of inconsistent interpretation did ‘not involve the exercise of a judicial function’.139 However, 
he held that the ‘making of the declaration does not affect the court’s judicial function’, and 
therefore it was ‘consistent with the existing constitutional relationship between the court, the 
legislature and the Executive.’140 In other words, the conferral of this non-judicial function on 
the Supreme Court of Victoria was not incompatible with the institutional integrity of the 
court. In fact, his Honour reasoned that ‘[b]y exemplifying the proper constitutional limits of 
the court’s functions it serves to reinforce, rather than impair, the institutional integrity of the 
court’.141 He stated that the declaration did ‘no more than manifest, in a practical way, the 
constitutional limitations upon the court’s role and the fact that it is Parliament’s responsibility 
ultimately to determine whether the laws it enacts will be consistent or inconsistent with 
human rights’.142 
 
In contrast, Justice Gummow viewed s 36 as constituting a ‘novel regime’ which did not 
‘withstand constitutional scrutiny’.143 He argued that upholding the validity of s 36 would 
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create a ‘significant change to the constitutional relationship between the arms of government 
with respect to the interpretation and application of statute law’.144 He reasoned that it was 
analogous to the situation in the case of Wilson v Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander Affairs (1996) 189 CLR 1 where the court found that allowing a federal judge to 
provide the Executive with an ‘advisory opinion upon a question of law…was incompatible 
with the holding of that office’.145 His honour maintained that it was not appropriate for the 
court to be placed in a position ‘to set in train a process whereby the executive branch of 
government may or may not decide to engage legislative processes to change existing 
legislation.’146 
 
Reviewing the judicial discussions in Momcilovic serves to highlight the delicate line the court 
must walk in interpreting statutory provisions in compatibility with human rights standards. 
Under the dialogue model, and in consistency with the separation of powers, courts must be 
careful to remain strictly within the scope of their appropriate role. This would be particularly 
the case in relation to reading legislation in compatibility with the HRTHE, as it would 
inevitably involve consideration of contentious issues of interpretation. Experience with the 
ACT’s Human Rights Act 2004 (which contains a similar interpretation provision) 147 
demonstrates that the judiciary has been relatively conservative in its application of the 
provision.148 This is an understandable approach given fears regarding the possibility of the 
interpretation provision being utilised as a mechanism for judicial activism.149 The first five 
year review of the operation of the ACT legislation revealed that the approach to the 
interpretation provision had not ‘been conclusively considered by the ACT courts’. 150 
However, at present the methodological approach adopted in the case of R v Fearnside 
appears to be the leading approach.151  
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The Human Rights Law Centre explains that the Fearnside approach requires the court to ask 
the following questions:152  
1. Does the section to be interpreted enliven a human right;  
2. If so, does the section constitute a reasonable limit on the human right;  
3. If not, apply the interpretive principle. 
 
To date, this interpretive approach has not been applied to an ESC right. Unlike the Victorian 
Charter (which contains no ESC rights), the ACT legislation contains one ESC right – the 
right to education.153 The interpretive provision applies to this right, and accordingly there is 
precedent for the application of the provision to an ESC right. The possibility of recognising 
the HRTHE under the Act has been canvassed by the Australian Capital Territory Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights Research Project.154 Although it did not consider how the right’s 
recognition might impact on the interpretation of existing legislation, it did note that the Water 
Resources Act 2007 (ACT) and Environmental Protection Act 1997 (ACT) protect the right 
to clean, potable water and the right to a healthy environment.155  
 
In the case study context, water resources legislation and more general environmental 
protection legislation are the most likely to engage the human right to a healthy environment. 
At the federal level, the most relevant legislation is the Water Act 2007 (Cth) and the 
Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conversation Act 1999 (Cth). It is difficult to 
foresee how consideration of the right would influence judicial interpretation of these pieces 
of legislation, given that they are both already guided by the principles of ecologically 
sustainable development. However, it is impossible to predict the ways in which the judiciary 
might utilise the right in its interpretation process, and it may be possible that consideration 
of the HRTHE could influence the interpretation of this type of legislation to help ‘fill gaps’ 
where they arise. However, the judiciary would be limited in its ability to address gaps in 
legislation through the interpretive process, owing to the confines of the judicial role under 
judicial review. For instance, in Barrington - Gloucester - Stroud Preservation Alliance Inc v 
Minister for Planning and Infrastructure [2012] NSWLEC 197, the NSW Land and 
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Environment Court was required to consider challenges to approvals to grant an exploration 
licence for coal seam gas. The judgment of Justice Pepper began by acknowledging the 
‘contentious’ nature of coal seam gas mining, whilst noting that an assessment of the ‘merits, 
or otherwise, of the use of this resource are irrelevant to the issues raised for determination’.156 
Her Honour emphasised that judicial review is concerned only with the ‘lawfulness of the 
approval under the challenge’.157 The applicant (Stroud Preservation Alliance Inc.) contended 
that the Planning Assessment Commission (the government decision maker) ‘failed to 
correctly formulate and properly consider the precautionary principle in respect of the project 
approval’.158 Justice Pepper held that the principle was relevant, and had been ‘adequately 
considered’ by the Commission in making their determination.159 In reaching this conclusion, 
Her Honour was cautious to delineate the line between judicial review and merits review. She 
explained that ‘an incorrect assessment of the preconditions or the adequacy of the response 
if met, is not amenable to judicial review…’ as ‘to do so would be to trespass on the merits of 
the decision made by the PAC to approve the major project’. 160 
 
As can be seen, judges play an important role in interpreting the nature and scope of the duties 
imposed on government decision-makers under environmental management legislation. In 
Barrington, the Court was required to consider how broad environmental protection principles 
contained in legislation should have been considered by decision makers in the course of 
exercising their functions. However, the case demonstrates the significant limitations imposed 
on the judiciary due to the fact that they are unable to engage in merits review of government 
decisions. Despite this, even within the scope of their limited role, judicial interpretation of 
government duties can have a significant impact on the practical operation of environmental 
protection legislation. Accordingly, imposing a duty on decision makers to consider the 
HRTHE in their decision making could potentially have a significant impact on the way in 
which the nature/scope of government powers and duties are interpreted by the court, and 
ultimately the way in which the subject of the legislation (for example, the environment 
generally or water resources specifically) is protected.  
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A further possible way in which recognition of the HRTHE could operate to address ‘gaps’ 
in environmental protection legislation is through the use of statements of compatibility and 
reports of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights (and state/territory 
equivalents) in the process of statutory interpretation. As noted by Dan Meagher, it is possible 
that these documents could be utilised in the process of statutory interpretation in certain 
instances.161 Section 15AB (1) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) allows the court to 
use extrinsic material in the interpretation of legislation in certain specified circumstances:  
(a)  to confirm that the meaning of the provision is the ordinary meaning conveyed by the text of the 
provision taking into account its context in the Act and the purpose or object underlying the Act; or  
(b)  to determine the meaning of the provision when:  
          (i)  the provision is ambiguous or obscure; or  
(ii)  the ordinary meaning conveyed by the text of the provision taking into account its context 
in the Act and the purpose or object underlying the Act leads to a result that is manifestly 
absurd or is unreasonable.  
 
However, Meagher argues that in the majority of cases statements of compatibility ‘will not 
assist the courts in discharging their interpretive duty’, which is due in part to the quality of 
the statements submitted thus far.162  In support of this argument, he notes the fact that as of 
2014, the Victorian Supreme Court had not used a statement ‘to assist in ascertaining the 
proper construction of the relevant statutory provision in issue’ during the course of judicial 
review proceedings.163 In contrast, he argues that the reports of the Parliamentary Committee 
‘may prove a useful aid to the courts in ascertaining legislative meaning’.164 In terms of the 
HRTHE, if the right is recognised as a relevant right for consideration by pre-legislative 
scrutiny bodies at the Commonwealth and state/territory levels, materials prepared during the 
scrutiny process could potentially be used by the court during the process of statutory 
interpretation in instances where the s 15AB (1) provisions apply (i.e. for example where the 
provision is ambiguous). Accordingly, materials outlining the legislation’s potential impact 
on the HRTHE could be relevant considerations for the court to take into consideration in 
determining provisions with an ambiguous or confusing meaning. It is possible that this 
process could be perceived as conferring a benefit for environmental protection, as it may 
operate to assist the court in its consideration of the HRTHE’s application. For instance, if 
proposed amendments to water management legislation were introduced into Parliament, the 
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Bill effecting the amendments would need to be accompanied by a statement of compatibility 
explaining how the amendments are consistent with the HRTHE.  
 
It may do so on the grounds that the proposed modification seeks to pursue sustainable 
management of the resource. If the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights then 
considered that statement and agreed that the legislation was compatible with the right on 
those grounds, that view would be recorded in the relevant official report. If a provision 
introduced or modified by the amendments was then challenged in court, the judiciary would 
be able to examine these materials in order to assist in determining the meaning of the 
provision, if the meaning was ambiguous (or if one of the other s.15AB (1) conditions 
applied).  
 
If the court was being asked to adopt an interpretation of the provision which did not accord 
with the parliament’s intent to ensure sustainable management of the resource, the court could 
look to these materials to support an interpretation that furthers the purpose of the legislation 
as explained in the statement and report. Of course, it must be acknowledged that such an 
interpretive process could operate in a different manner, for instance where the statement of 
compatibility made it clear that the legislation was intentionally incompatible with the right. 
However, as noted by Meagher, early indications suggest significant government reluctance 
‘to concede that any proposed law is incompatible with human rights’.165 Accordingly, it can 
be seen that the right’s impact on the statutory interpretation process may facilitate the ‘filling 
of gaps’ in environmental protection legislation by the judiciary.  
 
7.7.6 Avenues to bring legal actions in the interests of environmental protection 
Legislative recognition of the right could create more legal avenues to challenge government 
decision making, and may also serve to strengthen arguments to maintain extended standing 
provisions and to support calls for further extensions of standing rules in order to facilitate 
public interest actions pursuing environmental protection aims. If a federal bill of rights was 
introduced, it would likely contain a provision similar in form to the Victorian and ACT 
charter provisions, relating to the duties imposed on public authorities. For example, s. 38 (1) 
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of the Victorian Charter provides that ‘it is unlawful for a public authority to act in a way that 
is incompatible with a human right or, in making a decision, to fail to give proper 
consideration to a relevant human right’.166  
 
In the case study context of water management, if a similar provision was enacted in a federal 
human rights act recognising the HRTHE, decision making by government agencies relating 
to water resources management would need to consider the HRTHE. For example, decisions 
made by public authorities pursuant to the Water Act 2007 (Cth) would need to be made in a 
manner compatible with the HRTHE. Under the Act, the Murray-Darling Basin Authority 
(MDBA) has responsibility for creating the ‘Basin Plan’. Accordingly, decisions made by the 
MDBA in relation to the Basin Plan would need to be made compatibly with the HRTHE. 
The Authority is already required to take a number of considerations into account in exercising 
its powers and performing its functions in relation to the Basin Plan.167 For instance, the 
Authority and the Minister must ‘take into account the principles of ecologically sustainable 
development’,168  ‘act on the basis of the best available scientific knowledge and socio-
economic analysis’,169 and ‘have regard’ to a number of other considerations:170    
              (i)   the National Water Initiative; 
              (ii)   the consumptive and other economic uses of Basin water resources; 
(iii)   the diversity and variability of the Basin water resources and the need to adapt management 
approaches to that diversity and variability; 
               (iv)   the management objectives of the Basin States for particular water resources; 
               (v)   social, cultural, Indigenous and other public benefit issues; 
               (vi)   broader regional natural resource management planning processes; 
 (vii)   the effect, or potential effect, of the Basin Plan on the use and management of water resources  
that are not Basin water resources; 
(viii)   the effect, or the potential effect, of the use and management of water resources that are not  
Basin water resources on the use and management of the Basin water resources; and 
                (ix)   the State water sharing arrangements. 
 
It is difficult to see how consideration of the HRTHE would add much to this consideration 
process. Although the content of the right is not yet known, it is likely that the HRTHE would 
require consideration of similar considerations (such as the principles of ESD). However, if 
an individual or organisation believed that the right had been inadequately considered (or not 
considered at all), they might be able to engage in judicial review of the decision. Under the 
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth), an applicant can seek review of a 
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decision to which the Act applies on various grounds, including on the grounds of an improper 
exercise of power (for example, taking an irrelevant consideration/not taking a relevant 
consideration into account in the exercise of a power).171 It is possible that an applicant could 
argue that in making a decision, an authority failed to adequately take into account the 
HRTHE. The knowledge that their decisions could be subject to review on these grounds 
could encourage government decision-makers to take their duty to consider the right more 
seriously. Moreover, jurisprudence created through challenges made on these grounds could 
help to clarify the nature of the duty for decision-makers.  
 
In addition to the impacts on grounds of review, recognition of the right could possibly serve 
to strengthen arguments to broaden standing. At present, under the Administrative Decisions 
(Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth), an applicant must demonstrate that they are a ‘person 
aggrieved’ by a decision to which the Act applies.172 The Act’s interpretation section explains 
that for the purposes of the legislation a ‘person aggrieved’ includes a reference to ‘a person 
whose interests are adversely affected by the decision’.173 The meaning of the term was 
considered by Ellicott J in Tooheys Ltd v Minister for Business and Consumer Affairs (1981) 
36 ALR 64, who explained that:174  
‘The words “a person aggrieved” should not, in my view, be given a narrow construction. They should 
not, therefore, be confined to persons who can establish that they have a legal interest at stake in the 
making of the decision… This does not mean that any member of the public can seek an order of review. 
I am satisfied, however, that it at least covers a person who can show a grievance which will be suffered 
as a result of the decision complained of beyond that which he or she has as an ordinary member of the 
public…’  
Recently, in Argos Pty Ltd v Corbell, Minister for the Environment and Sustainable 
Development (2014) 254 CLR 394, the High Court affirmed that the meaning of ‘person 
aggrieved’ should not be interpreted narrowly and can include persons whose economic 
interests have been adversely affected by a decision.175 Accordingly, the person aggrieved test 
under the ADJR Act is relatively broad. However, standing under the ADJR Act has been 
extended for decisions made under the EPBC Act/regulations.176  This extended standing 
means that individuals will be taken to be a person aggrieved for the purposes of the ADJR 
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Act if ‘at any time in the 2 years immediately before the decision, failure or conduct, the 
individual has engaged in a series of activities in Australia or an external Territory for 
protection or conservation of, or research into, the environment’.177  
 
An identical provision applies to organisations/associations, with the added stipulation that 
‘at the time of the decision, failure or conduct, the objects or purposes of the organisation or 
association included protection or conservation of, or research into, the environment’.178 
Recently, the Federal Government moved to remove this extended standing provision under 
the EPBC Act,179 on the grounds that allowing extended standing constitutes ‘a major threat 
to the administration of the EPBC Act’ as it delays projects and increases costs.180 Recently, 
the Parliamentary Joint Committee considered the Bill and concluded that the amendments 
‘could result in a failure to properly enforce the protections’ under the Act, and therefore it 
could ‘engage and limit the right to health and a healthy environment’.181 The Committee 
noted that the statement of compatibility accompanying the Bill did not consider the right to 
health or the right to a healthy environment.182  
 
The Committee reasoned that as the UNCESCR has stated that a violation of the right to health 
can occur where pollution laws are inadequately enforced, limiting the ability of 
environmental protection advocates to enforce those laws might ‘engage and limit’ the 
HRTHE.183 Accordingly, the Committee is now seeking advice from the Minister for the 
Environment ‘as to whether the bill limits the right to a healthy environment’, and if it does, 
to provide a response to the following questions:184  
 whether the proposed changes are aimed at achieving a legitimate objective;  
 whether there is a rational connection between the limitation and that objective; and  
 whether the limitation is a reasonable and proportionate measure for the achievement of that objective.  
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In doing so, the Committee emphasised that the identified ‘legitimate objective’ must ‘address 
a pressing or substantial concern and not simply seek an outcome regarded as desirable or 
convenient’.185 To be legitimate, the objective must also ‘be rationally connected to, and a 
proportionate way to achieve, its legitimate objective in order to be justifiable in international 
human rights law’.186  Arguably, a persuasive argument can be mounted against the legitimacy 
of the objective being pursued, the connection between the limitation and the objective, and 
the reasonableness of the measure for achieving the objective.   
 
The ‘objective’ of the proposed legislation can be ascertained by examining the comments 
made by the Attorney-General and the Minister for the Environment. In a statement 
announcing the proposed legislation, the Attorney-General Senator George Brandis, stated 
the rationale for the Bill:187  
The Government has decided to protect Australian jobs by removing from the Environment Protection 
and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (EPBC Act) the provision that allows radical green activists to 
engage in vigilante litigation to stop important economic projects. 
Section 487 of the EPBC Act provides a red carpet for radical activists who have a political, but not a 
legal interest, in a development to use aggressive litigation tactics to disrupt and sabotage important 
projects. 
The activists themselves have declared that that is their objective – to use the courts not for the proper 
purpose of resolving a dispute between citizens, but for a collateral political purpose of bringing 
developments to a standstill, and sacrificing the jobs of tens of thousands of Australians in the process. 
In the Minister for the Environment’s second reading speech, Mr Hunt explained that the Bill 
had been introduced to address ‘a major threat to the administration of the EPBC Act’.188 The 
threat referred to was the use of the extended standing provision by environmental 
conservationists to ‘disrupt and delay key projects and infrastructure’, in order to ‘increase 
investor risk’.189 Mr Hunt characterised this type of public interest litigation as a ‘well-funded 
and coordinated strategy to frustrate the careful consideration of the EPBC Act approval 
process…’190 He explained that the proposed removal of the extended standing provision 
would mean that only ‘those with a genuine and direct interest in a matter, such as farmers 
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and landowners’ could bring an action.191 Retaining the provision would be problematic in 
his opinion as it ‘allows virtually any person or group to bring a lawsuit, regardless of whether 
they are adversely affected or even near a project’.192   
 
It is questionable whether this constitutes a ‘legitimate objective’ according to the criteria 
described above. Arguably, this proposed amendment does not address a ‘pressing or 
substantial concern’, and could in fact be characterised as ‘simply seek[ing] an outcome 
regarded as desirable or convenient’. Compared to other jurisdictions (such as the US), and 
within the broader context of the quantity of environmental approvals processed each year, 
very few actions are brought utilising the extended standing provision.193 Accordingly, the 
‘concern’ is arguably too insubstantial to constitute a legitimate objective.  
 
Moreover, it is questionable to contend that it is problematic to allow individuals and 
organisations without a ‘direct’ interest in the subject matter to bring an action. The human 
right to a healthy environment seeks to protect the fundamental interest that all human beings 
have in protecting the natural environment. From this perspective, every human has an interest 
in the enforcement of environmental protection legislation, irrespective of their proximity to 
a proposed environmental impact. It is not only landholders and farmers who have an interest 
in the environmental impacts of proposed projects. All Australians have an interest in the 
assessment and approval processes governing the regulation of those impacts.  
 
Even if it is accepted that the type of litigation referred to does constitute some form of threat 
to the EPBC Act processes and therefore removal of the extended standing provision can be 
viewed as being aimed at achieving a ‘legitimate objective’, it is arguable whether the 
limitation is a reasonable and proportionate means to that ends. Removing the extended 
standing provision for all of the individuals/organisations which currently fall within its 
operation is arguably unnecessary to address the identified problem. There are already various 
                                                          
191 Ibid.  
192 Ibid.  
193 Donald K. Anton, ‘Attorney-General George Brandis trying to close doors on environmental challenges’ 




systems in place to address the problem of vexatious litigants in the court system.194 In order 
to bring the actions referred to in the Minister for the Environment and the Attorney General’s 
statements, environmental protection groups would have to establish grounds for their action. 
The Court would not entertain frivolous of unmeritorious claims. Moreover, as noted by 
Edgar, the grounds of review for public-interest based claims are significantly limited.195  
 
There was a compelling rationale for the original introduction of the extended standing 
provision in this context. As the ‘environment’ is incapable of representing itself through 
human legal and political processes, it is necessary to facilitate representation of 
environmental interests by human individuals and organisations. It is not accurate for the 
Minister for the Environment to draw analogies with standing under the Australian Crime 
Commission Act 2002 (Cth), or the Biosecurity Act 2015 (Cth).196 Environmental protection 
legislation is unique, and only truly analogous to animal protection legislation in terms of 
standing (as both concern subjects which are incapable of representing themselves).  
 
Making it more difficult for environmental conservationists and organisations to uphold the 
EPBC Act provisions is arguably a disproportionate means of achieving the ends of 
addressing allegedly vexatious litigation. Moreover, it can be argued that it unreasonably 
limits the human right to a healthy environment, as it limits the ability of environmental 
protection advocates to enforce environmental protection provisions through litigation. A 
more proportionate response would directly target the specific problem (vexatious litigants), 
rather than targeting all potential litigants who fall within the operation of the provision.  
 
Requiring the Minister to engage in the process of justifying this limitation on the human right 
to a healthy environment may have an impact on the government’s decision making process. 
Whilst it is still open to the Minister to continue with the proposed legislation in its current 
form, it does require the Minister to engage in the process of justifying the limitation and its 
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possible impact on the right, and to consider alternative options which would have less impact. 
Meagher notes that the New Zealand experience with pre-legislative scrutiny provides support 
for a ‘prophylactic rights effect’.197 He cites the reflections of a NZ Crown Law Office 
employee who noted that the pre-legislative scrutiny procedures have the effect of 
‘eliminating a large number of proposals that if enacted, may have resulted in unjustified 
intrusions upon human rights’.198 As has been demonstrated, it is possible to characterise 
removal of the extended standing provision as both a means of facilitating and impeding the 
effective operation of the legislation.  Whilst the government argues that removal is necessary 
for the protection of the functional operation of the legislation (and therefore, the broader goal 
of protecting the environment), various environmental protection advocates argue that the 
amendments will impede the ability of public interest litigants to uphold the legislation and 
achieve its environmental protection objectives. 199  Accordingly, as it is a question of 
interpretation, it is not possible to predict the substantive outcome which may result from 
consideration of the HRTHE.   
 
However, the HRTHE recognises that adequate protection of the environment and 
enforcement of environmental protection laws are in the interests of all human beings. 
Accordingly, limiting access to justice in this regard to individuals and organisations with 
more ‘direct’ interests in matters concerning the environment could be viewed as contrary to 
the right’s recognition of the inherent interests all human beings possess in ensuring the 
maintenance of a healthy natural environment. By making it more difficult for organisations 
and individuals to bring actions in the public interest, proposals to limit standing impact on 
access to justice and therefore Australia’s fulfilment of a number of the potential obligations 
imposed by the right. Accordingly, legislative recognition of the HRTHE could help to 
increase avenues to bring legal actions in the interests of environmental protection through 
the creation of further grounds for review of government decision-making, and by 
strengthening calls for expanded standing.  
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7.7.7 Inform environmental quality standards 
As the HRTHE may create a right to a certain minimum standard of environmental quality, 
recognition of the right may facilitate and strengthen calls for more stringent environmental 
quality standards. In the water management context, it was noted earlier that there are 
numerous issues facing water quality and water pollution regulation in Australia generally, 
and in the Murray-Darling Basin in particular. Water quality standards in Australia are 
variable, and relatively weak in terms of legal enforceability. Arguably, calls for stronger and 
more comprehensive water quality standards could be strengthened by recognition of the 
right. However, the key issue with respect to water quality regulation in Australia is not 
necessarily the articulation of standards, but rather the inadequate approach to management. 
As argued in Chapters Two and Six, in order to address the problem adequately, and with the 
seriousness it deserves, it would be beneficial for the Commonwealth to take a greater role in 
terms of both standard setting and enforcement. It was noted that there are various means 
available to the Commonwealth to increase its role in diffuse source water pollution regulation 
in particular. For instance, the establishment of a federal Environment Protection Authority 
(EPA) with the power to set national water quality standards/pollution regulations, and the 
enactment of federal water quality legislation stipulating mandatory water quality standards 
and pollution reduction targets, to be implemented and enforced by State EPA’s (discussed in 
Chapter Six). The proposed form of legislative recognition would not assist in facilitating 
these reforms in a legal sense, as it would not impact on the extent of the Commonwealth’s 
legislative power.200 However, it might help to support calls for reform on the grounds that 
these reforms may be necessary to help Australia realise the right in this context. Increased 
Commonwealth involvement could be justified on the basis that the Commonwealth 
Government is the government tasked with the responsibility of meeting Australia’s 
international human rights obligations. 
 
It was also noted that there are significant issues with the monitoring and reporting of water 
quality in Australia. Again, legislative recognition of the right would not directly assist in 
addressing these issues. However, it may focus attention on the need to adequately monitor 
the health of Australia’s water resources in order to ensure compliance with Australia’s 
                                                          
200 As noted in Chapter Six, if a constitutionally recognised HRTHE was accompanied by an expansion in 
Commonwealth legislative power over the topic matter of the ‘environment’, it may assist in providing the 
legislative authority for such reforms.  
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international human rights obligations under the ICESCR. Especially if the content of the 
right under the Covenant was interpreted as incorporating procedural rights, such as the right 
to access information about environmental health. Accordingly, whilst legislative recognition 
of the right would not operate in the same manner as a constitutional right in regards to this 
particular benefit (informing environmental quality standards), it would still be capable of 






7.8 Limitations of a legislative right as a tool for environmental protection 
in Australia  
In light of the above analysis, it appears that the proposed form of recognition of the right 
may offer two main benefits for improving environmental protection in Australia. Firstly, it 
may result in increased consideration and prioritisation of environmental protection concerns 
in the course of legislative, executive and judicial decision making. Secondly, it may provide 
further avenues to challenge decision making where decision makers have failed to adequately 
take the right into consideration. Whilst there are certainly a number of ascertainable potential 
benefits associated with legislative recognition of the HRTHE, there may however be some 
limitations regarding the utility of the right as a tool for environmental protection.  
 
7.8.1 Limitations associated with the form of recognition 
There are various limitations inherent within the proposed form of legal recognition. Unlike 
a constitutional right to a healthy environment, a legislative right contained within a charter 
based on the dialogue model is comparatively restricted in its ability to achieve the types of 
benefits which have been found to be associated with the recognition of the HRTHE in other 
jurisdictions (as discussed in Chapter Five). Under the proposed model, all three arms of 
government are necessarily restricted in their ability to consider and realise the right. As the 
legislature is only obliged to consider the compatibility of proposed legislation with the right, 
the Parliament retains the power to override identified incompatibility in order to allow 
incompatible proposed legislation to become law. The judiciary is similarly restricted. Where 
the court identifies that it is not possible to adopt an interpretation in consistency with the 
right, it may issue a declaration of inconsistent interpretation. However, such declarations do 
not impact on the validity of the law, and whilst the government must provide a response, 
they have no duty to amend the law to render it consistent with the right.  
 
Arguably, these limitations represent a necessary compromise in a legal system of Australia’s 
nature. Granting the judiciary greater interpretive scope, or providing the court with the ability 
to invalidate legislation on the grounds of incompatibility would represent a significant 
departure from the status quo. Similarly, limiting parliamentary sovereignty in order to 
provide better protection of the right during the legislative process would be highly 
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controversial. Whilst respecting this compromise may be the only way to achieve legal 
recognition of the right, it may do so at the expense of limiting its effectiveness.  
 
As a result of the limitations described, it is possible that legal recognition of the HRTHE may 
be relatively redundant, exerting very little practical impact on existing regimes for 
environmental protection. For example, it could be argued that given the integration of the 
principles of ecologically sustainable development in existing environmental protection laws, 
policies and procedures, consideration of the HRTHE in legislative, executive and judicial 
decision making may have minimal impact.  Godden and Peel explain that ‘ESD principles 
might be seen as promoting practices of decision making that are holistic in focus, consider 
long-term effects as well as more immediate impacts, take adequate account of scientific 
uncertainty, seek cost-effective solutions and incorporate community perspectives’. 201 
Arguably, this impact on decision making is very similar to the likely impact associated with 
consideration of the HRTHE.  
 
However, it is possible that the HRTHE may support and further the reach of ESD 
considerations in government decision-making. Two important factors limiting the 
achievement of ESD in Australia are the fact that environmental protection and management 
legislation does not always mandate consideration of ESD in decision making, and even where 
it is mandated it ‘goes into the mix of factors considered in the decision-making process’.202 
In contrast, the proposed form of legislative recognition would require consideration of the 
HRTHE in all relevant government decision-making impacting on the right, and as it is a 
human right consideration it may be given greater weight as a factor.  
 
7.8.2 Limitations associated with the nature and content of the right 
Due to the nature and content of the right, recognition of the right would provide little 
guidance regarding how the right can be effectively realised. The right raises but does not 
answer numerous crucial and contentious questions. For example, the right may impose an 
obligation on the government to sustainably manage environmental resources, but does not 
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provide guidance on how this can be achieved. Similar problems face the operationalisation 
of the principles of ESD, which have been criticised as not providing decision-makers with 
‘any real guidance…as to whether and how to apply the core principles or what weight to give 
them’.203 This issue is particularly relevant in the water management context, as there is 
significant debate regarding the most effective means of protecting Australia’s water 
resources. A particularly divisive issue in this regard concerns the appropriate role of the 
Commonwealth government in water policy, planning and management.  
 
As discussed, the increasing role of the Commonwealth facilitated by the EPBC Act and the 
Water Act in the water resources context has been challenged in various ways. For example, 
there have been attempts to amend the water trigger under the EPBC Act, and to place a cap 
on water purchases in the MDB under the Water Act. Recognising the HRTHE under a federal 
bill of rights would not necessarily prevent either of these reforms from passing. Although it 
would require consideration of the consistency of the amendments with the right, it is not 
certain that a reduction in Commonwealth oversight of coal seam gas mining water impacts 
or the imposition of a limit on Commonwealth involvement in the water market would 
necessarily constitute any sort of infringement of the right. Apart from the fact that it is the 
Commonwealth government which has the duty to fulfil the obligations imposed by the right, 
there is no inherent presumption within the content of the right that Commonwealth regulation 
and involvement is preferable. Accordingly, the right may not be of great assistance in 
resolving this crucial debate.  
 
Similarly, the right is not capable of resolving debates regarding the efficacy and desirability 
of market based mechanisms for water resources management. Arguably, these mechanisms 
offer one of the most effective means of improving environmental protection in the water 
resources context, especially in relation to the over-allocation of water resources, and conflicts 
and tensions over water rights. However, as discussed earlier, the right does not dictate any 
particular ‘means’ for achieving its realisation. Accordingly, the right would be of limited 
assistance in resolving disputes over the appropriateness of market based mechanisms vs. 
more traditional environmental regulation and protection approaches.  
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Despite this, as demonstrated by the water case study, it is still possible that recognition could 
assist in addressing some aspects of the key challenges facing environmental protection. For 
example, by increasing avenues for environmental protection advocates to bring legal actions, 
it could contribute to better enforcement of water pollution laws. By requiring proposed 
legislation to be scrutinised for consistency with the HRTHE, it may encourage a different 
balancing of environmental protection interests against competing property interests in water. 
Through requiring government decision-makers to consider the right in their decision making 
processes, it may impact on how water rights are allocated and how water resources are 
managed generally. However, ultimately the precise impact of the right in this context cannot 
be ascertained until the content of the right is known.  
 
It is possible that the right’s lack of guidance in regards to the most effective means of 
realisation could be viewed as a necessary and beneficial limitation. Rather than dictating how 
the right should be realised, it allows for the development of different approaches, and respects 
the government’s need to balance environmental governance in accordance with both the 
popular will and human rights standards.  
 
7.8.3 Limitations associated with the social and political context 
Another important area of limitation relates to the fact that many of the key challenges facing 
the full realisation of the HRTHE and environmental protection cannot be resolved through 
legal recognition of the right. These issues include political disagreements over environmental 
policy, competing economic, social and cultural interests, sourcing funding for monitoring 
and enforcement, differing social attitudes and values, technical challenges, and scientific 
uncertainties. Solutions to these varied and significant issues are generally beyond the scope 
of a limited legal tool. In many instances, what is required in order to improve environmental 
protection is systemic or cultural change. Whilst recognition of the right could provide an 
impetus for such change, it cannot of itself address many of the key problems impeding the 
achievement of sustainable environmental management. There are inherent constraints 
limiting the effectiveness of environmental protection approaches created by the existing 
social, political and legal context. As noted by Godden and Peel, ‘[s]ustainability problems 
have systemic causes ‘located deep in patterns of production and consumption, settlement and 
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governance’’.204 Rodriguez-Rivera notes that critics have questioned the utility of the human 
right to a healthy environment on the grounds that it ‘may not address the complex and 
technical issues’ involved in environmental protection, and that it ‘merely addresses the social 
symptoms and does not solve the structural causes of environmental degradation…’205 
 
Weston and Bollier argue that the operation of the right is limited by this context as ‘our 
formal/official national and international legal orders are structurally organized to contribute 
to – and not prevent – the deterioration of the natural world’. 206  They contend that as 
environmental governance must operate within the broader context of the capitalist system, 
‘the mainstream economic and political paradigm will not take the right to environment 
seriously, and it will remain an idiosyncratic influence at best.’207 This critique is shared by 
the earth jurisprudence/wild law theories discussed earlier in Chapter Three. Some 
commentators within these schools of thought are sceptical of the ability of human rights to 
address environmental protection issues, given the structural causes of environmental 
degradation.208 Whilst certainly more ‘radical’ rights alternatives (such as the rights of nature) 
provide a greater challenge to the current system, as discussed earlier, that is precisely why 
they are unlikely to be politically feasible in the Australian legal/political environment.  
 
Arguably, full realisation of the HRTHE would require significant structural reforms. Full 
realisation could represent a challenge to existing environmental regulation regimes which 
merely seek to minimise (rather than eradicate) environmental harm. As noted by Bates, ‘the 
prevailing assumption is that development and growth should be allowed to proceed unless 
there are clearly proven reasons for limiting it’.209 Systems which aim to achieve a balance 
between environmental protection and the protection of private property and economic 
interests can ‘fail to acknowledge the potentially inherent bias in institutional decision-making 
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towards economic and social values’.210  In some instances, it may be the case that proper 
realisation of the right would involve a removal or reduction in property rights, which may 
result in negative economic impacts. Allowing the right to operate in this manner would 
constitute a significant departure from the status quo, and is unlikely to be accepted in the 
near future. For this reason, facilitating progressive realisation through the proposed form of 
legal recognition, constitutes a pragmatic ‘working within the system’ approach to gradually 
realising the right within the existing political and legal context.  
 
7.8.4 Redundant or dangerous 
As demonstrated above, a legislative right is limited in its ability to deliver the environmental 
protection benefits which have been associated with constitutional recognition in other 
jurisdictions. In most instances, recognition of the right will simply serve to strengthen 
arguments to improve environmental protection, whilst leaving the ultimate decision as to 
whether and how this is achieved to the government. For this reason, it can only be stated that 
the right may operate to address aspects of some of Australia’s key environmental protection 
challenges. This does not however render the right ‘redundant’ as a legal tool for improving 
environmental protection, due to the various potential benefits outlined above.   
 
However, as discussed in the previous chapter, it is possible that the right could be viewed as 
operating in a ‘dangerous’ manner, as it could react with existing systems in unpredictable 
and non-beneficial ways.  For example, significant debate exists regarding the desirability of 
altering the role of the judiciary in this context.  Whilst providing further avenues to challenge 
government decision making can be beneficial as a means of providing an additional check 
on the exercise of government power, it can also involve the judiciary in questions which 
should perhaps not fall within the ambit of judicial consideration. It may be argued that it is 
more appropriate for the legislature to consider the best avenues for realisation of the right, 
and that involving the judiciary in questions of this nature would be problematic both in terms 
of consistency with the nature of the judicial role in the Australian legal system, and in terms 
of enabling the government to pursue effective policies to achieve realisation of the right 
without interference from the judiciary. Once the right is recognised, it will not be possible to 
completely predict the ways in which it will interact with existing systems, and how it will be 
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interpreted and applied. As can be seen with the experience of the recognition of civil and 
political rights at the state/territory level in Australia, novel interpretations and arguments can 
develop, leading to unexpected results. 
 
Arguably however, these concerns are more applicable in the context of a constitutionally 
recognised HRTHE. A legislative right would not involve the judiciary in the types of 
controversial questions which might arise as a result of constitutional recognition. As noted 
in the previous chapter, courts have taken a very active role in regards to implementation of 
the right in various countries where the right has received constitutional recognition. Such an 
active role for the court is not possible in relation to the proposed legislative right. The 
judiciary would not be permitted to invalidate legislation which was found to be inconsistent 
with the right, and would be unable to fashion the types of novel legal remedies which have 
been utilised in other jurisdictions where the right has received constitutional recognition. It 
certainly could not dictate to the legislature or the executive how the right to a healthy 
environment should be realised.  
 
In this respect, the ‘dangers’ associated with constitutional recognition are largely mitigated 
by the limitations on the three arms of government which are inherent within the form of 
legislative recognition proposed, as legislative and executive action cannot be invalidated by 
the judiciary on the basis of inconsistency with the right. Those potential ‘dangers’ that do 
remain arguably do not constitute adequate grounds upon which to reject legislative 
recognition of the right. Namely, the risk of unintended and undesirable consequences 
resulting from the dialogue process. Unlike with the operation of a constitutional right, most 
undesirable or unintended consequences could be remedied relatively easily. A statutory bill 
of rights can be amended through ordinary legislative amendment processes, and the 
parliament would retain the ability to expressly override the right where it was deemed 
necessary.  
 
7.8.5 Likelihood of legislative recognition 
At present, it is unlikely that the right would receive legislative recognition under statutory 
bills of rights at either level of government. As noted earlier, the National Human Rights 
Consultation Committee recommendation for the introduction of a federal statutory bill of 
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rights based on the dialogue model was not implemented by the Australian Government. Most 
of the state/territory jurisdictions are similarly yet to adopt bills of rights legislation. Of those 
that have already adopted rights charters, they have not recognised ESC rights, and do not 
look set to do so in the near future. Accordingly, not only is it unlikely that the recommended 
forms of legislative recognition will be adopted in the current political climate, even if they 
were it is unlikely that ESC rights would be included. In the absence of express recognition 
of the right, the only option for recognition would be recognition as an implied right. 
However, if ESC rights were not recognised, there would be no express rights from which the 
implied right to a healthy environment could be derived.  
 
Despite the slim likelihood of legislative recognition at present, legislative recognition is more 
likely than constitutional recognition. Two Australian jurisdictions have already adopted 
legislative rights charters based on the dialogue model, and the prospect of a Commonwealth 
statutory rights charter has been seriously debated for decades. It is accordingly more likely 
that if bills of rights were adopted they would be legislative rather than constitutional in form.  
286 
 
7.9 Conclusion  
Is it possible to provide legislative recognition of the human right to a healthy environment 
in Australia? If so, what is the most preferable form of legislative recognition? Can the 
potential benefits for environmental protection identified for domestic legal recognition be 
realised through the preferable form of legislative recognition? How could these benefits be 
realised in the Australian water management context? What are the potential limitations? 
 
The aim of this chapter was to explore the possible options for legislative recognition of the 
human right to a healthy environment in Australia. It has been demonstrated that both levels 
of government are likely to possess the requisite legislative power to pass legislation 
recognising the right. Although various legislative recognition options were considered, it 
was argued that Commonwealth and state/territory recognition of statutory bills of rights 
recognising an express independent HRTHE based on the dialogue model would be the most 
preferable legislative recognition option. This was justified on the basis that express 
recognition overcomes the various challenges posed by implied recognition, and recognition 
of the HRTHE within the context of a bill of rights enables the right to be interpreted in the 
context of other ESC rights.  
 
It was argued that the proposed legislative option could increase government accountability, 
encourage rights awareness in executive decision-making, facilitate proactive action on 
legislation which has the potential to breach the obligations imposed by the right, and create 
more avenues for review of government decision-making. Accordingly, it was concluded 
that a number of the potential benefits of legal recognition for environmental protection 
outlined in Chapter Five are capable of being realised through the proposed form of 
legislative recognition.  Utilising the thesis’ case study of water management, it was 
demonstrated how recognition could potentially lead to greater consideration and possibly 
prioritisation of environmental protection in government decision-making and impact on the 
development of proposed legislation.  
 
Possible criticisms of recognition were addressed, including claims that the right may prove 
to be redundant or dangerous in its operation. It was concluded that whilst there is some 
merit to these arguments, acknowledgment of the issues canvassed does not constitute a 
definitive argument against legal recognition. Rather, it provides a pragmatic caution as to 
the limited utility of the right as a tool for environmental protection. A vast range of 
complicated factors contribute to Australia’s environmental protection issues, which are 
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beyond the scope of redress by a limited legal tool. Many of the key challenges facing the 
protection of Australia’s natural environment stem from a systemic acceptance of 
environmental harm. Recognition of the human right to a healthy environment can not, and 
can not be expected to, address the fact that Australia’s environmental protection regimes 
operate on the presumption that a certain (and sometimes significant) degree of 
environmental harm is legally tolerated. For instance, pollution of land and water resources 
by mining and agricultural industries is generally regulated, rather than completely 
prohibited. Accordingly, if the right is recognised it will have to operate within this broader 
context, and will therefore be limited in its ability to achieve significant reform.  
 
However, the right should not be viewed as a ‘redundant’ tool for environmental protection 
as a result. As demonstrated earlier in the chapter, there are various impacts of recognition 
which may provide environmental benefits. Principally, recognition could lead to greater 
consideration and possibly prioritisation of environmental protection in government decision 
making and impact on the development of proposed legislation. The risk of unintended or 
‘dangerous’ consequences flowing from such recognition does not constitute a strong 
argument against recognition. There are risks inherent with any legislative change, and 
experience in other jurisdictions and with the state/territory human rights legislation 
demonstrates that for the most part these concerns are not significant issues in practice. 
Therefore, this thesis advocates for consideration of the adoption of a statutorily recognised 
















Could international and domestic legal recognition of the human right to a healthy 
environment offer any potential benefits for environmental protection in Australia?  
 
8.1 Introduction  
The aim of this thesis was to evaluate whether legal recognition of the human right to a 
healthy environment at the international level and in Australia’s domestic laws may offer 
benefits for environmental protection in Australia. In order to respond to this question, the 
thesis was structured into six substantive chapters, each designed to address a specific set of 
research sub-questions.  
 
This chapter presents the conclusions reached in response to these questions, and provides a 
response to the overarching research question. It explains that it was ultimately concluded 
that Australian legal recognition of the human right to a healthy environment may be a 
useful, although limited, tool for environmental protection. It emphasises that the general 
utility of the right should not be overstated, given the limited scope of the thesis, the 
significant and broad ranging nature of the challenges facing environmental protection, and 
the limited operation of the right. 
 
The significance of the research as an original and useful contribution to the relevant bodies 
of literature is then discussed. It is explained that the research contributes to three significant 
gaps in the scholarship. The limitations of the research are highlighted, and areas for further 
research are identified. It is acknowledged that as the research is necessarily limited in scope, 
there is significant scope for further research considering the potential application of the 
right in other environmental protection contexts and under alternative legal recognition 
models. The subjective nature of some aspects of the legal analysis are also identified, 
leading to a call for further scholarly discussion and critical engagement with the issues 
raised. Finally, potential avenues for future research adopting a different analytical scope, 





This section outlines the conclusions reached in response to each set of research sub-
questions. 
8.2.1 Research sub-questions 
The research sub-questions explored in Chapters 2-7 were outlined in Chapter One, as 
follows:  
1. What are the current approaches to environmental protection in Australia? Have 
these approaches been successful in achieving ecologically sustainable 
development? What are some of the key environmental protection challenges facing 
Australia? What approaches to environmental protection have been adopted in the 
Murray-Darling Basin water management context, and how effective have they 
been?   
2. What is the environmental rights revolution, and why has it emerged? What are the 
types of environmental rights which have been recognised? Has Australia embraced 
the concept of environmental rights? If not, what are the possible factors explaining 
Australia’s reluctance? 
3. Can the human right to a healthy environment be established as a moral right? What 
is the legal status of the right under international law? What is the scope and content 
of the right, and what obligations does it impose on states? How can compliance with 
the obligations imposed by the right be assessed at the international level? 
4. What are some potential benefits for environmental protection in Australia 
associated with international legal recognition of the human right to a healthy 
environment? How could the human right to a healthy environment be recognised 
under Australia’s domestic laws? What potential benefits for environmental 
protection may be associated with domestic legal recognition of the right? What are 
the possible limitations of both forms of recognition?  
5. Is it possible to recognise the human right to a healthy environment under the 
Australian Constitution? If so, what is the most preferable form of recognition? Can 
the potential benefits for environmental protection identified for domestic legal 
recognition be realised through the preferable form of constitutional recognition? 
How could these benefits be realised in the Australian water management context? 
What are the potential limitations? 
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6. Is it possible to provide legislative recognition of the human right to a healthy 
environment in Australia? If so, what is the most preferable form of legislative 
recognition? Can the potential benefits for environmental protection identified for 
domestic legal recognition be realised through the preferable form of legislative 
recognition? How could these benefits be realised in the Australian water 
management context? What are the potential limitations? 
 
8.2.2 Conclusions in response to the research sub-questions 
Chapter Two set the context for the thesis, by explaining the nature of current approaches 
to environmental protection in Australia. As the thesis seeks to evaluate the utility of 
adopting a rights-based approach as an additional tool for environmental protection, it was 
important to explain the nature of current approaches, and to assess their effectiveness in 
addressing the challenges facing environmental protection. Through this process, it was 
identified that despite the existence of a complex system of environmental regulation, there 
are a number of challenges facing the achievement of ecologically sustainable development 
and adequate environmental protection in Australia. The chapter then outlined the current 
approaches to environmental protection in the water management context in the Murray-
Darling Basin. As water management was utilised as a case study throughout the thesis, it 
was necessary to explain the nature of the current system and to identify the current 
challenges facing environmental protection in this context. The chapter concluded that in 
light of continuing environmental protection challenges, consideration of additional possible 
approaches to environmental protection (such as rights-based approaches) is warranted. 
 
Chapter Three aimed to explain why Australia has thus far failed to embrace rights-based 
approaches to environmental protection. In order to understand Australia’s exceptionalism, 
it first sought to identify the factors contributing to the emergence of the rights revolution at 
the global level. It was suggested that this trend can be attributed to various possible factors, 
including a growing concern that traditional approaches to environmental protection are 
incapable of adequately protecting the natural environment, and the popularity of the ‘rights’ 
discourse as a means of protecting fundamental interests. It was explained that there are 
various types of environmental rights available for adoption in Australia, ranging from 
environmental human rights to more ecocentric rights concepts. It was concluded that given 
Australia’s reluctance to comprehensively recognise human rights, it is unlikely that 
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Australian legislatures would engage with rights of a more controversial nature, such as the 
rights of nature. A number of possible factors explaining Australia’s refusal to join the 
environmental rights revolution were discussed. It was suggested that there may be a 
perception that broad environmental rights declarations do not sit easily with Australia’s 
existing legal and political systems, which tend towards a preference for incremental rights 
recognition. It was further noted that Australia’s approach to environmental protection is not 
characterised by a willingness to make broad sweeping guarantees of environmental 
protection. Moreover, it was hypothesised that there may be a perception that environmental 
rights recognition is unnecessary, as Australia already has a complex system of 
environmental regulation in place across three levels of government (as outlined in Chapter 
Two). However, it was argued that consideration of rights-based approaches is warranted, 
in light of the fact that Australia is yet to achieve the goal of ecologically sustainable 
development, and continues to face various environmental protection challenges.  
 
Having concluded that nature rights-based approaches would be highly unlikely to be 
recognised in Australia, the chapter advocated for consideration of the application of a 
human rights-based approach in the Australian environmental protection context. A human 
rights-based approach has the benefit of being more accepted within the existing legal and 
political framework, and enables environmental protection to utilise the institutions and 
concepts associated with the human rights enterprise. It was argued that the anthropocentric 
nature of this approach can be viewed as a strength, as it characterises environmental 
protection as a human interest. Accordingly, legal recognition of the human right to a healthy 
environment was identified as a potentially useful approach for consideration in the 
Australian context.  
 
Chapter Four considered the existence of the human right to a healthy environment as a 
moral right, and as a legal right under international law. Acknowledging the contentious 
debates over the identification and definition of emerging human rights, it was concluded 
that a persuasive argument can be mounted for the existence of a moral right to a healthy 
environment. This was justified on the basis of an interest based theory of rights, arguing 
that all human beings have an interest in maintaining a natural environment, and this interest 
is sufficiently important to warrant protection by a right. The chapter then considered the 
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status of the right at international law. It was concluded that whilst arguments can be made 
to support the existence of the right under customary international law, this basis for the right 
is too contentious at present. Accordingly, it was argued that the right can be interpreted as 
an implied right under one of the two major international human rights treaties comprising 
the international bill of rights, namely, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights. Although it was recognised that the right has not yet received recognition 
by the United Nations under the Covenant, or any other binding global agreement, it was 
argued that the right may be recognised as either an implied or express right in the future. 
Accordingly, the chapter sought to identify the potential content of the right as an ICESCR 
right. As no authoritative guidance has been provided by the relevant UN Committee (the 
UNCESCR), the chapter devised a methodology for identification of the potential content 
of the right. This involved consideration of the Committee’s approach to identification of 
the content of the implied human right to water, which has been recognised as an implied 
right under the Covenant, derived from the same express rights as the possible implied 
human right to a healthy environment (the human rights to health and an adequate standard 
of living). By applying this approach to the identification of the HRTHE’s possible content, 
a number of potential obligations imposed by the right were identified.  
 
These included obligations to recognise the right at the domestic level, to provide a legal and 
policy framework for sustainable environmental management, to ensure adequate standards 
of environmental quality, and to ensure adequate access to environmental resources and 
information about environmental health and management. It was acknowledged that whilst 
these potential obligations have not been articulated by an authoritative body, they can be 
utilised to guide the thesis’ analysis of the right’s possible operation. The chapter concluded 
by considering how compliance with these obligations could be assessed through the use of 
human rights indicators. It was argued that although the development of human rights 
indicators to measure progress towards realisation of the right are necessary, it is not yet 
possible to devise a set of progress indicators for the right as the right’s content has not been 
authoritatively outlined.  
 
Chapter Five considered the potential benefits for environmental protection in Australia 
associated with international and domestic legal recognition of the right. Three potential 
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benefits of international legal recognition were identified and discussed. Namely, increased 
scrutiny of Australia’s environmental protection performance, the ability to benefit from 
international experience with implementation of the right, and comparison against 
international standards. In particular, it highlighted the possibility that if Australia chose to 
ratify and sign the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR in the future, Australian citizens would 
be empowered to submit communications to the UNCESCR alleging violations of the 
HRTHE. It was argued that although the Committee’s views are not binding, they can be 
highly persuasive and lead to changes in state behaviour. This increased international 
scrutiny could be viewed as beneficial for Australian environmental protection, as it could 
lead to the enactment of necessary reforms. However, the chapter concluded by noting three 
limitations on the right’s impact on environmental protection in this regard. Specifically, the 
possibility that the obligations imposed by the HRTHE may be largely duplicative of 
Australia’s existing international environmental law obligations, the fact that a number of 
the benefits are already being achieved via other mechanisms, and the inconsistent record of 
the Australian Government in regards to fulfilment of human rights obligations which have 
not been recognised under domestic legislation.  
 
Despite these limitations it was argued that there are discernible distinct benefits for 
environmental protection associated with international legal recognition of the right. The 
chapter then considered the possible options for domestic legal recognition and expression 
of the right, concluding that the most appropriate expression is recognition of a ‘human right 
to a healthy environment’. It then considered the potential benefits for environmental 
protection associated with domestic legal recognition of the right. In order to scope the 
analysis, it identified a set of potential benefits which have been realised in other 
jurisdictions where the right has received recognition. These include, increased emphasis on 
the fundamental importance of the interrelationship between human health and wellbeing 
and the natural environment, a stronger basis for environmental laws and policies, increased 
prioritisation of environmental protection considerations in government decision-making, 
the creation of safeguards against environmental protection rollbacks, the creation of a safety 
net by filling gaps in environmental legislation, increased avenues to bring legal actions in 
the interests of environmental protection, and impacts on environmental quality standards. 
It was argued that realisation of these benefits in the Australian context would satisfy the 
definition of benefits for environmental protection outlined in Chapter One, as they would 
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potentially assist in the achievement of ESD and help to address some of Australia’s 
environmental protection challenges. Accordingly, it was concluded that consideration of 
the potential realisation of these benefits under different forms of constitutional and 
legislative recognition was warranted. 
 
Chapter Six considered the options for constitutional recognition of the right at the 
Commonwealth and state/territory levels. It was explained that the Commonwealth 
Constitution does not expressly or impliedly recognise the HRTHE. Accordingly, the 
options for express constitutional recognition under the Commonwealth Constitution were 
considered, including recognition of the right within a broader constitutional bill of rights, 
recognition in the Preamble of the Constitution, and recognition within an existing chapter. 
Recognition in state constitutions and territory self-governing legislation was also 
considered. It was concluded that whilst there may be benefits associated with each potential 
form of recognition at the Commonwealth level, the most comprehensive and preferable 
form of Commonwealth constitutional recognition is recognition of the right as an 
independent right within the context of a broader constitutional bill of rights.  
 
The possible realisation of the identified set of potential benefits under this form of 
constitutional recognition was then considered. Utilising the thesis’ case study, it was 
demonstrated that all of the identified benefits could possibly be realised to some extent. 
However, despite these benefits, two key criticisms of the right as a tool for environmental 
protection were considered. Namely, that the right may prove to be either redundant or 
dangerous in its operation. It was argued that it would be unlikely that the right would be 
redundant in its operation, given the experience with other constitutionally recognised rights, 
and the powers that the judiciary would possess with respect to addressing violations of the 
right. As for the contention that the right may prove to be ‘dangerous’ for democracy due to 
the role of the judiciary in its interpretation and application, it was argued that given the 
conservative judicial approach to rights interpretation at present, it is unlikely that the courts 
would adopt an expansive interpretation of the HRTHE. However, it was acknowledged that 
the right would grant the judiciary significant power, which would constitute a significant 
departure from the status quo. The prospect of activist judges utilising the right as a means 
to achieve policy objectives was considered. However, it was argued that there are various 
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constraints on judicial activism which would likely operate to prevent such activism. Despite 
this, it was concluded that constitutional recognition of the right is unlikely in the Australian 
context. This was attributed to three main factors. Namely, the history of limited 
constitutional amendment, a traditional reluctance to recognise express constitutional rights, 
and the controversial nature of the right. Accordingly, the subsequent chapter was devoted 
to consideration of legislative recognition options.  
 
Chapter Seven considered the possibilities for legislative recognition of the right. Firstly, 
the chapter considered whether the Commonwealth has the requisite legislative power to 
recognise the right. It was concluded that it is likely that the Commonwealth could 
successfully establish legislative power utilising the external affairs power. Three main 
options for Commonwealth legislative recognition were then discussed. Specifically, 
recognition of the right as an independent right within a statutory bill of rights, recognition 
as a derivative right under a statutory bill of rights, and recognition as an independent right 
under specific HRTHE legislation. Through this process, it was concluded that recognition 
of the right as an independent right within a statutory bill of rights based on the dialogue 
model is the most preferable form of recognition. This was justified on the basis that it would 
enable the right to be recognised within the context of other ESC rights, and would bypass 
the challenges associated with implied recognition. The options for state/territory legislative 
recognition were also considered. It was explained that the state and territory parliaments 
possess the legislative power to recognise the right, although the legislative power of the 
territories is subject to greater constraints. The same three options considered for 
Commonwealth legislative recognition were then considered for the states/territories, 
reaching the same conclusion that recognition of an independent HRTHE within the context 
of bills of rights legislation is the most preferable form of recognition.  
 
Having identified the most preferable form of recognition, the chapter then turned to an 
evaluation of its ability to realise the potential benefits for environmental protection 
identified in Chapter Five. It was concluded that the proposed form of recognition is capable 
of realising a number of the identified benefits. However, despite this it was argued that the 
right is a limited tool for environmental protection. It was explained that some of these 
limitations relate to the nature of the proposed form of recognition, which by its nature is 
more limited than a constitutionally recognised HRTHE. Other limitations relate to the 
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broader socio-economic and political/legal context in which the right must operate. It was 
acknowledged that mandatory consideration of the right may have minimal impact on 
government decision-making given that in many instances the principles of ESD must 
already be taken into account for most environmental planning and management decisions, 
and the two concepts may have few points of differentiation in practice. The limited reach 
of the right was also identified as a limiting factor, as it is clear that the right can not be 
expected to address the myriad challenges facing the achievement of environmental 
protection in Australia.  
 
However, it was emphasised that it is not necessary for the right to do so, as it is sufficient 
to warrant recognition if the right offers some possible benefits for environmental protection. 
It was further highlighted that the right appears to offer little guidance regarding the most 
effective mechanisms for its realisation. Whilst this may be an issue, it is also arguably 
beneficial for the right to allow for discretion in regards to the methods for its fulfilment. 
Finally, the possible ‘dangers’ associated with legislative recognition were addressed. It was 
acknowledged that the proposed form of recognition would result in a modified role for the 
judiciary. However, it was argued that the alleged dangers associated with the modified 
judicial role in the context of a constitutionally recognised right arguably do not apply in the 
context of a legislative right due to the limited judicial role under the dialogue model. 
Although it was recognised that the dialogue process may lead to unpredictable results, it 
was argued that such a possibility does not justify refusing recognition of the right as this is 
a risk with any form of rights recognition.  
 
8.2.3 Overall conclusion in response to the thesis research question 
In response to the overarching thesis research question, it was argued that international and 
domestic legal recognition of the HRTHE in Australia can be viewed as providing some 
potential benefits for environmental protection. It was concluded that although it is unlikely 
that the right would prove to be either redundant or dangerous in its operation, it is of limited 
utility as an additional mechanism for improving environmental protection in Australia. 
However, it was argued that the limited nature of the right should not be viewed as grounds 
for refusing recognition of the right, as it is not necessary to demonstrate that the right is the 
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‘only or best approach’ to environmental protection.1 It is sufficient to warrant recognition 
if it can be demonstrated that it is a potentially useful additional and complementary 
approach.  
 
The limitations of the right were attributed partly to the nature of the proposed form of 
recognition, and partly to the broader context in which the right must operate. As explained, 
a legislative HRTHE recognised under dialogue model bills of rights legislation requires 
consideration of the right in legislative, executive and judicial decision-making. However, 
unlike a constitutionally recognised right, a legislative HRTHE does not represent a 
significant challenge to the status quo. Under the proposed form of recognition, it would still 
be possible for the legislature to pass legislation incompatible with the right. Similarly, it 
would be possible for the executive to take the right into consideration, yet fail to make 
decisions in true consistency with the right. Whilst the judiciary would be empowered to 
interpret legislation as far as possible in consistency with the right and the purpose of the 
legislation, the extent to which this consideration would result in improved outcomes for 
environmental protection is a matter of debate. Having acknowledged these limitations it 
was argued that it is likely that the requirement to take the right into consideration by the 
three arms of government, and the possibility of scrutiny and review, could encourage a 
culture shift in government. It was noted earlier that this has occurred in other jurisdictions 
where the dialogue model has been adopted.  
 
One of the right’s greatest benefits may in fact lie in its ability to provide a ‘hook’ on which 
to hang arguments for increased environmental protection. As discussed, by couching 
environmental protection as a fundamental human interest deserving of protection by a right, 
calls for improved environmental protection can be strengthened. Duncan argues that it is 
problematic to conceptualise a healthy environment as a human right as ‘the environment 
needs to be protected not for, but from, human beings’.2 However, arguably one of the most 
effective ways to improve protection from human impacts is to characterise environmental 
                                                          
1 Rodriguez-Rivera argues that criticisms of legal recognition of the right need to recognise that the adoption 
of a ‘human rights approach to environmental protection and the elaboration of the substantive right to 
environment does not imply that it is the only or best approach for global environmental protection…’: Luis 
E Rodriguez-Rivera, ‘Is the Human Right to Environment Recognized Under International Law? It Depends 
on the Source’ (2001) 12 (1) Columbia Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy 1, 32. 
2 Myrl L Duncan, ‘The Rights of Nature: Triumph for Holism or Pyrrhic Victory?’ (1991) 31 Washburn Law 
Journal 62, 68.  
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protection as a human interest. Historically, lack of appreciation of the link between human 
health and environmental health has hindered efforts to improve environmental protection. 
Moreover, the right’s emphasis on ensuring equal access to environmental information and 
a healthy environment helps to focus attention on the need to improve environmental justice 
in Australia. The right’s intergenerational aspects may also help to strengthen focus on 
consideration of the impacts of current practices on the enjoyment of the right by future 
generations. Although it is difficult to predict the needs of future generations in this regard, 
it is important that decision-making takes these interests into account.  
 
However, it must be acknowledged that full realisation of the right could require significant 
structural changes that legal recognition of the right is not able to effect. The proposed 
legislative right is limited by this context, as it must work within a legal and political 
framework which accepts certain types of environmental harm. The extent to which the right 
is capable of impacting on this framework to achieve increased protection of the 
environment is contingent upon the form of recognition adopted, the degree of political and 
institutional support for its full realisation, and the extent and nature of opposition. Arguably, 
a constitutionally recognised HRTHE would be more capable of constituting a genuine 
challenge to the status quo than a legislative right. However, whether such a revision to the 
existing system is necessary or desirable is a matter of considerable debate.  
 
Granting the judiciary greater power to invalidate legislation and executive decision-making 
allegedly violating the right would not necessarily be a positive outcome for environmental 
protection. It may be desirable in countries with inadequate legislative and executive 
decision-making processes, however in Australia such an expanded role for the judiciary in 
the determination of environmental disputes is arguably not required. Moreover, it could 
result in inappropriate interference with the law and policy-making roles of the political arms 
of government. Accordingly, the proposed legislative form of the right can be viewed as a 
desirable compromise which allows for recognition of the right whilst avoiding the potential 





8.3 Significance of the research  
As explained in Chapter One, the thesis aims to contribute to three key gaps in the relevant 
bodies of literature. Namely, practical implementation of rights-based approaches to 
environmental protection, the application of rights-based approaches to environmental 
protection in Australia, and the application of rights-based approaches to water management 
in Australia. Rather than focusing on the theoretical justifications and legal status of the 
right, the thesis sought to evaluate the possible consequences associated with practical 
implementation of the right in the Australian context. The scholarship concerning 
environmental rights generally and the HRTHE specifically, tends to focus on these broader 
issues. In contrast, this thesis aimed to move past this debate, in order to assess how the right 
could be recognised at the international level and under domestic law, and how such 
recognition could benefit environmental protection in Australia. Through this process, the 
research contributed to two important areas in need of further research within the human 
rights and the environment literature. Specifically, elucidation of the potential content of the 
right under international law, and the need for authoritative guidance to be provided in order 
to assist in the development of human rights indicators to assess progress towards realisation 
of the right.  
 
The research also contributed to addressing the second identified gap in the literature – 
application of rights-based approaches to environmental protection in Australia. Whilst there 
has been limited academic commentary regarding the possibility of recognising some form 
of environmental rights in Australia, there has been no extended academic analysis of the 
application of rights-based approaches to environmental protection. Given the growing 
jurisprudence and literature on environmental rights globally, this is a significant omission. 
It is hoped that this thesis has contributed a useful starting point for further academic 
discussion on this issue. In particular, by putting forward a potential explanation for 
Australia’s reluctance to join the environmental rights revolution it may help to identify 
ways of crafting a rights-based approach that is appropriate and acceptable in the Australian 
context.  
 
Finally, the thesis addressed the application of rights-based approaches to water resources 
management in Australia. The literature on water law and policy in Australia focusses quite 
heavily on the implementation of the Commonwealth Government’s national water law 
reforms and the management of the Murray-Darling Basin. Although there has been some 
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academic consideration of the potential application of a rights-based approach to Australian 
water management, it has largely been restricted to discussion of the human right to water. 
Accordingly, by considering the potential interaction of legal recognition of the HRTHE 
with water management in the MDB, the thesis contributes to an under examined area within 






8.4 Limitations and areas for further research 
The research is limited in various ways. Firstly, in terms of addressing the thesis question, 
consideration of both the options for legal recognition and the potential benefits for 
environmental protection were limited in scope. The thesis adopted a specific definition of 
‘benefit’ for environmental protection, and did not comprehensively consider all potential 
legal recognition options at both the international and domestic levels. Rather than 
considering all of the potential benefits which could possibly be associated with domestic 
legal recognition of the right, the thesis was restricted to consideration of the potential 
realisation of a specific set of potential benefits which have been realised through legal 
recognition in other jurisdictions. Similarly, rather than considering all of the potential 
domestic legal recognition options in depth, the analysis focused on examination of the 
realisation of the identified potential benefits under two specific forms of domestic legal 
recognition. Furthermore, instead of considering how realisation of these benefits could be 
utilised to address all of Australia’s vast and varied environmental protection challenges, the 
thesis concentrated on a case study of the possible realisation of the benefits in one specific 
environmental protection context (water resources management, specifically in the MDB). 
Even within this case study area, the thesis scope was limited to consideration of the potential 
impacts on two issue areas; sustainable water resources management and water quality and 
pollution management.  
 
The use of the case study was not intended to provide a comprehension exploration of the 
potential impact of the right in the case study context. Rather, illustrative examples of the 
right’s potential operation in the water management context were utilised to demonstrate 
how the general potential benefits could be realised through the forms of legal recognition 
considered. Until the content of the right is known, it is not possible to comprehensively 
ascertain the precise impact of the right in specific contexts. Accordingly, there is significant 
scope for future research. This research has hopefully provided as a starting point for further 
discussion regarding other potential environmental protection benefits associated with 
recognition, the advantages/disadvantages associated with alternative legal recognition 
options, and the impacts that those options may have in different environmental protection 
contexts. For instance, once the content of the right has been ascertained, it would be useful 
to ascertain the extent to which the potential general benefits outlined may be able to be 
realised in other contexts, such as the biodiversity conservation, climate change, and forestry 
management contexts. It is possible that the right may have greater or less utility in these 
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different contexts, and for this reason the general utility of the right as a tool for 
environmental protection should not be overstated.  
 
A second important area of limitation relates to the subjective judgements made during the 
course of the research. As acknowledged, there is significant debate regarding the 
identification of environmental challenges, the efficacy and desirability of possible 
responses, and the aims of environmental protection generally. Accordingly, the identified 
benefits may not enjoy universal recognition as benefits for environmental protection in the 
Australian context. Further research will hopefully critically engage with this issue, and 
explore other ways in which the right may be of use as a tool for environmental protection. 
Similarly, various aspects of the legal analysis are open to interpretation. In particular, the 
interpretation of the HRTHE as an implied right under the Covenant, and the identification 
of the potential content and obligations imposed by the right are both open to interpretative 
debate. Further scholarly discussion addressing the source and potential content of the right 
is necessary, in order to help inform discussions about how the right may be operationalised 
in practice. 
 
A third limitation concerns the nature of the methodological approach adopted. Ideally, 
future research will build upon the discussions in this research, by engaging in qualitative 
research seeking to gauge the opinions of individuals and groups working in the 
environmental protection field who are best placed to evaluate the potential impact of the 






In an age of climate change and global decline in ecological health, it is crucial that the law 
develops innovative and effective ways of responding to key environmental protection 
challenges.  Rights-based approaches to environmental protection offer an alternative way 
of thinking about the human/environment relationship, and may be utilised as additional 
tools to help improve protection of the natural environment. Across the world, expressions 
of popular will are resulting in the legal recognition of environmental rights. Although this 
environmental rights revolution has thus far failed to take hold in Australia, it is the 
contention of this thesis that Australia should give serious consideration to the adoption of 
a rights-based approach. In particular, Australia should consider enacting federal and 
state/territory legislative bills of rights based on the dialogue model, recognising an 
independent human right to a healthy environment.  
 
It was recognised that federal recognition of a statutory bill of rights is unlikely at present, 
and that recognition of ESC rights and the HRTHE in particular may prove particularly 
contentious. However, it was argued that despite this it is important to discuss potential 
alternative approaches to environmental protection, even if they may not be considered as 
policy options in the near future. The right to a healthy environment can be viewed as a pre-
requisite right to the realisation of all other human rights, as human life cannot be sustained 
in a degraded and ecologically imbalanced environment. It is hoped that the legal status, 
scope and content of the right at the international level will be clarified by an authoritative 
body in the near future, in order to facilitate informed discussion of the obligations imposed 
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